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Standardising employment growth and standardising employment growth multinationals and multinationals and rates of foreign multinationals in Canada: domestic firms in Canada:

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INTRODUCTION

trends, such as employment growth in foreign-controlled enterprises, should not be interpreted without multinational standardising the trends for differences in composition. The composition of foreign multinationals in Canada, the example used in this report, is different from Canadian-controlled firms in industry mix, regional location and the size distribution of firms. Each of these compositional differences proves to have an important, independent and intrinsic effect on employment growth. Hence conclusions about the contribution of multinational enterprises to employment growth that are based on data in which these compositional differences have not been partitioned out may be quite wrong. For example, employment in firms in Canada defined as foreign-controlled declined by 1.13 per cent from 1978 to 1986, while it grew by +18.36 per cent Canadian-controlled firms. Apparently, then, foreign multinationals did much worse than Canadian firms in job creation over this period. But when the effects of industry mix, regional locational, and distribution of firm size, together with interaction and other effects, are all partitioned out, the The intrinsic, direct effect of foreign control of results are reversed. firms in Canada was an employment growth rate of +15.07 per cent compared with -3.59 per cent for Canadian control.

The interpretational problems of analysing composite data, and the need to standardise trends for compositional differences, are fully recognised by statisticians. Indeed, many cases have been documented in the statistical literature of Simpson's paradox – where the trend of the whole is contrary to the trends of the parts. Examples of Simpson's paradox can be found in employment growth of foreign— and Canadian—controlled firms in Canada. Recognition of these problems has led to the development and general use of standardised rates and indexes in many fields. Social scientists would be unlikely, for instance, to compare crude demographic rates without adjusting them for differences in age and sex composition.

The development of standardisation procedures for employment growth data, which had a promising start in the 1940s, has since lagged far behind policy needs. The shift-share technique, developed at that time, has been widely used, although it standardises data for only two factors - and both of those inaccurately, as is demonstrated in this report. Furthermore, a number of influential reviews of the shift-share technique reveal a basic misunderstanding of the purpose and use of standardisation procedures in general, as well as of this technique in particular.

The primary purpose of this report is to present a new, multifactor partitioning method of standardising growth rates. The method reformulation and extension of shift-share analysis. The results of the partitioning, though more detailed, are in a similar format and interpreted in the same manner. The methodology, developed in collaboration with statistical and subject-matter specialists at Statistics Canada, is applied to employment growth data specially tabulated at Statistics Canada, by the Small Business and Special Surveys Division. The Canadian data are of special interest because of the extent of foreign ownership and control of industry in Canada and concerns that the Canadian operations of such foreign multinational enterprises may be closed down or reduced during periods of recession before plants in the home country of the MNE are closed down or reduced. The period analysed, 1978-86, includes two years, 1981-82, and 1982-83, in which net employment in Canada actually decreased, and it decreased over the eight-year period for large firms (defined as having 100 or more employees in 1978), the size class in which multinational firms are concentrated.

FROM SHIFT-SHARE TO MULTIFACTOR PARTITIONING

1. Drawing the wrong conclusions: Simpson's paradox

The observed incidence of, or rate of change in, a characteristic in a given region is affected by the composition of the underlying population in the region. Crude death rates, for example, are affected by the age, sex, income, occupation and ethnic structure of the population. Inter-regional differences in observed incidences or rates are, therefore, affected by inter-regional differences in the composition of the populations, and may be quite misleading if these differences are large.

The failure to adjust regional rates for heterogeneity in regional composition confounds inter-regional differences in rates with inter-regional differences in composition. In the extreme case of Simpson's paradox, the adjusted rates may be the opposite of the crude rates (Simpson, 1951; Paik, 1985; Blyth, 1972; Cohen, 1986).

Three real examples are quoted from Cohen (1986) to illustrate the paradox. Every age-specific female death rate was higher in Costa Rica in 1960 than the corresponding figure for Sweden. Yet Costa Rica's crude death rate was lower than Sweden's, because Costa Rica's crude rate is biased by the concentration of its population in the younger age groups, where both countries' rates are low, and Sweden's by its concentration of older age groups, where both countries' rates are higher. A less obvious example of paradox is Simpson's provided by average family size French-speaking families are bigger than English-speaking families in Quebec (1.80 versus 1.64 for the period 1971-76) and in the rest of Canada too (2.14 versus 1.97). But the Canada total shows that English-speaking families are larger (1.95 versus 1.85). The paradox arises because the French-speaking total is dominated by Quebec, where both figures are low, English-speaking by the rest of Canada, where both figures are higher. third example quoted by Cohen is for income tax in the United States. rates were lowered for each of the five income categories from 1974 to 1978, but the overall tax still increased as category creep edged a higher proportion of income into the upper tax rates.

Simpson's paradox is always a lurking threat in the analyis of composite data. It can recur whenever a new variable is introduced into the analysis. Each new stratification of the data can reverse the previous inequalities in the rates as long as substantial heterogeneity persists within the subgroups delimited. But complete homogeneity is no answer to the paradox either, for it can be achieved only at the cost of adding variables and categories to the point where individual cell values become too small for reliable analysis. An uneasy trade-off is needed. Analysts must use sufficient categorisation of the populations to achieve substantial homogeneity of individual cells, and to minimise the risk of a potential Simpson's paradox. On the other hand, the categories must be broad enough to produce robust cell values that withstand mathematical partitioning.

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2. The basic concept of shift-share analysis

Shift-share analysis is a method of standardising growth rates when the differences in the rates and the effects of composition are both of interest. The technique has become widely used and generally accepted to determine the extent to which inter-regional differences in employment growth are due to differences in each region's mix of industries.

Shift-share analysis identifies three different components of change. One is the national component or the national growth rate effect. The national growth rate effect is the employment change which would have occurred in a region if total base year employment in that region had grown at the same rate as total employment in the nation as a whole. This effect provides a useful index of comparison. The difference between the actual growth rate in employment and the national growth rate for each region draws attention to how much better or worse the employment growth of each region has been, compared with the nation. Attention is then focused on trying to understand this deviation from the national performance level.

The key to shift-share analysis is the partitioning of the deviation of the region's growth rate from the national growth rate into two further components: an industry effect and a region effect. The industry effect is calculated first, and the region effect is then derived as a residual. Assume that each industry in every region grew at the national growth rate for that industry. Regional differences would then be determined solely by the mix of fast and slow growth industries in each region. Hence an "expected" employment growth can be calculated for each region using the national industry growth rates. The industry-mix effect on employment growth in a region then equals the difference between the national growth rate effect and the expected employment growth. A positive difference indicates a favourable balance of fast growth industries in the region: that is, a favourable industry-mix effect.

The regional effect is a residual component calculated as the difference between the actual employment growth and the expected growth. A positive regional effect for an industry in a region may be interpreted as indicating positive locational advantages possessed by that region for that industry—though it is important to note that non-locational factors can strongly influence regional employment growth rates.

In summary, shift-share analysis partitions employment growth into three components: a national growth rate effect, an industry effect and a regional effect. These components are derived by computing the growth that would have occurred in the region if it had grown at the national employment growth rate: the expected rate, if each industry in each region had grown at the national rate for that industry and the actual rate. The industry-mix effect is then the difference between the expected rate and the national growth rate, and the regional effect is the difference between the actual rate and the expected rate.

If the results of the partitioning are summed for every region in the analysis, then both the industry mix and regional effects go to zero. The employment for all regions combined equals the national growth. The industry mix for all regions combined is the national industry mix, and there is no industry-mix effect for the nation. And since the industry-mix effect is zero, there is no residual, and hence no regional effect at the national level.

3. The origins of shift-share analysis

The early applications of shift-share analysis are of particular interest because of the conflicting claims made about its origins, because mathematical errors in the procedure have persisted uncorrected for so long, and because of arguments as to the value and limitations of the technique.

Edgar Hoover wrote that "this approach was apparently first used by Daniel B. Creamer in 1942" (Hoover, 1971, p. 293). Harry Richardson changed this in his book to "Hoover points out that the technique was first used by Daniel B. Creamer in the early 1940s" (Richardson, 1978, p. 206). Hoover, in fact, based his statement on Perloff et al. (1960, p. 33) where Creamer is cited as an example of an early user, and on Ashby (1968, p. 423) where Creamer is cited as the first to use shift-share analysis in the United States. Actually, Armstrong and Taylor (1978, p. 300) are certainly nearer the truth when they write, "As far as we are aware, the shift-share technique was first used by J.H. Jones in 1940 (in an appendix to the Barlow Report on the Distribution of the Industrial Population)". However, in a thoughtful review of the concept, Stevens and Moore (1980, p. 419) cite Edgar S. Dunn in Perloff et al. (1960) as the originator. While it is true that Dunn was the first to use the now standard three-component approach described above, he had published the methodology in French a year earlier (Dunn, 1959). reference has never, as far as I am aware, been cited in the English literature on shift-share, even though it was followed by a comment (Rosenfeld, 1959) demonstrating conclusively that the formulas could not be measuring what they were said to.

The extensive literature of shift-share commonly cites Creamer (1942) and Dunn (1960), and only very rarely is the work of Jones (1940) or Rosenfeld (1959) mentioned. It is possible that had these overlooked works been more widely studied, then the errors in the mathematical procedure might have been corrected much sooner.

(a) The Barlow Commission and Professor J. Harry Jones

The shift-share analysis was of central concern to the Barlow Commission. The Commission was concerned with the growing concentration of industrial population in the south-east of England. It recognised that economic considerations must determine the location of industry. Hence there was a need to know the economic impact of diverting industrial growth. The fundamental question was thus whether the growth of south-east England was due to the faster rate of growth of individual industries there than in the rest of the United Kingdom, or whether it merely reflected a favourable industry-mix effect of industries that could be expected to do about as well in other parts of the country.

Jones began by classifying industries into two classes: local and basic. Local industries, such as building and retailing, had to locate near the population they served, and could not be diverted. Basic industries, however, send their products to places outside the area in which they are situated, and are basic in the sense of determining the size of the local industry that is needed. Jones then further divided the basic industries into 23 that increased employment from 1927 to 1937, such as motor vehicles and electrical engineering, and those that declined in employment, including coalmining, textiles, shipbuilding and iron and steel.

know how far regional employment reflected their industrial To composition, Jones needed to calculate what their "fair share" of the national growth of each industry should be. But he was uncertain as to how to do this. A region's fair share of the national growth could be computed in two different ways, he noted (Jones, 1940, p. 269). The first was to allocate the growth on the basis of the regional employment in that particular industry. The second was to use the total employment in the region. After all, as Jones noted, "an area may have had more than its fair share of the growth even if the percentage rate of increase in the industry has been no higher, or indeed lower, than in the whole country, simply because a relatively high proportion of the insured workers in the area worked in that industry" (Jones, p. 269). Jones in fact went on to use the first method, as has everyone since, and his question as to whether the second approach was better has seldom been tested in the 50 years since the Barlow Report was published.

The results of his analysis using the first approach were so clear-cut that Jones probably did not feel the need to re-test them using the second. He calculated each region's fair share of industry growth, and subtracted this from the actual growth to obtain the regional shift. He defined a "shift" as the amount of employment by which the actual employment in an area exceeds or falls short of the "fair" share of the area in the national expansion of the industry (Jones, p. 273). The regional shares accounted for the bulk of the inter-regional employment differences. The south-east (London and the Home Counties), for example, had had a 42.7 per cent employment growth 1923-37. Their "fair share" was 40.2 per cent, so the regional shift was only 2.5 per cent. His conclusion was that London's growth was largely due to its concentration of expanding industries, and it did not appear to mean a change in the competitiveness of the London region (Jones, p. 279). Similarly, the rate of expansion of individual industries was, on balance, no greater in the more prosperous than in the more depressed areas (Jones, p. 273).

(b) Early applications in the United States

The first use of the shift-share approach in the United States was Creamer's analysis of shifts in manufacturing industry between 1929 and 1937. He gives no source for his methodology, and it is not clear whether or not he developed the methodology independently. He does use the same term "shift", defined in the same way as Jones, to mean the difference between the actual and expected employment growth. But Creamer's focus is on industries and why they shift location, not on regions and why their growth rates differ. He finds that the amount of locational shift is related to the amount of industry growth (positive or negative): that is, shifts are more likely to occur when industry is expanding and new plants are being opened, or when it is declining and plants must be closed. But in either case the shifts were small, and as in the United Kingdom analysis, regional growth rates for individual industries were close to their national rates.

Perloff, Dunn, Lampard and Muth (1960) cite the work of Creamer, but not Jones, in what still stands as the most detailed shift-share analysis yet undertaken. The analysis was the work of Edgar Dunn, and his contribution is properly described in the preface by the principal author as a remarkable feat. Dunn states that his methodology is an elaboration of the earlier work of Creamer, based on the contemporary work on the analysis of inter-state income differentials. Like Jones, he identifies two ways of doing the computations - the one a very time-consuming method using a complex weighted average of rates, and the second computing the regional effect as a residual in the way that Jones did.

Dunn (p. 67) identified the contributions of shift-share analysis. It usefully characterises regional economic structure. It highlights the extent to which employment growth in an industry is uniform across a nation, and the extent to which it involves shifts from some regions to others. It pinpoints the relatively stable and less stable elements in the economic structure of the nation and in the individual regions. Dunn also identified that regional shifts could result from residual heterogeneity in the industrial classification. Thus a region could grow because it contained the growing parts of a declining industry, for instance, the growing cattle industry in a declining agricultural sector.

Dunn's work, though an outstanding achievement in general, had two unfortunate results. First, he used a complicated terminology: "proportionality shift" for the industry effect — what Jones called the "share" or fair share and differential shift for the regional effect, what Jones and Creamer termed simply "shift". The confusion in terminology has persisted to the present, to the detriment of the technique (Stevens and Moore, p. 435).

More serious, the Dunn methodology, though incorrect, became definitive procedure for shift-share analysis, emulated by Ashby (1965) in computations for the United States Government, and by Statistics Canada (then called the Dominion Bureau of Statistics) in 1967. And the range of applications has grown over the years. To give only a few examples, shift-share has been used to prepare projections of regional employment growth (Brown, 1969; Floyd and Sirmans, 1973; Hellman, 1976; Stevens and Moore. 1980; United Kingdom National Plan, 1964; Williamson, 1980), and examine regional unemployment rates (DeBoer and Seeborg, 1984). It has been used to test location theory (Chalmers and Beckhelm, 1976) and to examine broad centre-periphery patterns of development (Keeble, 1976; and Nguyen and Saldivar, 1979). It has been used to analyse labour productivity (Ledebur and Moomaw, 1983) and export opportunities (Green and Allaway, 1985). Rhodes (1973 and 1974) have used shift-share to evaluate regional development policy. It has been used to analyse population growth (Paris, 1970) and regional crime rates (Blair and Mabry, 1980).

4. Critiques and defences of shift-share

Fothergill and Gudgin (1979, p. 309) have remarked that shift-share fits the expectation that, when a technique is simple and apparently useful, it will be both widely used and heavily criticised. Shift-share has indeed been criticised many times on many points. Four of these points are pertinent to multifactor partitioning as well as shift-share, and are therefore worth reviewing. These four are (1) the difference between data standardisation and model building; (2) level of data disaggregation; (3) interaction; and (4) policy implications.

(a) Data standardisation versus model building

It is on this point that the misunderstanding of shift-share has been serious. Houston (1967), for instance, argued that there was a normative implication to the shift-share components: "Consider the first national growth component which implicitly asserts that every industry in a region should grow at the aggregate national rate" (Houston, p. 579). As Ashby replied (1967, pp. 423-424), there is no such implicit assertion in shift-share analysis, but only the belief that comparisons of the growth of individual industries in particular regions with the national aggregate

performance and with the national performance of the individual industries are both useful.

Standardisation of data does not require an underlying theory as to how the data trends should behave. Rather it provides data which may be used to test theories. This positive contribution is sometimes viewed negatively. Richardson (1978, p. 205) describes shift-share as "merely a standardisation technique permitting us to look at available data in a particular way that may generate a few insights into regional economic structure. It tells us nothing about the capacity of a region to retain growing industries or how to attract them in the first place". No, it does not, but it does identify which are the growing industries, and in which regions they are growing the fastest, and in which the slowest, and these are necessary prerequisites to answering the questions posed by Richardson.

(b) Level of data disaggregation

Most reviews of shift-share raise the fact that the finer the level of industry classification, the smaller will be the regional effect (Houston, 1967, answered by Ashby, 1967; Townroe, 1969, and Buck, 1970, answered by Stilwell, 1970; and Richardson, 1978, answered by Fothergill and Gudgin, 1979).

Any variation of the input data is likely to affect the results in any technique that is not insensitive to inputs (Ashby, p. 424, and Stilwell, p. 454). The fallacy is to argue that the finer the industrial classification, the more accurate are the results of the shift—share analysis (Stilwell, p. 454). Broad groupings may be more helpful as a general guide to the sectoral distribution of differential shifts.

Certainly Richardson (p. 205) overplays his hand on this point, noting that the region effect always goes to zero in the extreme case where each firm represents an industry. Single-firm industries are as meaningless in economics as if sociologists regarded every individual as constituting a single social class (Fothergill and Gudgin, p. 311), or as if geographers regarded every grid reference as constituting a separate region.

Industry classification has been recognised as a fundamental problem much of economic analysis, since the seminal underlying E.H. Chamberlin's Theory of monopolistic competition in 1933 (Hay and Morris, The theory of competition requires the acceptance of competing groups of firms in the same industry, as does in fact much of the theory of market conduct and performance, which are the component structure, problem with Richardson's industrial economics. The classification, which places each firm in its own industry, is that it destroys not only the underlying logic of shift-share analysis, but brings industrial economics crashing down with it. Acceptable classification is as essential to theory as it is to measurement and data standardisation.

