GB.268/6
268th Session Geneva, March 1997 |
Case No. 1867 (Argentina): Interim report
Case No. 1885 (Belarus): Report in which the Committee requests to be kept informed of developments
Case No. 1831 (Bolivia): Definitive report
Case No. 1889 (Brazil): Definitive report
Case No. 1859 (Canada): Definitive report
Cases Nos. 1761, 1787 and 1896 (Colombia): Interim report
Case No. 1865 (Republic of Korea): Interim report
Case No. 1875 (Costa Rica): Definitive report
Case No. 1901 (Costa Rica): Definitive report
Case No. 1882 (Denmark): Definitive report
Case No. 1908 (Ethiopia): Interim report
Case No. 1854 (India): Report in which the Committee requests to be kept informed of developments
Case No. 1903 (Pakistan): Report in which the Committee requests to be kept informed of developments
Case No. 1796 (Peru): Report in which the Committee requests to be kept informed of developments
Case No. 1845 (Peru): Definitive report
Case No. 1878 (Peru): Interim report
Case No. 1906 (Peru): Interim report
Case No. 1891 (Romania): Report in which the Committee requests to be kept informed of developments
Case No. 1904 (Romania): Definitive report
Case No. 1843 (Sudan): Interim report
Case No. 1884 (Swaziland): Interim report
1. The Committee on Freedom of Association, set up by the Governing Body at its 117th Session (November 1951), met at the International Labour Office, Geneva, on 6, 7 and 14 March 1997, under the chairmanship of Professor Max Rood.
2. The members of Indian and Argentinean nationalities were not present during the examination of the cases relating to India (Case No. 1854) and Argentina (Case No. 1867) respectively.
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3. Currently, there are 73 cases before the Committee, in which complaints have been submitted to the governments concerned for observations. At its present meeting, the Committee examined 24 cases on the merits, reaching definitive conclusions in 14 cases and interim conclusions in 10 cases; the remaining cases were adjourned for reasons set out in the following paragraphs.
4. The Committee adjourned until its next meeting the examination of the following cases: Nos. 1911 (Ecuador), 1914 (Philippines), 1915 (Ecuador), 1916 (Colombia), 1917 (Comoros) and 1918 (Croatia), because it is awaiting information and observations from the Governments concerned. All these cases relate to complaints submitted since the last meeting of the Committee.
5. The Committee is still awaiting observations or information from the Governments concerned in the following cases: Nos. 1805 (Cuba), 1876 (Guatemala), 1888 (Ethiopia), 1892 (Guatemala), 1894 (Mauritania), 1895 (Venezuela), 1897 (Japan), 1898 (Guatemala), 1899 (Argentina), 1902 (Venezuela) and 1907 (Mexico).
6. In Case No. 1881 (Argentina), the Committee is still awaiting the complainant's comments. The Committee requests the complainant to send without any further delay the observations and information requested.
7. In Cases Nos. 1512, 1539, 1595, 1740, 1778, 1786 and 1823 (Guatemala), 1773 (Indonesia), 1835 (Czech Republic), 1869 (Latvia), 1887 (Argentina) and 1900 (Canada/Ontario), the Governments have sent partial information on the allegations made. The Committee requests all of these Governments to send the remaining information without delay so that it can examine these cases in full knowledge of all the facts.
8. As regards Cases Nos. 1850 (Congo), 1852 (United Kingdom), 1855 (Peru), 1877 (Morocco), 1880 (Peru), 1886 (Uruguay), 1890 (India), 1905 (Zaire), 1909 (Zimbabwe), 1910 (Zaire), 1912 (United Kingdom/Isle of Man) and 1913 (Panama), the Committee has very recently received the Governments' observations and intends to examine the substance of this case at its next meeting.
9. As regards Cases Nos. 1812 (Venezuela), 1828 (Venezuela), 1851 (Djibouti), 1863 (Guinea), 1864 (Paraguay), 1872 (Argentina) and 1873 (Barbados), the Committee observes that, despite the time which has elapsed since the presentation of these complaints or since their last examination, it has not received the Governments' observations. The Committee draws the attention of all these Governments to the fact that, in accordance with the procedural rules set out in paragraph 17 of its 127th Report, approved by the Governing Body, it may present a report on the substance of these cases, even if the observations or information requested from the governments have not been received in due time. The Committee accordingly requests the Governments to transmit their observations or information as a matter of urgency.
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10. The Committee takes note of communications from a law firm sent on behalf of the Association of Nurses and Radiographers at the County Hospital of Glostrup (Denmark) dated 28 October and 13 November 1996. These communications raise exactly the same issues as those arising out of the complaint of the Danish Nurses' Organization which were dealt with within the framework of Case No. 1882. In these conditions, the Committee decides not to examine this complaint on the merits and refers to the conclusions adopted in Case No. 1882.
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11. The Committee draws the legislative aspects of the following cases to the attention of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations: Bangladesh (No. 1862), Peru (No. 1796), Romania (Nos. 1891 and 1904), Sudan (No. 1843) and Swaziland (No. 1884).
Case No. 1723 (Argentina)
12. The Committee last examined this case at its meeting in March 1996 [see 302nd Report, para. 37]. The case concerns the dismissals which occurred between 1 January 1959 and 12 December 1983 for political and trade union reasons of unionists employed in banking institutions, as well as the non-observance of Act No. 23523 which protects bank employees dismissed for political or trade union reasons. During its last examination, the Committee expressed the hope that the parties would be able to reach an agreement as quickly as possible.
13. In its communication dated 8 October 1996, the Bank Association states that, following a tripartite meeting on 23 May 1995 where the representatives of the employers and of the unions put forward their positions, and after sanctions had been imposed on the banks which violated Act No. 23523, the Government has not convoked any new tripartite meetings nor has it undertaken any legal proceedings with the goal of requesting the full implementation of Act No. 23523 (the complainant organization adds a list of dismissed workers and the names of the banks which have not applied Act No. 23523).
14. In a communication dated 5 February 1997, the Government states that it is going to transmit the list of dismissed workers sent by the complainant organization to the banks requesting them to provide information on the status of the re-examination of the persons mentioned with a view to a further evaluation of the situation, in line with the Committee's recommendations. The Committee takes note of this information. Recalling once again the importance it attaches to the effective implementation of Act No. 23523, the Committee requests the Government to continue to make all efforts to find a negotiated solution as quickly as possible.
Case No. 1777 (Argentina)
15. When examining this case at its meeting in November 1995, the Committee requested the Government to take measures for the immediate registration of the Congress of Argentine Workers (CTA) [see 300th Report, para. 73]. In its communications dated 24 May and 16 July 1996, the Congress of Argentine Workers (CTA) and the World Confederation of Labour (WCL) reiterated the procedures followed since May 1993 for the registration of the CTA and stated that, despite the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association in this respect, the Government has not issued the corresponding administrative decision for registration. In its communication dated 14 January 1997, the Government states that the CTA has been made aware of the administrative action taken for the resolution of the matter which takes into account a legal opinion, and that this position was being studied. Moreover, the Government indicates that the CTA officers had held several meetings with the authorities of the Ministry of Labour concerning this question. While noting this information, the Committee deplores that the trade union organization in question has still not been registered despite the fact that three years have passed since the registration was requested. In these circumstances, the Committee, reiterating that this is a matter of serious violation of Convention No. 87, urges the Government once again to take the necessary measures for the immediate registration of the CTA.
Case No. 1837 (Argentina)
16. The Committee examined this case at its meeting in June 1996 [see 304th Report, paras. 40-56] and requested the Government to keep it informed of the developments in the legal proceedings brought in connection with the acts of violence that occurred during the demonstrations and strikes organized in the provinces of Tierra del Fuego, Corrientes and San Juan, especially as they relate to the death of the worker Víctor Choque, the injuries sustained by unionists Juan Roberto Vera and Alejandro Vásquez and the assault and denial of freedom of which Eloy Camus and Juan González were victim. The Committee also requested the Government to keep it informed of the legal proceedings brought by the police against the trade union leader Juan González.
17. In a communication dated 14 January 1997, the Government stated that: (i) the legal proceedings relating to the provisional detention of Juan González in the province of Corrientes are currently in the inquiry stage; (ii) in the affair of the homicide of Víctor Choque, a police officer was sentenced as the person responsible for his death to nine years in prison, but this verdict is being appealed and; (iii) it was not possible to obtain information on the subject of the legal proceedings relating to the abduction of Eloy Camus in the province of San Juan. The Committee takes note of this information and requests the Government to keep it informed of the results of these legal proceedings.
18. The Committee also requests the Government to keep it informed of the judicial inquiry under way concerning the injuries sustained by Juan Roberto Vera and Alejandro Vásquez, as well as the legal proceedings brought by the police against the trade union leader Juan González.
Case No. 1849 (Belarus)
19. At its meeting in March 1996, the Committee requested the Government to: repeal Order No. 158 of 28 March 1995 to the extent it includes organizations and enterprises not providing essential services as defined by the Committee; implement fully the decision of the Constitutional Court which declared certain articles of Decree No. 336 to be unconstitutional; take the necessary measures, without delay, to ensure the reinstatement in their jobs of all workers dismissed in connection with the strikes in Minsk and Gomyel in August 1995; immediately set up an independent commission of inquiry to clarify all the facts relating to this case and to keep it informed of the conclusions reached by the Procurator of the Republic and the commission of inquiry in this regard [see 302nd Report, para. 222].
20. In its communication of 9 September 1996, the Government indicates that the Constitutional Court considered a petition presented by the Permanent Commission on Social Policy and Labour of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Belarus on 20 June 1996 for an independent examination, with ILO experts, of the compliance of Order No. 158 with the Constitution and the laws of Belarus. According to the Government, the Constitutional Court ruled not to act on the petition and asked the Supreme Council to eliminate, by 15 September 1996, the contradiction between section 16(1) of the Act on the procedures for settling collective labour disputes which provides the list of enterprises where strikes are prohibited and section 13(2) of the same Act which stipulates the notification dates for strikes in those enterprises listed in section 16. Court procedure on the case has been suspended.
21. As concerns the dismissal of workers for having participated in strike action, the Government recalls that the illegal nature of the strikes in question had been recognized by the Minsk City Court of First Instance. It indicates that, on this basis, 15 persons were fired from Gomyel enterprise (trolleybus), five of whom have been taken back into the enterprise and another reinstatement is still under consideration. None of the Minsk Motor Enterprise employees have been re-employed and the Minsk City Executive Council has taken a number of measures to assist those fired at Minsk Metro with employment. In this respect, the Government also provides certain detailed information on court cases for reinstatement which had already been considered by the Committee in its first examination of the case.
22. The Committee notes this information. As concerns the Committee's recommendation to repeal from the list of Order No. 158 those enterprises and industries which it does not consider as essential services, while noting that the Constitutional Court has requested the Supreme Council to eliminate a contradiction between two sections of the Dispute Settlement Act, the Committee regrets that no steps have been taken to amend Order No. 158 to ensure that transport services, such as the Minsk Metro, are not excluded from the right to strike. The Committee therefore urges the Government to take the necessary measures to amend Order No. 158 in this respect and to keep it informed on the progress made in this regard.
23. As concerns the dismissal of workers participating in the August 1995 strikes in Minsk and Gomel, the Committee notes the Government's indication that five persons among 15 dismissed at the Gomel enterprise (trolleybus) have been reinstated. It notes with regret however that none of the other dismissed workers either at Minsk Metro or at Minsk Motor Enterprise have been reinstated and that the Government continues to insist that these dismissals are justified by the fact that the strike action was declared by the court to be illegal. The Committee finds itself obliged therefore to recall that the right to strike may be restricted or prohibited: (1) in the public service only for public servants exercising authority in the name of the State; or (2) in essential services in the strict sense of the term (that is, services the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of whole or part of the population). The Committee has already indicated in the past that transport generally does not constitute an essential service. [See Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee, 4th (revised) edition, 1996, paras. 526 and 545.] When last examining this case, therefore, the Committee had come to the conclusion that the strike action in question represented the exercise of legitimate trade union activity. Recalling that there remain 58 workers who were dismissed from Minsk Metro (according to the complainant's initial allegations) and at least ten trolleybus drivers in Gomel, the Committee must once again emphasize that the dismissal of workers for taking part in legitimate strike action constitutes anti-union discrimination in employment and requests the Government to ensure the immediate reinstatement in their jobs of all workers dismissed in connection with these strikes. The Government is requested to keep the Committee informed on the progress made in this regard.
24. The Committee regrets that the Government has not provided any information concerning its recommendation to implement fully the Constitutional Court decision which declared certain articles of Decree No. 336 to be unconstitutional. The Committee finds this all the more disturbing as it has been called upon to examine in this same report another complaint [see Case No. 1885] alleging the continuing implementation of the articles of this Decree which it has already concluded infringe trade union rights. The Committee refers to its previous conclusions concerning Presidential Decree No. 336 in its 302nd Report and calls upon the Government to take immediate steps to revoke those articles of the Decree which interfere with the free exercise of trade union rights, namely articles 1, 2 and 3, and to keep it informed of the progress made in this regard.
25. Finally, the Committee regrets that the Government has not provided any information concerning its recommendation that an independent commission of inquiry be established to clarify the facts relating to this case. While having noted in its previous examination of this case [see 302nd Report, para. 221] that an inquiry was being carried out by the Procurator of the Republic concerning the legality of actions taken by the law enforcement bodies, the Committee had considered that the questions raised by this case went beyond the mandate given to the Procurator. It must therefore request the Government once again to take steps for the immediate establishment of a commission of inquiry, the composition of which would be acceptable to all parties concerned, in order to clarify all the facts relating to this case. It requests the Government to keep it informed both of the conclusions reached as a result of the Procurator's inquiry, as well as of those of the commission of inquiry.
Case No. 1509 (Brazil)
26. The Committee examined this case concerning the murder of the trade union leader Valdicio Barbosa dos Santos at its meeting in November 1996 and requested the Government to continue to keep it informed of the legal proceedings under way [see 305th Report, para. 13]. In a communication dated 7 January 1997, the Government states that: (i) they still do not know where Marçal da Rocha, the presumed murderer in question, is; (ii) the defence of Mr. Romualdo Eustaquio Luiz Faria, presumed co-author of the murder, has been presented; (iii) in the legal proceedings, the hearing of the witnesses for the prosecution is now over. The Committee takes note of this information and requests the Government to keep it informed of the final results of these legal proceedings.
Case No. 1806 (Canada/Yukon)
27. At its meeting in November 1995 [see 300th Report, paras. 101 to 129], the Committee had considered that the Public Sector Compensation Restraint Act, 1994, went well beyond what it had previously considered as acceptable measures since it had the effect, amongst others, of extending the term of collective agreements for a period of three years in the education sector (up to July 1997) and of freezing for the same period all forms of remuneration. Furthermore, the Committee had regretted that the Government had not given priority to collective bargaining as a means of determining the wages of workers in the public sector of education and had urged the Government to refrain from having recourse to such measures in the future. In a communication dated 10 January 1997, the Government states that on 11 July 1996, it announced its intention to adopt new legislation the effects of which would be to limit the duration of the measures prescribed by the Act of 1994 to a two-year period and to provide for the return of collective bargaining in the education sector from July 1996. The Government adds that this measure reflects its commitment to give priority to collective bargaining and allow labour relations in the Yukon Territory, as regards the education sector, to return to normal. The Committee takes note of this information with satisfaction.
Case No. 1781 (Costa Rica)
28. At its meeting in November 1996, the Committee requested the Government to indicate the possibilities, according to the terms of the legislation, for applying the agreement of 16 May 1996 (in particular, section 3 concerning dismissals following collective disputes in Geest Caribbean, Ltd.) given the cessation of activities by the company in question in May 1996 [see 305th Report, paras, 17-20, approved by the Governing Body at its 267th Session (November 1996)].
29. In its communication of 6 January 1997, the Government stated that it had inquired of some previous legal representatives of the company and that they had indicated that the company as such did not exist in Costa Rica or elsewhere. Absent any such legal existence, any inquiry with a desired legal effect is impracticable. The Committee regrets having to note this information.
Cases Nos. 1594 and 1846 (Côte d'Ivoire)
30. During its last examination of Case No. 1594 in November 1996, the Committee requested the Government to keep it informed of developments with respect to the reinstatement of the workers dismissed from Irho Lame because of their trade union activities [see 305th Report, paras. 22-25].
31. In a communication dated 24 January 1997, the World Confederation of Labour (WCL) indicated that the workers concerned had still not been reinstated. No proposal for progressive reinstatement has been made by the Government. To the contrary, the workers were reportedly chased from the land where they get their food, some of whom were injured.
32. Furthermore, as concerns Case No. 1846 for which, in November 1996, the Committee had expressed its deep concern at the fact that several trade unionists were still being held in detention and had requested that measures be taken for their immediate release, designating them by name [see 305th Report, para. 25], the WCL indicated that Mr. Hassan Dabone and Mr. Diebre Boukary were still in the Maca prison.
