|
|
 |
|
|
Interpretation of rules (899,-666)
You searched for:
Keywords: Interpretation of rules
Total judgments found: 35
1, 2 | next >
Judgment 4897
138th Session, 2024
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges her appraisal report for 2018.
Consideration 8
Extract:
[T]he complainant perceives a breach in the fact that those goals were imposed on her by her reporting officer although she had expressed reservations in their regard [...] It is true that the Guidelines of 20 December 2017 define performance development as “the process by which managers and staff collaboratively agree upon the contribution to be made by individual staff members to enable the EPO to fulfil its mission”. But this statement, which merely aims to explain the general principle underlying the assessment system introduced by the Guidelines, cannot be construed as having intended to lay down a rule according to which any individual goal assigned to a staff member by her or his reporting officer must mandatorily be adopted by mutual agreement.
In Section III.1 concerning “[g]oal setting”, the Guidelines provide that “[t]he translation of business area goals into individual goals [...] is discussed by the reporting officer [...] and the staff member at a meeting”. Even if the text goes on to refer – somewhat awkwardly – to the goals set following that meeting as “the agreed goals”, the Tribunal considers that these provisions must be construed as only requiring that the reporting officer consult the staff member concerned on the goals that the reporting officer intends to assign to her or him, and not that those goals must receive the staff member’s assent.
Keywords:
consultation; interpretation of rules; performance report; rating;
Consideration 12
Extract:
[T]he complainant argues that the goals assigned to her should have been updated during the year. However, aforementioned Section III.1 of the Guidelines provides in this connection that the goals set “may [...] be reviewed in the course of the year, depending on business requirements”. This is therefore merely an option [...].
Keywords:
interpretation of rules; performance report; rating;
Judgment 4836
138th Session, 2024
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges his non-selection for several positions.
Consideration 10
Extract:
External advertisement of vacant positions may only be done pursuant to Staff Regulation 5.4.1(d). Under its provision, vacant positions may be advertised externally, only when the position requires technical skills, experience or professional qualifications are unlikely to be available among current Federation staff, or when a different skill set and external experience for the post or within the existing team is needed. Outside of these circumstances, the Federation’s rules do not permit external recruitment. The Federation, who is required by the case law, stated, for example, in consideration 20 of Judgment 3601, to prove that the procedure it had put in place was duly followed, has not shown that it advertised the subject positions because the requirements in Staff Regulation 5.4.1(d) existed at the material time.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3601
Keywords:
burden of proof; external candidate; internal candidate; interpretation of rules; selection procedure; vacancy notice;
Judgment 4827
138th Session, 2024
International Atomic Energy Agency
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision not to pay him a repatriation grant upon his separation from service.
Considerations 5-6
Extract:
The Tribunal recalls that the principles of statutory interpretation are well established in the case law. The primary rule is that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning (see, for example, Judgments 4681, consideration 5, 4477, consideration 4, 4145, consideration 4, 3310, consideration 7, and 2276, consideration 4). Moreover, as the Tribunal stated in Judgment 3734, consideration 4, “[i]t is the obvious and ordinary meaning of the words in the provision that must be discerned and not just a phrase taken in isolation”.
[…] Given the plain language of the above provisions of Staff Rules 3.03.1(H)(3), 3.03.1(I), 6.01.1(B)(5) as well as Staff Rule 6.01.01 of AM.II/12 and their interrelationship, the phrase “five years of continuous service” as set forth in Staff Rule 6.01.1(B)(5) cannot be read in isolation. It must be interpreted as a period of service that satisfies the requirements contained in Staff Rule 3.03.1(I) and Staff Rule 6.01.01 of AM.II/12. Accordingly, in calculating the “five years of continuous service” for purposes of determining a staff member’s eligibility to receive a repatriation grant under Staff Rule 6.01.1(B)(5), the period of service under a Short-Term appointment shall not be counted. The Tribunal further finds that the above provisions are unambiguous and that the complainant’s reliance on the principle established in Judgments 3701, 2276 and 1755 that texts which are ambiguous are to be construed in favour of the staff member is therefore misplaced.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1755, 2276, 3310, 3701, 3734, 4145, 4477, 4681
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules; repatriation allowance;
Judgment 4818
138th Session, 2024
Green Climate Fund
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision denying her and her dependents an individual medical insurance plan following her separation from service.
