Judgment No. 4808
Decision
1. The Director-General’s decision of 12 November 2020 is set aside.
2. The Organization shall pay the complainant moral damages in the amount of 40,000 euros.
3. It shall also pay her 1,000 euros in costs.
4. All other claims are dismissed.
Summary
The complainant challenges the outcome of the investigation procedure conducted in respect of her harassment grievance and the resulting lack of compensation.
Judgment keywords
Keywords
complaint allowed; harassment; moral damages
Consideration 8
Extract:
The Tribunal first notes that, in the impugned decision, the Director-General inferred from the findings contained in the investigation report that “the evidence contained in the report justifie[d] the conclusion that two [...] harassment allegations against Mr [N.] were substantiated and that this create[d] a hostile work environment”, while also emphasizing that he agreed with the conclusions that the other harassment allegations relating to Mr N. and Ms D. were not substantiated.
The Tribunal considers that this assertion by the Director-General overlooked the express finding in the investigation report concerning “the cumulative effect of the incidents” surrounding the other acts with which Mr N. was charged, which, taken individually, did not constitute harassment. In her report, the investigator, having identified two incidents which, in her concluding analysis, constituted harassment as individual events, turned to consider “the cumulative effect” of the other individual acts of which the complainant accuses Mr N. On this subject, the investigator expressly stated that “the cumulative effect” of these acts, which were, first, similar in terms of pattern and behaviour, then occurred over a very brief and intense period when there was plainly a dysfunctional and unhealthy working environment and, lastly, continued throughout the complainant’s temporary secondment, “[m]ight reasonably have had a negative and unhealthy impact on the working environment and the capacity of [the complainant] to familiarize herself with the requirements of the post”. The investigator added that in her view, “[t]aking into account the two occasions” which constituted harassment as individual incidents, “the cumulative effect of the incidents could reasonably be considered as harassment”.
Since the Director-General overlooked this crucial aspect of the report in his review of its findings and, accordingly, in the choice of the measures that may consequently be taken, the Tribunal is of the opinion that the impugned decision is flawed by a failure to take into consideration an essential fact. This misunderstanding of the report clearly influenced the perception of the nature and extent of the harassment that the investigator had found to have been established and was a crucial factor in the Director-General’s analysis.
Keywords
harassment; failure to take account of material facts
Considerations 9-11, 14 & 17
Extract:
The Tribunal [...] notes that, in the impugned decision, the Director-General did not properly analyse whether or not it was appropriate to provide compensation for the moral injury suffered by the complainant as a victim of the harassment identified by the investigator in her report and recognized by the Organization. In so doing, the Director-General acted in breach of [the] provisions [which] established the complainant’s right to obtain explanations concerning compensation measures that may have been imposed taking into account the harassment identified in the investigation report; however, the Director-General did not attempt such explanations in the impugned decision. [...]
In this regard, the Tribunal notes that the Director-General’s comments in the impugned decision concerning the disciplinary actions or corrective measures that could not be taken due to the retirement of Mr N. and Ms D. did not relate to compensation for the victim of the harassment, namely the complainant.
Furthermore, the Tribunal notes that the Director-General appears to have considered that the payment of benefits received by the complainant under Annex II to the Staff Regulations, further to the recognition of the health problems from which she suffered as a result of the harassment as a service-incurred illness, covered all the injury suffered by the complainant. However, such benefits are not intended to cover the moral injury resulting from this harassment.
The Tribunal further notes that the Director-General’s other comment contained in the impugned decision, that the investigation report would help in some measure to bring the matter to a close, did not, in the circumstances of the case, constitute adequate compensation.
With regard to the Director-General’s comment that, if the complainant required any further support or assistance he encouraged her to make her needs known to HRD, this also was not compensation. [...] The Organization adds that, where a right to
compensation exists, express provision is made in the relevant texts. However, it contends that there is no express provision requiring the Director-General to award financial compensation in the procedure for the administrative resolution of harassment grievances.
The Tribunal cannot accept the defendant’s reading of the relevant provisions, which provide expressly for the right to redress of a staff member subjected to harassment and require the Director-General to consider the applicable remedies in a situation where harassment is recognized. The assertion that no express provision requires the Director-General to grant financial compensation is based on a confusion between the right to redress and the nature of the relief that could be awarded. While it is true that redress does not automatically imply the award of financial compensation and that, in some cases, measures other than the payment of a sum of money may prove adequate, the fact remains that the Organization ought first to have determined the appropriate redress for the complainant in the circumstances of the case, which it did not properly do.
Furthermore, in Judgment 4602, considerations 14 and 16, the Tribunal recalled that, even in a situation where no provision in the internal regulations, rules or policies directly provides for the possibility of a compensation to victims of harassment, its case law clearly recognizes the right to such compensation when properly supported:
“14. Notwithstanding this, the Tribunal considers that the WTO’s assertion, to the effect that no provision in the internal regulations, rules or policies directly provides for the possibility of a compensation to the individuals who filed a harassment complaint, is in tension with and indeed ignores its rather clear case law which recognises the right to such compensation when properly supported. In Judgment 4207, consideration 15, adopted by all seven judges, the Tribunal wrote the following on this issue:
‘It is observed that there are no specific provisions in the IAEA’s Staff Regulations and Staff Rules that articulate a comprehensive procedure to deal with a claim of harassment of the type first discussed in the preceding consideration. In the absence of a lawful comprehensive procedure within the IAEA’s Staff Regulations and Staff Rules to deal with a claim of harassment, the IAEA had to respond to the complainant’s claim of harassment in accordance with the Tribunal’s relevant case law. It is well settled in the case law that an international organization has a duty to provide a safe and adequate working environment for its staff members (see Judgment 2706, consideration 5, citing Judgment 2524). As well, ‘given the serious nature of a claim of harassment, an international organization has an obligation to initiate the investigation itself [...]’ (see Judgment 3347, consideration 14). Moreover, the investigation must be initiated promptly, conducted thoroughly and the facts must be determined objectively and in their overall context. Upon the conclusion of the investigation, the complainant is entitled to a response from the Administration regarding the claim of harassment. Additionally, as the Tribunal held in Judgment 2706, consideration 5, ‘an international organisation is liable for all the injuries caused to a staff member by their supervisor acting in the course of his or her duties, when the victim is subjected to treatment that is an affront to his or her personal and professional dignity’ (see also Judgments 1609, consideration 16, 1875, consideration 32, and 3170, consideration 33). Thus, an international organization must take proper actions to protect a victim of harassment.’ These principles have been recognized by the Tribunal’s case law in a number of situations before that Judgment 4207 (see, for example, Judgments 3995, consideration 9, and 3965, considerations 9 and 10) as well as after that Judgment 4207 (see, for example, Judgments 4547, consideration 3, and 4541, consideration 4).