33. Finally, the WCL adds that it is not able to communicate freely with the Dignité union because the telephone lines are regularly cut obstructing all contact with its affiliate for several days. This was the case at the beginning of December 1996 when the Government took measures for the holding of social elections at the autonomous port of Abidjan.
34. In a communication dated 24 February 1997, the Government emphasizes the fact that, contrary to the complainant's allegations, proposals for progressive reintegration of the workers dismissed from Irho Lame, enabling the reinstatement of at least 300 workers, have been formulated by the Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research and by the management of the enterprise. Furthermore, the Government specifies that 167 workers were reinstated previously without condition.
35. The Government confirms that Hassan Dabone and Diebre Boukary have been kept in preventive detention while awaiting their next appearance before the courts. The material and physical harm suffered by the victims and the perfect state of health of the detainees justifies such a measure. Mr. Dabone and Mr. Boukary have been charged under Act No. 92-464 concerning premeditated violent misdemeanours and assault.
36. Finally, the Government recalls that consultations have been held in order for the elections at the autonomous port of Abidjan to take place in calm and serenity. In common agreement with the trade union organizations, the elections were set for 18 January 1997. In the Government's opinion, the strike at the autonomous port of Abidjan and the fact that some trade union organizations, such as the GODPAA and the SYLIDOPACI, were not able to prove their formation in conformity with the law, rendered elections on this date impossible. The Government considers nevertheless that this delay will enable these organizations to run in the next elections. The Government concludes by denying any allegations concerning the control of communications between the complainant organization and its affiliate, Dignité.
37. The Committee takes note of this information. As concerns the workers dismissed at Irho Lame because of their trade union activities, it urges the Government to take the necessary measures so that they be reinstated as soon as possible and to keep it informed in this regard. Furthermore, it once again requests the Government to keep it informed of the results of the social elections at the autonomous port of Abidjan. As concerns the preventive detention of Mr. Dabone and Mr. Boukary, the Committee recalls that the facts giving rise to this measure occurred in January 1995. In the Committee's opinion, preventive detention of such a long duration is wholly unjustifiable and it must therefore once again urge the Government to take the necessary measures for the immediate release of Hassan Dabone and Diebre Boukary. The Committee requests the Government to keep it informed of all developments in this regard. Finally, as concerns the restriction of communications between the Dignité union and the WCL, the Committee recalls that Article 5 of Convention No. 87, ratified by Côte d'Ivoire, provides that workers' organizations shall have the right to affiliate with international organizations of workers and requests the Government to assure that contacts between these organizations can be established without any hindrance from the authorities.
Case No. 1552 (Malaysia)
38. When it last examined this case at its November 1996 meeting [see 305th Report, paras. 43-46], the Committee noted with interest the Government's indication that the Court of Appeal had ordered the reinstatement of the 21 dismissed workers of Harris Solid-State Sdn-Bhd and requested the Government to keep it informed of any development as regards the implementation of this judgement. In a communication dated 31 January 1997 the Government confirms that 20 workers were indeed reinstated at Harris Solid-State as of 1 October 1996 and one worker was granted medical leave at the worker's request. As for the payment of back wages, the Government indicates that the legal counsel of the employer and of the workers are still in the process of negotiation and that it will keep the Committee informed of any further developments in this regard. The Committee notes this information with interest.
Cases Nos. 1687 and 1691 (Morocco)
39. At its last examination of these cases, the Committee requested the Government to undertake inquiries into the allegations of violations of freedom of association, including bodily injury, in the BISMA, SINET, and FILARSY enterprises [see 305th Report, paras. 397 to 412].
40. In its communication dated 2 December 1996, the Government states that the national legislation recognizes the right to strike and to bargain collectively for workers. The number of strikes called by trade unions in the private and public sectors without any measures being taken against the persons exercising this right is proof. Moreover, the Government adds that, in 1996, it came to an agreement with the social partners on the terms of a declaration according to which they restated their commitment to the free exercise of freedom of association, the conclusion of collective agreements and the reinstatement, within the framework of a tripartite investigatory and conciliation committee, of workers dismissed for their trade union activities. The Government specifies that the committee, which has begun its work, will have before it existing collective disputes and will try to identify solutions which are acceptable to all parties concerned. Finally, the Government indicates that the intervention of the police during certain conflicts was justified by the need to maintain public order and that charges were lodged only against those workers who had broken the law and committed acts of violence.
41. The Committee takes note of this information but nevertheless deplores that the Government has not furnished any specific information concerning the recommendations made when the case was last examined. It once again requests the Government to rapidly undertake an impartial and independent inquiry in order to fully clarify the facts, determine responsibilities and punish those responsible, and to provide, as a matter of urgency, the results of the investigations concerning: (a) Moukhbir Mohammed, General Secretary of the UMT union of the BISMA enterprise, who was reportedly arrested during a 48-hour strike at Sidi Slimane on 26 July 1994 and the subject of physical assault and; (b) the arrests during the same strike at the UMT local headquarters at Sidi Slimane of 11 workers, including the Deputy General Secretary of the local UMT union, Mr. Khallaf Saïd, the General Secretary of the UMT union in the BISMA enterprise, Mr. Moukhbir Mohammed, and his deputy, Mr. Bouzidi Cherkaoui. Finally, the Committee requests the Government to communicate information concerning the appeals lodged by four shop stewards at SINET (Bouna Houcine, Mouzoune Hassan, Attor Ahmed and Lachgar Brahim) and by the seven unionists at the FILARSY enterprise and to keep it informed of the judgements handed down in these cases. The Committee once again expresses the firm hope that, if the court concludes that these workers were dismissed as a result of their trade union activities, the Government will take the necessary measures to enable them to be reinstated in their jobs.
Case No. 1712 (Morocco)
42. At its last examination of this case, the Committee requested the Government to arrange for inquiries into: (a) the anti-union intimidation and pressure reportedly exerted on workers at the Plastima factory in Casablanca in May 1993 and at the Mansour El Dahbi Hotel in Marrakesh in April 1993 and; (b) the police intervention in strikes carried out at the above two places. Finally, the Committee urged the Government to provide information on the situation of named UMT activists who were reportedly incarcerated on the occasion of the strike at the Mansour El Dahbi Hotel [see 304th Report, paras. 365 to 380].
43. In its communication dated 23 January 1997, the Government recalls that the industrial dispute at the Plastima factory was based on the dismissal of 11 workers, three of whom were union representatives. The Government adds that the police had to intervene in this dispute in order to ensure public order and protection of the freedom to work. Finally, the Government specifies that the dispute was reportedly resolved by the signing of a protocol between the parties stipulating the reinstatement of five workers and the payment of indemnities to the other workers concerned. The latter reportedly lodged complaints with the first level court which rejected their appeal. The plaintiffs are still awaiting the results of the appeal which they lodged against this decision.
44. The Committee takes note of this information and requests the Government to transmit a copy of the judgement of the first level court, as well as the decision, once it is made, of the appeal court. It nevertheless deplores that the Government has not furnished any information concerning the situation of workers at the Mansour El Dahbi Hotel in Marrakesh. It requests the Government to keep it informed of the inquiries made into the acts of anti-union intimidation and pressure reportedly exerted on the workers of the hotel and on the police intervention during the strikes carried out there. Finally, the Committee urges the Government to provide information on the current situation of the UMT activists arrested in Marrakesh (Aboul Hanana Abdeljalil, Abou Nouass Latifa, El Hasnaoui Ahmed, Al Korssa Aberahmane, Boukentar Mohamed, Soulal Fatima, Boulal Zohra and Kati Mohammed).
Case No. 1793 (Nigeria)
45. During its last substantive examination of this case in June 1996 [304th Report, para. 13], the Committee urged the Government to take the necessary measures to ensure the immediate release of Mr. Kokori, General Secretary of NUPENG, to repeal immediately Decrees Nos. 9 and 10 dissolving the executive councils of NLC, NUPENG and PENGASSAN and to allow independently elected officials to exercise their trade union functions once again. Absent any response from the Government in the Committee's subsequent report of November 1996, the Governing Body decided to make a pressing appeal to the Government of Nigeria inviting it to respond as soon as possible to the repeated requests made since November 1995 urgently to authorize an ILO mission to examine questions related to past complaints and to visit without impediment trade unionists held in detention, so as to enable the mission to present a report as soon as possible to the Committee. The Government was sent a letter to this effect on 26 November 1996 and subsequently sent a reminder on 5 February 1997. No reply has yet been received from the Government.
46. Since its last examination of this case, several new decrees have been brought to the Committee's attention which appear to indicate an expansive and systematic approach to diminishing trade union rights in Nigeria. In this regard, the Committee would point out in particular the Trade Disputes (Essential Services Deregulation, Proscription and Prohibition from Participation in Trade Union Activities) Decree and the Trade Disputes (Essential Services) (Proscription) Order 1996 of 21 August 1996 which proscribe and prohibit the participation in any trade union activities of the Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational and Associated Institutions, the Academic Staff Union of Universities and the Senior Staff Association of Universities, teaching hospital, research institutes and associated institutions and dissolve the National Executive Council and the Branch Executive Councils operating within any university in Nigeria. Furthermore, the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 5 January 1996 restructures the previous 41 registered industrial unions into 29 trade unions affiliated to the Central Labour Organisation (named in the law) and omits from the list of registered organizations 25 previously registered and recognized trade unions of senior staff and ten employers' associations in violation of the right of both workers and of employers to establish and join organizations of their own choosing. Finally, Trade Unions (Amendment) (No. 2) Decree of 16 October 1996 (also referred to as Decree No. 26) amends the Trade Unions Act, inter alia, by granting the Minister the power to revoke the registration of any trade union in the interest of overriding public interest and substituting the right of appeal to the appropriate High Court ensured previously with a right to appeal only to the Minister. Among the various consequences of an administrative revocation of the certificate of registration of a union is the termination of automatic check-off of union dues and the decree provides a fine of 100,000 Naira and/or five years' imprisonment for the contravention of any of its provisions.
47. In the light of the above, the Committee notes with ever-increasing concern the persistent deterioration of trade union rights in Nigeria. Furthermore, it profoundly regrets the lack of cooperation on the part of the Government in respect of the Committee's recommendations in this case and of the Governing Body's repeated calls for the Government to authorize an ILO mission. The Committee finds itself obliged once again to reiterate in the strongest terms the Governing Body's appeal to the Government to accept an ILO mission at the earliest possible date to examine the outstanding matters of this case.
Case No. 1785 (Poland)
48. During its last examination of this case at its meeting in November 1996, the Committee requested the Government to ensure the equitable redistribution of assets between the NSZZ Solidarnosc and the Polish Trade Union Alliance (OPZZ) and requested the Government to keep it informed of any progress concerning the final redistribution. It also requested the Government to furnish a copy of the executive order to be issued by the Minister of Labour determining, in consultation with both trade union confederations, which assets would belong exclusively to one or the other confederation [see 305th Report, paras. 57-59].
49. In a communication dated 13 January 1997, the Government indicates that the executive orders to be issued by the Minister of Labour are being considered and may be completed after the adoption of the Budgetary Act for 1997 in February. This has not however hindered the implementation of the Act amending the Act concerning the restitution of assets forfeited by trade unions which came into force on 4 August 1996 and the Social Commission for Revindication has taken decisions up to the end of 1996 imposing upon the State Treasury an obligation of cash payment or compensation in other (non-cash) forms to various organizational units of NSZZ Solidarnosc. Cash payments may be already effected, whereas compensation in non-cash form will only be possible after the Council of Ministers has issued the necessary executory order. The NSZZ Solidarnosc and the OPZZ have been invited to designate their representatives to the commission responsible for making the inventory list of the real assets of the former trade union association. The commission is expected to begin its work once the Budgetary Act has designated funds for covering the cost of its functioning and the deadline for completion of its work, as provided for in the Act, is 30 June 1997. The Government adds however that the NSZZ Solidarnosc has taken a decision to apply to the Constitutional Tribunal concerning the constitutionality of the Act.
50. The Committee notes this information and expresses the firm hope that an equitable redistribution of the assets will be made between the two trade union confederations in the near future. It requests the Government to keep it informed of all developments in the implementation of the Act on the restitution of trade union assets and of any judgement from the Constitutional Tribunal concerning the constitutionality of the Act.
Case No. 1857 (Chad)
51. As concerns the participation of the Trade Union Confederation of Chad (CST) on joint or tripartite bodies, the Committee requested the Government, where there was any doubt as to the representativity of the CST, to undertake an objective and impartial determination of its degree of representativity and to take appropriate measures in the event that the CST turns out to be the most representative [see 305th Report, paras. 434 to 450]. According to the information provided by the CST in a communication dated 19 December 1996, the Committee is able to note an improvement in the situation. Indeed, the Ministry of the Public Service and Labour had requested the CST to designate its representatives to the High Committee for Labour and Social Security and to name its assessors to the labour courts. While noting this information with interest, the Committee also notes that, according to the CST, some problems still exist with respect to the naming of its representatives to other bodies or meetings such as the National Office for the Promotion of Employment. The Committee requests the Government to review this matter so that the CST may also name its representatives to these bodies. It requests the Government to keep it informed in this regard.
Case No. 1727 (Turkey)
52. At its meeting in November 1995, the Committee regretted that the Government had not furnished the information requested in paragraph 332(b) of its 295th Report concerning the functioning without hindrance of the EGITIM-IS union, the withdrawal of legal or administrative proceedings against trade unionists and the annulment of acts of anti-union discrimination. It requested the Government to provide this information as soon as possible [see 300th Report, para. 35].
53. In its communications of 10 January, 9 April and 6 December 1996, the Government stated that: (i) the criminal judicial authorities have decided to declare the cases against the 42 unionists (the names were cited by the Government) as without standing and not to pursue them for the acts committed in violation of the penal code during their union activities; (ii) a trial is under way against the trade union leader Mr. Altunya for having made statements to the press in violation of section 15 of Act No. 657 which prohibits public servants from making such statements; (iii) the administrative tribunal of the prefecture of Aydin has rejected the request to annul the withdrawal of Mr. Hüseyin Mercan's promotion; (iv) the administrative authorities have annulled the decisions to close and to prohibit the functioning of the branches of EGITIM-IS in the provinces of Van and Eskisehir, as well as in the Caycuma township.
54. The Committee takes due note of this information. Nevertheless, it reiterates the recommendations which it made during its first examination of this case [see 295th Report, para. 332(b)] and urges the Government to cease the judicial procedures against Mr. Altunya for having exercised his trade union activities and to annul the acts of discrimination taken against Mr. Mercan (transfer and suspension of promotion).
* * *
55. Finally, as regards Cases Nos. 1581 (Thailand), 1618 (United Kingdom), 1623 (Bulgaria), 1685 (Venezuela), 1719 (Nicaragua), 1725 (Denmark), 1726 (Pakistan), 1795 (Honduras), 1809 (Kenya), 1819 (China), 1824 (El Salvador), 1826 (Philippines), 1834 (Kazakstan), 1847 (Guatemala), 1856 (Uruguay), 1858 (France/Polynesia), 1870 (Congo), 1874 (El Salvador) and 1883 (Kenya), the Committee requests the Governments concerned to keep it informed of any developments relating to these cases. It hopes that these Governments will quickly furnish the information requested. Furthermore, the Committee has just received information concerning Cases Nos. 1698 (New Zealand), 1818 and 1833 (Zaire) and 1825 (Morocco) which it will examine at its next meeting.
* * *
Interim report
Complaint against the Government of Argentina
presented by
the State Workers' Association (ATE)
Allegations: Failure to reinstate a trade union official
suspended on account of his trade union activities
56. The State Workers' Association (ATE) submitted a complaint against the Government of Argentina for infringement of trade union rights in a communication in December 1995. The ATE sent additional information in a communication dated 3 April 1996.
57. The Government sent its comments in a communication dated 14 February 1997.
58. Argentina has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).
A. The complainant's allegations
59. In its communications of December 1995 and 3 April 1996, the State Workers' Association (ATE) alleges that Miguel Hugo Rojo (Secretary General of the provincial Executive Council of the ATE) suffered reprisals for his trade union action during a collective dispute at the General Incomes Board of the Province of Salta in 1992. These consisted of: (1) a change in his workplace (he was transferred from being Inspector of the External Finance Department to the Department of Internal Auditing); and (2) suspension from his post without pay for 90 days (for having refused to change his workplace), as a result of a summary indictment. Both measures hindered the freedom of movement of the person concerned, thus preventing the exercise of his rights with respect to freedom of association. Moreover, Miguel Hugo Rojo has not received his wages since then because he has still not taken up his post.
60. As a result of these measures, Miguel Hugo Rojo lodged successive appeals which went as far as the Supreme Court, which decided that as he was a provincial official, he would have to exhaust all the administrative procedures and submit his case to the Administrative Court. The first judgement handed down by the courts, however, had ordered the reinstatement of the person concerned in his job.