(c) Industrial interaction

MacKay (1968) was particularly critical of the failure of shift-share analysis to take account of the knock-on effect of slow growth in one industry in a region with the industries that supplied it with inputs and services: "Thus if one region's economy is dominated by a group of declining industries while another region has a large share in expanding industries, this is likely to produce different rates of growth in other sectors of the regional economy" (MacKay, p. 142).

In fact one test, in which the region effects on employment growth in manufacturing were adjusted for multiplier effects, showed that the differences did not bias or substantially affect the results (Fothergill and Gudgin, p. 316). However, the authors were careful to point out that the multiplier effects were probably much more important in determining regional shifts in the service sector.

One reason why industrial interaction may not be as critical to regional shifts in employment has been suggested by Keeble (1976, p. 34). Keeble notes that input-output relationships are to some extent built into shift-share analysis through national-level linkages, which result in a common trend of national decline or growth in a certain industry. Shift-share analysis can be properly criticised for ignoring special industry relationships peculiar to certain regions over and above average national-scale links, he says, but most linkages are national scale rather than regional.

(d) Policy implications

Shift-share analysis was created to assist with a national policy issue (Barlow, 1940) and has been used in policy analysis ever since (for instance Creamer (1942), Hemming (1963), the United Kingdom National Plan (1964), Randall (1973) and Danson et al. (1980)). The criticism levelled is that the policy implications drawn from shift-share analysis have been too mechanical and too simplistic. At worst, regions with slow employment growth are categorised according to whether their problem is the industry effect (that is, a concentration of slow-growth industries), or whether their problem is the regional effect (that is, slower growth of individual industries in their regions than in the nation as a whole). The policy implications may then be seen as locating fast-growth industries in these regions in the first type, in order to improve the industry mix. In the second type, the policy implication is interpreted as infrastructure improvements to improve regional growth rates.

The problem with the above interpretation is that it confuses data standardisation with regional economic analysis, the effects of industrial structure with the reasons for industrial structure, and the measured causes slow regional growth with the remedies. In particular, standardisation does not identify the reasons for the regional shifts in employment, and these reasons do need to be identified before policies are proposed. Randall (1973), in his study of west-central Scotland, identified: the degree of local ownership of industry and the consequent level of local research and local higher management positions; the general organisation and ownership of firms; and the local availability of venture capital. Buck (1970), in an examination of industries with large regional shifts, found that the contributing factors included firms attracted into his Merseyside study area by regional subsidies, and firms closed because of reorganisation, as well as cases caused bу firm-classification or product heterogeneity. Data errors are a whatever analytic technique is used, but in shift-share analysis their effects are likely to end up in the regional shift, making this component trickier to interpret.

Finally, it needs to be remembered that when shift-share has been applied to a sequence of periods to assess the effectiveness of policy intervention (as in Moore and Rhodes, 1973 and 1974), the regional shifts of each period become part of the industry mix of the next. The industry mix is constantly changing. The crucial questions may well be, how did some regions build up a favourable industry mix while others were left with an unfavourable one, and why is the regional shift of employment out of certain regions and into others? That is shift-share focuses the policy issues that need to be

addressed. But data standardisation is no facile substitute for the detailed anlysis which must follow.

5. Conceptual errors in the mathematics of shift-share

It is rather surprising that in all the searching reviews of the shift-share technique, the conceptual errors in the mathematics remained uncorrected, even though Jones (1940) pointed out the problem of defining a region's fair share of the national growth, and Rosenfeld (1959) had demonstrated mathematically the flaw in the formula for the region effect. However, Cunningham (1969) came very close to both identifying one of the problems, and to proposing a solution that points towards the multifactor partitioning presented in this paper. The discovery of them in this study was triggered by the extension of simple shift-share to include the effects of firm size and country of control of firm, as well as the industry and region effects. In the two-factor case, only one effect need be measured directly, and the other can then be considered to be equal to the residual. But when the data have to be decomposed to measure four main effects, the conceptual errors are compounded, and the need to rethink the mathematics becomes imperative.

The conceptual errors in the mathematics can be demonstrated definitively only by a mathematical analysis of the shift-share technique (see Mathematical Appendix). But it seems important to outline the problems to those who will not wish to work their way through the mathematical notation and equations.

(a) The problem of interwoven effects

The crux of the shift-share technique is to measure the expected employment growth of a region. The obvious answer is to calculate the expected growth as the actual employment in each industry in the region at the beginning of the period, multiplied by the growth rates of those industries in the nation as a whole. After all, the simplest expectation is that each industry would tend to grow at the same national rate, wherever it was located, with regional deviations from the national rate in fact reflecting regional factors. But Jones (1940) suspected that this result would be biased by the regional distribution of the labour force. And so it is. The problem is that the national growth rate for an industry is actually the weighted average of the regional rates. It can be calculated in several different ways, but it does equal the rate of growth in each region. So the national rates of growth of each industry are affected by their regional mix.

Shift-share analysis acknowledges that regional growth is affected by the distribution of employment among the different industries in each region. Indeed, a prime purpose of the technique is to standardise for this industry-mix effect. What was overlooked was the equal need to standardise industry growth rate for their regional-mix effects.

Some analysts recognised this conceptual problem in shift-share analysis and explored possible solutions. Rosenfeld (1959) was the first. He wrote (p. 534) in a commentary on a preceding article by Edgar Dunn (1959) that what was called the differential shift (regional effect) was not entirely free of the proportional shift (industry-mix effect). Equally he found it difficult to accept that the regional effect formula expressed what it was supposed to. His mathematical approach was rather different than that in the Mathematical Appendix, but it rested on the same critical point. Rosenfeld found that the

formula for the regional effect could be partitioned to isolate a proportionality (industry-mix) effect embedded within it.

Cunningham (1969) was less dogmatic than Rosenfeld, to whom he does not refer, and noted only that a choice had to be made in applying this technique as to which weights to apply. He proposed using aggregate industry employment weights rather than the standard industry-specific weights (p. 123). The industry and regional effects obtained were different, he said, and both contained useful information. Ideally, a way should be found to combine the two sets of results, including his measure psi (y). Cunningham's psi turns out to be precisely the "allocation" effect in multifactor partitioning.

The problem with Cunningham's very penetrating approach to shift-share was that he produced a partitioning of employment growth comprising an uncorrected industry-mix effect, the allocation effect, and a residual, which is hard to interpret. But he correctly diagnosed that the problem of selecting weights in calculating industry rates "makes it impossible to decompose a regional problem into two tidy and uniquely measurable elements".

Esteban-Marquillas (1972) did not refer to Cunningham's article, but did restate Rosenfeld's argument with great clarity. He noted (p. 250) that one would suppose that in the case of two regions with the same number of workers, and two industries with precisely the same growth rate, the regional effect would be identical with regard to that industry in the two regions. But this only happens if the proportions of workers in that industry are the same. This suggests that "the competitive effect, as it is normally formulated, does not reflect exactly what it pretends, but is influenced and interwoven with the industry-mix effect" (p. 250).

Esteban-Marquillas then came up with a new formula to correct this problem. Unfortunately he fell right back into the same trap, and far from purging the region effect of the industry-mix effect, his formula merely embeds the problem of interwoven effects deeper.

Esteban-Marquillas did recognise that any solution to the problem required recognition of an "allocation" effect which is separate and independent of the industry and region effects: "This component will show us if a region is specialised in those sectors in which it enjoys better competitive advantage". In fact, in the multifactor partitioning, this question is evaluated only for the country as a whole, and the allocative effect, like the national growth, is a constant ratio applied to each region.

Another very clear statement of the problem of interwoven effects (which is in fact the term they introduced) is an article by Herzog and Olsen (1977). They wrote: "The competitive position and industry-mix effects are interwoven; both depend on industrial structure. Therefore, the classical formulation of the competitive [region] effect does not measure what it is often described to measure ... the competitive position is an impure measure of regional competitive advantage or disadvantage" (p. 444).

Very sadly, Herzog and Olsen then followed Esteban-Marquillas, repeating the same mistake and embedding further into their calculations the problem of interwoven effects. And perhaps, not surprisingly, in another methodological argument Arcellus (1984), also referring back to Esteban-Marquillas, also makes the same mistake. And so, although the mistake was recognised, at least by the more thorough and careful practitioners, it remained uncorrected nearly half a century after the technique was first used.

(b) On the perpetuation of an error

How could a methodology so fundamentally flawed have continued, in widening use, uncorrected for so long — even when the originator (Jones, 1940) had spelled out so presciently his concerns with it? Part of the answer is the complete inadequacy of the references given in the early literature. Creamer (1942) gives no sources for the methodology. Dunn (1960) does not refer to Jones (1940), his own earlier paper (1959) or the Rosenfeld commentary which accompanied it. Cunningham (1969) has no references at all. Esteban-Marquillas (1972) does refer to Rosenfeld (1959) but missed Cunningham (1969). The demonstration of the flaw in shift-share by Esteban-Marquillas is incisive, but the suggested correction repeats precisely the same mistake. And it is the Esteban-Marquillas article, which is in English, not Rosenfeld's which is in French, that influences the course of the methodological debate, including Herzog and Olsen (1977) and Arcellus (1984). Klaasen and Paelink (1972) and Bishop and Simpson (1972) miss both Rosenfeld (1959) and Cunningham (1969).

A second problem was the confused perception that the methodological debate about appropriate weightings was a peripheral refinement. It was not recognised that standardisation procedures are fundamentally concerned with weights and that any questions about the validity of the weighting system used strikes at the heart of the methodology. So when Thirlwall replied to Cunningham's article, "There seems no a priori reason why one weighting system should be preferred to another" (Thirlwall, 1969, p. 129), he diverted the debate away from this crucial issue to the secondary questions raised by Houston (1967), and elaborated by Buck (1970) and others.

Discussions pointing out the flaws in the weightings used in shift-share were either forgotten or glossed over. The growing recognition of the need for some form of data standardisation produced a widening range of applications of this faulty technique, giving it an unstoppable momentum and diverting attention still further from the fundamental issues.

But it should be admitted that the effectiveness of the methodology papers was blunted by a total failure to agree on any standard notation (or even mathematical approach), or any standard terms for the various effects. Instead, readers were presented with a bewildering array of alternative equations and incomplete solutions. These incomplete solutions seemed to present as many problems as they solved. Shift-share analysis produced a few simple effects that had ready interpretations. Who could say that about Cunningham's solution, for instance? It is only when the residual bits and pieces of terms are grouped into an allocation and interaction effect that a simple comprehensive interpretation emerges.

Finally, it must be conceded that standardisation of one factor only, with the other derived as a residual, leaves too much leeway for error. It is only when the technique is pushed to the multifactor case that the cracks open wide and force a rigorous and painstaking review.

If there are any lessons to be learned from this unhappy story, one is the need for thorough bibliographic research and documentation, rather than the uncritical acceptance of what previous authors have said. Another is the requirement to study and understand a methodology before applying it. And perhaps most important is acceptance that the prerequisite to success and progress in methodological developments and applications is close team-work by both subject-matter specialists and mathematicians and statisticians who can see when the emperor is rather naked and can point it out very compellingly.

6. Multifactor partitioning

(a) The basic concept

Multifactor partitioning, like shift-share, is a method of standardising growth rates when the differences in the rates and the effects of composition are both of interest. It corrects the shift-share formulas so that the various effects do indeed measure what they say they do. And it extends shift-share to deal with two or more factors.

The number of effects identified in multifactor partitioning depends on the number of criteria of classification. In the standard two-factor region and industry classification, five effects are identified: the three as in shift-share and two more. The three effects comparable to shift-share are the national growth rate effect, the industry effect and the regional effect. The regional effect is separately measured in multifactor partitioning and is not These three effects are interpreted in the same way in multifactor partitioning as in shift-share. The national growth rate effect is the employment change in a region (or industry) that would have occurred if the region (or industry) had grown at the standardised national rate. industry effect measures how much faster or slower the standardised growth rate of each industry is than the standardised growth rate of the nation. region with a concentration of fast-growth industries will have a favourable, positive industry-mix effect. The region effect is similarly a comparative measure of how much faster or slower industries as a whole tend to grow in that region than in the nation as a whole. The region effect for any given region is the same for all industries in that region (unlike shift-share which produces a different region effect for each industry).

Multifactor partitioning identifies two further effects to avoid the problem of interwoven effects which occurs in shift-share. These two are the interaction effect and the allocation effect. The interaction effect is readily understandable. Each region has specific resource and locational attributes that have a differential value for each industry according to its needs. Agriculture and mining provide obvious examples. Hence there are industry-region interactions, specific to each industry-region combination, that occur over and above the region-wide industry effects, and the industry-wide regional effects.

The allocation effect is again readily understandable. Imagine that all industries are proportionately distributed among all regions. It is this distribution of employment that provides the basis of the definition of the standardised industry and national growth rates. The allocation effect is then the difference between the actual growth rate of employment in the nation and what it would have been had each industry been distributed in each region strictly in proportion to the regional total employment.

The number of growth effects identified in multifactor partitioning increases with the number of categories of classifications used. Three categories, say industry, region and size class, create nine effects, four more than for two factors. The extra effects are a size effect and three more interaction effects. The three extra interaction effects all involve aspects of economies of scale: industry-size interaction, which is internal economies of scale; region-size interaction, which is external economies of scale; and industry-size-region, which is a very specific agglomeration economy measure. With four factors, for example with country-of-control-of-firm added, 17 effects are created, including a country-of-control effect and six more interaction effects.

Although the number of effects increases rapidly, the main effects are easily interpreted. The interaction effects probably need to be grouped according to the purpose of the study.

(b) Calculations

The calculations for multifactor partitioning turn out to be surprisingly simple for all but the interaction effects. The same basic calculations are required as in shift-share analysis. In addition a set of standardised growth rates is needed. Standardised growth rates are based on assumptions of strict proportionality.

The essential difference between multifactor partitioning and shift-share is that multifactor partitioning treats the particular growth rates in each cell as the intrinsic rates, while shift-share treats the aggregate rates as the basic rates. So while shift-share focuses on national, industry and regional rates, and partitions these rates, multifactor partitioning adopts the reverse approach. It regards these aggregate rates as merely the weighted sums of the individual cell rates. Thus the industry rate for the nation is the weighted sum of the growth in each industry-region cell. But the weighted lock in the disproportionalities in the regional Once embedded in the aggregate rates, these distributional distributions. effects cannot be purged. Therefore, multifactor partitioning computes a whole new set of standardised weights, using not the actual employment distributions as in shift-share, but the strictly proportional distributions. Hence there is a residual, which is the difference between the actual and the standardised national growth rates. This residual is precisely the allocative effect early researchers sought. Then the true unbiased effects are calculated as the differences between appropriate standardised rates, and not actual rates as in shift-share.

For the user, it makes little obvious difference which set of rates has been used, except that standardised rates isolate additional interaction and allocation effects. For the analyst, an additional set of standardised rates has to be computed, each of which takes more calculations as more factors are added.

(c) <u>Multifactor partitioning and shift-share:</u> Some common problems

Multifactor partitioning clearly solves a set of fundamental problems with the mathematical formulas used in shift-share. It provides the interaction effect lacking in shift-share. Multifactor partitioning is, however, no more than a correction and extension of that technique. The criticisms and defences of shift-share apply in much the same way to multifactor partitioning.

It is just a method of data standardisation, not an explanatory model based on a body of theory. There are no normative assumptions about the behaviour of the effects. The level of disaggregation is at least as important in multifactor partitioning as in shift-share. The addition of extra criteria of classification quickly divides cell values to the point where cell growth rates can become erratic. The criteria and number of classes used may, therefore, have to take account of the actual employment distributions as much as research ideals. Moreover, in multifactor partitioning, as in shift-share, the values obtained for the various effects are sensitive to the level of classification. Multifactor partitioning does nothing to help solve this problem.

Multifactor partitioning can help to answer questions about the effects of composition on growth rates. For example, did small firms grow faster in the 1980s because of their industry mix? Or did foreign MNEs grow as fast as domestic MNEs, correcting for industry-region-size differences? It can also provide an essential first step to policy analysis by providing standardised growth rates. But as with shift-share, there is no simple step from data standardisation to policy conclusions.

Multifactor partitioning may add some problems to data standardisation. Composition changes over time. Firms may change in size class, industry classification and country of control. As more factors are incorporated in the analysis, it may be that more thought must be given not only to the specific start and end years, but also to the length of the period. It may be, too, that the debate on the appropriate year at which to measure the composition in shift-share analysis needs to be addressed in multifactor partitioning. The case study that follows uses the initial-year weights only.

The essential point is to replace any application of shift-share with multifactor partitioning. Multifactor partitioning corrects the conceptual errors in the mathematical formulation of shift-share. The difficulties that remain are intrinsic data standardisation problems that confront the analyst whatever standardisation procedure is used.

EMPLOYMENT GROWTH AND FOREIGN FIRMS IN CANADA: 1978-86

1. Canada as a case study

(a) Foreign control of industry

Canada is a good choice for a test application of multifactor partitioning of the effects of foreign control on employment Employment in multinational manufacturing enterprises has grown in most countries in the post-Second World War period, and now accounts for about a third of the total in industrialised market economies (ILO, 1981, p. 1). But usually, as in the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, it is domestic MNEs which dominate. Canada is exceptional in extent of foreign ownership and control of its economy. investment, as distinct from portfolio investment, began to grow in Canada in the inter-war period and accelerated after the Second World War, so that by the 1960s more of its production in mining and smelting, in mineral fuels and in manufacturing was owned and controlled by foreigners than by Canadian Canadians recognise the need for foreign investment to develop their economy and accept that direct investment provides convenient packages of capital, technology, product, management and marketing. The direct job creation is also very obvious. Less obvious are the backwash effects, as foreign investment increased in dominance, and the largest MNEs grew larger than some national economies (Todaro, 1977). Concern, both public and private, grew rapidly after the Second World War, leading to a sequence of government reports, increased data gathering on foreign firms, and the establishment of a monitoring agency (Dow and Kumar, forthcoming), and making Canada the best-documented case of the effects of foreign MNEs in the world (Dicken, p. 379).