[...]
16. The Tribunal observes that the WTO’s position is not that victims of harassment are not entitled to compensation. It rather argues that relief must be confined to compensation for the injury caused and that a finding of an unlawful act does not in itself establish a sufficient ground for compensation. The Tribunal in fact understands from the assertions contained in the WTO’s pleadings that the Organization recognizes the complainant’s strong emotions in relation to her request for additional compensation and does not wish, by its contestation, to belittle her feelings in this regard in any way. The WTO emphasizes, however, that any requests for additional compensation sought by the complainant must still meet the applicable legal requirements. On this matter, the Tribunal’s case law indicates that any complainant seeking compensation for material or moral damages must provide clear evidence of the injury suffered, of the alleged unlawful act, and of the causal link between the injury and the unlawful act (see, for instance, Judgments 4158, consideration 4, 3778, consideration 4, 2471, consideration 5, 1942, consideration 6, and 732, consideration 3), and that it is the complainant who bears the burden of proof in this respect (see Judgments 4158, consideration 4, 4157, consideration 7, and 4156, consideration 5).”
The general principle that “an international organisation is liable for all the injuries caused to a staff member by their supervisor [...] when the victim is subjected to treatment that is an affront to his or her personal and professional dignity”, asserted in Judgment 2706, consideration 5, and reiterated in the aforementioned Judgment 4207, applies all the more with regard to the measures to be considered by the executive head in a harassment situation (see also, on this subject, Judgments 4217, consideration 9, and 4171, consideration 11).
Lastly, in Judgment 4299, consideration 5, the Tribunal recalled the following in a case where a staff member alleged to have been harassed and requested compensation:
“It is true that a staff member who has, in the latter situation just discussed, established she or he has been harassed may also be entitled to an award of moral damages by the organization for the harassment (see, for example, Judgment 4158, consideration 3). Whether there is such an entitlement may depend on the terms of the regime in place within the organization to deal with harassment grievances. It is certainly something that can be awarded in proceedings in the Tribunal (see Judgment 4241, considerations 24 and 25). However, what is important is that, even if moral damages might be awarded, that is a subsidiary remedy or relief available in cases of this type when harassment is established. As just discussed, the primary obligation of the organization if harassment is proved is to protect the complainant and prevent further harassment.”
In a situation similar to that of the complainant in the present case, the Tribunal’s case law recognizes that it is the responsibility of the organization that establishes the existence of harassment to redress the injury caused and that, ordinarily, this redress should take the form of monetary compensation for the injury suffered (see, on this subject, Judgment 4158, consideration 3).
[I]t is true that redress for injury suffered by the victim of harassment may, in certain cases, take forms other than monetary compensation [...].
[...]
The Tribunal considers that the complainant has duly established the moral injury she has suffered as a result of the harassment recognized in the investigation report. Since the main factor in the recognition of harassment is the perception that the person concerned may reasonably and objectively have of repeated acts or remarks liable to demean or humiliate them (see, for example, Judgment 4541, consideration 8), the complainant could legitimately, as she maintains, have felt demeaned by the actions of Mr N., and she could have felt that the latter was creating a hostile working environment in her regard, and thus have suffered substantial moral injury (see the aforementioned Judgment 4541, consideration 8).
[...]
[T]he Tribunal has repeatedly recognized the right of a staff member to the payment of monetary compensation for the moral injury suffered as a result of harassment and the resultant affront to her or his dignity (see, for example, Judgments 4663, considerations 17 and 20, 4241, considerations 24 and 25, 4217, consideration 9, and 3995, consideration 9).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1609, 1875, 2524, 2706, 3170, 3347, 3995, 4158, 4207, 4217, 4241, 4541, 4547, 4602, 4663
Keywords
compensation; harassment; moral damages
Consideration 9
Extract:
The Tribunal recalls that a collective agreement becomes part of the law of the international civil service and should be applied in accordance with its terms and the intention of its authors.
Keywords
collective agreement
Consideration 13
Extract:
In the circumstances, the Tribunal should normally refer the matter to the Director-General in order for him to determine the redress that it would be appropriate to contemplate as compensation for the injury suffered by the complainant as a result of the harassment established. However, in view of the time that has elapsed and the fact that there is sufficient evidence and information in the file to enable the Tribunal to reach a decision on the nature of this redress and to properly assess the amount of compensation for moral injury claimed by the complainant, it would be inappropriate to do so in this case (see, for example, Judgments 4663, consideration 17, 4602, consideration 18, and 4471, consideration 20).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4471, 4602, 4663
Keywords
moral injury; case sent back to organisation; compensation; harassment
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