Consideration 18
Extract:
According to the Tribunal’s case law, the primary rule of interpretation is that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning (see Judgments 4321, consideration 4, 3310, consideration 7, and 2276, consideration 4). Where the text is clear and unambiguous, the Tribunal will apply it without reference to the preparatory work or the supposed intent of the lawmaker. Strict textual interpretation is an essential safeguard of the stability of the position in law and so of the organisation’s efficiency (see Judgments 4506, consideration 5, 3701, consideration 4, and 691, consideration 9).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 691, 2276, 3310, 3701, 4321, 4506
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules;
Judgment 4800
137th Session, 2024
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the rejection of her requests for special leave for very serious illness of a child.
Consideration 16
Extract:
[I]f the Office were to submit requests for special leave for serious illness of a child made under the aforementioned Article 59(3)(h) to the medical adviser for an opinion and, in order that those requests might be investigated, were to require the production of a medical certificate including a diagnosis of the medical condition involved, as in the case of requests for special leave for very serious illness, this would, in fact, breach the applicable provisions of the Service Regulations.
The Tribunal must point out that, in contrast to Article 59(3)(i), which deals with leave for very serious illness of a child, Article 59(3)(h) does not, in this regard, provide that the seriousness of the illness must be attested to by a doctor. The provisions of Article 89 of the Service Regulations are therefore not applicable to requests for leave made under Article 59(3)(h). The same goes for Rule 8 of Circular No. 22, which [...] only governs special leave for very serious illness (or hospitalisation) of a child referred to in Article 59(3)(i), and there is no other rule in that circular, nor [...] in any other existing set of rules, that contains similar provisions in relation to the leave referred to in Article 59(3)(h).
[...] However, it is clear that there is no requirement, when a request of that type is made, for the seriousness of the illness relied on to be evident from the medical certificate produced or for the grant of that leave to be conditional on the medical adviser’s opinion.
Keywords:
interpretation of rules; sick leave;
Consideration 3
Extract:
It is clear from [Article 59(3) and Article 89 of the Service Regulations and Rule 8 of Circular No. 22 of 11 May 2015] that special leave requested by an employee for “very serious illness of a child” can only be granted following an opinion from the medical adviser, who must determine the seriousness of the illness in question, and that this opinion must be given in the light of a medical certificate provided by the doctor who examined the child – or, if applicable, on the basis of other documents or information provided by that doctor – containing sufficient details of the condition diagnosed to allow the medical adviser to make the necessary assessment.
[...]
[W]hile it is true that [...] Rule 8(b)(i) of Circular No. 22 does not, when listing the matters to be included in the medical certificate, expressly mention a diagnosis of the illness in question, the need for that diagnosis to be mentioned necessarily follows from the wording of that subparagraph where it specifies that the medical adviser is to inform the Office “whether in his opinion the medical conditions of Article 59(3)i) are met”, which means that the medical adviser must be in a position to verify the “very serious” nature of the illness in question.
[A]lthough it is true that the reference in Article 89(3) of the Service Regulations to the “employee’s doctor” is not appropriate in the particular case of leave requested for the illness of a child, it is clearly to be taken, in the legal context relevant to that situation, as a reference to the doctor consulted to examine the child, as is also clear from the wording used in Article 59 and in Circular No. 22.
Keywords:
interpretation of rules; sick leave;
Judgment 4796
137th Session, 2024
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to deduct from the amount of the education allowance paid in respect of his child the remuneration received by the latter during an internship.
Consideration 3
Extract:
[I]t is appropriate to recall the basic rules of statutory interpretation defined by the Tribunal’s case law. These state that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning and must be construed objectively in their context and in keeping with their purport and purpose (see, for example, Judgments 4639, consideration 3, 4506, consideration 5, 4066, consideration 7, 4031, consideration 5, and 3744, consideration 8).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3744, 4031, 4066, 4506, 4639
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules;
Considerations 3-7 & 10
Extract:
[T]his dispute essentially revolves around the interpretation of the aforementioned provisions of Article 71(9) of the Service Regulations [of the EPO].
[...]