The first official body to fix the question of foreign ownership on the political agenda was the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects (the Gordon Commission, 1956) which led to the Corporation and Labour Unions Return Act (CALURA) of 1962 (Dow and Kumar, forthcoming). CALURA required the collection (but not publication) of financial and other information — including country of ownership and control — of enterprises and labour unions operating in Canada.

The Gordon report also led to the establishment of a Privy Council Task Force on Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Industry (the Watkins Report, 1968), which was the first comprehensive study of the problems created by foreign investment. It brought to the fore many problems including "extraterritoriality", in which branch plants operate according to the laws not of the country in which they are located, but of the country in which their head office is located. Special studies, commissioned by the Task Force, also suggested other backwash effects. Thus, concentrated foreign investment in the Toronto region increased the wide regional disparities in income and employment levels across Canada which is itself a matter of serious policy concern (Ray, 1967 and 1971).

The Watkins report recommended the creation of a special agency to monitor foreign-owned firms. This recommendation was picked up in another Government of Canada report, Foreign Direct Investment in Canada (Gray, 1972) and the Foreign Investment Review Agency was established in 1974 to screen foreign investment. But the Agency was never popular with big business and with a change of Government its name and mandate had been changed by 1985 to Investment Canada in order to encourage, rather than to screen, foreign investment.

Meanwhile researchers continue to underline the problems caused by foreign investment. Britton and Gilmour (1978), in a study for the Science Council of Canada, noted the indirect job losses caused by the sourcing of components and parts in the United States and argued that foreign investment relegated Canada to a technologically backward branch-plant economy. The press, too, is quick to point out public concern with each new major foreign takeover bid, as in the recent case of the Canadian mining giant, Falconbridge (Crane, 1989).

(b) Longitudinal employment data

Appraisal of the costs and benefits of foreign direct investment in Canada have been hampered by lack of data, which is only now being overcome through the achievement, at Statistics Canada, of the linkage of records, both cross-sectionally and longitudinally from the microfiles on firms at Statistics Canada (including the Business Register and CALURA files), at Revenue Canada and at Employment and Immigration (McVey, 1987(a)). The first of these data have now been published (Statistics Canada, 1988, table 3, pp. 52-55). The tabulations presented in this report were specially undertaken from those files by the Small Business and Special Surveys Division of Statistics Canada.

The employment data are derived by tracking firms longitudinally from 1978 (or the year they began business if after 1978) to 1986. Firms are classified by size and location at the beginning of the period, and by country of control and Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) at the end of the period. Firms then retain this classification for the entire period, regardless of any changes that occur during it. McVey notes, for instance, that 302 large firms accounting for 5 per cent of the employment in large firms changed country of control between 1978 and 1985 (McVey, 1987(b)). Growth of employment in any industry-region size-control group can occur only through the net growth of firms in that group continuously throughout the entire period (or the part of it during which they are in business). None of the change in employment can occur because of the reclassification of a firm during the period.

All commercial firms, with paid employment, are included in the enumeration. Firms excluded are those in non-commercial services (education, health and religious organisations, SIC 801-831); public administration and defence (SIC 902-991) and unclassified (SIC 000). However, there are virtually no foreign firms in these excluded categories.

One difficulty with the Statistics Canada longitudinal files is that they contain no direct count of the number employed in each firm, but only the total annual payroll. An "average labour unit" (ALU) or job equivalent is obtained by dividing each firm's payroll by the average annual earnings of workers in the three-digit SIC-province group to which the firm belongs. It is not possible to determine the accuracy of this procedure in detail, but Statistics Canada has compared the aggregate results with two sample surveys: the monthly Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the monthly Survey of Employment, Payroll and Hours (SEPH). For 1984, Canada had 9,847,000 paid workers according to LFS, 9,885,000 ALUs and 9,928,000 according to SEPH (Statistics Canada, pp. 15-18). Furthermore, the ALU and LFS had parallel annual trends 1978-84. In any case, the differences between the three estimates need to be placed in the context of the considerable job turnover and churning that occur (Baldwin and Gorecki, forthcoming).

The ALU data indicate dramatically different employment growth rates according to country of control. The growth rate for foreign-controlled firms, 1978-86, was -1.13 per cent compared with +18.36 per cent for Canadian-controlled. This contrast must be of concern because unemployment levels rose from 8.3 per cent of the labour force in 1978 to 9.6 per cent in 1986 - both years of moderately low but not cyclically minimal unemployment (Gera and Rahman, 1989). The contrast might be interpreted at face value as an indication perhaps of the relocation of foreign-controlled manufacturing activity outside Canada. What is needed first, however, before looking for any explanations, is to standardise the data for differences in the composition of foreign and Canadian firms.

2. Disproportionalities in employment distribution

(a) Disproportionalities in industry structure

Just as the Barlow Commission found that regional differences in employment growth rates were largely due to regional differences in industry composition, so it might be supposed that differences in employment growth rates by country of control might be due to differences in their industry mix. In fact, although the differences in composition are considerable, these compositional differences contribute little to explaining the aggregate difference in growth rate.

Foreign investment in Canada has always been concentrated in the goods-producing sector, particularly mining and manufacturing, and in 1968 these industries accounted for 60 per cent of the labour force in foreign-controlled firms. The concentration was particularly high in secondary manufacturing (involving the production of finished goods) which alone accounted for a third of the foreign-firm labour force (table 1 and figure 1).

It is precisely the concentration of MNE activity in manufacturing which has caused labour organisations great concern, for these jobs are more easily moved from one country to another (ILO, 1981, p. 4). There are, of course, costs to closing plants (or "barriers to exit") and relocating production, but these costs are probably lower for MNEs than for domestic firms (Harrigan and Porter, 1983, Shapiro, 1983, MacLachlan, 1986, Baldwin and Gorecki, 1983).

Employment in foreign-controlled mining and manufacturing, as well as in the goods-producing industries generally, had dropped by 1986 (table 2 and figure 1). This decline, coupled with a growth in the service-producing industries, did produce a shift in the industry composition of foreign-controlled employment. But the shift was general, affecting both Canadian— and foreign-controlled firms. Hence the relative industry disproportionalities in employment by foreign-controlled firms remained much the same in 1986 as they had been in 1976.

MNE foreign investment is generally concentrated in fast-growth industries (ILO, 1981, p. 48). However, the Canadian sectors in which foreign investment was concentrated tended to do relatively poorly from 1978 to 1986. There is no significant correlation between level of foreign investment and growth at either the two- or three-digit level of the SIC. And, indeed, foreign-controlled firms had a worse employment-growth record than Canadian-controlled firms in every sector of the economy except transportation (which includes transportation, storage, communication and utilities) (table 3). Foreign-controlled goods-producing industries had a growth rate of -11.3, compared with the Canadian-controlled performance of +9.8. So although the

industry-composition of foreign firms was not favourable during this period, it cannot, by itself, explain their poor job-generation performance.

Table 1. Employment in Canadian— and foreign—controlled firms by industry: Canada, 1978

	Number empl	Number employed (in '000)			Per cent distribution		
	Canadian- controlled	Foreign- controlled	All firms	Canadian- controlled	Foreign- controlled	All firms	
Goods-producing							
Primary	86.6	4.3	90.8	1.5	0.3	1.3	
Mines	98.7	58.1	156.8	1.7	4.3	2.2	
Manufacturing I	658.1	284.1	942.2	11.6	21.1	13.5	
Manufacturing II	626.9	465.8	1 092.7	11.1	34.7	15.6	
Construction	405.9	41.6	447.6	7.2	3.1	6.4	
Total	1 876.2	853.8	2 730.0	33.2	63.5	39.0	
Services- producing							
Transportation	815.2	45.3	860.5	14.4	3.4	12.3	
Wholesale trade	433.4	96.4	529. 8	7.7	7.2	7.6	
Retail trade	939.9	141.3	1 081.3	16.5	10.5	15.5	
Finance	492.6	67.6	560.2	8.7	5.0	8.0	
Services	1 092.6	139.9	1 232.5	19.3	4	17.6	
Total	3 773.7	490.4	4 264.2	66.8	36.5	61.0	
Total: Goods and							
services	5 649.9	1 344.3	6 994.2	100.0	100.0	100.0	


<u>Note</u>: Firms are classified by industry and control in 1978, or year defunct if before 1986, and tracked longitudinally. Number employed is based on job equivalents measured in ALUs (Average Labour Units).

Manufacturing I (primary manufacturing) includes Major Groups I, Food and beverages; 2 Tobacco; 3 Rubber and plastics; 4 Leather; 5 Textiles; 8 Wood industries; 10 Paper; 12 Primary metals; 17 Non-metallic mineral products; and 18 Petroleum and coal products.

Manufacturing II (secondary manufacturing) includes 6 Knitting mills; 7 Clothing; 11 Printing; 13 Metal fabricating; 14 Machinery; 15 Transportation equipment; 16 Electrical products; 19 Chemical products; 20 Miscellaneous manufacturing.

<u>Source</u>: Special tabulation by Small Business and Special Surveys, Statistics Canada.

Figure 1. Distribution of employment by industry and country of control: Canada 1978 and 1986



(b) Regional disproportionalities in foreign investment

Foreign investment in Canada has always shown marked regional concentrations, but it is not likely that these disproportionalities can help to explain the poor employment growth record of foreign firms. Foreign investment is concentrated in Ontario, particularly Toronto south-west, and the province accounts for more than half of the employment in foreign-controlled firms (table 4 and figure 2). The degree of concentration increased slightly between 1978 and 1986 as foreign-controlled employment made substantial gains only in Ontario, and declined absolutely in Manitoba, Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces. By contrast, Canadian-controlled employment was more evenly distributed and grew more evenly across the country, though growth rates were highest for Ontario and western regions (table 5 and figure 3).

Foreign firms have undoubtedly benefited from concentrating in Ontario. Ontario has long been Canada's highest income province, largest market, and, together with Quebec, contains the country's manufacturing belt. Ontario's per capita incomes were about 20 per cent above the national average in the 1960s, and 10 per cent above since the early 1970s. Inter-regional differences in per capita income are closely related to inter-regional differences in labour productivity which in turn is related to factors such as capital investment per worker, education levels, urbanisation economies and internal economies of scale. While foreign firms should have benefited from the locational advantages which Ontario offers, their concentration there has possibly contributed to regional disparities in the country.

Table 2. Employment in Canadian- and foreign-controlled firms by industry: Canada, 1986

	Number empl	Number employed (in '000)			Per cent distribution		
	Canadian- controlled	•		Canadian- controlled	_	All d firms	
Goods-producing							
Primary Mines Manufacturing I Manufacturing II		2.5 50.9 240.8 431.2	116.1 174.8 888.8 1 154.3		0.2 3.8 18.1 32.4	1.4 2.2 11.1 14.4	
Construction Total	452.2 2 061.0	31.6 757.0	438.8 2 817.9		2.4 57.0	6.0 35.2	
Services- producing							
Transportation Wholesale trade Retail trade Finance Services	735.9 495.3 1 232.4 605.9 1 556.7	45.6 92.6 183.9 75.3 174.8	781.5 587.9 1 416.3 681.1 1 731.5	7.4 18.4 9.1	3.4 7.0 13.8 5.7 13.2	9.7 7.3 17.7 8.5 21.6	
Total	4 626.2	572.2	5 198.4	69.2	43.0	64.8	
Total: Goods and services	6 687.2	1 329.1	8 016.3	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Source: Special Canada.	tabulation	by Small H	Business an	nd Special	Surveys, St	atistics	

Table 3. Employment growth in Canadian- and foreigncontrolled firms by industry: Canada, 1978-86

	Employment	Employment growth (in '000)			Growth rate		
	Canadian- controlled	Foreign- controlled	All firms	Canadian- controlled	Foreign- controlled	All firms	
Goods-producing					,		
Primary	27.0	-1.8	25.3	31.2	-42.2	27.8	
Mines	25.2	-7.1	18.0	25.5	-12.3	11.5	
Manufacturing I	-10.0	-43.3	-53.3	-1.5	-15.2	-5.7	
Manufacturing II	96.3	-34.6	61.7	15.4	-7.4	5.6	
Construction	46.3	-10.1	36.3	11.4	-24.1	8.1	
Total	184.8	-96.9	87.9	9.8	11.3	3.3	
Services- producing							
Transportation	-79.3	0.3	-78.9	-9.7	0.7	-9.2	
Wholesale trade	61.9	-3.8	58.1	14.3	-4.0	11.0	
Retail trade	292.4	42.6	335.0	31.1	30.2	31.0	
Finance	113.3	7.7	120.9	23.0	11.4	21.6	
Services	464.1	34.9	499.0	42.5	25.0	40.5	
Total	852.5	81.7	934.2	22.6	16.7	21.9	
Total: Goods and							
services	1 037.2	-15.2	1 022.1	18.4	-1.1	14.6	

Note: Growth rate is 1978-86 employment growth as a per cent of 1978 employment.

<u>Source</u>: Special tabulation by Small Business and Special Surveys, Statistics Canada.

Table 4. Regional distribution of employment in Canadian-and foreign-controlled firms: 1978 and 1986

	British Columbia	Prairies ²	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic	Canada
		19	78			
			<u>, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , </u>			
Employment in '000						
Canadian Foreign	649.2 122.1	978.6 161.5	2 144.7 719.9	1 473.8 285.2	403.6 55.6	5 649.9 1 344.3
All firms	771.3	1 140.1	2 864.6	1 759.0	459.2	6 994.2
Per cent in each region						
Canadian	11.5	17.3	38.0	26.1	7.1	100.0
Foreign	9.1	12.0	53.6	21.2	4.1	100.0
All firms	11.0	16.3	41.0	25.1	6.6	100.0
		<u>19</u>	86			
Employment in '000						
Canadian	769.8	1 160.3	2 639.1	1 661.3	456.7	6 687.2
Foreign	118.0	162.1	758.8	237.5	52.7	1 329.1
All firms	887.8	1 322.4	3 397.9	1 898.8	509.4	8 016.3
Per cent in each region						
Canadian	11.5	17.4	39.5	24.8	6.8	100.0
Foreign	8.9	12.2	57.1	17.9	4.0	100.0
All firms	11.1	16.5	42.4	23.7	6.4	100.0

Source: Special tabulation by Small Business and Special Surveys, Statistics Canada.

Yukon is included in British Columbia.
North-West Territories is included in the Prairies.

Figure 2. Distribution of employment by province and country of control




Table 5. Regional growth in employment in Canadianand foreign-controlled firms: 1978 and 1986

British Columbia	Prairies	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic	Canada
120.6 -4.1 116.4	181.7 0.6 182.4	494.4 38.9 533.3	187.5 -47.8 139.7	53.0 -2.8 50.2	1 037.2 -15.2 1 022.0
18.6 -3.4 15.1	18.6 0.4 16.0	23.1 5.4 18.6	12.7 -16.7 7.9	13.2 -5.5 10.9	18.4 -1.1 14.6
	120.6 -4.1 116.4	120.6 181.7 -4.1 0.6 116.4 182.4	120.6 181.7 494.4 -4.1 0.6 38.9 116.4 182.4 533.3	120.6 181.7 494.4 187.5 -4.1 0.6 38.9 -47.8 116.4 182.4 533.3 139.7	120.6 181.7 494.4 187.5 53.0 -4.1 0.6 38.9 -47.8 -2.8 116.4 182.4 533.3 139.7 50.2


Note: Growth rate is increase in employment 1978-86 as a per cent of 1978 employment.

<u>Source</u>: Special tabulation by Small Business and Special Surveys, Statistics Canada.

Calculating the employment growth of foreign-controlled firms by region seems to increase the disparity with Canadian-controlled firms rather than helping to explain it. Foreign firms did worse in employment growth in all five regions in primary industries, mining, manufacturing, construction, finance and services (table 6). In Quebec they did worse in all nine sectors, and in the Prairie provinces in eight. Looked at in another way, Canadian-controlled firms scored absolute employment gains in all five regions in five of the nine sectors, the foreign-controlled in none. Canadian-controlled firms did not suffer employment losses in all five regions in any sector, but the foreign did in primary industries, manufacturing and construction.

The poor performance of foreign-controlled firms in job generation appears to be almost conclusively established. However, there is one more disproportionality that needs to be assessed - the effect of size class.

Figure 3. Distribution of employment by province and country of control: Canada, 1978 and 1986



(c) Size-class disproportionalities in foreign control

Disproportionalities in size-class composition have assumed importance in recent decades as net employment growth has been increasingly accounted for by small firms. The contribution of small firms to growth first attracted widespread attention with the work of Birch (1979) in the United States and the Bolton Enquiry (1971) and the work of Fothergill and Gudgin (1979, 1982) and Lloyd and Dicken (1979) and others in the United Kingdom (Mason and Harrison, 1985). The methodology of Professor Birch was applied to measuring job creation by size class of firm to Canada (Canada, DREE, 1986(a)) the finding corroborated in later analyses using the longitudinal Statistics Canada data (Canada, DREE, 1986(b), and CFIB 1986 and 1988). precise results depend on the end years selected, but the general result is always the same: small firms account for a very small proportion of the total labour force, but for most of the job creation. Therefore, to compare employment growth for any groups of firms without considering differences in size distribution is likely to be misleading.

It is on size class that foreign-controlled firms are seriously disadvantaged. In 1978, almost all of their employment was in large firms (those with 100 or more employees) whereas the Canadian-controlled firms had large proportions in both small and medium (table 7 and figure 4). Between 1978 and 1986 there was a substantial redistribution of employment distribution between the three size classes, with the small firms increasing their share at the expense of both the medium and large. Foreign firms actually had a faster growth rate in the small class, but they were building on employment base in small firms of less than 1 per cent of the national labour force in 1978 (table 8). And even breaking down employment growth by size class shows they did worse than Canadian in the medium and large-size classes, which accounted for some 98 per cent of their employment. So even the size factor suggests a generally poor performance by foreign firms in job generation, with the exception of the small-size class.