61. The complainant organization feels that the constitutional and legal provisions pertaining to protection against anti-union discrimination were incorrectly interpreted and applied (in particular, section 47 of Act No. 23551, concerning occupational associations -- considered not applicable to the public employees of the federal State of Salta by the judicial authorities -- which provides for swift judicial proceedings in the event of an obstruction to the free exercise of trade union rights.
B. The Government's reply
62. In its communication of 14 February 1997, the Government stated that the order which suspended Mr. Hugo Rojo (Decree No. 1127/92) was not brought into question in the appeal which he lodged as it was an administrative order which benefits from the presumption of legitimacy. According to national jurisprudence, as a consequence of this presumption, judges are prohibited from issuing decrees ex officio invalidating such administrative orders and their illegitimacy must be proven. In this case, the State does not need judicial authorization for the suspension of functions to the extent that Decree No. 1127/92 has not been called into question. Moreover, at no point in time was it raised in the allegations that Mr. Hugo Rojo was separated from his post due to his trade union membership or participation in trade union activities.
63. As regards the allegation that legal standards were incorrectly applied or interpreted by the judicial authority, to the effect that section 47 of Act No. 23551 concerning occupational associations (which provides for a speedy judicial proceeding in the event of obstruction of freedom of association) is not applicable to public officials in the Province of Salta and that, under the provincial legislation of Salta, employees must exhaust all administrative procedures before lodging an appeal with the Administrative Court, the Committee notes that the position of the complainant and the Government are contradictory. The Committee considers that it is not its role to determine in federal States which are the internal standards regulating protection against anti-union discrimination and, in particular, whether the standards of general application or those of the province in question should be applicable.
64. The Committee nevertheless recalls that irrespective of the procedural or substantive laws applying to public officials or employees in provinces of a federal State, it is bound to examine whether the actual alleged anti-union discrimination measures are or not in accordance with the provisions of ratified ILO Conventions and the principles of freedom of association.
65. In this respect, the Committee notes that, according to the complainant organization, the decision to transfer the trade union official Miguel Hugo Rojo from one workplace to another and the subsequent measures taken against him were on account of his trade union action in a collective dispute which began at the beginning of February 1992. According to the documentation presented by the complainant, strikes took place and accusations were made of financial irregularities and corruption -- such as an administrative resolution which changed the rules pertaining to the "incentive fund" for workers. The Committee also notes that the Government denies that the measures taken against Miguel Hugo Rojo had anti-union motives. The Committee nevertheless notes that the administrative resolutions containing the grounds for the transfer of Miguel Hugo Rojo and the penalties against him, which have been communicated by the complainant organization, indicate the following:
66. The Committee notes that the versions given by the complainant and the administrative authority concerning the transfer of and the penalties imposed on the trade union official Miguel Hugo Rojo are contradictory.
67. In the numerous cases involving allegations of anti-union discrimination that it has examined, the Committee has consistently stressed that no person shall be prejudiced in employment by reason of his or her trade union membership or legitimate trade union activities, whether past or present [see Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee, 4th (revised) edition, 1996, para. 690]. This protection should cover not only hiring and dismissal, but also any discriminatory measures during employment, in particular transfers [see Digest, op. cit., para. 695]. In addition, the remedy of reinstatement should be available to those who were victims of anti-union discrimination [see Digest, op. cit., para. 755].
68. In the case at hand, the Committee considers that the available information is insufficient to permit a determination of whether anti-union motives underlay the transfer of Mr. Miguel Hugo Rojo. Under these circumstances, in order to arrive at its conclusions in full knowledge of the facts, the Committee requests the complainant and the Government to provide supplementary information, in particular regarding the administrative acts and decisions, as well as the judgements that have been rendered on this subject.
69. In the light of its foregoing interim conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendation:
In order to arrive at its conclusions in full knowledge of the facts, especially concerning whether the transfer of Miguel Hugo Rojo was for anti-union reasons and concerning his non-reinstatement, the Committee requests the complainant and the Government to provide supplementary information, in particular regarding the administrative decisions and judgements that have been rendered on this subject.
Report in which the Committee requests to be
kept informed of developments
Complaint against the Government of Bangladesh
presented by
-- the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU) and
-- the International Textile, Garment and Leather
Workers' Federation (ITGLWF)
Allegations: Serious acts of anti-union discrimination,
physical assaults of workers and trade unionists,
attack on trade union premises
70. The Committee already examined the substance of this case at its May 1996 meeting, when it presented an interim report to the Governing Body [see 304th Report, paras. 57 to 96, approved by the Governing Body at its 266th Session (June 1996)].
71. In communications dated 11 June 1996 and 30 January 1997, the International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' Federation (ITGLWF) presented new allegations concerning further violations of trade union rights by the Government. The Government supplied further observations on the case in communications dated 3 September and 30 October 1996.
72. Bangladesh has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).
A. Previous examination of the case
73. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) presented allegations to the effect that the Government had violated freedom of association principles by failing to provide protection to workers and trade unionists in several cases of employer resistance to the establishment of a new union in the garment industry in Bangladesh and to the carrying out of union activities. The ICFTU alleged that there had been industry resistance to the Bangladesh Independent Garment Workers' Union (BIGU) from the moment it had been formed in December 1994. In particular, there had been systematic violations of workers' rights at the Palmal Knitwear Factory in Dhaka. The repeated violations occurring there included beatings, forced resignations, dismissals, blacklisting, threats and other types of intimidation of workers and their family members as well as an attack on the office and study centre of BIGU in Dhaka. In order to defend workers' rights, BIGU had been involved, since the beginning of 1995, in a number of labour court cases involving garment companies.
74. The Government, for its part, indicated that it had carried out a thorough inquiry concerning the allegations made. Following this inquiry, however, it could not detect any violation of trade union rights. It rejected any anti-union motives on the part of the employer, basing itself almost exclusively on information provided by the company itself. Moreover, the Government pointed out that, according to the management of the company, the allegations were promoted from outside so as to damage the business prospects of the garment industry which was entirely export-oriented.
75. At its June 1996 Session, in the light of the Committee's interim conclusions, the Governing Body approved the following recommendations:
B. The Government's reply
76. In its communication of 30 October 1996, the Government indicates that an Inquiry Committee was established vide office order No. POKO/SRAMA-2 (17) 96/51 dated 20 July 1996 of the Ministry of Labour and Manpower in order to look more deeply into alleged violations of freedom of association by Palmal Knitwear Factory Ltd. (hereinafter "Palmal"). The Inquiry Committee convenor issued a notice upon the President of BIGU to come up with all relevant papers and witnesses, if any, on 14 September 1996 in the office of the Director of Labour. A similar notice was also served upon the Managing Director of Palmal. The Government states that both parties, who were present on the fixed date, as were Inquiry Committee members, gave their respective statements. Both parties were allowed to cross-examine the other's statement so that the Inquiry Committee would have a fair and balanced view of the issues raised. Finally, a joint statement was recorded and read over to both parties, and being satisfied, they signed it. The Government states that the findings of the Inquiry Committee, in respect of the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association, are as follows.
77. First of all, BIGU applied for registration on 18 May 1995. Its application was rejected by the Registrar on 14 June 1995 on the ground that it failed to fulfil the conditions laid down in section 7(2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter "IRO") and also because of the absence of any legal provision enabling the registration of a trade union on a nationwide basis when there is more than one employer. The number of employers involved in this case was 122. Moreover, there had been a court verdict debarring registration of one union comprising workers from different establishments owned by different employers. BIGU appealed to the second Labour Court in Dhaka against the rejection order of the Registrar. The case is still pending in the Labour Court.
78. Regarding the motives of Palmal for sending photographs of workers to other employers, the Inquiry Committee questioned the Managing Director of Palmal, Mr. Nurul Haque Sikdar, in this connection. The Government states that Mr. Sikdar denied this allegation altogether. The complainant also failed to produce any documentary evidence in this respect. The Government adds that according to the Managing Director, the management had had information that some of the absentee workers of Palmal were working in some other factories. To confirm this information, the management had sent a letter only to those factories where the absentee workers were reportedly working. But there was no proof that the management had sent photographs of the absentee workers to those factories. Thus, according to the Government, there appeared to be no other motive behind the management's actions other than to confirm the absentee workers' employment in the other factories so as to initiate departmental and legal action against them.
79. Regarding the circumstances leading to the termination of employment of Mr. M. Rahman and Mr. N. Ahmed, the Government refers to the Managing Director's statement that neither of them had been terminated from service. They had voluntarily resigned. The Managing Director submitted the photocopy of the resignation letters of the two workers.
80. As regards the alleged termination of employment of eight BIGU members, the Government indicates that the Managing Director stated that these workers had not been dismissed from service. They had remained absent without the management's authorization for a long time. The management had called all of them to resume their duties but they did not turn up. They had submitted their grievances to the competent authority who replied to their grievances. But they were not satisfied and filed cases in the Labour Court against the management. Those cases are still pending in the Labour Court for disposal. Later two BIGU members withdrew their cases and voluntarily resigned from service.
81. As regards the forced resignation of two women workers, the Government indicates that the Managing Director stated that they were dismissed after exhausting all the procedures as provided for under the Employment of Labour Act, 1965.
82. Regarding the allegation that 11 BIGU members had been discredited, and that four of them were threatened with transfer, the Government points out that the Managing Director denied this allegation during the inquiry. When the complainant was asked about this, she failed to produce any witness and supporting documentary evidence in this respect. On the other hand, the Managing Director produced a paper sent to the Human Rights Organization by 155 workers of Palmal alleging that the 11 absentee and dismissed workers of Palmal, in connivance with some national and international agencies, were working against the interest of the workers as well as of the factory. It was alleged by the complainant that the management of Palmal wrote a letter to the Human Rights Organization in this respect but she could not produce any document.
83. Regarding the threat of transfer of four workers, namely Mr. Badal (mechanic), Mr. Nurul Islam (supervisor), Mr. Shahidul Islam (packing man), and Mr. Hashem (packing man), the Government indicates that the complainants could not produce any document in support of the allegation. The Government points out that the Managing Director had indicated that in the case of technical workers it was general practice that such workers could be transferred from one factory to another (with the same employers and producing similar type of goods) with their consent. But till today, none of them had been transferred.
84. As regards the dismissal of Ms. Kalpana, the Government indicates that according to the Managing Director, she had been dismissed from service after exhausting all the legal procedures as laid down in the Employment of Labour Act, 1965. In reply, Ms. Kalpana stated that she did not even get any notice. The Managing Director stated that she was served notice through registered post at her address available in the factory's office record. But she refused to accept it and the notice was returned to the factory which was produced before the Inquiry Committee. In spite of all this, the management was still agreeable to appoint her as per her qualifications in Palmal but she wanted to impose certain conditions which were contradictory to prevailing labour laws. Ms. Kalpana is not unemployed at present. The Managing Director of Palmal stated that she had worked in Jamuna Knitting and Dyeing Garments Ltd. from 9 October 1995 as machine operator and later on she had also worked in Southern Services Ltd. from 19 December 1995 as junior operator. The Managing Director further claimed that she was now working in AAFLI with a monthly salary of tk3,000. But Ms. Kalpana denied this.
85. Regarding the alleged attack on trade union premises, the Inquiry Committee held an on-the-spot inquiry at 200, Santibag, Dhaka where the BIGU (unregistered) office had been established. At the time of the inquiry, the organizing secretary, Nazma Sheikh and one person were present. But neither of them could confirm that the alleged attack had been carried out by the employers of Palmal Knitwear Factory Ltd. The president of BIGU stated that an FIR had been lodged with the Motijheel Police Station for the alleged attack but she failed to produce any document in support of her statement.
86. Over these various issues, from the workers' side, IRO cases Nos. 48/95, 49/95, 50/95, 51/95, 53/95, 54/95 and 55/95 were filed in the labour courts, of which IRO cases Nos. 49/95 and 53/95 had been withdrawn by the complainant. The remaining cases are still pending for disposal in the labour courts as is IRO Case No. 74/95. Another IRO case No. 95/95 has also been withdrawn by the complainant. The Government states that the outcome of the pending cases will be made available through gazette notification once the labour courts concerned have handed down their respective decisions.
C. The complainant's further information
87. In its communication dated 11 June 1996, the ITGLWF indicates that its latest complaint relates to the situation at Saladin Garments Ltd. where workers have over the past couple of months suffered intimidation and harassment and have faced very severe threats. The circumstances are as follows. The workers of Saladin Garments Ltd. were preparing themselves for the formation of a union from January 1996. For this process they were collecting "D" forms -- forms signed by workers indicating they want a particular union. These forms are required by the Government to register a trade union. This information reached the management of Saladin Garments Ltd.
88. On 9 April 1996 the workers of Saladin filed their application for union registration with the Registrar of Trade Unions. Several days prior, factory management started to threaten workers involved in organizing and demanded that they cease their union activities and that they divulge the names of all workers who had signed "D" forms. On 8 April, it is alleged that production manager, Mr. Nannu, mechanic in charge, Mr. Jainal, and floor in charge (finishing), Mr. Monir, took a worker named Chand Mia to the office and pressured him to give the list of the workers involved in the union process. He was detained in the room until 6.30 p.m. On 9 April, it is alleged that production manager Nannu along with his aides again took Chand Mia to his room and detained him. He was again interrogated about the names of workers who had signed up for the union. During the interrogation, he was slapped, told "we'll see how you form a union" and Production Manager Nannu held a blade to his throat. A General Diary No. 522 dated 9 April 1996 was lodged in Sobuj Bagh Police Station.
89. The workers wrote a letter to the factory Managing Director, Mr. Abdus Salam Murshedi, informing management that they were exercising their legal right to form a union. The letter included the names of the workers involved in the formation of the union and asked for management's cooperation. (The letter was written on 8 April 1996 and reached the factory approximately two days later.) After receipt of the said letter it is alleged that Mr. Abdus Salam Murshedi called Ms. Asma, President of the union, into his office. With him one Mr. Jibon (an outside thug of Saladin Garments) and Mr. Seraj, administrative officer started interrogating Asma about her involvement in union affairs. The Managing Director told Ms. Asma not to form any union with AAFLI's assistance since AAFLI was destroying the garment industry. He said if workers wanted to form a union, management would help them to do so. The Managing Director told Asma if she did not refrain from her union activities, the workers "will see five dead bodies after the (national) election". He then stated "the lawyer [of BIGU] has already been attacked but still she did not refrain from her work. She shall be punished for this." (In an apparent reference to the 21 November 1995 attack on the BIGU office in which the lawyer was doused with petrol and terrorized by armed thugs.)
90. Thereafter the management started issuing show-cause notices (misconduct letters) and other warning letters to the workers involved directly in the union. The management started making the women workers work at night on a regular basis. Sometimes a single woman worker was made to work in an isolated place without security. (Night work for women is prohibited under the Factories Act of 1965.) Women workers sent letters to the Managing Director protesting night work, but management continued with the practice. Intimidations, threats and public humiliations are now routine and resulted in the resignation of the union General Secretary, Ms. Shuli, and another woman union member. The ITGLWF contends that even if these allegations are only partially correct, they represent a very severe abuse of basic workers' rights. It insists that these workers should have the protection of the authorities and are afforded the right to organize in accordance with the laws of Bangladesh and relevant ILO Conventions. The women workers who resigned as a result of the intense intimidation and harassment they faced should be reinstated.
91. In its communication of 30 January 1997, on the Committee's request, the ITGLWF provides more information regarding the threat of transfer of four BIGU members as requested to do so by the Committee during its previous examination of this case [304th Report, para. 96(e)]. The ITGLWF indicates that in late July 1995, four active BIGU members were told by factory General Manager, Mr. Shamim Reja Pinu, that as of August 1995 they would be transferred to another factory in the Palmal group of companies which was located approximately 25 km from their current workplace and homes in Dhaka. On 28 July 1995, the workers sent letters to management explaining the economic hardships the transfer would pose. Later, following external pressure, the transfer order was abandoned.
D. The Government's further reply
92. In its communication of 3 September 1996, the Government indicates that the ITGLWF's complaint has already been inquired into by the Department of Labour. It provides a summarized version of the inquiry report as follows.
93. As regards the formation of a trade union by the workers of Saladin Garments Ltd., it is a fact that the process started since January 1996 and the application for registration of the newly formed union was actually filed on 3 April 1996 with the Registrar of Trade Unions (RTU), Dhaka Division. The RTU processed the said application as per sections 7 and 9 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance (IRO) 1969 and rejected the same on 3 June 1996 as per section 10 of the IRO 1969 for not meeting the legal requirements. The alleged complaint that the workers involved in the process of forming a trade union were harassed and intimidated by the management had not been proved during the inquiry.
94. As regards the incident of torturing in various ways of Mr. Chand Mia, a worker, on 8 and 9 April 1996 by the Production Manager, Mr. Nannu, mechanic in charge, Mr. Jainal, and floor in charge (finishing), Mr. Monir, this also could not be proved at the time of the inquiry. Even Ms. Asma, President of the union, admitted that she did not see Mr. Chand Mia being physically tortured and that she simply learnt of it. The police had yet to take any action on General Diary No. 522 dated 9 April 1996.
