Email (731,-666)

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Keywords: Email
Total judgments found: 5

• Judgment 4551

  
  134th Session, 2022
  European Patent Organisation
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainants contest modifications made with respect to the use of mass emails within the Office.

  Judgment keywords

  Keywords:

  complaint allowed; email; freedom of association; plenary judgment; staff union activity;
  

  Consideration 12

  Extract:

  Since the freedom of communication, information, and speech includes the right to choose the proper means, the Organisation is not allowed to impose certain means (such as, in the present case, the dedicated intranet webpage) rather than others (the mass emails). This is particularly true where the means offered (or imposed) are more complicated and less viable than the other ones technically available, or are even under the supervision of the Organisation itself. In the present case, the alternative means offered by the Organisation consisted in an intranet webpage on the Organisation’s website. This is, manifestly, a less viable means of communication and, moreover, it is under the supervision and the management of the Organisation, and not under the complete control by and availability for the staff representatives. It must also be recalled that according to the Tribunal’s case law, the ability of a body representing the staff to circulate emails to all staff members is not “a privilege”. Such body “has a legitimate right to avail itself of this facility, unless there is good cause for restricting it” (see Judgment 3156, consideration 14).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 3156
  

  Keywords:

  email; intranet webpage; staff union activity;
  

  Considerations 9-10

  Extract:

  [T]he Tribunal’s case law has long recognised that staff of international organisations have a general right to associate freely. There can be no doubt that freedom of association is a well-recognised and acknowledged universal right which all workers should enjoy. It is recognised as a right by the Tribunal as well as by a large number of international conventions and declarations (see, for example, the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, Article 2(a); the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 22; the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 8), and by the Administrative Council of the EPO itself, which recognised the importance of human rights when formulating the rights and obligations of staff (see Judgment 4482, considerations 12 and 13). Article 30 of the Service Regulations, entitled “Freedom of association”, provides: “Permanent employees shall enjoy freedom of association; they may in particular be members of trade unions or staff associations of European civil servants”. The role of staff associations or unions is to represent the interests of members primarily in dealing with their employing organisation on issues concerning the staff. Staff associations or unions should be able to do so unhindered or uninfluenced by the Administration of the employing organisation. Were it otherwise, the role would be compromised (see Judgment 4482, consideration 8).
  Freedom of association necessarily involves freedom of discussion and debate. In Judgment 274, under 22, the Tribunal stated that “this freedom when feelings run strong [...] can spill over into extravagant and even regrettable language”. Nonetheless, the Tribunal also acknowledged that freedom of discussion and debate is not absolute and that there may be cases in which an Administration can intervene if, for example, there is “gross abuse of the right to freedom of expression or lack of protection of the individual interests of persons affected by remarks that are ill-intentioned, defamatory or which concern their private lives” (see Judgments 2227, consideration 7, and 3106, consideration 8).
  The Tribunal’s case law has it that a staff association enjoys broad freedom of speech and the right to take to task the Administration of the organisation whose employees it represents, but that like any other freedom such freedom has its bounds. Thus, any action that impairs the dignity of the international civil service, and likewise gross abuse of freedom of speech, are inadmissible. But the prevention of such abuse cannot give the Administration a power of prior censorship over the communication of written information produced by the groups and associations concerned (see Judgment 911 and Judgment 2227, consideration 7).
  In Judgment 3156 the Tribunal held that, in specific cases, a prior authorisation for the dispatching of mass emails could be justified: “The freedom of speech and the freedom of communication [...] are not, however, unlimited. Not only is an organisation entitled to object to misuse of the means of distribution made available to its staff committee [...], but it also follows from the case law [...] that the right to freedom of speech does not encompass action that impairs the dignity of the international civil service, or gross abuse of this right and, in particular, damage to the individual interests of certain persons through allusions that are malicious, defamatory or which concern their private lives. [...] Since organisations must prevent such abuse of the right of free speech, the Tribunal’s case law does not absolutely prohibit the putting in place of a mechanism for the prior authorisation of messages circulated by bodies representing the staff. An organisation acts unlawfully only if the conditions for implementing this mechanism in practice lead to a breach of that right, for example by an unjustified refusal to circulate a particular message” (see Judgment 3156, considerations 15 and 16).
  