Table 6. Employment growth rates in Canadian—and foreign—controlled firms by industry and region: 1978-86

	British Columbia ¹	Prairies ²	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic	Canada
Canadian firms						
Primary	7.0	55.9	27.8	47.5	39.5	31.2
Mines	0.7	39.2	53.3	-6.7	-3.2	-25.5
Manufacturing	2.8	7.3	16.6	-3.7	3.5	6.7
Construction	-0.7	-14.1	33.2	14.3	1.0	11.4
Transportation	0.4	2.0	-16.5	-12.2	-5.3	-9.7
Wholesale trade	2.3	3.7	24.8	18.1	0.4	14.3
Retail trade	28.3	36.0	28.4	35.1	24.8	31.1
Finance	19.8	15.3	35.7	9.6	23.6	23.0
Services	52.4	38.4	46.7	36.7	33.2	42.5
Foreign firms						
Primary	-86.7	-48.9	-25.5	-35.3	-52.1	-42.2
Mines	11.0	10.9	-36.6	-44.8	-16.4	-12.3
Manufacturing	-27.7	-14.6	-4.9	-16.0	-27.3	-10.4
Construction	-28.4	-28.2	-21.7	-22.7	-11.8	-24.1
Transportation	12.0	4.8	-5.0	-18.1	36.0	0.7
Wholesale trade	-13.0	-6.6	13.9	-29.4	8.7	-4.0
Retail trade	94.8	15.4	41.2	-10.4	56.4	30.2
Finance	-9.9	0.3	29.2	-12.7	-1.4	11.4
Services	27.8	30.6	36.2	-6.3	1.5	25.0
All firms						
Primary	4.3	55.0	22.7	47.0	32.5	27.8
Mines	3.6	29.0	13.2	-20.7	-7.9	11.5
Manufacturing	-6.6	1.3	6.6	-7.1	-3.6	0.4
Construction	-2.9	-15.9	27.8	12.0	0.2	8.1
Transportation	2.4	2.0	-16.1	-12.5	-4.8	-9.2
Wholesale trade	-0.1	2.2	22.4	9.2	1.2	11.0
Retail trade	33.0	33.6	30.6	29.8	28.1	31.0
Finance	17.0	14.0	34.7	7.2	20.7	21.6
Services	49.8	37.7	45.1	32.8	30.8	40.5

¹ Yukon is included in British Columbia.

<u>Source</u>: Special tabulation by Small Business and Special Surveys, Statistics Canada.

² North-West Territories is included in the Prairies.

Table 7. Employment in Canadian- and foreign-controlled firms by size-class of firm: Canada, 1978 and 1986

	Employment	(in '000):	1978	Employment	(in '000):	1986	
Size class of firm	Canadian- controlled firms	Foreign- controlled firms	All firms	Canadian- controlled firms	Foreign- controlled firms	All firms	
Small	1 478.6	18.2	1 496.7	2 505.7	44.2	2 550.1	
Medium	1 191.6	91.9	1 283.5	1 291.2	96.0	1 387.1	
Large	2 979.8	1 234.2	4 213.9	2 890.3	1 188.8	4 079.1	
Total	5 649.9	1 344.3	6 994.2	6 687.2	1 329.1	8 016.3	
	Per cent di			Per cent distribution of employment: 1986			
Small	21.1	0.3	21.4	31.3	0.6	31.8	
Medium	17.0	1.3	18.4	16.1	1.2	17.3	
Large	42.6	17.6	60.2	36.1	14.8	50.9	
Total	80.8	19.2	100.0	83.4	16.6	100.0	

Note: Small firms employed less than 20 in 1978, medium firms 20 to less than 100, large firms 100 or more.

Source: Special tabulation by Small Business and Special Surveys, Statistics Canada.

The analyst could be forgiven for arguing that the growth data presented, by industry, by region and by size add up to a formidable case against the employment creation performance of foreign firms. But there is one more step to go: the examination of employment growth by industry cross-tabulated by region and by size class, and it is at this detail that a different story begins to emerge. The furniture industry is presented as an example (table 9). In Ontario, Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces, as well as in Canada itself, foreign-controlled firms outperformed Canadian in every size class (in which they were represented), but in each of these cases, because of size-class disproportionalities, they did worse on total employment growth.

These are, of course, cases of Simpson's paradox (as explained earlier in section 1), and other examples at the national level occur in primary metals, retail trade and services. In a Simpson's paradox, aggregate trends are the opposite of each of the individual trends. It is the extreme case. But this example of the furniture industry serves as a warning that industry, region and size-disproportionality effects are simultaneously at work. Their effects cannot be identified separately. The proper answer to the effects of disproportionalities on employment growth requires multifactor partitioning.

Figure 4: Distribution of employment by size-class of country and country of control: Canada, 1978 and 1986




Table 8: Employment growth in Canadian- and foreign-controlled firms by size of firm: Canada, 1978-86

Size class	Employment growth (in '000)			Growth rate		
or rrin	Canadian- controlled firms	Foreign- controlled firms	All firms	Canadian- controlled firms	Foreign- controlled firms	All firms
Small Medium Large	1 027.2 99.6 -89.5	26.2 4.0 -45.4	1 053.4 103.6 -134.9	69.5 8.4 -3.0	144.2 4.4 -3.7	70.4 8.1 -3.2
Total	1 037.2	-15.2	1 022.1	18.4	-1.1	14.6

Note: Growth rate is 1978-86 employment growth as a per cent of 1978 employment.

Source: Special tabulation by Small Business and Special Surveys, Statistics Canada.

Table 9. Employment growth rates in Canadian- and foreigncontrolled firms in the furniture and fixtures industries by region: 1978-86

Size class of firm	Per cent employment growth: 1978-86						
	British Columbia	Prairies	Ontario ²	Quebec ²	Atlantic ²	Canada ²	
Small							
Canadian	85.7	1.0	170.4	111.7	93.2	130.6	
Foreign		-	431.5	168.1	-	504.9	
Medium							
Canadian	-1.1	-25.9	12.2	1.5	-37.6	3.4	
Foreign	28.9	28.1	54.1	135.2	-10.8	69.5	
Large							
Canadian	-19.7	30.8	0.1	-41.0	-51.7	-18.7	
Foreign	-50.2	-55.4	13.0	-0.7	-33.6	2.6	
Total							
Canadian	37.0	32.4	32.5	-2.0	-15.2	17.5	
Foreign	-46.5	-36.1	22.4	-17.9	-30.6	14.6	

¹ Manufacturing Major Group 9: Furniture and fixture industries includes Household furniture (SIC 261), Office furniture (SIC 264), Miscellaneous furniture and fixture (SIC 266) and Electric lamps and shades (SIC 268).

3. <u>Multifactor partitioning of employment</u> growth in Canada

(a) The standardised industry effect

To understand the impact of any one factor on employment growth, we need to remove from its crude growth rate the effects of the other factors. These effects arise both because of disproportionalities and interactions. Only when both sets of these effects have been removed can we be sure we have isolated the intrinsic standardised effect of the factor under consideration.

Thus, to compare the employment growth performance of foreign and Canadian firms, we need properly standardised industry growth rates. If foreign control affects employment growth, its effect will be strongest in those industries where foreign investment is concentrated and will bias their growth rates. If, on the contrary, it is the industry concentration which

² The industry provides examples of Simpson's paradox. Foreign firms did better than Canadian in each size class in Canada, as well as the Ontario, Quebec and Atlantic regions. But Canadian firms did better than foreign in total. Other industry examples of Simpson's paradox are: Primary metal industries (Manufacturing Major Group 12), Retail trade (Trade Major Group 2) and Services to business management (Community and Other Services Major Group 5).

strongly affects the aggregate performance of foreign firms, then the industry growth rates still need to be corrected for disproportionalities, including size and region, so that the employment growth can be fully partitioned and the foreign control and other effects fully accounted for.

The result of the multifactor partitioning is to produce standardised industry rates that are much different from the crude (table 10). This is so even allowing for the fact that the weighted sum of the standardised rates is zero, while the weighted sum of the crude rates is the national growth rate.

Table 10. The partitioned industry effect on industry growth rates: Canada, 1978-86

Industry	Actual growth rate 1978-86 1	Partitioned industry effect		
		Rate ¹	Number	
Primary	27.8	-24.2	-22 024	
Mines	11.5	20.4	32 035	
Manufacturing	0.4	-4.3	-87 169	
Construction	8.1	-33.1	-147 999	
Transportation	-9.2	-13.0	-111 734	
Wholesale trade	11.0	-11.3	-59 860	
Retail trade	31.0	16.0	173 439	
Finance	21.6	3.9	21 788	
Services	40.5	16.4	201 525	

Rates are given as percentages. For instance, employment in primary industries would have declined by 24.2 per cent in the absence of other factors. The actual industry growth rate is from table 3.

Compare the rankings of the crude and partitioned rates. The ranking of industries on their employment growth is particularly affected within the goods-producing industries. Primary industry drops from third to eighth, while mining and manufacturing each rise in rank, in the case of mining to first. These changes, which presumably reflect the impact of size composition on crude industry rates, make the industrial concentration of foreign control in mining and manufacturing appear much less unfavourable. Indeed, when employment in foreign firms in each industry is multiplied by the 1978 employment base, the result is fairly neutral. The weighted, standardised industry growth rate is -0.27 per cent for foreign firms, and 0.06 per cent for Canadian. The industry mix of foreign firms can thus be attributed with producing 3,657 jobs less than if they had had the national industry mix. To place this industry effect into perspective, recall that there were 1,344,293 workers in foreign-controlled plants in 1978 (table 1). If foreign-controlled employment had grown at the national rate, it would have increased by 196,443. On the contrary, it fell by 15,167, leaving a shortfall of 211,610 jobs to be accounted for. Clearly, other effects were at work.

The partitioned industry effect is the corrected employment growth rate after removing the effects of regional distribution, size mix, country-of-control mix, interaction and other effects, and the national growth rate. The number of jobs attributed to the partitioned industry effect must, by mathematical definition, sum to zero.

(b) The standardised region effect

Multifactor partitioning does not have any major effect on the regional rates: their growth-rate rank order remains the same. It does, however, emphasise the positive growth differential of Ontario, versus the negative differential region effects of all the other regions (figure 5). The partitioned effects thus emphasise a heartland-hinterland pattern of employment growth, with the Canadian heartland shrunk to within Ontario, rather than the east-to-west pattern of growth evident in the crude rates.

Foreign-controlled firms are concentrated in Ontario, and did benefit from this positive regional effect - but not by a great deal. Their regional mix contributed 1.79 per cent to their growth (compared with -0.43 per cent for Canadian-controlled firms) representing a 24,113 employment growth.

(c) The standardised size effect

It is the disproportionality in the size distribution of foreign firms that accounts for their very poor employment growth performance. The standardised growth rate of small firms was 74.71 per cent (compared with a crude rate of 70.4). Foreign firms are predominantly in the large size class. The size-mix effect is -20.88 per cent - almost the full-strength large-size class value.

The cost of the size factor to the employment growth of foreign firms was 279,828 jobs. The size-class mix is more than enough, by itself, then to account for the poor employment growth record of foreign-controlled firms in Canada from 1978 to 1986. Even adding in the industry-mix and regional-mix effects leaves an "over-accounting" for the three factors combined of 47,753 jobs (that is a growth of -211,611 to account for, and -279,820 allocated to the three effects).

(d) The standardised country-of-control effect

The intrinsic effect of foreign control turns out to be very different from the crude rate: +15.07 per cent instead of -1.13 per cent. It is thus almost as big as the size-mix effect, though opposite in sign, and it represents a growth of 202,550 jobs. Conversely, the Canadian country-of-control effect changes from a crude rate of +18.36 per cent to a partitioned rate of -1.13 per cent. None of the other crude rates show such a change, suggesting that greater disproportionalities among firms classified by country of control than by any other factor.

Of course, the result of the four factors combined is an expected change in employment of -56,822, compared with the national growth rate effect of +196,443. To complete the accounting, the interaction and disproportionality factors must be measured.

(e) Interactions

Two of the sets of interactions are presented here: industry-region and control-region. The interpretation is straightforward. Each region and each industry has a standardised effect. The growth of a particular industry in a particular region, controlling for all the other effects, might be expected to equal the sum of the two individual effects. Two examples illustrate why it usually does not. Primary industry had a standardised growth rate of -24.2 per cent and British Columbia -1.53 per cent. But the interaction

effect was to reduce growth by a further 33 per cent - the biggest interaction effect on the table (table 11). This poor result reflects a very low growth rate in British Columbia in primary industry (only 4.31 per cent) compared with Canada (27.8 per cent), even though British Columbia's aggregate growth (15.1 per cent) was higher than Canada's (14.61 per cent). The low growth rate in turn reflects British Columbia's reliance on forestry, which employs three-quarters of the primary labour force in the province, compared with 40 per cent in the country. The problems of the forestry industry in Canada in the 1970s and 1980s have been well documented (Hayter, 1988, and Cohen and Allen, 1988). The industry declined by 3.13 per cent in Canada 1978 to 1986, but in British Columbia it declined by 16.24 per cent. So the very large negative interaction largely reflects one industry, forestry, which did relatively badly in a sector and in a province both of which did relatively well.

<u>Table 11.</u> <u>Industry-region interaction effects on</u> employment growth rates: Canada, 1978-86

	British Columbia and Yukon	Prairies and North-West Territories	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic
Primary	-33.0	-14.6	7.9	7.3	14.5
Mines	9.6	30.6	-8.3	-8.9	-6.3
Manufacturing	-8.2	-2.3	3.0	0.8	-2.5
Construction	-18.6	-14.7	8.8	3.9	-2.0
Transportation	-1.1	2.9	-5.5	-0.7	31.5
Wholesale trade	-18.4	6.6	-0.8	14.7	-3.9
Retail trade	24.7	6.5	-7. 7	-0.1	-7.0
Finance	2.2	-11.4	8.8	-8.1	0.7
Services	7.5	6.6	-0.8	-3.7	-9.9

Note: Interactions are given in per cent. Thus employment in manufacturing in Ontario grew by 3 per cent more than the manufacturing effect plus the Ontario effect, even when all other effects are taken into account.

Similarly the very high positive interaction for MNEs in the Prairies is due largely to the role of the petroleum industry in Alberta. Petroleum was Canada's most rapidly growing mining industry — employment increasing by some 58 per cent from 1978 to 1986. This industry accounts for 42 per cent of the mining employment in the Prairies.

The second example, control-region interactions, indicates a strong east—west pattern of growth for foreign—controlled firms. It is not possible to detect this pattern in the raw employment data, nor to tell whether the west coast figure (+14.8 per cent) represents the employment growth consequence of largely Japanese capital compared with continuing United States influence in Ontario. What is rather surprising is the high negative interaction (-15.5 per cent) for Quebec (table 12).

Table 12. Control-region interaction effects on employment growth rates: Canada, 1978-86

	British Columbia	Prairies	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic
Canadian-control	-3.5	-0.7	-1.3	3.7	1.7
Foreign control	14.8	3.0	5.5	-15.5	-7.3

4. The composite results of the multifactor partitioning

(a) Employment growth by industry and country of control

Just as each individual firm belongs to a particular industry, region, size class and country of control, so each possible group of firms will belong to a particular industry or industry mix; region or regional mix; size class or mix of size classes; and country of control or mix of control. And according to its composition, the growth rate will be the sum of each of these effects, or the weighted sum of the mix of these effects, together with the national growth rate effect, relevant interactions and disproportionality, or allocation effect.

Let us begin by grouping firms by industry and by country of control (table 13). The crude employment growth rates (column 1), repeated from table 3, with their disparities between Canadian— and foreign—controlled firms, are partitioned among the four main factors identified. The industry effect for each given industry remains the same for any group of firms drawn from that industry. Thus foreign—controlled and Canadian—controlled both have the same industry effect within any one industry. The industry effect cannot contribute at all to the differences between the growth rates of Canadian— and foreign—controlled firms in any one industry.

Foreign-controlled firms have a more favourable regional distribution than the Canadian in every single industry except transportation: hence their more favourable regional-mix effect. In every industry, however, the difference in the size-mix effects for Canadian- and foreign-controlled firms is greater than regional mix.

The other effects can be expected to be numerically large. They include the national growth-rate effect (14.61 per cent) and the disproportionality or allocation effect (7.83 per cent), together with the relevant interactions which vary by industry and by country of control. In nearly every case, these rates are lower for the foreign: the exception is retail trade.

The sum of all the effects for any industry-control group of firms is their crude employment growth (so column 1 equals the sum of the other columns in table 13). The individual effect of any factor can be converted from a rate to the actual number of jobs by multiplying the rate (in table 13) by the employment base (in table 1).