95. The allegation that management advised Ms. Asma, President of the proposed union not to form a union with the assistance of outsiders is admitted to by the management. But no evidence could be found during the inquiry that Ms. Asma was issued show-cause notices only because of her involvement in the establishment of a trade union. She, along with other workers, were issued show-cause notices for various other reasons as per the existing laws of the country.
96. As regards the allegation that women workers were made to work on a regular basis in an isolated place without security, the Government indicates that the management partly denied the allegation. It stated that on an emergency basis, women workers were sometimes required to work at night and that they were paid overtime allowance for the additional work. The allegation that a single woman worker was required to work at night was termed as ridiculous by the management, as in a garment factory, the work is done in shifts by a group of workers working together. Finally, the Government points out that in the management's view, as the two women workers had resigned voluntarily, there was no room for their reinstatement.
97. In addition to the above findings, the Government states that in the garment sector in Bangladesh, efforts are being made to enforce legal provisions under the Factories Act, 1965 and the Shops and Estts. Act, 1965, as strictly as possible. No trade union of workers or employers is discouraged to be registered under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The Government only ensures that the union is registered in accordance with the requirements of the IRO, 1969. Moreover, any union, aggrieved by any decision of a RTU, has the right to appeal against him in the Labour Appellate Tribunal.
98. The Committee notes that there are two sets of allegations in this case: first those that relate to the trade union situation at Palmal Knitwear Factory Ltd. which were already examined by the Committee and secondly, those relating to the trade union situation at Saladin Garments Ltd. The Committee proposes to deal first of all with the allegations concerning violations of freedom of association by Palmal Knitwear Factory Ltd.
Trade union situation at Palmal Knitwear Factory Ltd.
99. Before examining the matters at issue individually, the Committee recalls that in view of the number and seriousness of the allegations ensuing from this complaint, it had requested the Government, during the previous examination of this case, to extend its inquiry in order to clear up contradictions in the evidence provided by the complainant and the management thus far. In this respect, the Committee notes that an Inquiry Committee was established by the Ministry of Labour and Manpower on 20 July 1996 to look more deeply into alleged violations of freedom of association by Palmal Knitwear Factory Ltd. (hereinafter "Palmal"). The Committee further notes from the Inquiry Report provided by the Government that the President of BIGU, Ms. Kalpana Akhter and BIGU activist, Ms. Hasna Hena as well as the Managing Director of Palmal, Mr. Nurul Haque Sikdar presented their respective statements to the Inquiry Committee whose members were comprised of Mr. Mella Golam Sarwar (Director of Labour), Mr. Khurshid Alam Chawdhury (Joint Director of Labour) and Mr. Lokman Hekim Talukder (Assistant Chief of Labour).
100. The Committee notes with regret however that although both parties signed a joint statement pursuant to this second inquiry, the latter still did not resolve the contradictory statements provided by the two parties. It is the Committee's understanding that this was largely due to the fact that whenever the Managing Director denied an allegation, the complainant failed to produce any documentary evidence to substantiate the allegation in question. The Committee would remind the Government, however, that in such instances it may often be difficult, if not impossible, for a worker to furnish proof of an act of anti-union discrimination of which he or she has been the victim. The Committee also notes the inconsistency in the evidence given by the Managing Director which affects the credibility of his evidence. Moreover, since the allegations in this case concern beatings, forced resignations, dismissals, blacklisting, threats and other types of intimidation of workers and their family, the Committee must once again draw the Government's attention to the importance it attaches to the principle that the rights of workers' and employers' organizations can only be exercised in a climate that is free from violence, pressure or threats of any kind against the leaders and members of unions, and it is for governments to ensure that this principle is respected [see Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee, 4th edition, 1996, para. 47].
101. The Committee further notes that several cases, mainly IRO Cases Nos. 48/95, 50/95, 51/95, 54/95, 55/95 and 74/95, are still pending in labour courts concerning incidents referred to by the complainant. The Committee requests the Government to provide copies of these decisions as soon as they are handed down.
Registration of BIGU
102. As regards the registration of BIGU as a trade union, the Government states first of all that BIGU's application was rejected by the Registrar on 14 June 1995 on the ground that it failed to fulfil the conditions laid down in section 7(2) of the IRO. The Committee would nevertheless draw the Government's attention to the fact that for several years now, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations has been asking the Government to review section 7(2) and 10(1)(g) of the IRO in order to bring them into conformity with Article 2 of Convention No. 87. These two provisions respectively impose a membership requirement of 30 per cent of the total number of workers employed in the establishment or group of establishments concerned for a union to be registered, and permit dissolution if membership falls below that level (see observation, Report III, Part 4A of 1997, page 151 of the English text). The Committee, like the Committee of Experts, requests the Government to amend its legislation in this respect.
103. Another reason put forward by the Government for non-registration is the absence of any legal provision enabling the registration of a trade union on a nationwide basis whose workers are employed by several employers and a court verdict barring registration of a union comprising workers from different establishments owned by different employers. However, the Committee has considered on previous occasions that the free exercise of the right to establish and join unions, implies the free determination of the structure and composition of unions and that under Article 2 of Convention No. 87, workers have the right to establish organizations of their own choosing, including organizations grouping together workers from different workplaces and different cities [see Digest, op. cit., paras. 275 and 283].
104. The Committee therefore requests the Government to take the appropriate steps to ensure that the appropriate legislative amendments, in the light of the principles expressed above, are made to the IRO so that workers have the right to establish and join the organization of their own choosing without any restrictions. It urges the Government to take appropriate steps to ensure that BIGU is granted registration as a trade union organization in conformity with the requirements of Convention No. 87 which has been ratified by Bangladesh. The Committee requests the Government to provide information on any progress made in this regard and draws the attention of the Committee of Experts to this aspect of the case.
Blacklisting of workers and trade unionists
105. The Committee notes that during the course of the second inquiry, the Government indicates that the Managing Director of Palmal completely denies having sent photographs of workers to other employers. The Government states that the management had only wanted to confirm information that some absentee workers of Palmal were reportedly working in some other factories. The management had therefore sent letters (but no photographs) to those factories to confirm the absentee workers' employment there. The Government concludes that since the complainant did not produce any documentary evidence to substantiate the allegations of blacklisting by management, there was no other motive behind the management's actions. The Committee notes however, that the management's statement is in direct contradiction with what it had said during the course of the first inquiry and the previous examination of this case. At that time, the Palmal management had admitted to sending letters with the photos of the absentee workers, although it maintained that this was done only to confirm that absentee workers were employed in other factories [304th Report, para. 76]. In view of this contradiction, the Committee would recall that workers face many practical difficulties in proving the real nature of their dismissal or denial of employment, especially when seen in the context of blacklisting, which is a practice whose very strength lies in its secrecy [see Digest, op. cit., para. 710]. The Committee considers that these allegations, if proven, constitute a violation of freedom of association principles.
Intimidation, beating and resignation of Mr. M. Rahman and N. Ahmed
106. Regarding the circumstances leading to the termination of employment of Mr. M. Rahman and Mr. N. Ahmed, the Committee notes with concern that the Government merely repeats the statement of the Managing Director of Palmal to the effect that neither of the above had been terminated from service; they had resigned voluntarily. The Government adds that proof of this was the photocopy of resignation letters of the two workers submitted by the Managing Director. In view of the seriousness of the allegations according to which these two BIGU activists were both intimidated, beaten and forced to resign, the Committee once again draws the Government's attention to the fundamental principle that intimidation, assaults on the physical integrity of trade unionists and forced resignations constitute a serious violation of freedom of association [see Digest, op. cit., paras. 46, 47 and 702]. The Committee requests the Government to ensure the reinstatement of these persons in their jobs, if they so wish.
Termination of employment of eight BIGU members
107. As regards the reasons for terminating eight BIGU members, the Committee notes that the Government in its inquiry report, refers to the Managing Director's statement that these eight workers had not been dismissed but rather had been on long unauthorized absence from duty. The Committee notes that although the Government does not mention the complainant's point of view in this matter, the complainant had alleged, during the previous examination of this case by the Committee, that these eight BIGU members had been terminated as a consequence of defending workers' rights on compensation issues, i.e. in the exercise of trade union activities [304th Report, para. 64]. The Committee notes the Government's statement that there are now six cases pending in the Labour Court relating to this incident. In view of the contradictory statements as to the reasons for terminating these eight BIGU members, the Committee once again recalls that no person should be dismissed or prejudiced in his or her employment by reason of legitimate trade union activities, and it is important to forbid and penalize in practice all acts of anti-union discrimination in respect of employment [see Digest, op. cit., para. 696]. The Committee requests the Government to keep it informed of the outcome of judgements handed down in the cases pending in the labour courts and to take measures to reinstate the workers concerned if their dismissals are proven discriminatory.
Discrediting of 11 BIGU members and threat of transfer
of four BIGU members
108. The Committee notes that there are still conflicting statements on whether the company in question had attempted to discredit 11 BIGU members by exercising pressure on 155 workers to sign blank sheets of paper which were then attached to a cover page condemning the activities of these 11 BIGU members who had brought law suits against the company. In view of the failure to clear up this matter during the course of the Government's second inquiry, the Committee would recall that in such instances it may often be difficult, if not impossible, for a worker to furnish proof of an act of anti-union discrimination of which he or she has been the victim.
109. Regarding the threat of transfer of four BIGU members, namely Messrs. Badal, Nurul Islam, Shahidul Islam and Hashem, the Government indicates that the complainant could not produce any evidence in support of this allegation during the course of the inquiry. The ITGLWF contends, however, that these four BIGU members were threatened with transfer to another factory in the Palmal group of companies which was located approximately 25 km from their current workplace and homes in Dhaka. Later, following external pressure, the transfer order was abandoned. In view of the contradiction between these two statements, the Committee recalls that threats of transfer, depending on the circumstances, may constitute anti-union discrimination in employment [see Digest, op. cit., para. 695].
Forced resignation of two women workers
110. The Committee notes that the Government, on the basis of its inquiry, indicates that the two women workers were dismissed after exhausting all the procedures provided for under the Employment of Labour Act, 1965, and that they were therefore not forced to resign under pressure of blacklisting because of their contacts with BIGU. The Government does not however explain for what reason these two women workers were dismissed. The Committee would draw the Government's attention to the fact that it considers the allegation of forced resignation under pressure of blacklisting, if proven, to constitute a severe form of anti-union discrimination.
Attempted forced resignation and dismissal of Ms. Kalpana
111. As regards the attempted forced resignation and dismissal of Ms. Kalpana, the Committee notes that Ms. Kalpana is no longer employed at Palmal despite her wishes to the contrary. (This was admitted to by the Managing Director who stated during the course of the inquiry that she was served notice through registered post but that she refused to accept it). Moreover, the Committee notes that during the inquiry, the Managing Director insisted that she was now employed elsewhere whereas Ms. Kalpana denied this. The Committee regrets that the inquiry failed to clarify this matter, especially since the Committee had previously noted that Ms. Kalpana was exposed to serious difficulties in her employment because of trade union activities [304th Report, para. 90]. The Committee would therefore reiterate its request to the Government to take the necessary steps to clarify Ms. Kalpana's employment situation, to ensure that she can continue to work in her post at Palmal, if she so wishes and to make sure that she is not discriminated against because of her trade union activities. The Committee requests the Government to keep it informed of developments in this regard.
Attack on trade union premises and physical assault
on trade unionists
112. The Committee regrets that the Government did not comply with the Committee's earlier request to institute an independent judicial inquiry into the attack on trade union premises on 21 November 1995 and the physical assault on trade unionists present [304th Report, para. 96(g)]. Furthermore, the Committee notes with concern that the second government inquiry has not shed any further light on this serious incident. Deploring this severe violation of trade union rights, the Committee recalls that attacks against trade unionists and trade union premises and property constitute serious interference with trade union rights. Criminal activities of this nature create a climate of fear which is extremely prejudicial to the exercise of trade union activities [304th Report, Case No. 1862 (Bangladesh), para. 94].
* * *
113. In view of the fact that two inquiries carried out by the Government have failed to resolve the contradiction in the evidence provided by the respective parties, the Committee would request the Government to institute an independent judicial inquiry into the various allegations made and to keep it informed of the results thereof. The proceedings of such an inquiry could possibly be facilitated by calling as witnesses BIGU members who were allegedly subjected to various acts of anti-union discrimination.
Trade union situation at Saladin Garments Ltd.
114. As regards the ITGLWF'S allegations concerning the trade union situation at Saladin Garments Ltd., the Committee notes the Government's statement that the Department of Labour has already carried out an inquiry into the ITGLWF'S complaint. The Committee notes with serious concern however, that this government inquiry, like the ones carried out with regard to the trade union situation at Palmal, rejects any anti-union motives on the part of the employer. The Committee regrets that the Government, during the course of the inquiry, based itself almost exclusively on information provided by the management of Saladin Garments Ltd. and did not take account of the position of the complainant to a larger extent. In view of the seriousness of the allegations made -- severe harassment, death threats, physical assaults, forced resignations and other types of intimidation of workers at Saladin Garments Ltd. -- the Committee must once again draw the Government's attention to the importance it attaches to the principle that the rights of workers' organizations can only be exercised in a climate that is free from violence, pressure or threats of any kind against the leaders and members of unions, and it is for governments to ensure that this principle is respected [see Digest, op. cit., para. 47]. In the light of this principle, the Committee requests the Government to institute a genuinely independent judicial inquiry into the various allegations made and to keep it informed in this regard.
Registration of new union at Saladin Garments Ltd.
115. The Committee notes the Government's statement that the application for registration of a newly formed union at Saladin Garments Ltd. was rejected by the Registrar on 3 June 1996 for not having met the requirements of sections 7, 9 and 10 of the IRO 1969. The Committee must stress once again that the above provisions are not in conformity with Article 2 of Convention No. 87 for the very same reasons enumerated in the preceding paragraphs pertaining to the registration of BIGU. The Committee therefore requests the Government to take appropriate steps to ensure that the newly formed union at Saladin Garments Ltd. is granted registration so as to enable it to exercise legitimate trade union activities.
Torture of Mr. Chand Mia
116. As regards the alleged torture of a worker, Mr. Chand Mia, by Messrs. Nannu, Jainal and Monir on 8 and 9 April 1996, the Committee regrets that the Government merely confines itself to stating that this allegation could not be proved at the time of the inquiry and that even the President of the union did not see Mr. Chand Mia being physically tortured but simply learnt of it later on. The Committee further deplores the fact that the police had taken no action on a complaint lodged on 9 April 1996. The Committee believes that an independent judicial inquiry is especially warranted here since it has considered on previous occasions that in the event of assaults on the physical or moral integrity of individuals, an independent judicial inquiry should be instituted immediately with a view to clarifying the facts, determining responsibility, punishing those responsible and preventing the repetition of such acts [see Digest, op. cit., para. 53].
Harassment and intimidation of union President and
members; forced resignation of two women workers
117. As regards the alleged harassment and intimidation of the union President, Ms. Asma, and of other workers for attempting to establish an independent union, the Committee notes the Government's statement that during the course of its inquiry, the management did admit to "advising" Ms. Asma not to form a union with the assistance of outsiders. The Government maintains however, that Ms. Asma and other workers were issued show-cause notices (misconduct letters) later on not because of their involvement in the establishment of a trade union but for "various other reasons" as per the laws of the country.
118. Similarly, as regards the alleged forced resignation of union General Secretary, Ms. Shuli, and another women union member, the Committee notes that the Government merely repeats the management's view that as the two women workers had resigned voluntarily, there was no room for their reinstatement.
* * *
119. In a general manner, the Committee notes that the Government, while not denying the anti-union attitude of the management, does not shed further light on it during the course of its inquiry. The Committee considers that these allegations complete the picture of active anti-union discrimination by the management. It further considers that attempting to obtain lists of unionists for the purpose of having a basis for systematic anti-union activities, such as issuing death threats and misconduct letters to union leaders and members as well as engineering their forced resignations, is a severe violation of freedom of association principles. It therefore requests the Government to keep it informed of the outcome of the independent judicial inquiry into the above allegations.
120. In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations:
Report in which the Committee requests
to be kept informed of developments
Complaint against the Government of Belarus
presented by
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)
Allegations: Expulsion of unionists, violations of freedom
of assembly and freedom of association
121. In communications dated 15, 21 and 29 May 1996, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) submitted a complaint of violations of freedom of association against the Government of Belarus.
122. In the absence of any reply from the Government, the Committee had to postpone its examination of this case involving allegations of a particularly serious nature on two occasions. At its meeting in November 1996 [see 305th Report, para. 9], the Committee made an urgent appeal to the Government stating that, in accordance with the procedural rules set out in paragraph 17 of its 127th Report, approved by the Governing Body, it could present a report on the substance of the case at its next meeting, even if information and observations requested from the Government had not been received in due time. The Government has not furnished any observations to date.