[T]he Tribunal considers it apparent from the provision in question – even though the wording could undoubtedly be better – that the two particular kinds of allowance mentioned are not exhaustive and that allowances other than scholarships and grants, which are only referred to because they are the most common forms of educational assistance, could also give rise to such a deduction. The way in which the words “scholarships” and “grants” appear in the text, being placed in brackets and separated by a comma, rather than by a conjunction such as “or” or “and”, supports this interpretation. This is further confirmed by the fact that Article 71(9) refers to the “deduction [...] of any allowance received from other sources for the child’s education (scholarships, grants)” [...].
In addition, when called upon to rule on complaints challenging the lawfulness of Article 71 of the Service Regulations, the Tribunal stated, in Judgment 2870, consideration 12, that “[p]rovision is also made in Article 71(9) for the deduction of allowances from other sources (e.g. scholarships) payable in respect of the child’s education” [...]. While not entirely addressing the matter at hand in the present case, the wording used by the Tribunal in that sentence was already leading towards the above interpretation.
However, the Tribunal also considers that [...] internship payments made to the child of an employee during an internship carried out with an employer as part of her or his studies [...] do not constitute an allowance received for the child’s education within the meaning of Article 71(9) and cannot, therefore, be lawfully deducted from the amount of the education allowance.
The reference made in that provision to “any allowance received [...] for the child’s education” must be understood as an allowance the purpose of which is to contribute to the expenditure involved in the child’s studies, which, once again, is confirmed by the reference in the text, quoted above, to “any allowance received [...] for the child’s education” [...].
But that is not the purpose of internship payments made by employers to students or pupils carrying out an internship with them as part of their studies. Such payments are principally intended as remuneration for the services provided by the intern to the employer. Even though [...] such payments can certainly not be regarded as a salary, they are still, by their very nature, a form of remuneration made to the child, and not a contribution to the cost of her or his education.
It is true that internship payments can sometimes include a contribution from the employer towards the expenses incurred by the child or by her or his family in connection with the internship. Even on this assumption, however, that is not their essential purpose, which is still to remunerate the intern as described above, and such a contribution cannot, in any event, be regarded as a payment “for the child’s education” within the meaning of the aforementioned Article 71(9).
[...]
The aforementioned Article 71(9) does not provide, in letter or in spirit, that any allowance which derives from a source other than the Office and which could potentially be set towards those costs can be deducted from the amount of the education allowance. It only permits the deduction of those allowances the specific purpose of which is to contribute to the expenditure connected with the child’s studies, which, as already stated, is not the case with internship payments.
[...]
It follows from the[se] considerations that [...] the EPO was wrong to deduct the amount of the internship payments made to the complainant’s son from the amount of the education allowance paid to the complainant and that, in making such a deduction, the EPO breached the aforementioned provisions of Article 71 of the Service Regulations [...]
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2870
Keywords:
education expenses; interpretation; interpretation of rules;
Judgment 4795
137th Session, 2024
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges his performance evaluation report for 2018.
Consideration 5
Extract:
[T]he complainant submits that Communiqué 2/17 is unlawful because Rule 12d of the Implementing Regulations to the European Patent Convention, concerning the appointment and re-appointment of the members of the Boards of Appeal, which is one of the provisions forming the basis for the Communiqué, was itself adopted under a flawed procedure. He considers that, to the extent that Rule 12d governs the way in which the performance of the members of the Boards is evaluated, it should have been submitted for an opinion to the Committee on Patent Law which was created by a decision of the Administrative Council (CA/D 3/94) [...].
Under paragraph 5 of Decision CA/D 3/94, “[t]he Committee [on Patent Law] shall advise the Administrative Council” on various questions connected with its object [...]
[I]t is clear from the aforementioned provisions, and also from other provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6 of Decision CA/D 3/94, that consulting the Committee on matters falling within the scope of its competence is merely an option for the Administrative Council and not a mandatory formality.
Keywords:
consultation; interpretation of rules;
Consideration 4
Extract:
[T]he complainant argues, in the first place, that the procedure leading to the adoption of Communiqué 2/17 was flawed because it was not submitted to the General Consultative Committee (GCC) [for consultation].
[...]