Table 13. Partitioned rates of employment growth by industry and country of control: Canada, 1978-86

	Employment growth 1978-86	Industry effect	Regional distribution effect	Size-mix effect	Control effect	Other
Primary	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					
Canadian	31.23	-24.24	-0.92	44.54	-3.59	15.44
Foreign	-42.17	-24.24	3.03	-14.73	15.07	-21.29
Total	27.80	-24.24	-0.73	41.76	-2.71	13.72
Mines						
Canadian	25.47	20.43	-2.29	-11.52	-3.59	22.43
Foreign	-12.31	20.43	-1.55	-20.90	15.07	-25.37
Total	11.48	20.43	-2.02	-14.99	3.32	4.73
Manufacturing						
Canadian	6.71	-4.28	-0.58	-9.52	-3.59	24.68
Foreign	-10.39	-4.28	2.60	-21.64	15.07	-2.13
Total	0.41	-4.28	0.59	-13.99	3.29	14.80
Construction						
Canadian	11.41	-33.07	0.50	25.05	-3.59	23.51
Foreign	-24.14	-33.07	0.27	-21.00	15.07	14.58
Total	8.10	-33.07	-0.42	20.76	-1.85	22.68
Transportation						
Canadian	-9.72	-12.99	-0.06	-13.43	-3.59	20.33
Foreign	0.73	-12.99	-0.10	-20.30	15.07	19.05
Total	-9.17	-12.99	-0.06	-13.79	-2.60	20.26
Wholesale						
Canadian	14.29	-11.30	-0.82	12.84	-3.59	17.14
Foreign	-3.95	-11.30	0.29	-13.57	15.07	5.56
Total	10.97	-11.30	-0.62	8.04	-0.19	15.03
Retail						
Canadian	31.11	16.04	-0.42	16.76	-3.59	2.31
Foreign	30.15	16.04	1.27	-21.91	15.07	19.67
Total	30.99	16.04	-0.20	11.71	-1.15	4.58
Finance						
Canadian	22.99	3.89	-0.05	-1.74	-3.58	24.48
Foreign	11.37	3.89	1.50	-19.72	15.07	10.62
Total	21.59	3.89	0.13	-3.91	-1.33	22.81
Services						
Canadian	42.47	16.35	-0.30	16.30	-3.59	13.71
Foreign	24.96	16.35	1.61	-21.05	15.07	12.97
Total	40.49	16.35	-0.08	12.06	-1.47	13.62

(b) Employment growth in manufacturing by region and country of control

A second example of how the partitioned rates are composed is given for manufacturing firms by region and country of control (table 14). The industry effect is not shown separately as it is -4.28 per cent for all subgroups regardless of location or country of control. The first effect shown is the region effect. The region effect for any one region is the same for all groups of firms in that region regardless of their other attributes. The region effect does not sum to zero for Canada because manufacturing firms are a subset of the total. It is in fact slightly positive reflecting the very favourable regional mix of foreign firms.

Table 14. Partitioned rates of employment growth in manufacturing by region and country of control: 1978-86

	Employment growth % 1978-86	Regional effect	Size-mix effect	Control effect	Control- region interaction effect	Other
B.C. & Yukon						
Canadian	2.78	-1.53	-8.29	-3.59	-3.51	19.70
Foreign	-27.67	-1.53	-21.83	15.07	14.77	-34.14
Total	-6.62	-1.53	-12.47	2.17	3.46	1.76
Prairies & NWT						
Canadian	7.32	-3.08	-6.27	-3.59	-0.72	20.98
Foreign	-14.56	-3.08	-21.50	15.07	3.03	-8.07
Total	1.26	-3.08	-10.49	1.58	0.32	12.93
Ontario						
Canadian	16.55	8.61	-9.88	-3.59	-1.31	22.71
Foreign	-4.85	8.61	-21.58	15.07	5.50	-12.46
Total	6.57	8.61	-15.34	5.12	1.87	6.30
Quebec						
Canadian	-3.71	-9.49	-9.84	-3.59	3.68	15.52
Foreign	-16.04	-9.49	-21.82	15 .07	-15.49	15.69
Total	-7.14	-9.49	-13.17	1.60	-1.64	15.56
Atlantic						
Canadian	3.52	-7.13	-12.58	-3.59	1.74	25.08
Foreign	-27.27	-7.13	-21.56	15.07	-7.31	-6.34
Total	-3.60	-7.13	-14.66	0.73	-0.35	17.80
Canada						
Canadian	6.71	-0.58	~9.52	-3.59	0.39	20.01
Foreign	-10.39	2.60	-21.64	15.07	1.01	-7.42
Total	0.41	0.59	-13.99	3.2 9	0.62	9.90

Manufacturing firms tend to fall into the large size class and every subgroup of firms has a negative size-mix effect. The effect is almost the same (about 22 per cent) for all foreign firms. It is lower and more varied for Canadian firms.

The control-region interaction (given earlier in table 12) is always the same for any given region-ownership combination, regardless of size mix or industry. The total interaction effect for a province, however, is the weighted average of the proportions of base employment in the two groups. The mix effect is favourable for Ontario and Western Canada and unfavourable for Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces.

(c) Graphical presentation

Multifactor partitioning can be presented in graphical form as a series of effects operating on the base year employment (1978) to produce the end year employment (1986) (figure 5). The growth of large, foreign firms in mining and manufacturing in Canada serves as a worked example (figure 6). Employment in 1978 in foreign firms in the two industries in 1978 was 758,477. If they had grown at the national rate they would have added 110,837 workers. The industry-mix effect was negative, however: +11,107 in mining, -30,163 in manufacturing to give a net reduction of 19,056. The industries had a favourable regional mix (the proportion in each region multiplied by each region's effect), adding 17,428 to the growth in employment. The group is limited to large firms, and hence an unmitigated large firm effect of -173,538. Foreign control added 114,283 (base year employment times 15.07 per cent). Other effects cost 146,626. The net total of all these effects, added to the 1978 employment, yields the 1986 employment of 661,805.

The results on the effects of foreign control on employment growth are summarised in table 15 and figure 7. They underline the turbulence behind the net changes observed in the crude growth rates. Country of control is only one of many factors influencing growth, some of which are positive, others negative. When firms are grouped by country of control, the individual industry effects are partly netted out to leave a muted industry-mix effect. The same is true of the region effect. In the case of size, however, not only are the individual size-class effects very large, but foreign firms fall disproportionally in the large-size class. This effect emerges as the most important discriminant in their growth rates. The control effect is not mixed, and in its undiluted form emerges as the second largest discriminant between the two groups: its effect is positive for foreign firms, but it is not strong enough to offset the size-effect.

5. The effect of foreign investment on employment growth

The conclusions drawn about the effect of foreign investment employment growth are dramatically changed once the growth standardised. The employment growth performance of foreign firms appears to lag far behind Canadian firms when the crude rates are examined. firms grew slower than Canadian from 1978 to 1986 in eight out of the nine principal sectors, including both mining and manufacturing where foreign investment is concentrated. Foreign firms should have benefited from their regional concentration in Ontario. But when their performance is compared with Canadian firms, they did worse in all five Canadian regions and in six of the nine sectors. They did worse than Canadian firms in all nine sectors in Quebec, and worse in eight out of nine in the Prairies. Even the size breakdown is discouraging. Foreign firms grew more slowly in the medium- and large-size classes. And in aggregate their crude growth rate from 1978 to 1986 was -1.13 per cent, compared with a crude rate for Canadian firms of +18.36 per cent.






Table 15. Partitioned rates of employment growth in Canadian-and foreign-controlled firms: Canada, 1978-86

	Canadian-controlled firms	Foreign-controlled firms
Employment growth 1978-86	18.36	-1.13
National growth rate effect	14.61	14.61
Industry-mix effect	0.06	-0.27
Regional distribution effect	-0.43	1.79
Size-mix effect	4.95	-20.82
Control effect	-3.59	15.07
Industry-region interaction effect	0.17	0.89
Size-region interaction effect	-0.19	-0.58
Control-region interaction effect	0.06	1.06
Industry-size interaction effect	-2.33	-2.28
Other	5.05	-10.60

Note: "Other" includes other interaction effects and the disproportionality effect (which is a constant of 7.83 per cent).





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It is only when the employment figures are calculated by region, by industry and by size for Canadian and foreign firms that a different story emerges. The disproportionalities in the employment distribution of foreign firms are then shown to produce lower aggregate growth rates even when every subgroup has higher rates. These are nice examples of Simpson's paradox, and a clear warning to the policy analyst and decision-maker of the dangers of working with crude data. The sequential correction for individual effects does nothing to help. It requires a full, simultaneous, multifactor partitioning to sort out all the individual effects at work on the growth rates and to uncover the true, intrinsic effect of foreign ownership on employment growth. This standardised effect is the reverse of the crude effect. Not a rate of -1.13 per cent, but of +15.07, a result which is qualitatively as well as quantitatively different.

The multifactor partitioning does not turn an employment decline by foreign firms into an employment growth. It does not change the reality of the recession years of the early 1980s. It does refocus the questions which need to be answered, and it provides the standardised data that is needed in that inquiry. The key question is not: Why did large foreign firms do so poorly in job generation? It is: Why did large firms in general do so badly — and why, apparently, did Canadian MNEs do much worse than foreign MNEs? It has been noted that the employment growth of Canadian MNEs has probably been greater outside Canada than at home (ILO, 1981, p. 19). Is Canada an exception, then, to the rule that home country MNEs do not export large numbers of jobs (ILO, 1981, p. 95)? More data tabulations, further standardisation and analysis are needed, but an important start has been made.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

- 1. Standardisation of data is essential to correct the effect of composition differences on rates and trends. Comparisons of unstandardised data confound differences in rates with differences in composition.
- 2. In the extreme case of Simpson's paradox, the standardised trends are the opposite of the crude trends. Moreoever, the potential for recurring examples of Simpson's paradox remains as long as substantial compositional heterogeneity persists within categories of the data.
- 3. The accepted procedure over the past 50 years to standardise employment trends has been shift-share analysis. Shift-share analysis was first used by Professor J. Harry Jones in the Barlow Report (1940) to identify the extent to which inter-regional differences in employment growth rates were accounted for by inter-regional differences in industry mix. The procedure was refined by Dunn (Perloff et al., 1960). Both pointed to alternative computational procedures, but both settled for a simple procedure which has been used ever since.
- 4. A number of subsequent reviews have noted that the shift-share formulas fail to measure what they purport to, but none have succeeded in providing a partitioning which correctly isolates all the effects. The fundamental problem is that although shift-share attempts to standardise regional growth rates for their industry mix, it fails to standardise industry growth rates for their regional mix. It thus fails to partition out the effect of disproportionalities in the regional distribution of industry on industry growth, and consequently incorporates part of the regional effect in the measure of industry mix. It also fails to extract industry-region interaction effects, although the need to do so has long been identified (MacKay, 1968).
- 5. The mathematical problems in shift-share analysis become very apparent once additional effects (in this study, size-class of firm, and country-of-control of firm) are introduced. The deficiencies in shift-share standardisation have had to be corrected before a defensible procedure of multifactor partitioning could be developed.
- 6. A principal finding of this study is that the shift-share technique is mathematically flawed. It should not be used. In its place, multifactor partitioning should be used to standardise data, even where only two factors, such as region and industry, are involved.
- 7. Multifactor partitioning, the technique presented and tested in this report, builds on the same logic as shift-share analysis, and the results are to be interpreted in the same way. In the simple, two-factor case, five effects are isolated. The first is the national growth-rate The second, the industry effect, corresponds with what is effect. sometimes called in shift-share analysis the proportionality shift, the share or the structure component. The third, the regional effect, corresponds to the differential shift. to the differential shift. Two additional effects are an industry-region interaction, and a disproportionality or extracted: allocation effect. The allocation effect measures the of employment growth attributable to the concentration of employment in faster-growth industries and in faster-growth regions. The allocation effect was first identified by Cunningham (1969).

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- 8. Multifactor partitioning, like shift-share analysis, is no more than a standardisation technique. It does not explain trends, though it does isolate the trends that need to be explained. It is not a theory about the way in which growth occurs, though the results it provides are important for the quantitative analysis of any theory. There is no direct translation of the multifactor partitioning into policy implications, but failure to standardise data for all factors simultaneously can lead to entirely erroneous conclusions as to underlying trends and policy needs.
- 9. The final conclusion is thus very clear. Decision-makers who need to know employment growth trends, either by industry or region, or by size-class of firm or country of control, cannot obtain the results they need merely by tabulating the data on the one classification they require. The correct measurement of any one of these trends can be obtained only by simultaneously measuring and standardising each of the effects at work. Failure to do so can lead to the trap of Simpson's paradox.

MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX*

I THE NOTATION

A variety of notations has been used to explain shift-share. This notation is motivated by the need for maximum simplicity in order to reveal the mathematical problems with the existing formulation, to correct these errors, and to extend the technique to the multi-variable case.

Let E° refer to the employment in the base year in industry i and in the region j Let i = 1, 2, ..., I and j = 1, 2, ..., R

Let E_{ij}^{τ} represent employment in year T in industry i region j

Let $E_{ij}^{o} = \sum_{i} E_{ij}^{o}$ be total employment in the base year in region j

and $E_{i}^{o} = \sum_{j=i,j}^{\infty} E_{i,j}^{o}$ be the national employment in industry i

and $E_{i,j}^{\circ} = \sum_{i} \sum_{j} E_{i,j}^{\circ}$ be total employment in the base year in the nation

Let E_{i}^{T} , E_{i}^{T} and E_{i}^{T} be the corresponding employment in year T.

Where only the base year employment is referred to, let E° be simplified to E.

* Written in collaboration with K.P. Srinath, Statistics Canada.

II EMPLOYMENT GROWTH DEFINITIONS

The employment growth rate in industry i, region j is r_{ij}

$$r_{ij} = \frac{E_{ij}^{T} - E_{ij}^{0}}{E_{ij}^{0}}$$

The employment growth rate in industry \dot{c} in the nation is $r_{\dot{c}}$.

$$r_{i.} = \frac{E_{i.}^{T} - E_{i.}^{\circ}}{E_{i.}^{\circ}}$$

The employment growth rate in region j is r_{ij}

$$r_{\bullet j} = \frac{E_{\bullet j}^{T} - E_{\bullet j}^{\circ}}{E_{\bullet j}^{\circ}}$$

$$= \sum_{i} \frac{Y_{i,j} E_{i,j}^{\circ}}{E_{\bullet j}^{\circ}}$$

The employment growth rate in the nation is $r_{\bullet \bullet}$

$$r_{\bullet \bullet} = \frac{E_{\bullet \bullet}^{\mathsf{T}} - E_{\bullet \bullet}^{\circ}}{E_{\bullet \bullet}^{\circ}}$$

$$= \sum_{i} \frac{r_{i} \cdot E_{i}^{\circ}}{E_{\bullet}^{\circ}}$$

Note that the growth in the number employed is the growth rate multiplied by the base year employment. Actual employment growth in region j is $E_{ij}r_{ij}$

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III THE SHIFT-SHARE PARTITIONING OF EMPLOYMENT GROWTH

Shift-Share partitioning uses three calculations of regional employment growth, based on actual, national and expected growth rates.

Actual employment growth in region j is $r_{\bullet j} \to r_{\bullet j} \to r_{\bullet$

$$r_{\cdot j} = \sum_{i} \frac{r_{i} \cdot E_{ij}}{E_{\cdot j}}$$

That is, the expected growth uses national rates of industry-specific growth, but regional weightings of industry-specific employment.

The three employment growth calculations permit growth to be partitioned thus:

 $(r_{,}-r_{,})$: the deviation of the regional employment growth rate from the national growth rate.

(r, -r,): the deviation of regional from national employment growth rates, which is calculated on an industry-by industry basis. Hence this deviation may be called the <u>region</u> effect. (It is also called the differential shift in the shift share literature).

and (r, -r,): the deviation resulting from the difference in industry mix between the region and the nation. Hence this deviation may be termed the industry-mix effect. (It is also called the proportionality shift in the shift-share literature).

.

The three partitions are related thus:-

$$(r_{\bullet j} - r_{\bullet \bullet}) = (r_{\bullet j} - r'_{\bullet j}) + (r'_{\bullet j} - r_{\bullet \bullet})$$
 (1)

This equation says that the regional deviation from national employment growth rates is equal to the region effect plus the industry-mix effect. The equation may be re-ordered thus:-

$$\mathbf{r}_{\bullet \mathbf{j}} = \mathbf{r}_{\bullet \bullet} + (\mathbf{r}_{\bullet \mathbf{j}} - \mathbf{r}_{\bullet \mathbf{j}}') + (\mathbf{r}_{\bullet \mathbf{j}}' - \mathbf{r}_{\bullet \bullet}) \tag{2}$$

Equation (2) says that regional growth equals a national growth-rate effect, plus a region effect, plus an industry-mix effect.

Substituting earlier definitions of growth rates for r and r' in equation (1) and shortening E° to E we have:

$$(\mathbf{r}_{\bullet j} - \mathbf{r}_{\bullet}) = \sum_{i} (\mathbf{r}_{\bullet j} - \mathbf{r}_{i}) \frac{\mathbf{E}_{ij}}{\mathbf{E}_{\bullet j}} + \sum_{i} (\mathbf{r}_{i} - \mathbf{r}_{\bullet}) \frac{\mathbf{E}_{ij}}{\mathbf{E}_{\bullet j}}$$
(3)

Equation (3) may also be written in the form:-

$$(\mathbf{r}_{\bullet j} - \mathbf{r}_{\bullet}) = \sum_{i} (\mathbf{r}_{\bullet j} - \mathbf{r}_{\iota \bullet}) \frac{\vec{E}_{ij}}{E_{\bullet j}} + \sum_{i} \mathbf{r}_{i \bullet} (\frac{E_{i,i}}{E_{\bullet j}} - \frac{E_{i \bullet}}{E_{\bullet \bullet}})$$
(4)

Equation (4) is useful in that it makes clear that the region effect is fundamentally due to a difference in industry-specific growth rates $(r_{\cdot\cdot\cdot} - r_{\cdot\cdot})$ between the region and the nation, whereas the industry-mix effect is fundamentally due to differences in the employment composition of the region (E $_{\cdot\cdot\cdot}$ /E $_{\cdot\cdot\cdot}$) and the nation (E $_{\cdot\cdot\cdot}$ /E $_{\cdot\cdot\cdot}$) in each industry.