123. Belarus has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).
A. The complainant's allegations
124. In its communication of 15 May 1996, the ICFTU alleges that the Government of Belarus has again taken action to prevent the independent trade unions of the country from enjoying normal, international trade union contacts.
125. According to the ICFTU, a NSZZ Solidarnosc delegation led by Marian Krzaklewski, President, accompanied by Andrzej Adamczyk, International Secretary, and Eugeniusz Polmanski as well as their driver travelled to Minsk on 13 May for a fraternal visit to the Free Trade Union of Belarus (SPB).
126. A number of meetings were organized by the SPB with workers in various enterprises. The delegation had received a permit to enter the Minsk Factory of Production Lines which they were to have visited on 14 May in the morning. This was subsequently withdrawn without any explanation. The delegation therefore met the workers in a school stadium outside the factory premises during their break. Thereafter, the delegation went to the union headquarters and had lunch in a nearby restaurant. Upon leaving the restaurant, they were stopped by eight officers of the Presidential Police and were taken to the police station of the Partisan district. The Polish Ambassador in Minsk intervened immediately and was allowed to meet the delegation. They were declared persona non grata and ordered to leave the country forthwith. The ICFTU indicated its understanding that there was a high risk of repressive measures being strengthened against the SPB.
127. In its communication of 21 May 1996, the ICFTU adds that on 15 May, immediately after the deportation of the NSZZ Solidarnosc delegation, the police visited the headquarters of the SPB and served a court summons on Gennady Bykov, President, and P. Moyseyevich, Vice-President of the SPB and president of the Metal Workers' Union, on the grounds of their participation in an illegal gathering. The illegal gathering in question was the meeting held in a school stadium when the permit to visit the Minsk Factory of Production Lines was refused.
128. The Deputy Minister of Industry wrote to the union on 14 May, referring to Presidential Decree No. 336 imposing a temporary ban on the activity of the SPB. In view of this Decree he advised that any meeting with the workers should take place outside their work premises. As the union had received a written permit for the visit to the factory from the director, they arrived at the factory in line with the agreed schedule. Upon their arrival, they were met by armed police and security officers with video cameras. The director was visibly upset and withdrew the permit. Bykov and Moyseyevich in effect remained in the factory discussing with the director and officers while the meeting in the school stadium was taking place. They therefore did not participate in the allegedly illegal gathering. Nevertheless, if they are to be tried and condemned, Bykov, who has already served a ten-day sentence, would be eligible for a minimum six-month imprisonment.
129. The ICFTU further alleges that the SPB was informed by the Deputy Minister of Justice that the ministry had received instructions from the Presidency to implement Decree No. 336. In terms of the Decree, the ministry would need to close all SPB offices. Furthermore, the two unions associated with the SPB, namely the Belarus Independent Union (formerly NPG) and the Free Trade Union of Transport Workers, have been served with summons for the use of illegal insignia on the occasion of their first of May demonstrations. Both unions have union flags with their acronyms printed against the background of the former flag of free Belarus.
130. In conclusion, the ICFTU emphasizes the continuing use by the Government of Presidential Decree No. 336, in clear contradiction with recommendations on this subject previously made by the Committee on Freedom of Association.
131. The Committee regrets that despite the time elapsed since the presentation of the complaint and given the seriousness of the matters alleged, the Government has not responded to any of the allegations made by the complainant organization, though it has been invited to make comments and observations on this case on several occasions, including by means of an urgent appeal.
132. Under these circumstances, and in accordance with the applicable rule of procedure [see the 127th Report of the Committee, para. 17, approved by the Governing Body at its 184th Session], the Committee feels obliged to submit a report on the substance of the case, even in the absence of the information which it had hoped to receive from the Government.
133. The Committee first of all reminds the Government that the purpose of the procedures established by the International Labour Organization for examining allegations of violations of freedom of association is to ensure that this freedom is respected in law and fact. While these procedures protect governments against unreasonable accusations, they must recognize for their part the importance of formulating detailed replies to the allegations made against them for objective examination. [See First Report of the Committee, para. 31.]
134. The Committee notes that the allegations in this case refer to the expulsion of non-national unionists, the serving of a court summons on trade union leaders for participation in a union gathering, and the continued threat of implementation of a ban on the activity of the Free Trade Union of Belarus (SPB) and its dissolution. In particular, the Committee notes with concern that many of these allegations concern violations of the principles of freedom of association which had recently been drawn to the Government's attention in the Committee's examination of another complaint submitted against the Government of Belarus [Case No. 1849, 302nd Report, paras. 161-222].
135. The Committee first notes that members of a delegation of the NSZZ Solidarnosc, after having met with workers from the Minsk Factory of Production Lines and having visited the SPB headquarters, were stopped by eight officers of the Presidential Police and taken to the police station where the Polish Ambassador in Minsk was obliged to intervene. The NSZZ Solidarnosc officers were declared persona non grata and ordered to leave the country. The Committee further notes that, immediately after the deportation of the NSZZ Solidarnosc delegation, a summons was issued against Gennady Bykov and P. Moyseyevich, the President and Vice-President respectively of SPB, for having participated in an "illegal gathering" (i.e., the SPB meeting with the NSZZ Solidarnosc delegation held in a school stadium when the permit to visit the Minsk Factory of Production Lines, originally granted, was subsequently revoked without explanation).
136. The Committee must first emphasize the importance of the principle, affirmed in 1970 by the International Labour Conference in its resolution concerning trade union rights and their relation to civil liberties, that the respect for civil liberties, such as the freedom of assembly, is essential for the normal exercise of trade union rights. On the basis of the information available, the Committee cannot but conclude that the serving of a court summons on Bykov and Moyseyevich for participation in a meeting of the SPB with the NSZZ Solidarnosc delegation is in violation of the union's right to free assembly and of freedom of association. Furthermore, given that the allegations indicate that Mr. Bykov, if tried, would be eligible for a minimum six-month prison term, the Committee wishes to emphasize, as it did in another case concerning Belarus [see 302nd Report, para. 213], that the imprisonment of trade union leaders for activities connected with the exercise of their trade union rights is contrary to the principles of freedom of association. The Committee therefore calls on the Government to immediately withdraw any charges made against Bykov and Moyseyevich for their participation in the SPB meeting of 14 May 1996 and to refrain from any further measures interfering with the right of free assembly of trade unions. It requests the Government to keep it informed concerning the withdrawal of charges against Mr. Bykov and Mr. Moyseyevich.
137. The Committee also regrets that the members of the NSZZ Solidarnosc delegation were declared persona non grata and deported following, and apparently as a result of, their participation in the SPB meeting. It finds this fact all the more disturbing given that the delegation had already initially received a permit to enter the Minsk Factory and to visit the workers there which was subsequently revoked without explanation. In this respect, the Committee would draw the Government's attention to the principle that the formalities to which trade unionists and trade union leaders are subject in seeking entry to the territory of a State, or in attending to trade union business there, should be based on objective criteria and be free of anti-union discrimination. [See Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee, 4th edition, 1996, para. 639.] It requests the Government to ensure in the future that this principle is fully respected in practice.
138. The Committee also notes from the allegations that the SPB has been informed by the Deputy Ministry of Justice that the ministry had received instructions from the Presidency to implement Decree No. 336. In its examination of Case No. 1849, the Committee noted with satisfaction that the Constitutional Court had declared certain articles of Presidential Decree No. 336 to be unconstitutional, in particular those concerning the suspension and termination of the activities of the Free Trade Union of Belarus, as well as the pursuit by the Procurator's office of its dissolution. [See 302nd Report, paras. 207, 209 and 210.] The Committee, however, expressed serious concern that it did not have any information on the follow-up given to the Court's decision and urgently requested the Government to ensure its full implementation. [See 302nd Report, para. 222(d).]
139. In these circumstances, the Committee cannot but express its profound regret that the Government has not taken any measures to implement its above recommendation concerning Decree No. 336 and, to the contrary, would appear to be threatening new steps to implement the Decree despite the declaration by the Constitutional Court of its unconstitutionality and the conclusions of the Committee that its provisions were in violation of the principles of freedom of association. The Committee therefore urges the Government to take immediate steps to revoke the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 336 which interfere with the free exercise of trade union rights, namely articles 1, 2 and 3, and to keep it informed of the progress made in this regard.
140. Finally, as concerns the summons served upon two unions associated with the SPB (the Belarus Independent Union and the Free Trade Union of Transport Workers) for the use of illegal insignia on the occasion of their demonstrations on the first of May, the Committee must recall that the full exercise of trade union rights calls for a free flow of information, opinions and ideas, and to this end workers, employers and their organizations should enjoy freedom of opinion and expression at their meetings, in their publications and in the course of other trade union activities. [See Digest, op. cit., para. 152.] The Committee is of the opinion that the choice of union insignia falls within the scope of freedom of expression, the respect of which is essential for the normal exercise of trade union rights, and therefore should, as a general principle, be left solely to the internal affairs of the trade union in question. The Committee trusts that, if charges are maintained against the unions in question concerning their use of this insignia, that they will be reviewed by an independent judicial body which will ensure that the freedom of expression of trade unionists is also respected when considering other interests which might eventually be invoked. The Government is requested to keep the Committee informed of any further developments concerning the summons served upon the Belarus Independent Union and the Free Trade Union of Transport Workers for the use of what the Government considers as illegal insignia.
141. In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations:
Definitive report
Complaints against the Government of Bolivia
presented by
-- the World Confederation of Labour (WCL) and
-- the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)
Allegations: Consequences of the state of
emergency on trade union rights
142. The Committee examined this case at its November 1995 meeting [see 300th Report, paras. 371 to 398, approved by the Governing Body at its 264th Session (November 1995)], in which it came to interim conclusions.
143. Given the lack of information provided by the Government on the issues pending, the Committee has had to postpone the examination of this case on three occasions. At its November 1996 meeting, the Committee also drew the Government's attention to the fact that, in accordance with the procedural rules set out in paragraph 17 of its 117th report, approved by the Governing Body at its 184th Session (November 1971), it might present a report on the substance of this case at its next session, even if the observations or information requested had not been received in due time [see 305th report, approved by the Governing Body at its 267th Session (November 1995), para. 9]. To date, no information from the Government has been received.
144. Bolivia has ratified both the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).
A. Previous examination of the case
145. In the Committee's previous examination of the case, the issue concerning the consequences of the state of emergency in Bolivia, declared in April 1995 following strikes in major sectors, demonstrations and marches, remained pending. More specifically, the Committee made the following recommendations [see 300th Report, para. 398]:
... the Committee stresses that the state of emergency is incompatible with the full exercise of freedom of association. It urges the public authorities not to resort in the future to such measures. The Committee requests the Government to confirm that the state of emergency has been lifted. It requests the Government to provide information on the manner in which the constitutional provisions concerning the state of emergency were applied and on the impact of its application on trade union rights. It emphasizes that the consequences of the state of emergency which have violated the rights of trade unionists must be set aright. The Committee requests the Government to ensure that all those who were dismissed be reinstated in their jobs and to guarantee the full exercise of freedom of association.
146. First of all, the Committee regrets that the Government has not communicated the observations requested on the issues pending, despite the time which has elapsed since the last examination of the case and that it was invited to submit its comments and observations on a number of occasions, including by means of an urgent appeal.
147. In these circumstances, in accordance with the applicable procedural rule [see para. 17 of its 127th Report, approved by the Governing Body at its 184th Session], the Committee will have to present a report on the substance of the case without being able to take account of the information it hoped to receive from the Government.
148. The Committee would remind the Government that the purpose of the whole procedure instituted by the International Labour Organization to examine allegations of violations of freedom of association is to promote respect for this freedom in law and in fact; the Committee therefore remains confident that, if the procedure protects governments against unreasonable accusations, governments on their side will recognize the importance of formulating for objective examination detailed factual replies to the allegations put forward [see first Report of the Committee, para. 31, approved by the Governing Body in March 1952].
149. The Committee has noted that the state of emergency, declared under Supreme Decree No. 23993 of 18 April 1995 and approved by the Council of Ministers under a resolution dated 21 April 1995, was extended by 90 days. According to article 111 of the Constitution "the Executive shall not extend the state of emergency beyond 90 days or declare another within the same year ...".
150. As regards the consequences of the state of emergency (April 1995) on trade union rights, the Committee, noting that the state of emergency has come to an end and that the Government has not provided the information requested on this matter, urges the Government once again to redress any wrongs that might have been inflicted on trade unionists as a result of the state of emergency and to ensure that all those who might have been dismissed for their trade union activities be reinstated in their jobs.
151. In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations:
Definitive report
Complaint against the Government of Brazil
presented by
the Single Confederation of Workers (CUT)
Allegations: Application of fines exceeding the payment
capacity of trade unions for holding strikes
152. The complaint was submitted in communications from the Single Confederation of Workers dated 28 May and 21 October 1996. The Government sent its observations in communications dated 19 December 1996 and 28 January 1997.
153. Brazil has not ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), however it has ratified the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).
A. The complainant's allegations
154. In its communications of 28 May and 21 October 1996, the Single Confederation of Workers (CUT) recalls that in May 1995 the Supreme Labour Tribunal declared abusive (illegal) the strike held within the framework of the collective bargaining process in the PETROBRAS oil company and imposed the working conditions to be respected by the parties (this action was considered by the Committee on Freedom of Association as a violation of the right to strike, bearing in mind the circumstances of the case [see 300th Report, Case No. 1839, para. 86]. The CUT adds that following the pursuance of the strike, the Supreme Labour Tribunal imposed on each trade union affiliated to the Single Federation of Oil Workers (FUP) a fine of US$100,000 for each day of strike, which given the duration of the strike made a total of US$2 million. This astronomic amount exceeded the payment capacity of the trade unions in question, preventing them from: using the dues paid by their members; fulfilling their economic obligations; paying their employees and carrying out their trade union activities.
155. The CUT adds that although the National Congress approved an amnesty law absolving the trade unions from paying the above-mentioned fines, the President of the Republic vetoed this law on 1 April 1996.
156. Furthermore, the CUT alleges that the Government has sent a Bill (1802/96) to the National Congress which amends the Act respecting strikes, in particular as regards essential activities. This Bill limits collective bargaining by authorizing the judiciary to intervene in interest disputes between employers and trade unions, through the exercise of the standard-setting power of the labour courts, by submitting such disputes to a compulsory settlement, and it expressly provides that the judicial authority shall apply fines to trade unions engaging in strikes deemed as "abusive", thus regulating the fines already imposed on the trade unions by the courts.
157. The CUT objects in particular to the following provisions of the proposed text of Bill No. 1802/96:
Section 11
Paragraph 2. In the event that a collective labour dispute which has resulted in a strike is placed before the Tribunal, the President of the Tribunal responsible for its examination may immediately issue a judicial order establishing the conditions and percentage of employees who must remain at work during the stoppage, with a view to complying with the provisions stated at the beginning of this section, and which shall vary in accordance with the nature of the work in the production section in question.
Paragraph 3. The judicial order respecting the unavoidable needs of the community, the infringement of which by any of the parties shall result in a daily fine of up to 500 minimum wages, shall remain in force:
Paragraph 4. In the event of failure to comply with the order, the legitimate party may, and the Ministry of Labour must, take steps with the Tribunal for the payment of the fine.
Section 16
If the strike is declared abusive by the Tribunal, the latter shall order the immediate return to work of the strikers, and warn the trade union that in the event of non-compliance with the decision a daily fine shall be imposed which in any case shall not exceed 1,000 minimum wages for each day that the strike movement continues.
Paragraph 1. In determining the amount of the fine, the Tribunal shall take into account the economic and financial capacity of the trade union and the social and economic consequences of non-compliance with the decision.
Section 17
If the Tribunal has declared the strike abusive and imposed the fine, it may suspend its payment, in whole or in part, for a period of up to five years, at the request of the interested party or at the request of the Public Ministry of Labour, once the situation has returned to normal.
Paragraph 1. Once the time-limit stipulated at the beginning of this section has elapsed without the trade union organization having engaged in any abusive strike, the competent court may order the cancellation of the fine at the request of the trade union concerned.
Paragraph 2. Proceedings shall be engaged for the full payment of the fine in the event that an abusive strike is held within the time period established at the beginning of this section.
Section 2
Trade unions subject to the execution of a fine imposed by judicial decision within the framework of a collective labour dispute which has resulted in a strike may apply to the Tribunal which applied the sanction to request that such fines be adapted to the criteria and limits established in section 16 and the suspension of the application of the fines under the provisions of section 17 ...
Section 3
This Act shall come into force on the day of its publication.
158. Finally, the CUT requests that a recommendation be made to the Government to withdraw the proposed text of Bill No. 1802/96 and to annul the standard-setting power of the courts in cases of collective labour disputes resulting in strikes since at present such disputes are subject to compulsory settlement.
B. The Government's reply
159. In its communications of 19 December 1996, the Government states that Bill No. 1802/96, drafted by the Executive, is the result of the latter's commitment to introduce reforms to modernize the State and its institutions.