  As observed earlier, the right to freely associate is a general right that enshrines more specific rights, which are necessary or useful in order to ensure that the right to freely associate is effective. It includes the rights to freedom of communication, information, and speech in all forms, including discussion and debate (see Judgment 3106, considerations 7 and 8). Such rights are vested not only in their authors (usually the staff representatives), but also in the recipients. The right of each staff member to freely associate also includes their right to freely receive communications and information, and their right to listen to speeches. In this perspective, every limitation to the right of staff representatives to send mass emails to the staff members, is also a limitation to the right of the staff members to receive mass emails.
  Free communication, information, and speech also imply:
  (i) the right to the confidentiality of communication, information, and speech; and
  (ii) the right to freely choose the means by which the communications are sent, information is provided, and speeches are given.
  An organisation is entitled to issue reasonable guidelines in order to govern the use of the office emails by staff members and staff representatives, and to establish authorised and non-authorised uses. Insofar as the criteria on the use of mass emails are underpinned by general interests, such as those listed in Communiqué No. 10 of 29 March 2006, they shall be considered lawful, as they ensure a reasonable balance between the interests of the organisation and the fundamental rights to free communication, information, and speech, vested in the staff members and their staff unions and representatives. This general balance should not allow a prior supervision or preventive censorship by the organisation on the content of the communications, information, and speech (see Judgment 2227, consideration 7). However, the Tribunal’s case law considers lawful a mechanism of prior authorisation under exceptional circumstances (see Judgment 3156, considerations 15 and 16 quoted in full in consideration 9 [...]).
  Staff members and their representatives are not allowed an indiscriminate and unfettered exercise of their rights to freedom of communication, information, and speech. Their “freedom” must be consistent with the duties of the staff members towards the Organisation and towards fellow staff members. Freedom of communication, information, and speech is not freedom to insult or to offend (see Judgment 3106, considerations 7 and 8). The communication, information, and speech fall within the responsibility of their authors. Those that exceed the boundaries of freedom and fail to respect the duties of a staff member or result in insults or offences should be subject to disciplinary proceedings and sanctions.
  Whether a communication, information, or speech violates the duty of the staff members can be established only on a case-by-case basis, and, normally, after the communication, information, and speech are divulged.

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 274, 911, 2227, 2227, 3106, 3106, 3156, 4482
  

  Keywords:

  email; freedom of association; freedom of speech; international instrument; staff representative;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4161

  
  128th Session, 2019
  World Intellectual Property Organization
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant challenges the validity of a settlement agreement.

  Consideration 4

  Extract:

  Contrary to the complainant’s arguments, the Tribunal’s case law in principle accepts notification by email (see Judgment 2966, consideration 8, and the case law cited therein). There is no reason to distinguish between emails sent to the staff member’s work address when he is employed and those sent to his private address once he has left the organisation. The Tribunal further considers that since the complainant had chosen his counsel’s office as his address for notification purposes, which the parties do not dispute, any notification made to that address is valid.
  The decision’s notification to both the complainant and his counsel by both email and registered letter, and also the wording of the email, confused the complainant and led to an exchange of emails with the Deputy Director General concerning the start of the time limit for filing a complaint with the Tribunal. It is true that the Deputy Director General alerted the complainant to the terms of Article VII of the Statute of the Tribunal and advised him to consult his counsel about how to calculate the time limit. However, he did not inform him clearly of the date to take into account. The fact that the email stated that it contained only an advance copy of the decision and that the paper copy would be sent by registered post, and the failure of the email to indicate that the time limit would start to run on the date on which the email was received, could have misled the complainant and caused him to believe that the time limit only started to run on the date when the paper copy of the decision was received (for a similar case, see Judgment 3704, considerations 7 and 8). In this case, it is hence the later date that must be considered as the date on which the time limit for filing a complaint to the Tribunal started to run.

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT reference: Article VII of the Statute
  ILOAT Judgment(s): 2966, 3704
  

  Keywords:

  email; late filing; notification; receivability of the complaint;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 3869

  
  124th Session, 2017
  World Health Organization
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant, a former WHO staff member, challenges the decision to abolish his post.

  Consideration 9

  Extract:

  Whatever may have been the state of the Tribunal’s case law in 1983, it is now settled that a decision may validly be notified by email and the time runs from the date on which the complainant learns of the decision (see, for example, Judgment 2966, consideration 8). It is true that circumstances can arise where the email communication together with a scanned copy of a hardcopy document accompanying the email misleads a complainant about when a time limit has commenced to run. An example of this is found in a recent judgment: Judgment 3704, consideration 8.

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 2966, 3704
  

  Keywords:

  email; notification;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 3849

  
  124th Session, 2017
  International Organization for Migration
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant contests the non-renewal of his fixed-term contract.

  Consideration 5

  Extract:

  There is no substance in the complainant’s argument that the e-mail [...] could not have been notification because it took the form of an e-mail. No particular formality is required and notification by e-mail can constitute effective notification (see, for example, Judgment 2966, consideration 8).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 2966
  

  Keywords:

  email; notification;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 3138

  
  113th Session, 2012
  International Telecommunication Union
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR

  Consideration 10

  Extract:

  It is certainly regrettable that the complainant’s professional mailbox was consulted in her absence. However, the evidence in the file shows that she was informed that such a technical check was imminent and – naturally – it had to be carried out urgently.

  Keywords:

  due process; email; evidence;