Note that the growth in the number employed can be partitioned by multiplying the terms in the above equations by the employment in the base

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year (E $_{\bullet}$). Hence, using equation (3):-

$$(\mathbf{r}_{\bullet j} - \mathbf{r}_{\bullet \bullet}) \, \mathbf{E}_{\bullet j} = \sum_{i} (\mathbf{r}_{ij} - \mathbf{r}_{i\bullet}) \, \mathbf{E}_{ij} + \sum_{i} (\mathbf{r}_{i\bullet} - \mathbf{r}_{\bullet \bullet}) \, \mathbf{E}_{ij} \quad (5)$$

Equation (5) partitions the growth in employment in region j into the part which is attributed to the region effect and the part which is attributed to the industry-mix effect.

IV CONCEPTUAL ERRORS IN THE MATHEMATICS OF SHIFT-SHARE

The national growth rate of industry i is a weighted average of the regional growth rates of the industry. In shift-share,

$$r_{i.}$$
 = $\sum_{j=1}^{r} \frac{E}{ij}$

A standardized national growth rate of industry i can be defined (r;) using total regional employment weights instead of industry-specific weights. Thus:-

$$\hat{r}_{i.} = \sum_{j} \frac{r_{ij} E_{.j}}{E_{..}}$$

The region effect may now be partitioned using the two measures of industry growth Γ_i and Γ_i . Thus

$$(r_{ij} - r_{i.}) = (r_{ij} - \hat{r}_{i.}) + (\hat{r}_{i.} - r_{i.})$$
 (6)

but

$$(\hat{r}_{i}. - r_{i}.) = \sum_{j} r_{ij} \left(\frac{E_{ij}}{E_{i}} - \frac{E_{ij}}{E_{i}} \right)$$

.

Comparing the above expression with the definition of industry-mix in equation (4) makes clear that disproportionalities in the distribution of industry bleed some of the industry-mix effect into the region-effect as it is defined in standard shift-share analysis.

To correct this problem and in order to extract the interaction effect, a new partitioning is proposed.

V MULTIFACTOR PARTITIONING: TWO VARIABLE CASE

Three further growth rates are calculated in addition to Γ_{ij} , Γ_{i} , and Γ_{i} . The definition of $\hat{\Gamma}_{i}$.

has been given above -- it is the national growth rate of industry under strict proportionality.

The regional growth-rate under strict proportionality is

$$\hat{r}_{ij} = \sum_{i} \frac{r_{ij} E_{i}}{E_{i}}$$

The national growth rate under strict proportionality is

$$\hat{r}_{..} = \sum_{j} \frac{\hat{r}_{.j} E_{.j}}{E_{..}} = \sum_{i} \frac{\hat{r}_{i.} E_{i.}}{E_{..}}$$

a) Aggregate partitioning

It will help to understand the procedure to begin with two aggregate partitionings, to identify the aggregate region and industry effects. The regional growth deviation ($r_{\bullet,\uparrow} - r_{\bullet,\bullet}$) can be partitioned:

$$(r_{-j} - r_{--}) = (\hat{r}_{-j} - \hat{r}_{--}) + (r_{-j} - \hat{r}_{-j}) + (\hat{r}_{--} - \hat{r}_{--})$$

Note
$$(\hat{r}_{ij} - \hat{r}_{i}) = \sum_{i} (\hat{r}_{ij} - \hat{r}_{i}) \frac{E_{i}}{E_{i}}$$
 true region effect 7(a)

$$\left(\mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{j}} - \hat{\mathbf{r}}_{\mathbf{j}}\right) = \sum_{i} \mathbf{r}_{ij} \left(\frac{\mathbf{E}_{ij}}{\mathbf{E}_{\mathbf{j}}} - \frac{\mathbf{E}_{i}}{\mathbf{E}_{\mathbf{i}}}\right)$$

$$(\hat{r}..-r..) = \sum_{i} r_{ij} \left(\frac{E_{i}.E_{ij}}{E^{2}} - \frac{E_{ij}}{E_{i}} \right)$$
 7(c)

Of the three right hand terms in equation 6, only the first (see 7 (a)) decomposes to a term involving differences in regional and national rates of growth. Hence $7(a)(\hat{r}_{\bullet j} - \hat{r}_{\bullet \bullet})$ is the true region effect. The other two terms, 7(b) and 7(c), include the effects of disproportionalities.

In a similar way, we may partition the industry growth deviation

$$(r_{i} - r_{i}) = (\hat{r}_{i} - \hat{r}_{i}) + (r_{i} - \hat{r}_{i} + \hat{r}_{i} - r_{i})$$

where $(\hat{r}_{i}, -\hat{r}_{i})$ is the true industry effect, free from the effects of disproportionalities.

(c) Partitioning individual cell values.

The definitions of the true region and industry effect greatly facilitate the partitioning of growth for an individual cell . The growth of industry i in region j

national growth rate effect
$$+\left(\hat{r},-\hat{r},.\right)$$
 the region effect

.

These partitioned growth rate effects in equation 8 can be multiplied by the base year employment (E $_{ij}$) to obtain the employment effects. Thus:

$$r_{ij} E_{ij} = r_{\bullet} E_{ij} + (\hat{r}_{i} - \hat{r}_{\bullet}) E_{ij}$$

$$+ (r_{ij} - \hat{r}_{i} - \hat{r}_{\bullet}) + \hat{r}_{\bullet} E_{ij} + (\hat{r}_{\bullet} - \hat{r}_{\bullet}) E_{ij}$$
(9)

These values can be calculated for each industry in turn, in region j, and then summed, to give equation 10.

$$\sum_{i} r_{ij} = r_{i$$

VI MULTIFACTOR PARTITIONING WITH MORE THAN TWO VARIABLES.

The extension to more than two variables is rather straightforward

The formulas for the standardized industry regional and national growth

rates (under strict proportionality) for three and four variables are

given below (Appendix Table 1)

APPENDIX TABLE 1

COMPUTATIONAL FORMULAS FOR STANDARDIZED GROWTH RATES

THREE VARIABLE

FOUR VARIABLE

$$\hat{r}_{i..} = \sum_{j k} \sum_{k} r_{ijk} \frac{E_{ij.E..k}}{(E...)^2} \qquad \hat{r}_{i...} = \sum_{j k} \sum_{k} r_{ijke} \frac{E_{ij.E..k}}{(E...)^3}$$

$$\hat{r}_{ij.} = \sum_{i} \sum_{k} r_{ijk} \frac{E_{ii.E..k}}{(E...)^2} \qquad \hat{r}_{ij...} = \sum_{i} \sum_{k} r_{ijke} \frac{E_{ii...}E_{i...}E_{i...}}{(E...)^3}$$

$$\hat{r}_{i...} = \sum_{i} \hat{r}_{ii...} \frac{E_{i...}}{E_{i...}} \qquad \hat{r}_{i...} = \sum_{i} \hat{r}_{ii...} \frac{E_{i...}}{E_{i...}}$$

The standardized growth rates for size class and country of control are similar. Note that two, three and four variable standardized rates calculated for a four-variable data set, successively collapsed to three and two variables are not equal (hence Simpson's Paradox).

$$\hat{\mathbf{r}}_{i.} \neq \hat{\mathbf{r}}_{i..} \neq \hat{\mathbf{r}}_{i..}$$

Only the crude . growth rate remains the same:-

$$\Gamma_{i,} = \Gamma_{i,.} = \Gamma_{i,.}$$

The computation of the individual effects proceeds as with the two variable partitioning

APPENDIX TABLE 2

COMPUTATIONAL FORMULAS FOR MULTIFACTOR PARTITIONING WITH TWO. THREE AND FOUR VARIABLES

-	Two variable	AND FOUR VARIABLES Three variable	Four variable
National growth rate effect	r	r	r
region	٠̂,-٠٠٠.	Ŷ Ŷ	Ŷ Ŷ
industry	r r.	ŶŶ	^ - r
size	,, 	^ - ^	Ŷ.,k Ŷ.,
country of contr	ol 		re - r
interaction	(ry-r̂i, - r̂j + r̂,.)	(rijk-ririjrik+2(m.))	(r _{ijke} - f _i f -f _e - f _k . +3f)
disproportionali	ty 🗘 - n.	r r	r., r.,.,
TOTAL OF ABOVE E	effects rij	rijk	rijke

Once employment growth has been partitioned for each individual cell, the various employment effects can be aggregated as needed. For instance, the size effect of size class k on the growth of foreign-controlled firms, &, in all industries in region j is equal to

$$\sum_{i} (\hat{r}_{..k.} - \hat{r}_{...}) E_{ijkl}$$

Similarly the effect of foreign-control, ℓ , on employment growth in industry "i", in the nation, for all size classes is

$$\sum_{j} \sum_{k} (\hat{r}_{...e} - \hat{r}_{...}) E_{ijke}$$

If all the effects are totaled, for all variables, then each of the main effects go to zero. Individual industries may have standardized growth rates above or below the standardized national growth rate, but the total for all industries is national employment, and this grows at the national rate. Regions too may grow faster or slower than the standardized national rate, but added together, they are the nation. Only three effects do not sum to zero: the national growth rate effect, the interaction effects and the disproportionality effect. For the nation, growth is at the national growth rate with the interaction effects and the disproportionality effect having equal absolute values, and opposite signs.

APPENDIX TABLE 3

Partitioned effects on employment growth in Canada by region, initial firm size and country of control (1978-86)

INDUSTRY BY INITIAL	AL D78	AL UB 6	TOTAL	NATC GROWTH			EFFECTS			vā l	SELECTED IN	INTERACTIONS		RATE OF
FIRM SIZE & CONTROL	£	(2)	GROWTH (A)	RATE EFFECT (B)	TDTAL A-B	REGIDN	INDUSTRY	FIRM	CONTROL	INDUSTRY REGION	S1ZE REGION	CNTL REGION	INDUSTRY SIZE	(A)/(1)
CANADA TOTAL DIVISIONS	6.994.213	8.016.290	1,022,077	1.022.071	٥	-	0	0		21,459	-18,705	17.681	-162.348	0.1461
SMALL	1.283.527	1.387.120	1.053.372	218,721	834,649	-8.807	784 136	1,118.259		3,610	-7,592	2,163	-86,168	.0807
LARGE LARZDIAN FOREJON	5.649,929 6.687,164 1,344,293 1.529,126	4.079,052 6.687.164 1.329.126	1,037.244	825.628 196,443	211.611	24.112	3,657	279.828 -279.828	-202,550 -202,550 202,550	9,532	-10.871 -7.834	15.575	-131.668	1836
	1,478,561	2.505.711	1.027,150	216,064	811,085	-9.180	22.465	1.104.672	-53.006	-146	-7.853	-338	-85.002	1,4419
NDIAN	1,191,598	1,291,167	99.569	174,129	-74,561	-8.270	7,751	-143,083	13.851	1,746	926.5-	1,477	-19,704.	.0836
ADIAN	2,979,761	2.890.286	-89,475	435,435	-524,913	-6.661	-26.559	-681,761	-106.825	7.932	1,939	2.259	-26,961	0300
PRIMARY PRIMARY SMALL SMALL LARGEIGH CANGIAN FOREIGN	90.844 58.195 17.741 14.907 86.591 4.252	116,097 90,888 14,576 10,633 113,628	25.253 32.694 13.166 -4.275 -1.793	13.275 8.504 2.593 2.178 12,634	11.978 24.190 -5.758 14.553 14.393	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	-22,024 -14,109 -4,301 -20,993	37.938 43.479 -2.130 -3.411 38.564	-2,464 -2,036 -496 -3,104	-5.006 -3.020 -1.544 -1.442	0.00 - 0.1 0.00 - 0.1 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 - 0.0	-453 -327 -73 -53 -624	-19,332 -21,711 543 -19,652	.2780 .5618 1784 2867 3123
SHALL CANADIAN	57.923		32.820 -126	8,464	24.355	-245	-14,043	43.276	-2.077	-2.968	.9 .9 .9 .9 .9	1849	-21.610	.5666
MEDIUM CANADIAN	16.988	14.043	-2,945	2,483	15.428	1329	-4,119	-2,040	113	1,494	1 4: 40 %3	112	520	1,1754
CANADIAN	11,679	8.851	-2,878	1,707	-4.535	1221	-2,832	-2.672	487	-1.609	166	110	1,439	2422
MINES. TOTAL. SHALL. SHALL. HEDIUH. LANGE. CANADIAN.	156.812 11,039 14,710 131.063 98.735 58.076	174.815 32.326 18.746 123.733 123.887 50.928	18,004 21,297 4,037 -7,330 25,152 -7,148	22, 915 15, 615 2, 150 19, 151 18, 421 18, 481	19,991 19,6884 126,4887 10,728	1.165 1.165 1.165 1.267 1.266 1.266	32.035 3.255 3.005 26.175 20.171	23.506 8.247 129.987 111.371	n nh m 012 4 nt 12 4 nt 12 4 0 to	16.589 1.747 12.563 10,968 5,621	2,489 2,489 2,406 616	134 123 144 171 171 305	15.890 -2.157 -19.727 -7.736	1148 1,2294 1,2744 1,2557 1,2547
Shall CANADIAN FOREIGN	10,174	26.589	16,415	1,487	14,928	-168	2,078	7,601	1365	1,584	-240 -26	-54 31	5.709	1.6134
MEDIOM CANADIAN	11.868	16,398	4,530	1,734	2.796	-175	2,424	-1,425	428	1,803	-391	92-	-1,901	.3817
CANADIAN FOREIGN	76,694	80.900	4,206	7,945	-7.001	-1,923	15.668	-17.547	-2,749 8,192	7,581	1,366	259	-11,544	.0548
	2,034,806 150,222 315,965 1,568,619 1,284,927 749,879	2,043,174 208,922 333,484 1,400,768 1,371,196 671,978	8,368 158,700 17,519 -167,851 86,270	297,348 21,952 46,172 229,224 187,768 109,581	-288,982 136,747 -28,653 -397,076 -101,499	11,999 11,999 14,403 17,469	-67,169 -13,536 -57,198 -55,045	1284,601 112,235 1237,940 1358,896 1122,298	66.923 -4,462 -3,713 -46.098 -12,988	0 - 0 n m n 0 0 n m n 0 0 0 m n 0 0 0 0 0 0 n 0 0 0 0 0 0	19,102 654 19,965 11,504	12,588 447 10,161 4,986 7,603	22,995 -2,778 -2,778 -81,084 -24,869	1.0564 0.0554 1070 .0671
::	145.274	297.182	#1 *-	21.229	130.679	-701	-6.223	108,538		169	536	342	22.237	1.0457
MEDICAL CENADIAN	275.141	292,218	17.077	5.966	-23,130	1.069	-11.787	-33,038	-9.864	1,139	-437	1,643	-2,419	.0108
CANADIAN	864.512	781,797	-82,715	126,532	-209,048	18:219	-37,035	-197,798	106.093	8,537	-1.60M	7.160	-44,688	0957
Total	447.571	483,834	36,263	65,404	-29,141	-1.902	-147,999	92.922	-8.279	-8,583	-1.542	432	-18,869	.0810

	ALU78	98178	TOTAL OBSERVED	GROWTH			EFFECTS			is.	SELECTED IN	INTERACTIONS		RATE OF
FIRM SIZE & CONTROL	ŝ		GROWTH (A)	RATE EFFECT (B)	TOTAL A-B	REGION	THDUSTRY	FIRM	CONTROL	INDUSTRY REGION	S12E REGION	CNTL REGION	1 NDUSTRY S 1 ZE	GRDWTH (A)/(1)
CANADA						-		_						
SMALL		286,650	99,857	27.296	72,560	-746	~ •	139.558	-6,599	-3,407	-1,563	1268	-31,235	0.5346
LARGE CANADIAN	405.939	98.459	-42,480	20.596 59.319 6.085	-63.076	-2.015	-46,605 -134,231 -13,769	-52.246 101.667 -8.745	2.149	-2.727	102	1 3 9 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	6,141	. 2014
SMALL CANADIAN		286,084	99.813	27,220	72,593	-762 -3	n –	139,168	-6.678	-3,404	-1,561	992-	87: 12-	5359
MEDIUM CANADIAN FOREIGN	2,505	97,199	-20,135	17,146	-37.282	-672	-38.799	-14.089	-4.206	-2,452	181	-106	6.095	1716
CANADIAN	102,327	29,496	-53,362	14.953	-48,315	100	-33,837	-23,412	5.818	-1,432	452 249	19	1,682	3260
Total	860.449	781,523	-78,925	55	-204,664	-524	734	-118,660	•	1.758	-1.117	2,250	-21,254	7160
MEDIUMCARGECANADIAN	70.705	77,537	7,132	104,847 119,121 6.618	-2,201 -240,073 -198,377 -6,288	1673	-9,181 -105,853 -105,853	1164.153	-1,643	814 622 2,413 -655	25-1-196	2.276	w 1.1 w	.1885 1885 0972
CANADIAN	71.599	120,177	48.578	10,463	38.115	-775	-9.297	53.493	-2.567	82.7.3 1.00	- 689	4.	-1,488	8768.
CANADIAN	65,923	71,909	5.986	9,633	-3.647	-588 -538	-8.560	-7.916	-2.363	321	-370	A 10 10 to	11.170	.0908
CANADIAN FOREIGN	59.841	543,823	-123.819	99,025	-232.845	9 17	-87.996	-155.043	-24,294	1.264	135	125	-29,970	-,1975
Totel SMACL HEDIUM		234.978	58 115 85,017	21,914	63,103	1.030	-59.860 -16.945	112.040	-1.018	1761	110	228	-27,064	7007
IAN.	219,321 433,390 96,361	209,924 495,308 92,558	-9,397 61,918 -3,803	32.050 63.332 14.081	-41,447 -1,414 -17,884		-24,783 -48,972 -10,888	-50.180 55.665 -13.074	4.898	1,335	-547 3147	25.6.2	26.173	-,0428
SMALL CANADIAN FOREIGN	143,118	11,573	80.287	20.914	59,373	-1,206	-16,172	106,927	1,031	-90 51	152	147	-37,097	. 6911
CANADIAN	25,363	123,245	-16.118	3,084	-36,483	258	-15,748	-16.734	3.180	9:01 13:00 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1	-680	182	-12.477	1157
CANADIAN	150.909	148.658	-2.252	25.053	-24.304	158	-17,052	-34,528	10,308	-2,168	821	-257	18,009	0169
	361.555	1,416,301	203.971	158.005 52.836	r	-2.172	173,439	126,586	-12,404	3,058	-2,531	360	-7.115	.3099
LARGE CANADIAN FOREIGN	525,489 939,936 141,319	631.693	106.204 292,443 42.603	76.790	155.088 159.413	1.776	150.771	157.553	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	4.589	-70 -7.967 -1.967	11 PU 12 PU 14 PU 14 PU 14 PU 14 PU 14 PU 16 PU	119.094	12021 13111 13111
CANADIAN	360,760	561,889	201.129	52,718	149,411	18 18 41 84	57.868	269.533	-12.933	1.065	-2.523	137	-7.751	3.5279
CANADIAN	188,863	211,922	23,059	27,599	1,032	90 PS	30.295	-22.678	-6,771	19 T	89 55	170	-18,570	. 3396
CANADIAN	390,314 135,176	458,569	57,949	57.037	11,218	1.727	62.609	-89.303	-13,993	1.548	517	429	14,668	.1749
Total	560,189	681,137	120.947	81,861	39,086	751	21,788	-21.908	-7,478	95-	1.891	821-	4.853	.2159