160. The Government points out that during the strike by workers at the PETROBRAS enterprise in May 1995, the Supreme Labour Tribunal ordered the immediate return of the workers to their workplaces, following its ruling that the strike movement was unlawful, since it violated the standards in force respecting collective labour disputes, non-compliance with which would be subject to the payment of a fine of 100,000 reales per day by each member of the Single Federation of Oil Workers (FUP), which represented the workers. The imposition of this fine by the labour court, given the refusal of the workers to return to their workplaces, was intended to put an end to a strike movement which lasted a month and during which the civilian population suffered a shortage of fuel and cooking gas because of the non-maintenance of a minimum level of essential services.
161. Following the application of the ruling made by the labour court, a number of representative trade union bodies of the workers of the enterprise which disregarded the ruling claimed that it compromised their financial situation.
162. Bill No. 600 (placed before the National Congress by the Government following the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association in Case No. 1839) granted an amnesty to the oil workers' trade unions in respect of the fines imposed by the labour courts following the strike movement of May 1995. After the Bill had been adopted by the National Congress, it was vetoed by the President of the Republic as being contrary to the public interest and to the respect of legal standards and judicial decisions. The precedent which would be created by the adoption of the above-mentioned Bill would have resulted in discrediting the legitimacy of the principles governing a democratic State based on the rule of law and called into question the harmonization of the powers of the State as established by the Constitution, which would be compromised by the disregard of decisions consistently adopted by the judiciary.
163. In vetoing the above-mentioned Bill, the President of the Republic presented another Bill (No. 1802/96) which regulates more precisely the consequences of the abusive exercise of the right to strike, by establishing parameters for determining with greater legal clarity the responsibility of unions which promote work stoppages considered as abusive, particularly in those branches which provide the general public with essential services, in accordance with Act No. 7783/89. The President's message tacitly acknowledged the excessive nature of the sanction imposed by the Supreme Labour Tribunal by emphasizing that the Executive is not indifferent to the fact that trade union activity by the oil workers may not be possible as a result of the high amount of the fines imposed.
164. Bill No. 1802/96 provided for a possible solution to the specific question of the fines imposed on the trade unions of workers of PETROBRAS and other trade unions by establishing parameters which must be respected by the labour courts in the fixing of fines, their payment and the possibility of suspending the application of such fines.
165. The Bill took account of the situation of an occupational category which, following the application of a fine imposed under a judicial ruling which declared a strike abusive, made the exercise of trade union activity in a specific production sector unviable by providing that any trade union subject to such an order could under the Bill apply to the court which imposed the order for the sanctions to be adjusted and/or the payment of the fines to be suspended, in accordance with the economic capacity of the trade unions. This provision preserves the independence of and harmony between the powers of the Republic, which would have been seriously compromised if the National Congress had withdrawn from the Supreme Labour Tribunal its authority respecting the application of fines imposed as a result of the strike movement of May 1995.
166. Bill No. 1802/96 introduces into Act No. 7783/89 (Act respecting strikes) certain practices which had already been adopted by the labour courts as regards the fixing of minimum percentages of staff who must remain at work and the conditions in which indispensable services are to be provided to meet the essential needs of the public in the event of strikes in essential services, and the imposition of fines and their application by the Public Ministry of Labour. In this way, the Bill before the National Congress is an attempt to promote a return to normal conditions in labour and trade union relations in the oil sector (including through the possible retroactive application of the provisions of the Bill) and goes beyond these immediate objectives by regulating more precisely the exercise of the right to strike guaranteed by the Constitution. The Bill offers a broader solution at the standard-setting level to the matter dealt with in the Bill vetoed by the President concerning the amnesty granted in respect of fines imposed on various trade union bodies by the Supreme Labour Tribunal.
167. Although immunity with respect to the abuses committed on the pretext of the right to strike is contrary to the Constitution, the competence of the labour courts should nevertheless be circumscribed by legal parameters concerning the imposition of pecuniary sanctions on trade union bodies. The Bill provides for its full application to fines imposed before its publication. This is also the case as regards the limitation on the amount of the fine and the suspension of its application. This innovation allows the pecuniary sanction to be lifted once the industrial relations situation has returned to normal.
168. In its communication of 28 January 1997, the Government indicates that the trade union organization's reference to the standard-stetting power of the labour courts as an instrument used against the workers is without basis. Consideration must be given to the nature of the collective disputes submitted to the assessment of the courts, determined as collective disputes, to which the workers, employers (and the public ministry in cases of the paralysis of essential activities) may have recourse and which require the assistance of the State to resolve those collective disputes where agreement or conciliation seems totally or partially impossible. The federal Constitution grants the labour courts the standard-setting power in order to establish rules and working conditions in the judgement of collective disputes, setting new conditions or working rules and respecting the limits imposed by the Constitution and the laws of the land. This is a result of the principle of jurisdiction which is a way of resolving conflicts through the intervention of the State in the judicial process where the concrete right is established, dictating to the parties the legal solution to the dispute. The standard-setting power should be interpreted in accordance with democratic principles (article 1), separation of powers (articles 2 and 49) and legality (article 5 II), all of which are provided for in the federal Constitution. As concerns strikes in cases where a collective rights dispute has been declared, or when submitted to the judiciary, it must be determined whether the strike is or is not abusive. Where a strike has been declared abusive taking into account the violation of the provisions of Act No. 7783/89 sanctions are provided where the workers have not returned to the workplace and recommenced negotiations.
169. The Government adds that the standard-setting power, contrary to what was said by the complainant organization, has limits established in the federal Constitution. When the labour courts exercise this standard-setting power it has executed an exclusively judicial activity. When judging collective disputes, existing standards in positive law must be observed, thus the courts are exercising jurisdictional power given that they are applying a legal order. The limits established by the Constitution prohibit the judiciary from exercising a legislative activity due to the principle of the separation of powers. When exercising the standard-setting power, it must assure private property, the equality of rights, the social function of private property, the objective of full employment, free enterprise, the value of human work and the dictates of social justice. The standard-setting power is exercised within the limits of the law, given that no one is required to do or not to do any act by virtue of the law (article 5 II). This means that the standard-setting power cannot be exercised if there is no legal provision for it. In this way, the standard-setting power cannot touch upon matters not provided for in the law. The standard-setting power establishes rules through a judgement dictated by a competent body, in the present case, the section on collective disputes of the Supreme Labour Tribunal, composed of lawyers and representatives of workers and of employers. Similarly, the standard-setting power enables the establishment of applicable standards according to which the competent body will determine the qualification of a strike, in the present case, part of the section of collective disputes, which includes among its members representatives of workers, of employers and lawyers.
170. Like all draft legislation, Bill No. 1802/96 may be subject to amendments during its passage through the committees of the National Congress. It is the responsibility of society, as represented by the National Congress, to decide upon its appropriateness, adaptation and timeliness, by introducing amendments considered necessary for its adoption and subsequent submission to presidential approval.
171. In this case, the complainant organization alleges the imposition of fines on trade unions affiliated to the Single Federation of Oil Workers (FUP) participating in strikes in the PETROBRAS enterprise in 1995 and which exceeded the payment capacity of the trade unions; the veto by the President of the Republic of an Act (No. 600) adopted by the National Congress which granted an amnesty in respect of these fines; the presentation of a Bill (No. 1802/96) which regulates the imposition of fines for strikes deemed abusive or illegal by the judicial authority and which, according to the complainant, contains provisions which are contrary to freedom of association and which subject collective disputes of interest to the judicial authority.
172. As regards the fines imposed by the judicial authority on the trade unions affiliated to the Single Federation of Oil Workers (FUP) following the strikes held in the PETROBRAS enterprise in 1995 after a compulsory judicial settlement, the Committee notes that the total amount of the fines is very high and that the Government recognizes that this high amount may make the trade union activity of the workers impossible. The Committee would like to refer to the conclusions which, within the framework of Case No. 1839, it reached at its meeting of November 1995 concerning this labour dispute and strike of oil workers and the submission of disputes to the judicial authority, which are reproduced below [see 300th Report, paras. 86 and 87]:
With regard to the violation of the principle of collective bargaining in the dispute under examination, the Committee observes that according to the complainant the strike commenced on 27 September 1994 pursuant to the enterprise's rejection of the union's main demands and that the Government states that three days later, on 30 September 1994, the Supreme Labour Tribunal established the working conditions to be respected by the parties (and, as a consequence, the workers on strike were to return to work immediately as required by legislation). The Government also declared that subsequently, on 9 May 1995, the enterprise submitted the collective dispute to the Supreme Labour Tribunal. Moreover, the complainant indicated in this context that neither the Government nor PETROBRAS had respected the terms of the relevant agreements (appended to the complaint) that they had signed with the Single Federation of Oil Workers on 10 and 25 November 1994 (the latter agreement was subsequently to be termed by the Supreme Labour Tribunal as a "protocol of intent" and declared legally invalid). Irrespective of these texts, the Committee must emphasize that, three days after the strike broke out and as the movement was continuing, the Supreme Labour Tribunal imposed working conditions to be respected by the parties thus rendering the strike activity illegal. On this score, the Committee wishes to recall the principle that "a provision which commits either party unilaterally to request the intervention of the labour authority may effectively undermine the right of workers to call a strike ... and does not promote voluntary collective bargaining" (cf. 265th Report, Cases Nos. 1478 and 1484 (Peru), para. 547, and 295th Report, Case No. 1718 (Philippines), para. 296]. In these circumstances, the Committee considers that the action taken violated the right to strike. It requests the Government to take measures to amend legislation so that the submission of collective interest disputes to the judicial authorities is only possible by common agreement between the parties or in the case of essential services in the strict sense of the term (the interruption of which may endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population).
Moreover, the Committee urges the Government to guarantee that collective agreements between management and unions be respected. It also requests the Government to encourage the social partners to resolve collective disputes by means of collective bargaining.
173. The Committee recalls that, in this case, it had concluded that the Government acted in violation of the principles of freedom of association by putting an end to the strike in the PETROBRAS enterprise. In these circumstances, the Committee concludes that the imposition of fines for the exercise of the right to strike in the circumstances of the present case is not consistent with the principle of freedom of association, in particular bearing in mind that the Government recognizes that the high amount of the fines may make trade union activity impossible. The Committee stresses that no fine or sanction should be imposed against the unionists in question. The Committee also notes that, in line with the previous recommendations of the Committee, the Government presented a Bill (No. 600) to the National Congress which granted an amnesty in respect of the fines (subsequently vetoed by the President of the Republic who invoked the respect of the decisions of the judiciary and the protection of the principles of a democratic State based on the rule of law). The Committee insists that the Government take the necessary measures to ensure that these fines are annulled. Furthermore, the Committee notes the Government's statement concerning the circumstances in which the standard-setting power of the labour courts would be exercised. In the Committee's opinion, this procedure is not incompatible with the principles of freedom of association to the extent that it concerns essential services in the strict sense of the term. The Committee reiterates the request already made at its meeting of November 1995 for the Government to take measures to amend legislation to ensure that the submission of collective interest disputes to the judicial authorities is only possible by common agreement between the parties or in the case of essential services in the strict sense of the term (the interruption of which may endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population).
174. As regards Bill No. 1802/96 which regulates and establishes criteria concerning the imposition of fines in the event of abusive or legal strikes, which the Executive sent to the National Congress, the Committee notes that according to the Government the Bill establishes parameters for determining with greater legal clarity responsibilities in the case of abusive stoppages in the essential services mentioned in the legislation, in particular bearing in mind that the high amount of the fines imposed by the judicial authorities might make trade union activity impossible. The Committee also notes that in the light of the resulting situation, the Bill provides that fines may be adjusted in accordance with the economic capacity of the trade unions and may be suspended and cancelled after five years if the trade union body has not carried out any other abusive strike (for example, failure to comply with the provision respecting minimum services).
175. The Committee would like to emphasize that the imposition of sanctions, including fines, on the social partners in the case of infringement of labour legislation is not in itself a matter of objection; however, such sanctions must be proportionate to the seriousness of the infringement committed and must in no case compromise the continuation of the activities of the parties thus sanctioned. Similarly, the Bill should not provide for fines or sanctions in cases of legitimate strike action. In this respect, the Committee believes that fines which are equivalent to a maximum amount of 500 or 1,000 minimum wages per day of abusive strike may have an intimidating effect on trade unions and inhibit their legitimate trade union activities, and that such an effect would also occur if -- as is also provided for in this Bill -- the cancellation of a fine of this kind is subject to the provision that no further strike considered as abusive is carried out. For this reason, the Committee requests the Government to consult with the social partners on the content of Bill No. 1802/96 and hopes that the results of these consultations and the above-mentioned principles will be taken into account in the final text of the Act.
176. In the light of the foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations:
Definitive report
Complaint against the Government of Canada
presented by
-- the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) and
-- the Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC)
Allegations: Restrictions on the scope of collective bargaining
177. In a communication dated 20 October 1995, the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) submitted a complaint of violations of freedom of association against the Government of Canada. The CLC transmitted supplementary information from its affiliate, the Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC) on 23 November 1995.
178. The Government sent its observations on this case in communications dated 6 February and 14 April 1996.
179. At its meeting in May-June 1996, the Committee requested both the Government and the complainant organizations to provide further detailed information concerning the machinery for determining matters of employment security in order to be in a position to examine the case in full knowledge of the facts.
180. The CLC submitted a supplementary statement of evidence in a communication dated 19 September 1996. The Government and the Public Service Alliance of Canada sent a joint statement dated 8 October 1996 in reply to the Committee's request. This statement was supported by the CLC in a separate communication of the same date. The Government sent comments on the CLC statement of 19 September in a communication dated 23 October 1996.
181. Canada has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87). It has not ratified the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), the Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No. 151) or the Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154).
A. The complainants' allegations
182. In its communication dated 20 October 1995, the CLC alleges that the Government of Canada has infringed Conventions Nos. 87, 98, 151 and 154 with the proclamation of Bill No. C-76 (the Budget Implementation Act, 1995) which adversely affects some 150,000 of its affiliate's (PSAC) members and thousands of other federal public sector workers in Canada.
183. The complainant organization points out that this is the fourth legislative intervention into collective bargaining in the federal public service of Canada since 1991. Bill No. C-76 amends the Public Sector Compensation Act (hereinafter "the Act" by explicitly rescinding the right of bargaining agents to negotiate job security provisions for a period of three years. The CLC alleges that this latest legislative extension of the Act will result in a situation whereby bargaining agents can return to collective bargaining in 1997-98, but will be prohibited by law from negotiating any provisions relating to job security and workforce adjustment.
184. The complainant organization further states that the Canadian Government has not implemented any of the recommendations made by the Committee on Freedom of Association in Case No. 1800 (also concerning legislative restrictions on collective bargaining) and it expresses concern that the Government has failed to act on the recommendation that it "make use of the assistance of the International Labour Office, in particular through an advisory mission".
185. On 23 November 1995, the CLC transmitted a document prepared by the PSAC explaining in detail the allegations involved in the present complaint and indicating the support it has given to the recommendations made in related cases. [Cases Nos. 1616, 1758 and 1800.] In particular, the PSAC expresses its strong support of the recommendation for an advisory mission as it believes that outside intervention is necessary if the federal public sector is to return to collective bargaining and if the bargaining process is to be truly free. Given that the Government has not agreed to the assistance and has continued with its legislative agenda, the PSAC feels that the federal labour relations crisis has only been further compounded.
186. On a general note, the PSAC emphasizes that their ability, along with the CLC, to file complaints, and the ILO's ability to consider them has failed to keep pace with the Canadian Government's legislative agenda. Hence, while the ILO was considering Cases Nos. 1758 and 1800, the Canadian Government was proceeding with legislation that once again intervenes in the collective bargaining process.
187. The PSAC recalls that, as a result of Bill No. C-113 and Bill No. C-17 extension of wage controls (the subject of previous complaints), the legislatively extended collective agreements of federal public sector workers would have expired at various times in 1996 and 1997, with the majority expiring in the second half of 1998. At that time, the return to bargaining would have been complete. This has now been complicated however by the adoption of Bill No. C-76 which, while not extending the wage control regime or imposing a general prohibition on collective bargaining once the legislative collective agreement extension is removed, does legislatively amend existing collective agreement provisions by prohibiting future negotiation of job security provisions beyond the expiration of the above-mentioned extensions.
188. Section 7.3(1) of Bill No. C-76 explicitly provides that, for a three-year period, terms and conditions of "employment related to job security or workforce adjustment ... shall not be the subject of collective bargaining, or be embodied in a collective agreement or arbitral award". The impact of Bill No. C-76 on the collective bargaining process is that groups which would have otherwise been in a position to negotiate during the three-year period following its commencement because of the expiration of the legislatively extended collective agreements will now be prevented from negotiating job security provisions until July 1998.