Article 1(4) of the Service Regulations provides that the regulations are to apply to members of the Boards of Appeal “in so far as they are not prejudicial to their independence”. The appraisal of members of those Boards is one of the particular problems associated with the guarantees of independence from which those members benefit. In addition, relating more generally to measures that specifically deal with the conditions of employment of members of the Boards of Appeal, it is apparent from the file [...] that, in view of this requirement for independence, it was increasingly seen as inappropriate for such measures to be subject to consultation with the GCC, especially given that that body is chaired by the President of the Office and half of its members are appointed by him. As a consequence, it became the practice, for measures of this type, to replace consultation with the GCC by consultation with the Presidium of the Boards of Appeal, an autonomous authority provided for in Rule 12b of the Implementing Regulations to the Convention, whose role, under paragraph 3 of that rule, includes “advis[ing] the President of the Boards of Appeal on matters concerning the functioning of the Boards of Appeal Unit in general” [...]. This practice was eventually codified in 2019 by the insertion of paragraph 8 into Article 38 of the Service Regulations, which expressly provides for consultation with the Presidium in such a situation rather than with the GCC.
This is the procedure that was followed for the drafting of Communiqué 2/17. Admittedly, the new version of Article 38 was not in force at that time. However, as just explained, even before the amendment was made to the Service Regulations, a practice existed to that effect and, contrary to what the complainant maintains, was already in use at the time when the Communiqué was issued, as evidenced by examples supplied by the EPO of previous consultations on other matters. Furthermore, although it is well-established case law that a practice cannot become legally binding where it contravenes rules already in force (see, for example, Judgments 4555, consideration 11, and 4026, consideration 6), the Tribunal considers that, in view of the aforementioned wording of Article 1(4) of the Service Regulations, the practice in question cannot be regarded as contravening the applicable rules. The lack of consultation with the GCC did not, therefore, constitute an irregularity.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4026, 4555
Keywords:
consultation; independence; interpretation of rules; practice; rating;
Judgment 4749
137th Session, 2024
International Criminal Court
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the termination of his appointment with compensation in lieu of notice.
Consideration 6
Extract:
[T]he Tribunal notes that Section 2.1 of the ICC Anti-fraud Policy states that the term “fraud” means any act that knowingly attempts to mislead a party in order to obtain a financial benefit or to avoid an obligation. [...]
Insofar as the complainant admitted to having obtained the fictitious invoices and being aware that they were intended to justify the amount missing from the relevant financial account, the Tribunal is not persuaded by the complainant’s explanation that he solely intended to assist his supervisor and not to mislead the organisation. The Registrar of the Court was undoubtedly entitled to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant intended to mislead the organisation in circumstances where the ultimate aim of the falsified invoices was precisely to justify an amount missing from the [organisation's] financial account.
[...]
[I]t is clear from the file that the complainant took steps to obtain and obtained the fraudulent invoices with the aim, which he must have known to be unlawful, of justifying fictitious services. The fact that the request to do so may have originated from his supervisor, as the complainant alleges, or that he may have stated to his supervisor that the invoices were falsified in no way alters the fact that the act constituted fraud as defined in Section 2.1 [...].
Keywords:
fraud; interpretation of rules;
Judgment 4741
137th Session, 2024
European Southern Observatory
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the non-renewal of her fixed-term contract.
Considerations 11-12
Extract:
[T]he Tribunal already recalled in Judgment 1734, consideration 3, with regard to Staff Rule VI 1.02, the very provision on which this dispute turns, emphasising the following:
“VI 1.02 is quite plain. An internal appeal being ruled out, [the complainant] should have thought of filing a complaint against non-renewal. If he could not understand the article on his own, he was free to get advice.”
It follows that, under Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Tribunal, since the complainant did not file her complaint within 90 days of the Organisation’s decision not to renew or extend her fixed-term contract, it is also irreceivable from that standpoint. The Tribunal has recalled on many occasions that, “[w]ith respect to Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Tribunal’s Statute, the Tribunal’s case law requires strict adherence to the ninety-day time limit on the grounds that time limits are an objective matter of fact and that strict adherence is necessary for the efficacy of the whole system of administrative and judicial review of decisions” (see Judgments 4354, consideration 7, 3947, consideration 5, and 3559, consideration 3).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1734, 3559, 3947, 4354
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules; non-renewal of contract; ratione temporis; receivability of the complaint; time limit;
Judgment 4519
134th Session, 2022
International Telecommunication Union
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to suspend her without pay.
Consideration 6
Extract:
ITU argues in its submissions that the reference to the duration of the investigation in the aforementioned Staff Rule 10.1.3(a) should be interpreted flexibly, since the intention behind that provision is to allow the organisation to continue a staff member’s suspension until the end of any disciplinary proceedings initiated as a result of the investigation itself.