	,		1000000									-		אם א רי
FIRM SIZE & CONTROL	(1) ·	(2)	GROWTH (A)	RATE EFFECT (B)	TOTAL A-B	REGION	INDUSTRY	FIRM SIZE	CONTROL	INDUSTRY REGICN	SIZE REGION	CNTL REGION	INDUSTRY SIZE	GROWTH (A)/(1)
CANADA FINANCE														1
MEDIUM. LARIE CANADIAN. FOREIGN.	64,131 394,319 492,609 67,580	78.047 438.142 605.875 75.261	13,915 43,823 113,266 7,681	9.84.17 57.622 57.622 5.846	4,544 -13,800 41,280 -2,194	1,291	2,494 15,336 19,159	-90.219 -8.580 -13.529	-1,492	-426 1,042 -1,120	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8	6,508 26,311 776 4,078	0.2170
CARADIAN	100.034	160.945		14,618	2.050	-337	3.891	74,738	-3,586	-587	-71	160	-27.497	-
CANADIAN	59.805	72.111	12,306	8,739	3.567	-249	2.326	-7,181	-2.144	-468	16	50 1 80 1	6.069	.2058
CANADIAN	332,770 61,549	372.820	40,050	48.628	-8.579	320 971	12.943	-76,137	-11.930	1,107	1595	1.199 823	22,204	.1204
	1,232,537 404,972 325,768 501,798 1,092,635 139,902	1,731,542 744,428 403,671 583,443 1,556,725 174,818	499,005 339,457 77,903 81,646 464,089 54,916	180,112 47,605 73,328 159,668	218.893 280.277 30.298 8.317 304.421	11.047 -1.781 -685 1.418 -3.304 2.256	201,525 66,214 53,264 82,046 178,650 22,874	148,638 302,565 -39,117 -114,810 178.093	18.092 -14.227 -9.915 -39.171	2000 x 20	13,654 -1,667 -1,781 -2,096	1,790 -284 -286 2,361 -570 2,360	13,696 13,696 13,696 13,070 14,914	28181 28181 1623 24247 24247
FOREIGN	403,408	738,698	335,290	58.950	276.339	-1,803	65,959	301,397	-14,462	1,257	-1,681	-303	13,644	.8311
FUNETGN	\$16.314	392,123 11,548	75.809	1,382	29.586	-964 180	51.719	-37,982	-11,340	1,998	-1.818	170	-8.191	.2397
CAMADIAN	\$72,914 128,884	425,904	52.990	54,494	-1.504	-636	60.973	-85,322	19,419	178	403	189	-1.538	.1421
ATCANISC TOTAL DIVISIONS Total	459,194	509.4		67.103	-16.882	-32.727	-672	11.792	-6.100	1.408		2.959	-12,471	.1094
SMALL MEDITOR	83,640	84,783	1,143	12::22	-11.080	-5.961	987	82,697 - 10,063	12.886	12,073	119.681	1.870	17.333	.0137
FOREIGN	403.642	52.7		8.118	-5.960	-28.768	1.086	23,605	9.370	3.368	2.076	7,018	-11,434	1314
CANADIAN	109.869	173,186	63.517	16,055	47.261	-7.830	990	82,086	-3,939	-3,057	19.583	1.910	-7,349	.3692
FOREIGN	3,314	3.339	1,118	11,739	-10.629	-5,725	-367	-9,645	-2,880	-2.289	5,224	1,397	-1,646	.0076
CAMADIAN	213.446	202.037	-11,410	31,191	-42.601	-15,272	-2,382	-48,836	7,652	8.715	9.285	3.711	-2.439	0535
SMALL	15.083	14.68	3,601	1.620	1.982	-790	-2.687	3.870	1233	1,604	-879	109	-1.968	. 5269
LARGE CANADIAN.	2.703 2.703 10.236 847		4, 04, 1, 044 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3,	395 1,496 124	2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1	1729	12.485	4,044	-367 -367 128	1,681	1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6	178	333 -2,060 92	. 3950 - 52157 - 5216
CANADIAN	6.323	10,731	4,409	926	3,485	-451	1,533	4.724	-227	9 20	-1.127	110	-2.359	. 2582
CANADIAN	1.977	1.670	-307	\$82 10	26.85 6.8	-141	-479	1237	-71	286- -0	129	28	ું જુ તાં જ	1.1700
CAMADIAN	1.936	1.877	-524	2H2 112	1342	-138 -55	-469	-443	1-69	111	M 69	356	239	0505
Tatal	14.945	13,761	-1,184	2.184	-3.368	1.065	3,053	350	199	-940	568 183	-223	-1,926	1.4160

DATE DE	GRDWTH (A)/(1)	0.52 4.4.6 1.03.6 1.64.0	1.4854	3239	1558		2727	.1560	.4129	0652	4079 4079 3049 1,2885	.4108	2051	1,2438	.5553	1.0540	.5416	1565	1456	.2017
	INDUSTRY	-160 -2.029 -1.147	240	26.9 5.9 5.9	-1,292	13,418	-2,225	1,115	113	-3,227	11.582 -2.594 -2.594 -4.21	12,588	574	33.4	11.485	2,189 -1,510	-125	784	-2,169	1.869
INTERACTIONS	CNTL	1211	r-m	100	149	1111	1,436	127	224	1.085	2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001	269	192	153	103	1,038	106	087	853	171
SELECTED IN	SIZE REGION	24 M W W W W W W W W	-76 -7	8 64 9 8	273	3,312 -1,336 3,738	1.058	-1.298	837	2.715	-1.605 -2.765 -1.765 -1.706	-2,758	719	334	1,398	2 2 3 3 4 5 5 5 5	-1,071	301	2.134	-464 -1.822 715
	INDUSTRY REGION	1 1 1 1 0 20 12 1 0 20 12	-27	127	1540	-2,732 -190 -2,55	-2,100	1 85 1 55 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	-327	-1.588	- 40 9 m v	1314	922-	-155	1.897	- 11 - 18 - 18 - 18 - 18 - 18 - 18 - 18	1,893	1.458	15,454	3000
	CONTROL	1 4 w w 6 w 4 0 0 0 4 70	-15	-21	-308	783	•	-261 32	168	7,238	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	10 10 10 10	962-	275		-1.691	-215	-166 40	-1.758	-673 -253 -272
	F1RM S12E	- 3.084 - 1.715 - 1.715	410 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80	171	-1.964	15.743 25.599 11.678		5,441	-1,545	-14.282	11.588 -1.165 -2.212 8.480	11,563	11,328	-1,754	4.498	-11.325	4,488	1556	-11.222	2.936 7,638 -1.319
EFFECTS	INDUSTRY	202 203 204 204 204 104 104 104	83.7	121	1,753	24 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25	11,064	-312	1551	-2.674	12.085 15.129 13.759 11.309	-5,117	-3,656	-2.536	-7,845	-6.428	-780	1601	-6,269	-4,067 -1,155 -1,242
	REGION	-71 -961 -684 -381	80 I	129	-612	7.655 4534 1996 1099 1099	177.1-	9121- 81-	-917 -79	-4.449	12.605 1.105 1.105 1.407 1.677	-1.103	1,388	-547	4006.1	14.55	-428	1 0 0 0	-3,496	-2,565 -729 -783
	TOTAL A-B	380 -4,343 -1,710	573	308	-2,592	5.132	-10.405	5,130	-1,095	-13,190	7 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -	4,096	-4.989	-3.757	2,463	-14,364 -11,888	2.376	121	-14,311	2,785 -3,854
	RATE EFFECT (B)	1,970 1,403 781	20,00	58	1.254	15.696 1.095 12.559	3.630	1,064	1.880	3,437	25.05 25.05	2,262	1,616	1.121	8.829 880	7,233 8,722	878	67.6	7,168	1,494
TOTAL	GROWTH (A)	526 -2,373 -307 -877	635	132	-1,337	-3,865 6,227 -10,416		33	785	-4.068	6,327 -3,467 -2,789 348 -277	6,358	-3.373	12.636	3,343	-7,130	3.254	724	-7,144	423 4,278 -2.248
AL US 6	(2)	1,525 11,106 9,296 4,465	1,063	789 789	7.246	103.548 13.721 14.302 75.525		13,477	13.651	58.354	36,617 21,837 7,902 6,878 34,549 2,069	21,834	7,683	1,846		42,368 56,518 995	9.261	5.353	41,905	36,418 14.502 8.740
ALU78	(11)	999 13,479 9,603 5,342	428	592	4.896	107,413 7.494 13.978 85,941		7.283	12.866	62,422	36.569 11.350 9.667 24.201 24.501	15,476	11.056	1.999	60,415	49,499 59,684 731	6.007	4.628	49.049	35,995 10,223 10,988
INDUSTRY BY INITIAL	FIRM SIZE & CONTROL	ATLANTIC MINES MEDIUM LARGE CANADIAN	CANADIAN,	CANADIAN	FOREIGN	MEDION.	FOREIGN	CANADIANFOREIGN	CANADIAN	CANADIAN FOREIGN	TOTAL SMALL HEDIUM LARGE CANADIAN FOREIGN	CANADIAN	FOREIGN	CANADIAN FOREIGN	Total	CANADIAN	CONADIAN	CANADIAM	CANADIAN	Total. SMALL. MEDIUM

AL ALU78	ALUB 6	TOTAL	NATL GROWTH			EFFECTS			S	SELECTED INTERACTIONS	TERACTIONS		RATE OF
FIRM SIZE & CONTROL (1)		GROWTH (A)	RATE EFFECT (B)	TOTAL A-B	REGION	INDUSTRY	FIRM S12E	CONTROL	INDUSTRY	S1ZE REGION	CNTL	INDUSTRY SIZE	GROWTH (A)/(1)
LARGE 14.784 CANADIAN 32.684 FOREIGN 3.311	13,177 32,819 3,599	-1,607 135 298	2.160	-3.768 -4.641 -196	-1.054 -2.329 -236	-1.671	3,551 -615	-48 -1,172 699	-573 -1,267 -128	-606	23 568 -242	1,764 -2,100 231	-0.1087 .0041
CANADIAN 10,149 FONEIGN 74	14,378	4,229	1,483	2.746 38	-723	-1,147	7,583	-364	1394	-1.809 -13	176	-2.631	4167
10.336	8,168	-2,168	1,510	-3,678	-737	-1.168	-1,241	-371	-401	672	180	-925 -58	2097
CANADIAN 12.199 FOREIGN 2.585	10.272	-1,927	1.783	-3.709	-869	-1.378	-2,791	-437	-473	531	212	1,456	1579
	108,6	23.842	12.396	11.446	0	13,607	11,758	-1,395	-5,904	-2.572	677	-991	.2811
SMALL	46.381 18.625 43.662	16,421		12,043	-2,135	4,806 2,843 5,957	22.384	-1.064 -590 258	-2.085		516 286 -125	-1,743	.0507
	94.8 13.8	18.865	11,106	7.759	-5.417	12.191	13,696	1.530	-5.290	-2.948	1,322	-1,286	.5640
29,904	46.310	16,406	4.370	12.036	-2.131	4,797	22,342	-1,072 B	-2.082	-5.330	520	1643	.5486
CANADIAM 17,482	18,117	635	2.555	-1.920	-1,246	2.804	-2.099	-627	-1.217	1,137	104	-1,719	1.0791
CANADIAN 28.616 FOREIGH 8.524	30.440	1,824	4.182	3.453	-2,039	4.590	-6,547	1.026	-1.992	1,245	498	1,075	.5512
: :	35.8	6 . 145 3 . 8 . 8	4.339	1,806	-2.116	1,155	1.655	1424	203	252	205	384	2070
HEDIUM. 2.770 LARGE. 21.964 CANADIAN. 26.255	23.216	1,252	20 5 1 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1	1.957	-197	108	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	141	150	0.85	2 4 80 K	1,466	3844
	'n	69-		-551	-245	134	-760	518	23		-251	220	0164
4,919	8,755	3.836	719	3.117	1351	191	3,675	-176	** °	-877	89 1	-1,352	.7798
2,678	3.799	1,121	193	729	-191	40,	-322	96-	81 -	174	47	272	.4185
CANADIAN 18.657 FDREIGN 3,307	19,895	1,237	2.726	-1.489	-1,330	726	-4,269	699-	128	812	324	1,245	.0663
-::	102.3	24.090	11.439	12,651	-5,579	12.799	12,883	-1,711	-7.720	-2.719	830	384	.3077
MEDIUM	32,642	2.683	2,758 4,378	629-1-695	12,135	7,085	12,266	-647		1,227	314	124	.0895
	Ņ	83	828	-770	-419	096	-1,257	885	-579	24	-429	-25	1510.
29.380	47,376	17,996	4.293	13,703	-2,094	4,804	21,951	-1.053	-2,898	-5,237	11.5 1.5	994	3509
CANADIAN 18.710	22.016	3.306	2.734	572	1.333	3.059	-2.247	-671	-1.845	1,217	82. 113.	787-	.5069
CANADIAN 24.317	27,017	2.700	3,553	-853 -842	-1,733	3,976	-5,564	-872 850	-2.398	1,058	423	-100	.1110
ITAL DIVISIONS 1.759.022 SMALL 371.915 MEDIUM 349.341	1.898,760	139.738 269.235 -3.889	257,048 54,348 51,050	-117.311 214.886 -54.939	-167.009 -35.311 -33.168	8,779	-1.518 277.868	-9.859	2.089	924	13,602	-39,926 -18,275	.0794

INDUSTRY BY INITIAL	AL U78	AL UB 6	TOTAL OBSERVED	NATL		ĺ	EFFECT\$			vi	SELECTED IN	INTERACTIONS		RATE OF
2 & CON7ROL	33	(2)	GROWTH (A)	RATE EFFECT (B)	TOTAL A-B	REGION	INDUSTRY	FIRM	CONTROL	1NDUSTRY REGION	SIZE	CNTL	INDUSTRY \$12E	GROWTH (A)/(1)
	!													
:::	1,473,793	912.159	-125.607 187.494 -47.755	151.650 215.367 41.681	-277.258 -27.874 -89.436	-139.530 -139.928 -27.081	-9,717	-237,438 57,905 -59,423	11,433	-4.212 2.083	9.226	54.303	-15,766 -33,798 -6,127	-0.1210
ADDAN	568.253	634,943	266.690	53,813 535	212.877	-34,963	8,960	275.132	-13,202	1.710	8, 12, 4,	13.569	-17,863	. 6948
CANADIAN	20.814	17,959	-1.034	3.042	-49.042	-31.192	167	-19.448	11.778	3,710	-10.551	12,105	-5.464	0031
CANADIAN	777,013	698.850	-78.163	113,546	-191,709	-73.773	-9.350 -366	-177,778	39,289	1,203	6,908	28.630	-10,471	1820
		19.204	6,136	1.910	5,652	-1.241	13.168	5.341	1452	950	66	465	-2,766	9695. 6000
MEDIUM	5.737 1,210 12,979	3.048 1.197 19.147	6.167	546 177 1.897	-1,236 4,271 -44	1.2355	1292	5 11 2 2 3 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	1-1-4-01-4-0-4-4-4-4-4-4-4-4-4-4-4-4-4-4	9 17. 6 8 8 4	-120 -120 -120 -130 -130	23 44 478 178		1.0103
ADDAN	8,111 10	14,956.	6,845	1,185	S. 660 -B	-770.	-1.966	6,060	-291	592	0,0	299	13.026	.8440
CANADIAN	3,660	2,994	1991	535	-1,202	-348	-887	6-	-131	267	1 1 8	135	112	-,1821
CANADIAN	1,208	1,197	Ę T	177	1 88 1	-115	1293	-276	24-	80 C	=0	20	149	-,0094
	1.142	3.823	2,682	3,805	-9.183	-2.472	5.319	-4.679	847	-2,307	162	-871	-3,121	1.2064
LARGECANADIAN		15,387	-8.281 -1.102 -4.277	220 3,417 2,410 1,395	11,699	12:120	3,778	12,551	880 1997	-2.072	208 90 90	-904 -904 608	-242 -3.520 -1.712	1465
SMALL CANADIAN FOREIGN	1,099	3.790	2.691	161	2,53	104	225	e di Ciri	6.4	9 1	M P	:	617	2,4487
CANADIAN	1,214	1.673	653-	177	282	- 115	248	146	5 5 5 5 5 1	-108	e 1	2.4.5 2.4.5	-195	.3780
CANADIAN FOREIGN	9.210	9.924 5.181	-4.252	2.072	-6.324	-1.346	1.882	-3.243	-508 1.388	-1,256	45.88 25.85 25.85	522	-2,134	2999
		547,943	-42,115	86.226	-128,342	-56.023	-25.277	-77.687	9.422	4.824	812	19,684	-16,205	0714
MEDIUMCARGE.CANADIAN	430.926 426.125 163.925	352,442	-8144 -78,484 -15,823	16.511 62.972 62.272	1141,456	140,914	18,255	142.567	13.279	20 0 4 4 20 0 4 4 20 0 4 4 20 0 4 4	1 WW	15.648	-22.275	1821
CANADIAN		мм	- 0	6.631	36,884	-4,308	496.1	33,903	-1.627	371	4.6	1,672	6.946	9589
CANADIAN	103.846	96.420	-7.426 -718	15.175	-22.601	098-6~	-4,449	-12,469	-3.723	849	3,335	3,826	208- 208-	0715
CONSTRUCTION	154,911	224.998	-51.912	40,465	92.378	-26.291	298-11-	-63,356	23.206	7.264	1.269	10.203	-14.314	1875
Total SMALL. MEDIUM.	39.486	103,675	27.863	13.525 5.770 3.505	22,406	-8.788	-30.605 -13.057 -7.931	19.966 29.501 -2.889	-2.253 -1.389 -785	3,638 1,552	1413	1,428	-6.603 -1.24 -24 -24 -44	.7056
	480167	SBS . 0	-12,703		-16,953	-2.762	-9.618	-6.655	62-	1,143	£35	<u></u>	1,267	4367