189. According to the PSAC, after having effectively controlled wages by means of Bill No. C-113 and Bill No. C-17, the Government has decided to reduce its operating costs through a massive employment reduction programme. Over a three-year period commencing in 1995, the Government has determined that 45,000 jobs will be eliminated. Under the collective agreements that were extended by virtue of the Act (as amended by Bill No. C-113 and Bill No. C-17), this employment reduction could not be implemented unless a significant number of workers voluntarily accepted a cash payment in lieu of their employment security. Hence, in order to implement its employment reduction programme, the Government had either to ensure, as private employers do, that its employment reduction programme was designed in such a way as to encourage a sufficient number of people to voluntarily leave the Government's employ, or adopt legislation that arbitrarily amended provisions of collective agreements. The Government's choice of this latter option demonstrates the little interest it maintains for negotiating or reaching mutual agreement with its workforce and bargaining agent.
190. During the time that the Bill No. C-76 amendments were being debated in the House of Commons and the Senate of Canada, the PSAC advanced a significant number of amendments that were designed to facilitate voluntary terminations and reduce the number of involuntary terminations. The PSAC offered to administer, at its own expense, a matching system that would allow a surplus worker to substitute his/her surplus status with a similarly qualified worker who had expressed a desire to voluntarily leave the Government's employ, but all of its recommendations and overtures were rejected out of hand by the Government.
191. The collective agreements covering federal public sector workers that were extended under the Act included a comprehensive set of workforce adjustment protections that were negotiated by the PSAC in 1991. This protection was provided under the Work Force Adjustment Directive (WFAD), a negotiated National Joint Council (NJC) Agreement that forms part of the collective agreements extended under the Act. The most important feature of the Work Force Adjustment Directive was the provision that surplus workers be guaranteed one reasonable job offer.
192. The PSAC recalls that the original Act included a clause that explicitly permitted legislatively extended collective agreements to be amended to incorporate amended NJC agreements which have the agreement of the Treasury Board. Moreover, the revised WFAD was incorporated into collective agreements. In fact, in its defence of the Act before the ILO, the Government used the existence of this legislative provision to argue that the Act did not prohibit collective bargaining. While the PSAC considers that the Government's argument was largely spurious, it agrees that the legislation did allow for a renegotiated WFAD to be incorporated into collective agreements. Once the new WFAD was incorporated into collective agreements in 1991, it became impossible for the Government to change the workforce adjustment rules without either securing the agreement of the affected unions or introducing legislation that would override the relevant provisions of the legislatively extended collective agreements. While the Government attempted to secure the agreement of the unions in late 1994 and early 1995, it failed to do so. The PSAC was unwilling to agree to modifications that weakened the existing job security provisions and make it easier for the Government to involuntarily terminate workers. Hence, in the February 1995 budget, the Government announced its intention to legislate the changes that had been rejected by the PSAC.
193. In essence, surplus workers in "most affected" (a term not defined in the legislation) departments and agencies are offered cash compensation for the loss of their job. If they accept the cash compensation, they are deemed to have voluntarily left their employment. With the exception of the fact that the cash compensation is higher under the Bill No. C-76 provision than it is under the WFAD, the application of this provision is the same in both cases. Under the original WFAD people who are declared surplus and who do not accept cash compensation for voluntarily leaving, are guaranteed that they will be made a "reasonable job offer". Unless they are offered and refuse a reasonable job elsewhere in the Government, they cannot be laid off. Under Bill No. C-76, workers who have the misfortune to be employed in a so-called "most affected" department or agency who refuse cash compensation will be placed on "unpaid surplus status" six months after being declared surplus.
194. Moreover, a worker who is placed on unpaid surplus status "shall be laid off ... where a reasonable job offer within the meaning of the Work Force Adjustment Directive was not made within 12 months after the commencement of the unpaid surplus status or the employee refuses the reasonable job offer".
195. Furthermore, pursuant to section 7.3(3) of Bill No. C-76, the Government can arbitrarily change the Work Force Adjustment Directive which is applicable to all federal public sector workers, by (a) the suspension of the separation benefit; (b) changing the geographic limitation with respect to guaranteed offers of appointment made as a result of privatization and contracting-out situations within the meaning of the Directive; and (c) proceeding with a contract in a contracting-out situation within the meaning of the Directive. The Government lost little time implementing these provisions. The separation benefit was suspended effective 15 July 1995.
196. In essence, by virtue of Bill No. C-76, workers in the so-called most affected departments and agencies have lost their job security, notwithstanding the fact that the job security was negotiated and agreed to by government. The fact that the reasonable job offer has been suspended (rather than eliminated) makes no difference whatsoever to the people who are to be made redundant over the next three years. Moreover, by virtue of the section 7.3(3) amendment to the Act, all federal public sector workers will be adversely affected by the implementation of Bill No. C-76.
197. In conclusion, the PSAC underlines that job security will remain an important if not paramount issue when it regains the legal right to bargain collectively in 1997. If anything, the importance of job security has increased since the passage of Bill No. C-76. During a September 1995 appearance before the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance, the President of the Treasury Board stated that the Bill No. C-76 45,000 person three-year employment reduction programme may well be increased and extended. Without providing any specifics, the Minister stated that the employment reduction programme would increase for at least a fourth year. As a result, this Bill No. C-76 provision and any extension of its term that the Government introduces will continue to frustrate PSAC's legitimate aspirations. Furthermore, the PSAC argues that the legislative prohibitions of the right to negotiate job security provisions until July 1998 will have a negative impact on collective bargaining by forcing the PSAC and other federal unions to consider negotiating collective agreements of short duration in order to minimize the length of time that employment security provisions remain legislated and frozen.
198. Finally, the PSAC adds that the bargaining environment in the federal public service in Canada has reached crisis proportions. In recent months, representatives of business organizations have publicly claimed that the federal public sector wage freeze is having a detrimental impact on morale and recruitment. Even government spokespersons have acknowledged that continued wage restraint will undermine the efficient operation of the public service. Notwithstanding these rhetorical announcements, the Government has yet to indicate that it will return to bargaining when the legislatively extended collective agreements expire in 1996 and 1997. Moreover, having frozen wages for the longest period in Canadian history by virtue of the Public Sector Compensation Act (PSCA) and the Bill No. C-113 and Bill No. C-17 amendments to it, the Government is now embarked on a course designed to reduce employment in the federal public sector by fully 45,000 person-years. Rather than negotiate a package with federal public sector bargaining agents that would have facilitated voluntary departures from the Government's employ, the current Government chose to adopt legislation that explicitly amended collective agreement provisions. Having done so now on four occasions since 1991, the Government has come dangerously close to making legislated incursions into collective bargaining a permanent feature of the bargaining structure in the federal public service of Canada.
B. The Government's reply
199. In its reply dated 6 February 1996, the Government denies the allegations set out in the complaint. In particular, the Government submits that:
200. The Government recalls its dual role as employer on the one hand, and as Government responsible for the welfare of the population as a whole, on the other. Many governments have, for several years, had to deal with economic circumstances which may create a need for restraint measures that may impact negatively on wages and working conditions of their employees. The Government suggests that it would appear timely to examine whether existing ILO collective bargaining jurisprudence (developed mainly on the basis of cases related to the private sector) adequately and realistically reflects the mandate of governments, in democratic societies, to reconcile legitimate, but divergent, interests and conflicting demands for the greater public good.
Bill No. C-76: The Budget Implementation Act, 1995
201. Bill No. C-76 does not extend the Public Sector Compensation Act, 1991 nor does it impede the return to collective bargaining. It allows the Government to carry out the provisions of the 1995 budget which calls for far-reaching action to restore the fiscal health of the federal Government which is essential for a strong and growing economy. The objective is to get Government right so that it can fulfil its social and economic mandates more effectively and sustainably. This includes deep cuts in the level of federal programme spending -- not simply lower spending growth but a substantial reduction in actual dollars spent.
202. Bill No. C-76 provides the framework for the Government to meet its interim deficit target -- 3 per cent of gross domestic product in the 1996-97 fiscal year. The ultimate goal is a balanced budget. It allows for the Government to implement the results of its programme review -- a comprehensive examination of federal department spending. As a result, Government will focus on what is essential and do it better. It acts on a new vision of the Government's role in the economy, it introduces major changes in social transfers to the provinces, and sets the fiscal parameters within which labour market programmes will be redesigned to foster increased employability.
203. In redefining its role in the delivery of programmes and services, the Government concluded that a more focused, effective and frugal public service would require fewer employees to deliver government programmes. Accordingly, the Government embarked on a massive downsizing of its workforce -- 45,000 positions over the three-year period 1995 to 1998. It was imperative to meet the reduction targets within the three years as part of the Government's fiscal plan. In order to achieve the reductions, it was necessary to have more flexible job security provisions for workforce adjustment situations covering employees declared surplus during the three-year period. This required amending the WFAD. In order to implement changes to the WFAD, section 7 of the Act required an amendment which is included in Part I of Bill No. C-76. These changes were twofold in nature. First, to introduce very generous departure incentives of up to 90 weeks' salary plus an education and training allowance that will induce many public service employees to resign voluntarily (these incentives replace the suspended separation benefit contained in the WFAD). Second, to introduce a new workforce reduction programme for surplus employees in designated departments hardest hit by the downsizing exercise. It is important to note that the job security guarantees contained in the WFAD are not abolished but suspended for the three-year period 1995-98.
Work Force Adjustment Directive
204. The WFAD is one of 28 National Joint Council policies or directives that are deemed to be part of collective agreements covering all 80 bargaining units in the federal public service which are represented by 16 different bargaining agents. It is important to note the differences between the negotiation/consultation process dealing with NJC policies and directives and the collective bargaining process that deals with the renegotiation of collective agreements. These are two distinct and separate processes. The NJC process is voluntary and involves all federal public service unions collectively whereas the process of bargaining collective agreements is legislated and each bargaining agent is dealt with separately.
205. The NJC is a consultative body that provides for regular consultation between representatives of the Government in its capacity as employer and representatives of the 16 public service unions certified as bargaining agents to represent federal public service employees. The NJC consults on matters that affect the whole of the public service such as travel, relocation, health and safety and workforce adjustment.
206. The NJC was established in 1944, 23 years prior to the introduction of formal collective bargaining in the federal public service. The NJC has its own by-laws including a provision allowing unions to opt in or out of any or all directives/policies. Although NJC policies/directives that form part of a collective agreement cannot be unilaterally amended, any changes recommended by the NJC must be approved by Treasury Board ministers. Each NJC policy/directive has its own effective date and is normally reviewed every three years. The triennial reviews do not require the reopening of collective agreements. Each policy/directive is consulted on separately and agreed-to changes can be implemented at any time during the term of a collective agreement(s).
207. Collective bargaining rights, on the other hand, were granted through the enactment of the Public Service Staff Relations Act (PSSRA) in 1967. Collective bargaining involving the renegotiation of terms and conditions in a collective agreement covering a certified bargaining unit is regulated by the PSSRA setting out the legal procedures to be followed by the parties to a collective agreement including a mechanism for resolving impasses, either by conciliation, strike/lockout or arbitration.
208. The WFAD was approved by the Treasury Board ministers on 7 November 1991 following consultation within the NJC. It became effective on 15 December 1991 and was subject to triennial review on 31 March 1994. Consultation with the unions on changes to the WFAD under the auspices of the NJC began in the Fall of 1993 and continued in a variety of forums until early 1995. The unions (including the PSAC) were aware of the public service renewal challenges facing the Government in redefining its role in delivering programmes and services to Canadians: that the transition from a public service that tries to be all things to all people to one that offers Canadians a more limited number of high-value programmes would inevitably lead to a smaller public service and involve a significant reduction in the federal government workforce. It was necessary to amend the WFAD in order to carry out the programme of massive downsizing.
209. In February 1995, the Executive Council of the PSAC rejected a deal that had been brokered with the assistance of a number of union heads and which was tentatively accepted by the leadership of the other 15 unions subject to ratification by their membership. The key elements of the deal included very generous early departure and early retirement incentive packages; a commitment to permit an early return to collective bargaining on non-monetary and cost-neutral issues; a commitment to establish joint labour-management committees across the country to find job opportunities for laid-off employees in other sectors and within the public service; in exchange for a more flexible job security provision with respect to the guaranteed reasonable job offer for surplus employees working in the hardest hit departments.
210. During the 17 months of negotiations, the PSAC rejected any proposal that reduced the job security provisions of the WFAD. They took the position that the manpower reductions should be handled through attrition and voluntary resignations whereby employees would voluntarily accept any early retirement or departure incentive packages.
211. It was projected that given the very low attrition rate in the public service, together with the availability of the WFAD's guarantee of a reasonable job offer before any lay-off action could take place, that the downsizing targets could not be met, particularly in hard hit departments, and therefore the fiscal plan announced in the budget would be seriously jeopardized.
212. As admitted by the PSAC in its contribution to the complaint, it was impossible for the Government to change the WFAD without either securing the agreement of the affected unions or introducing legislation that would override the relevant provisions of the WFAD. There were no other options. The PSSRA regulations did not apply. The Government could not shut down as a private sector organization could under similar circumstances. The leadership of the PSAC was not prepared to reduce the job security provisions of the WFAD despite the tentative willingness to do so by the other 15 union leaders. Furthermore, the Government could not afford to pay people ad infinitum if there was no work to do. Thus the Government was forced to legislate -- a choice imposed by the failure of the negotiations and the seriousness of the fiscal situation that had to be dealt with.
213. In legislating, the Government indicates that it was careful to remain as close as possible to the deal that all unions except the PSAC found acceptable and to make the required changes to the WFAD temporary in nature -- effective for the three-year downsizing period only -- until mid-1998. Moreover, the Government put the emphasis on voluntary measures by introducing the Early Departure Incentive (EDI) and Early Retirement Incentive (ERI) programmes with the possibility of employees alternating with one another to maximize voluntary departures and opportunities for those who wished to remain in the public service. In addition, to involve the unions in the downsizing process the Government signed an agreement with them to establish regional joint adjustment committees across the country to assist laid-off employees find alternative job opportunities.
214. Finally, the changes to the reasonable job offer guarantee contained in the WFAD were limited to those departments and agencies whose operations will be reduced most significantly during the period 1995-98. These departments and agencies have been designated as "most affected". Fifteen departments and agencies have been designated as "most affected". The majority of departments and agencies have not been declared "most affected", and in those departments and agencies the full job security provisions of the WFAD remain in place.
215. All surplus employees are eligible for an ERI which provides an unreduced pension for employees between the ages of 50 and 59 inclusive. Normally, employees who take early retirement have their pension reduced by up to 50 per cent. Only surplus employees working in "most affected" departments are eligible for an EDI. An EDI contains a lump-sum payment of either 52 weeks' pay for employees with more than five years of continuous employment or 39 weeks for employees with less than five years of continuous employment, plus severance pay equal to two weeks' pay for the first year of continuous employment and one week's pay for each additional year, plus a service allowance of up to six weeks' pay based on an employee's combined age plus years of employment, plus a training and education allowance of up to $7,000. Employees can receive a maximum of 90 weeks' pay plus the training and education allowance. The modified reasonable job offer only comes into play when a surplus employee in a "most affected" department turns down an EDI. At that point, the surplus employee is entitled to a reasonable job offer within the Government for a period of six months. Unless a job is found during this period, the surplus employee may be put on unpaid surplus status and could be laid off 12 months later. The surplus employee will continue to have health, dental and pension benefit coverage during the period of unpaid surplus status.
Collective bargaining
216. Bill No. C-76 does not impede the return to collective bargaining following expiry of the Act in 1997. The first bargaining unit is scheduled to exit the Act in February 1997. By the summer of 1997 it is expected that the Government will be engaged in collective bargaining with the unions representing 165,000 federal public service employees. The Government, as employer, is preparing for this next round of negotiations as is the PSAC. These actions are counter to PSAC's inference that the Government will not return to collective bargaining in 1997.
217. Bill No. C-76 enhances collective bargaining in the short term by amending section 8 of the Act to allow the parties to a collective agreement to negotiate on all matters including monetary, except wage rates and pay increments, provided that agreed-to changes do not increase costs. Under the amended section 8, a number of unions have requested to reopen collective agreements on a number of issues. For example: discussions with the Aircraft Operations Group Association on the areas of the application of flight pay to flight simulators, overtime and hours of work; discussions with the environment component of the PSAC regarding 12-hour shifts for marine traffic regulators; discussions with the Union of Solicitor-General Employees component of the PSAC on variable hours of work; and discussions with the Canadian Association of Professional Radio Operators to change the way designated holidays are administered.
218. The new subsection 7.3(1) of the Act (Bill No. C-76, Part I) dealing with the WFAD and collective bargaining will not interfere with the renegotiation of collective agreements but will ensure that matters contained in the WFAD will be negotiated collectively with all the federal public service unions as per the NJC process of reviewing NJC policies/directives on a triennial basis. However, new subsection 7.3(2) will allow changes to the WFAD that are agreed to by the Government as employer and all federal public service bargaining agents during the three years prior to the normal triennial review.