However, it is well established in the case law that where the wording of a provision is clear, the Tribunal will not engage in any constructive interpretation of this kind (see, for example, Judgments 1125, consideration 4, or 3358, consideration 5). The reference to the duration of the investigation in Staff Rule 10.1.3(a) is unambiguous. Furthermore, the Tribunal considers that, contrary to what ITU submits, there may be a rationale behind the limitation of the length of the suspension to that of the investigation that explains the content of the provision in question. Indeed, the main aim of suspending a staff member suspected of misconduct is often to prevent her or him taking any steps to destroy evidence or place witnesses under pressure. However, the issue of preserving the evidence no longer exists in the same way once the investigation is over. Lastly, while the Tribunal is aware of the difficulty that the return to duty of a staff member after her or his provisional suspension may cause in some cases, it is not the Tribunal’s role to palliate any defects in a provision, it being for the competent authorities of ITU to remedy them if need be.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1125, 3358
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules; suspension;
Judgment 4506
134th Session, 2022
World Intellectual Property Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the length of the extension of appointment that was offered to him.
Consideration 5
Extract:
The Tribunal’s case law states that, as long as the rules are neither amended nor repealed, the principle tu patere legem quam ipse fecisti requires the Organization to apply them (see Judgment 4310, consideration 9).
[A]n international organisation has a duty to comply with its own internal rules and to conduct its affairs in a way that allows its employees to rely on the fact that these will be followed (see Judgment 3758, consideration 15). As to the interpretation of that Regulation, in its relevant version, it must be recalled that according to the Tribunal’s case law the primary rule of interpretation is that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning (see Judgment 1222, consideration 4; see also Judgment 4321, consideration 4). Where the text is clear and unambiguous (as it is in the present case), the Tribunal will apply it without reference to the preparatory work or the supposed intent of the lawmaker. Strict textual interpretation is an essential safeguard of the stability of the position in law and so of the Organisation’s efficiency (see Judgment 691, consideration 9).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 691, 1222, 3758, 4310, 4321
Keywords:
interpretation of rules; patere legem;
Judgment 4480
133rd Session, 2022
International Labour Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision not to grant her a personal promotion in the 2015 exercise.
Consideration 5
Extract:
As the Tribunal has consistently held (see, for example, Judgments 4145, consideration 4, and 4701, consideration 4), the principles of interpretation of statutory texts such as the Staff Regulations are well settled. The primary rule is that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4145, 4701
Keywords:
interpretation of rules;
Judgment 4477
133rd Session, 2022
World Intellectual Property Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant claims compensation in lieu of notice of termination of appointment for reasons of health and the reimbursement of the days of annual leave he alleges that he had accrued before that termination.
Consideration 4
Extract:
In Judgment 4145, the Tribunal states as follows in respect of the principles of statutory interpretation:
“4. [...] The principles of statutory interpretation are well settled in the case law. The primary rule is that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning (see, for example, Judgments 3310, consideration 7, and 2276, consideration 4). Additionally, as the Tribunal stated in Judgment 3734, consideration 4, ‘[i]t is the obvious and ordinary meaning of the words in the provision that must be discerned and not just a phrase taken in isolation’.”
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2276, 3310, 3734, 4145
Keywords:
interpretation of rules;
Judgment 4473
133rd Session, 2022
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the decision not to recognise his son’s condition as a “serious illness” within the meaning of the provisions governing reimbursement of medical expenses.
Consideration 2
Extract:
The Tribunal notes that Article 35(2) [of Rule of Application No. 10] provides that a failure to observe the two-month time limit afforded to the Committee to issue its opinion, which allows the Director General to take a decision without having received that opinion, does not in itself render the decision on the internal complaint unlawful.
Keywords:
internal appeals body; interpretation of rules;
Judgment 4393
131st Session, 2021
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the reduction in his total net remuneration following his promotion to a higher grade arguing that it constitutes a breach of Article 49(13) of the Service Regulations.
Consideration 4
Extract:
The principles of statutory interpretation are well settled in the case law. The primary rule is that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning (see, for example, Judgments 4178, consideration 10, 3310, consideration 7, and 2276, consideration 4). Additionally, as the Tribunal stated in Judgment 3734, consideration 4, “[i]t is the obvious and ordinary meaning of the words in the provision that must be discerned and not just a phrase taken in isolation”.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2276, 3310, 3734, 4178
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules;
Judgment 4321
130th Session, 2020
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the non-renewal of her fixed-term contract.