219. The inclusion of subsection 7.3(1) will not dictate the term of the 80 collective agreements in the federal public service. The length of any collective agreement is determined by many factors, mainly the ability to predict the future. Short-term agreements can be very appropriate in certain circumstances. Because inflation is under control in Canada, there is a trend towards longer term collective agreements of up to six years with reopeners at various times during the life of these agreements. Ultimately, the parties to a collective agreement will decide what term suits them best.
220. Finally, there is no basis upon which to suggest that any further workforce reductions following the announced three-year programme will force the Government to extend those provisions of Bill No. C-76 pertaining to the WFAD. The Government does not foresee future downsizing of this magnitude.
221. In conclusion, the Government reiterates that:
222. The Government thus submits that it did not violate the standards established in Conventions Nos. 87, 98, 151 and 154.
223. In its communication dated 14 April 1996, the Government has provided additional background information, including press releases, concerning the measures it intends to take to reduce Program spending and to extend the reasonable job offers made to employees to include job offers to work for new employers, as well as various package benefits.
C. Additional information requested from the
Government and the complainant organizations
224. In its supplementary statement of evidence dated 19 September 1996, the Canadian Labour Congress stated that collective bargaining in the federal public sector in Canada is a complex system that operates under the Public Service Staff Relations Act. Unlike traditional bargaining structures in Canada and elsewhere, a number of issues that are considered common across the federal public sector are addressed outside the normal bargaining process. In essence, while individual unions and bargaining groups negotiate separately with the Government on issues such as hours of work and rates of pay, other issues, such as the travel directives and the like are jointly negotiated by the Government and all federal public sector unions.
225. This negotiation process takes place under the umbrella of the National Joint Council (NJC). Agreements reached through the NJC negotiation process form part of all federal public service collective agreements as though they had been individually negotiated by each union and bargaining unit. For greater certainty, a number of NJC agreements, including the Workforce Adjustment Directive, are explicitly referenced in PSAC collective agreements.
226. Historically, the NJC has been the vehicle that has been used in the federal public service to determine employment security issues. While issues such as employment security are normally determined through the NJC process, there is nothing to stop individual bargaining agents, including the PSAC, from withdrawing from the process on a specific issue, and negotiating a separate agreement on the issue, as happened for the 1991 Workforce Adjustment Directive.
227. A normal review of the Workforce Adjustment Directive began in 1990 between the NJC Unions, including the PSAC, and the Government. This process did not result in a package of amendments that was acceptable to either the PSAC or the Government of Canada as represented by the Treasury Board. As a result, the PSAC notified the Treasury Board of its intention to negotiate employment security directly with the Government and bipartite negotiations took place over the summer and early fall of 1991, resulting in an agreement acceptable to both the PSAC and the Government of Canada.
228. Subsequently, the Government of Canada took the PSAC/Treasury Board agreement to the NJC and secured the agreement of other NJC bargaining units. Following Cabinet approval of the amended Workforce Adjustment Directive in December 1991, the revised agreement was deemed to form part of federal public sector agreements, including PSAC agreements that had been extended by the Public Sector Compensation Act. The CLC adds that this agreement could not be arbitrarily amended by either party, and would continue in force until the parties agreed, following a normal review and negotiation process, to any amendment.
229. While a review was initiated by the Government, and discussions took place between the Government and the NJC unions in late 1994 and early 1995, no agreement was reached and the Government took the unprecedented step of legislatively amending the 1991 Workforce Adjustment Directive, thus arbitrarily changing provisions of PSAC collective agreements.
230. The CLC concludes that the 1991 Workforce Adjustment Directive formed part of the collective agreements between the Treasury Board and the PSAC that were extended by the Public Sector Compensation Act in 1991 and that the legislated amendments implemented by the federal Government under Bill C-76, the Budget Implementation Act 1995 arbitrarily changed provisions of PSAC collective agreements.
231. The Treasury Board Secretariat and Public Service Alliance of Canada indicated in a joint statement communicated on 8 October 1996 that employment security issues could be determined in one of two ways, either through the auspices of the National Joint Council (NJC) or through formal collective bargaining as provided for in the Public Service Staff Relations Act (PSSRA).
232. The NJC is a council consisting of representatives of the employers and bargaining agents of the federal public service in order to promote the efficiency of the public service and the well-being of those employed in the public service by providing for regular consultation between the Government as the employer and bargaining agents on behalf of employees who come under the jurisdiction of the PSSRA. The NJC may agree to consult on any benefit or working condition of service-wide applicability and make recommendations to the appropriate executive body of the Government. The NJC can further agree as to whether the matter is deemed to constitute part of the collective agreements between the parties.
233. Since the mid-1980s employment security matters have been included in the Workforce Adjustment Directive (WFAD) and dealt with at the NJC. Further, the WFAD is deemed to be part of all collective agreements covering federal government employees for which the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) is the employer including those agreements with the PSAC.
234. The NJC is governed by its own constitution and by-laws which requires its Executive Committee to establish and maintain a cyclical review schedule for NJC directives/policies/plans. The review schedule is normally every three years and does not coincide with the expiry dates of collective agreements. At the time that bargaining agents are notified of a triennial review, they have the option (individually or collectively) to either continue their participation in the NJC consultation matter or opt out. Bargaining agents opting in favour of NJC consultation undertake to refrain from making a collective bargaining proposal concerning items contained in the current directive/policy/plan under NJC review for the three-year period between cyclical reviews. When bargaining agents opt out of NJC consultation on a subject, the respective bargaining units shall continue to derive benefits and privileges from the NJC directive/policy/plan in effect at the time they opted out until the next collective bargaining agreement is negotiated in accordance with the PSSRA. However, if during the three-year period between cyclical reviews, a bargaining agent makes a collective bargaining proposal concerning a matter contained in a current NJC directive/policy/plan, then the NJC Executive Committee may determine that the bargaining agent has opted out of the NJC on that matter.
235. Finally, as indicated in the Government's reply, the WFAD can be amended prior to the next triennial review on the agreement of the Treasury Board (representing the Government as employer) and all the federal public service bargaining agents.
236. In a communication dated 23 October 1996, the Government made the following comment concerning the CLC supplementary statement. While considering that the process used to reach agreement concerning the WFAD in 1991 is not relevant to the complaint since that Directive expired in March 1994, the Government indicated that: in 1991 the PSAC along with all of the other bargaining agents representing federal public service employees opted to consult with the Treasury Board Secretariat on changes to the WFAD under the auspices of the NJC; that multilateral and bilateral (with PSAC) negotiations occurred at various times throughout 1991 resulting in a new/amended WFAD that was accepted by all bargaining agents including the PSAC by December 1991; and that as provided by NJC by-laws this new Directive was deemed to be part of all collective agreements. Subsequently, in March 1994, the WFAD became subject to its normal cyclical review as per NJC by-laws which led to the events which are the subject of the present complaint.
237. The Committee notes that the allegations in this case refer to restrictions on collective bargaining in the federal public service which have been legislatively imposed through the adoption of Bill No. C-76 (the relevant provisions of this Bill can be found in Appendix 1). The amendments in question modify the Public Sector Compensation Act by suspending, for a three-year period, a number of job security provisions found in the jointly approved Work Force Adjustment Directive (WFAD) and by explicitly banning any negotiation in respect of terms or conditions of employment relating to job security during this same period.
238. The Committee first notes the Government's indication that, in order to achieve the reductions necessary in the public service workforce to respond to the budget deficit concerns, it was necessary to have more flexible job security provisions concerning employees declared "surplus" during the three-year period from 1995-98. In this regard, the Government has recalled its dual role as employer on the one hand, and as Government responsible for the welfare of the population as a whole, on the other. Indeed, the Committee has always taken full account of the serious financial and budgetary difficulties facing the governments, particularly during periods of prolonged and widespread economic stagnation. It considers, however, that the authorities should give preference as far as possible to collective bargaining in determining the conditions of employment of public servants. In other words, a fair and reasonable compromise should be sought between the need to preserve as far as possible the autonomy of the parties to bargaining, on the one hand, and measures which must be taken by governments to overcome their budgetary difficulties, on the other. [See Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee, 4th edition, 1996, para. 899.]
239. As concerns the Government's attempt to resolve these difficulties through negotiation, the Committee takes due note of the Government's indication that consultations with respect to changes to the WFAD under the auspices of the NJC began in the fall of 1993 and continued in a variety of forums until early 1995 when the Executive Council of the Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC) rejected a deal that had been tentatively accepted by the leadership of the other 15 unions involved in the negotiation, subject to ratification by their membership. According to the Government, the PSAC rejected any proposal reducing the job security provisions of the WFAD, taking the position that human resources reductions should be handled through attrition and voluntary resignations. The PSAC, for its part, states that it had advanced a significant number of amendments designed to facilitate voluntary terminations and reduce the number of involuntary terminations, but all its proposals were dismissed out of hand by the Government.
240. As the PSAC approach, according to the Government, was not sufficient to meet the downsizing targets set, particularly in hard hit departments, and given the failure of the negotiations and the seriousness of the fiscal situation, the Committee notes the Government's statement that it had no choice but to legislate the necessary changes to the WFAD.
241. The Committee notes that section 7.3(1) of Bill No. C-76 excludes from the possible subjects for collective bargaining "the Work Force Adjustment Directive, any term or condition of employment relating to job security or workforce adjustment or any matter in relation to which the WFAD may be issued or amended during the period of three years, whether or not the WFAD is included in a collective agreement or arbitral award that has ceased or may cease to operate". The Committee also notes that Bill No. C-76 unilaterally suspends and amends certain provisions of the jointly agreed Workforce Adjustment Directive until July 1998 (see Appendix 2).
242. The Committee notes that the suspension of collective bargaining in respect of job security matters in the present case covers a large variety of issues, including protection otherwise provided to ensure an offer of alternative employment prior to dismissal, as well as various indemnities in case of unavoidable dismissals. In previous cases, the Committee has stated that there are certain matters which clearly appertain primarily or essentially to the management and operation of government business and can reasonably be regarded outside the scope of negotiation, whereas certain other matters are primarily or essentially questions relating to conditions of employment and should not be excluded from the scope of negotiations. [See, Digest, op. cit., para. 812.] While the Committee considers that staffing levels or the departments to be affected as a result of financial difficulties may be considered to be matters which appertain primarily or essentially to the management and operation of government business and therefore reasonably regarded as outside the scope of negotiation, the larger spectrum of job security in general includes questions which relate primarily or essentially to conditions of employment, such as pre-dismissal rights, indemnities, etc., which should not be excluded from the scope of collective bargaining.
243. Noting from the information provided jointly by the Government and the complainant organizations that normally matters of employment security can be determined either through the NJC or through formal collective bargaining as provided for in the Public Service Staff Relations Act (PSSRA), the Committee regrets that the effect of Bill No. C-76 is that, during the stipulated three-year period, no forum exists for the consultation of workers' organizations on these important matters which clearly affect them.
244. Given, however, that under the terms of the Bill, these restrictions on the collective bargaining of job security matters will expire in one year's time, the Committee urges the Government to refrain from imposing any further restrictions on negotiations of job security matters when the present WFAD amendments expire in July 1998.
245. Furthermore, noting the Government's indication that the procedures available to resolve impasses under the Public Service Staff Relations Act (PSSRA) do not apply to the WFAD and that there still does not appear to be any machinery for the settlement of disputes in this connection, the Committee cannot but regret that the Government has not implemented its recommendation in Case No. 1800 urging it to take into consideration the possibility of establishing a procedure which enjoys the confidence of the parties and which would allow them to have recourse to conciliation or mediation, and then to voluntarily have recourse to an independent arbitrator to resolve their disputes. As such a procedure might have assisted in avoiding the dispute in the present case and in improving the labour relations climate generally, the Committee once again urges the Government to give serious consideration to establishing conciliation, mediation and voluntary independent arbitration procedures which enjoy the confidence of the parties concerned.
246. The Committee also recalls that it had invited the Government in previous cases to make use of the assistance of the International Labour Office, in particular through an advisory mission, in order to facilitate finding solutions to the difficulties in reaching agreements in the public service.
247. In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations:
Relevant provisions of Bill No. C-76
(the Budget Implementation Act, 1995)
PART I
Compensation
Public Sector Compensation Act
2. Section 7.1 of the Public Sector Compensation Act is renumbered as subsection 7.1(1) and is amended by adding the following:
(2) On or after the date of the coming into force of section 7.2.
(3) For the purposes of this section and sections 7.2, 7.3 and 7.5,
"program" means a program respecting early departure incentives, unpaid surplus status, lay offs and related matters arising from the February 27, 1995 budget;
"public service" means the entities referred to in subsection 3(1);
"Work Force Adjustment Directive" means the Work Force Adjustment Directive issued on the recommendation of the National Joint Council of the Public Service and with the approval of the Treasury Board that came into force on December 15, 1991, as amended from time to time in accordance with subsection 7.3(2) and (3).
3. The Act is amended by adding the following after section 7.1:
7.2 (1) Notwithstanding this Act or any other Act of Parliament except the Canadian Human Rights Act, or any directive, policy, regulation or agreement made under any such Act.
(2) An employee within the meaning of the Public Service Employment Act who is laid off pursuant to subparagraph (1)(b)(ii) ceases to be an employee under that Act, but is entitled to the same rights and privileges to which that person would otherwise be entitled as a person laid off under that Act.
(3) The Treasury Board may authorize the deputy head of a department or the chief executive officer of any portion of the public service to exercise and perform, in such manner and subject to such terms and conditions as the Treasury Board directs, any of the powers, duties and functions of the Treasury Board under subsection (1).
7.3 (1) Notwithstanding this Act or any other Act of Parliament except the Canadian Human Rights Act, or any directive, policy, regulation or agreement made under any such Act, the Work Force Adjustment Directive, any term or condition of employment relating to job security or work force adjustment or any matter in relation to which the Directive may be issued or amended, whether or not the Directive is included in a collective agreement or arbitral award that has ceased, or may cease, to operate, shall not be the subject of collective bargaining, or be embodied in a collective agreement or arbitral award within the mean of the Public Service Staff Relations Act, in respect of any portion of the public service of Canada specified in Part I of Schedule I of that Act, during the period of three years beginning on the coming into force of this section.
(2) The Treasury Board and bargaining agents may, by agreement in writing, amend the Work Force Adjustment Directive but only as it relates to their collective agreements or arbitral awards, whether their collective agreements or arbitral awards are in force or have ceased to operate.
(3) The Governor in Council, on the recommendation of the Treasury Board, may amend the Work Force Adjustment Directive in relation to any of the following matters:
(4) Any amendment to the Work Force Adjustment Directive made pursuant to subsection (3) ceases to have effect on the expiration of three years after the coming into force of this section.
(5) Notwithstanding any other Act of Parliament or any collective agreement or arbitral award that incorporates by reference the Work Force Adjustment Directive and any amendments thereto, any amendment to the Directive made pursuant to subsection (3) is incorporated by reference in the collective agreement or arbitral award, subject to such modifications as are required by that Act and the collective agreement or arbitral award.
7.4 (1) The Governor in Council may change any terms and conditions of a compensation plan that is extended under section 5 or 6 or in respect of which section 11 applies if those terms and conditions are, in the opinion of the Treasury Board, required to implement the voluntary leave without pay programs arising from the February 27, 1995 budget.
(2) Any change to a compensation plan made by the Governor in Council pursuant to subsection (1) ceases to have effect on the expiration of three years after the coming into force of this section.
4. Section 8 of the Act is replaced by the following:
8. (1) Subject to subsection (3), the parties to any collective agreement or arbitral award that includes a compensation plan that is extended under section 5 or 6 or in respect of which section 11 applies may, by agreement in writing, amend any terms and conditions of the collective agreement or arbitral award otherwise than by increasing
Suspended provisions of the Work Force Adjustment Directive
The following sections were in effect prior to July 15, 1995 and will come back into effect on June 23, 1998 unless further changes are brought to the Directive.
...
6.1.1 Employees declared surplus as a result of a privatization are guaranteed an offer of appointment on an indeterminate basis to another position in the Public Service within their headquarters area, either at their current level or with salary protection, where necessary.
...
7.3.1 When a surplus employee is terminated, in whatever manner, under the provisions of this directive, that employee shall receive a separation benefit of one week's pay for each year of service with a department or agency for which the Treasury Board is the Employer (PSSRA I-I) up to a maximum of fifteen weeks' pay, providing that the individual is entitled to opt for or is entitled to an immediate annuity or an immediate annual allowance under the Public Service Superannuation Act, except where
...
8.4.1 Employees declared surplus as a result of contracting out are guaranteed an offer of appointment on an indeterminate basis to another position in the Public Service within their headquarters area, either at their current level or with salary protection, where necessary.
...
8.7.3 Subject to 8.7.4, a department contracting out the work of Public Service employees shall not proceed with that contract until all affected employees have:
8.7.4 However, where a contract is of a phased nature, individual phases may proceed without the situation of all affected employees being resolved, provided that no phase proceeds until the situations of those employees directly affected by that phase are resolved.