Consideration 4
Extract:
The principles of statutory interpretation are well settled in the case law. As the Tribunal reiterated in Judgment 4178, consideration 10:
“The primary rule is that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning (see, for example, Judgments 3310, consideration 7, and 2276, consideration 4). Additionally, as the Tribunal stated in Judgment 3734, consideration 4, ‘[i]t is the obvious and ordinary meaning of the words in the provision that must be discerned and not just a phrase taken in isolation’.”
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2276, 3310, 3734
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules;
Judgment 4320
130th Session, 2020
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to reject her application for a vacant post on the grounds that, as the holder of a fixed-term contract, she was not eligible to participate in the competition process.
Consideration 8
Extract:
[W]ell-established principles of statutory interpretation [were] recently reiterated by the Tribunal in Judgment 4178, consideration 10. The Tribunal stated:
“The primary rule is that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning (see, for example, Judgments 3310, consideration 7, and 2276, consideration 4). Additionally, as the Tribunal stated in Judgment 3734, consideration 4, ‘[i]t is the obvious and ordinary meaning of the words in the provision that must be discerned and not just a phrase taken in isolation’.”
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2276, 3310, 3734, 4178
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules;
Judgment 4178
128th Session, 2019
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision not to grant him a promotion in the 2014 professional promotion exercise.
Consideration 10
Extract:
The principles of statutory interpretation are well settled in the case law. The primary rule is that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning (see, for example, Judgments 3310, consideration 7, and 2276, consideration 4). Additionally, as the Tribunal stated in Judgment 3734, consideration 4, “[i]t is the obvious and ordinary meaning of the words in the provision that must be discerned and not just a phrase taken in isolation”. The meaning of the phrase “are expected to” read in the context of the complete text of the provision simply conveys to the Regional Directors what they are to do at that point in the process. The provision instructs the Regional Directors to do two things. First, the Regional Directors are to rank the reviewed candidates in order of priority. Second, the Regional Directors are to endorse the recommendation of “no more than” 50% of the candidates reviewed at the second level. The obvious and ordinary meaning of this provision does not allow for any deviation from the specified upper limit of the allotted quota by the Regional Directors.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2276, 3310, 3734
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules;
Judgment 4145
128th Session, 2019
European Molecular Biology Laboratory
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to transfer one of his subordinates to another team.
Consideration 4
Extract:
The principles of statutory interpretation are well settled in the case law. The primary rule is that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning (see, for example, Judgments 3310, consideration 7, and 2276, consideration 4). Additionally, as the Tribunal stated in Judgment 3734, consideration 4, “[i]t is the obvious and ordinary meaning of the words in the provision that must be discerned and not just a phrase taken in isolation”.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2276, 3310, 3734
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules;
Judgment 4099
127th Session, 2019
World Health Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to abolish her position.
Consideration 10
Extract:
The complainant submits that, further to the abolition of her position, she ought to have benefited from the reassignment process provided for by Staff Rules 1050.2 et seq. But this plea, which can only concern the decision announcing the termination of her appointment and not the decision to abolish the position itself, is unfounded.
This reassignment process, the purpose of which is to propose new employment within WHO to staff members whose positions have been abolished, only applies, under the terms of Staff Rule 1050.2, to the holders of fixed-term appointments “who have completed at least five years of continuous and uninterrupted service”. However, [...] the complainant had not completed this minimum length of service at the date of notification of the decision to abolish her position.
As the Tribunal has previously observed, the terms of the [...] Rule cannot be given a broad interpretation creating eligibility for the reassignment process for employees who do not fulfil that stated condition (see Judgment 3159, consideration 9). Moreover,
although the complainant argues that, in Judgment 3582 [...] and Judgment 3688, the Tribunal rejected the application of the English version of this Rule on the grounds that it was more rigorous than the French version with regard to another point, this case law is not applicable to the present case, given that the complainant does not even fulfil the above-mentioned condition of the minimum length of service, which is common to both versions of the text.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3159, 3582, 3688
Keywords:
interpretation of rules;
1, 2 | next >
|
|
|
|
|