Y BY INITIAL	ALU78	AL UB 6	TOTAL	NATL GROWTH			EFFECTS			is .	SLECTED IN	SELECTED INTERACTIONS		RATE OF
FIRM SIZE & CONTROL	£		GROWTH (A)	RATE EFFECT (B)	TOTAL A-B	REGION	INDUSTRY	FIRM SIZE	CONTROL	INDUSTRY REGION	SIZE REGION	CNTL	INDUSTRY S12E	GROWTH (A)/(1)
KUCTION										;		,		
CANADIAN	5.711	99.259	12,415	12.691	-2.130	18 - 2 4 5 1 2 4 5 1 2 4 5	-28.717	21.090	-3,113	3,614 224	1446	3,200	-4.312	0.1430
CANADIAN	39,344	67.130	27,786	5.749	22,037	-3,735	-13,010	29,395	-1.410	1,547	60	1,450	-6.579	.7062
MEDIUM CANADIAN	23,581	19.786	-3.795	3,446	-7.241	-2,239 -38	-7.798	-2.832	-845	927	-757	869	1,225	1609
LARGE CANADIAN	5,167	12.343	-11.576	3.495	-15.071	-2.271	-7,909	-5.473	-857	940	213	881	1,042	4840
ANSPORTATION Total	209.333	P 0	-26.076	30.590	9.674	-19.875	-27.183	13.284	-5,928	-1.521	957	6.093	-4,724	1246
MEDIUMCANGECANADIAN	19.268 172,285 200,882 8,451	16,540 176,664 176,339 6,918	-25,728 -25,620 -24,543	25.176 29.355	-5.544 -60.797 -53.898 -2.768	-16.357 -19,073 -802	-2.502 -22.372 -26.086 -1,097	-2,314 -39,418 -26,858 -1,590	-463 -4.868 -7.202 1.273	-140 -1.252 -1.459	1,532	5.003 7.402 -1.309	3,265 -7,620 -4,617 -108	1416 2068 1222 1814
CANADIAN	17,564	29,715	12,151	2.567	9,584	-1,668	-2,281	13,123	-630	-128	44	647	-365	.5618
CANADIAN	18,047	15.397	-2.650	2,637	-5,287	-1,713	-2,344	-2.167	184	131	-580	-189	3.058	1468
CANADIAN	165.271	131,227	-34,044	1,025	-58,195	-15,692	-21,461	-37,814	1,057	1,201	1.469	6.090	-7.310	2060
SALE IKAUE			12.602	5,890	14.264	-13.077	-15.563	13.006	-1,157		101	1.189	-8.776	3160.
CANDIAN	111.722	52.752 131.954	20.242	7.272	3.916	-4.725	12.623	16.848	1.749	- L- 60 W	- 442 - 981	4.116	5.939	.0601 .1812 -2938
SMALL CANADIAN FOREIGN		58.714	19.952	5,664 226	14,287	-3.680	-4,380	28.960	11,390	5,694	9 7	1,428	-10,047	.5147
MEDIUM CANADIAM	42.137 5.524	52,948	-9.189	6.158	-15,347	-4,001	-4.761	-5.060	1,511	6.190	-1.353	1,553	-3,773	2181
RGE CANADIAN	30.822	40,302	9,480	4,504	4,976	-2.926	-3.483	-7.052	-1,105	4.528	274	1.136	3.678	.3076
RETAIL FRAUE Total	261.325	339,167	77.842	38.188	59.654	-24.811	15,306	38.615	-3.725	-1.856	-278	3,828	-2.418	.2979
MEDIUM	48,585 117,319 231,068 30,257	54.766 124.165 312.052 27.115	6,181 6,846 80,984 -3,142	7,100 17,144 33,766 4,422	-919 -10.298 47,218 -7,563	-11,139	7,793 18,819 37,065 4,853	-5.834 -26.842 45.278 -6.663	-1.532 1.202 -8.284 4.559	1,6833	1,000 1,000	8 :574 -4 :235 -4 :686	4.777	.0584 .3505 .1058
SMALL CANADIAN		159.736	64.455	13.923	50,533	-9.046	15,283	71.186	-3.416	-677	239	3.511	-2.047	.6765
CANADIAN	1,126	53.639	6,230	165	-706	-4.506	7,613	-5,699	1701	-337	-1.524	1+749	-4.666	.1313
CANADIAN	88,329	98,627	10.298	12,908	-2.610	-8,386	14.168	-20.209	-3,167	-627	785	3,255	3,319	.1166
TOWNCE TO 431. SMACL. MEDIUM.	137,130 24,801 16,812 95,517	146,958 37,534 17,851	9.829	20.039	9,159 -1,418 -17,952	-13,020 -2,355 -1,596	5.333	18,343 18,530 -2,019	-2,112 -802 -368 -942	-11,166 -2.019 -1,369	4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	2.171 824 378 968	1,262	.0717 .5154 .0618
ADIAN		133.828	11,732	17,842	-6,110	-11,592	4.749	-2,498	-4.377	-9,942	292	4,499	375	1960.

INDUSTRY BY INSTINCT	AL U78	AL UB 6	TOTAL OBSERVED			:	EFFECTS			u	ELECTED IN	SELECTED INTERACTIONS		RATE OF
FIRM SIZE & CONTROL	æ	(2)	GRONTH (A)	RATE EFFECT (B)	TOTAL A-B	REGION	INDUSTRY	FIRM SIZE	CONTROL	INDUSTRY	S1ZE REGION	CNTL REGION	INDUSTRY	GROWTH (A)/(1)
QUEBEC FINANCE FOREIGN	15.034	ing ing ing ing ing ing ing ing ing ing	206,1-	2.197	100	1.427	282	20,845	30 c	200 1-	a r			776
CANADIAN	24,332	36.898	12.566	3.556	9.011	-2.310	956	18.179		-1.981	: 5	897	689.9-	
MEDIUM CANADIAN	15.55	686	1.165	69	148	-45	18	# 65 6 67 6	7.1	887	- 6	10 1		
FOREIGN		1.15.	-106	184	106	-119	4 4	# F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F	964	-1.267	140	573	1.578	0840
CANADIAM FOREIGN	42,210 13.306	11,292	-1,979	12,013	-13.993	-7.805	3.197	-18,809	2.947	-6,694	131	3,029	5,486	0241
SMALL	291,788	387,567	95.779	42,639	53,140	-27,704	47,709	37.711	-5,572	-10.710	102	5.727	914	. 3282
MEDIUM	74,797 118,276 265,578	89,613 121,927 362,999	14.816 3.652 97.420	10.930	3,886	-7,102 -11,230 -25,215	12.230	-27,061	2.351	-2,745	1,051	2.417	-1,937	
SMALL	26.210	24,568	-1.641	3.830	-5,471	-2.488	4.285	-5.481	3.949	-962	158	-4,059	-134	0626
FOREIGN	98,384	175.111	585	14,377	62.350	-9.341	16,086	73,505	-3,527	13.611	247	3,625	3,327	1.7640
CANADIAN FOREIGH	73.028	1,725	14.860	10,672	1303	991-	11,940	-8.769	267	-2,680	-2.345	2,691	-1.891	.2035
CANADIAN	94.167	100.001	5.834	13,761	-7.927	-8.941	3.942	-21.545	44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44	-3,456	214	3.470	961	2060
TOTAL DIVISIONS	2.864.598	.397.9	533.313	418.607	114.704	246.733	-4,619	-61.031	31.584		585.9-	11.529	-65,180	6.48
	534.887	586.566	414.948	78,164	356,784	41,491	8.038	599.628	-17,321		24.671		429.921	7758
CANADIAN	1,847,994 2,144,691 719,906	.861.5 ,639.1 758.7	13,515 494,426 38,887	313,406	-256.535 181,018 -66.315	184,726	-16,030	69,686	57.100	10 m	8.240	20,842	-26.821	
	524.940	925.6	400.698	76.710		45.214	165.8	392.197	-18.819	•	24.212			.7633
MEDIUM	976.6	24,196	16.249	1,453	12.796	857	1453	7,421	1.499	8 8	429	242	-749	1,4326
CANADIANFOREIGN	433,070	55,464	98.032 6.818	63,285	34,747	57,301.	4,986	-5.841	7.330	629	20,975	2.675	-7,402	.1401
	1,186,681	1.182.376	17,820	96.638	-177,716	102.211	-13.529	-271.509	99.643	9.298	-36,947	-15.529	-10,687	-,0036
Totel	25,895	23.766	5,886	3,784	2.102	2.230	-6.278	12.289	1468	2,041	907	, ,	-6.214	.2273
MEDIUM LARGE	3,839	3,713	-125	558	-686	321	1926	6231	258	301	8 - 1			
FOREIGN	2,466		-629	3200	760-6	212	865-	665-	371	1,846	926	136	-6,474	2552
CANADIAN	18,206	23.752	5.546	2.660	2.886	1.568	-4.414	13,602	5.50	1,435	840	1 G 80 C1	-6.792 -12	.3046
CANADIAN	3.508	4,018	510	513	MM A	302	-850 -75	-421	-126	276	170	17	167	.1454
CANADIAN FOREIGN	1,715	1.539	459	251	209	168	-416	1.192	192	135	1 1 5 6 6	117	211	.2677
Total	31,625	4.039	4.166	4.621	1.776	2.724	6.461	-5.025	1,500	-2.634	-624	547	-3.381	.1317
HEDIUM	27.040	29.801	339	3.951	-2.190	225	533	-314	1,598	-217	126	186	-418	1200
CANADIAN	17,507	26.837	9.330	2,558	6.772	1.508	3,576	-1.934	-628	-1.458	-213		-1.335	.5329

RATE OF	GROWTH (A)/(1)	-0.3658	1,0681	.2009	.5173	1.2914	.2220 0555 .1655 0485	1.2771	.2525	0393	. 2783 . 6958 . 0655 0973	•	.0732	2184	- 1607 - 3461 - 2759 - 1654	.7982	.3503	2821 1295	. 7075 - 0058 - 0626	1386
	INDUSTRY \$12E	-2,045	1,043	080 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60	-1.998	-32,367	-1.148 -40,533 -10,585 -21,782	8.810	-928 -220	-18.467	2,154 2,154 2,203 -7,404	-11.110	2.096	1.590	-9,508 -471 4,120 -13,157 -9,251	-467	3,833	-12,617	13,990 13,990 15,226 9,454	1.195
INTERACTIONS	CNTL	776	-24	- H-	-174	18,223	18.804 -6.810 25.033	181	1.373	23.478	-1.028 -859 -467 -1.875	10	-528	775	0.5546 1.2834 1.0600 1.0600	-294	-296	-3.733	7427 7427 8009 8009	2,305
ELECTED IN	S12E REGION	-411		115	-413		-24.4 -33.3 -11.9	2,655	5.115	-11.123	3.5073 2.008 -1.574 3.883	3.064	1,954	-1,136	17,040 11,045 19,1263 16,750 1,289	1,036	1,096	-8.882	2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00	
s	INDUSTRY	-1,176	2011	197	11.106	29.332	3.926 23.577 15.647 13.685	1,731	3,175	10,741	13,935 5,852 3,662 4,241 12,583	5.835	3.544	3,204	118.797 -11.236 -16.234 -18.026	-1,225	1,234	-15,567	1,530	-335
	CONTROL	2.127	-67	88 H	-476 2,074	49,924	51,515 -18,657 -68,581	-2.063	3.763	-12,807	12353 12353 12353 12353 12354	-2.382	-1.447	-1.308	-9.714 -774 -555 -8.384 -11.843	-805 31	-811	-10.227	2.199	6.314
	FIRM	-3.092	1,389	-28 -29 -29	-3,038	-149.626	-179.409 -179.409 -51.415 -98.211	43.002	-12,680	-81.737	144.780 149.780 146.970 146.970 146.970	49.637	-4.845	-8.347	156,058 168,066 151,007 12,850	16,777	-2.716	-65.268	15.193 40.326 -7.008 -18.125	14,406
EFFECTS	INDUSTRY	2.884	380	28.4 29.4	2.712	-41.792	-5,594 -33,592 -22,294 -19,499	-2,466	-4.524	-15.304	152,466 137,032 146,721 147,376	-21	-13,343	-12.064	- 44.731 - 2.942 - 38.158 - 42.897 - 1.835	-2,916	-2.937	-37.043	-21-645 -6.099 -6.595 -8.951	-4,735
	REGION	1.216	160	204	1,144	84.027	11,247	4.957	9.096	30.770	13. 6.4. 7.4. 7.4. 7.4. 7.4. 7.4. 7.4. 7.4	5.722	3,476	3,142	29,670 1,952 2,095 25,624 28,453	1.934	1,948	24.570	5.027 6.823 6.823	3.609
	TDTAL A-B	-7.227	1.714	130	4,928	-78.494	9,908 -158,093 10,098 -88,592	65.094	11.236	-66.232	1 1 1 8 2 9 4 9 4 9 8 9 8 9 8 9 8 9 8 9 8 9 8 9 8	36.678	-2.941	-7.172	14,999 14,999 125,543 102,913	14,642	4.617	-122.173	30.1894 1.00.1894 1.00.1894	-316
NATL GROWTH	RATE EFFECT (B)	2.063	272	146	1.940	142,560	19.081 114,587 76,047 66.513	8.411	15.432	\$2.205 62.383	23,185 9,736 6,059 7,389 20,936	9.709	5.897	5.331	20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20	3,281	3.305	1.787	27.992 7.887 8.529 11.576	6,124
TOTAL OBSERVED	GROWTH (A)	-5.164	1.985	476	6.868	64.067	28.989 -43.505 86.146 -22.079	73.505	26,668	-14.027	44,157 46,357 2,718 -4,918 47,501	46.387	2.955	-1,841	18.310 18.310 8.416 -82.070 -54.640	17.923	7,923	-80,486	38.186	5.808
ALUB6	(2)	8 . 955	3,844	2.847	20.146	1,039,632	159.565 749.555 606.552 433.080	131,062	132.271	343.219	202,817 112,986 44,183 45,648 190,772	112.825	43.307	34,641	289,127 40,968 275,733 275,701 13,426		20,543	204.780	234,444 92,161 58,025 84,258	47.7
ALU78	£	14.119	1.859	2,370			130.576 784.140 520.406 455.159	57,557	105,603	357,246	158 . 660 66. 628 61. 465 150 . 1766 153 . 1271		40.352	36,482	24.471 22,658 24.338 297,496 330,341	22,455	1,698	285.266	191,557 53,975 58,366 79,217	
INDUSTRY BY INITIAL	FIRM SIZE & CONTROL	ONTARIO MINES FOREIGN	CANADIAK	I SN.	CANADIAN	MANUFACTURING Total	MEDIUMCARGECANADIAN.	CANADIAM	CANADIAN	CANADIAN	Total. SMALL MEDIUM LARGE CAMADIAN FOREIGN	SMALL CANADIAN	MEDIUM CANADIAN	CANADIAN	TOTAL SWALL SWALL MEDIUM LARGE CANDIAN	SMALL CANADIAN FOREIGN	MEDIUM CANADIAN	CANADIAN	MOUESALE (RADE TOTAL) STALL MEDIUM	FUNETON

1.1 1.2	INDUSTRY BY INITIAL	ALU78	AL UB 6	TOTAL				EFFECTS			"	SELECTED IN	INTERACTIONS		RATE OF
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,	יות פונב פ רחו אחר	(1)		GROWTH (A)	RATE EFFECT (B)	TOTAL A-B		INDUSTRY	FIRM S12E	i	INDUSTRY	\$12E REGION		INDUSTRY S12E	GROWTH (A)/(1)
Colored Colo	DNTARID WHOLESALE TRADE SMAIL														
1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0	CANADIAN	49.866	84.7	34,863	7.287	27.576	4.295	-5,625	37,256	-1,788	8881	2.300	1653	-12,925	.8088
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,	FOREIGN.	47.580		-739 398		-7.692		-5.376	-5,713	1.706	180		-623 593	-4.260	0155
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,		52.204		2,955	3,947	-4,674	2,527	-5.899	-11,944	4.070	-417	-1.625	1.486	8.230	.0566
12-15-15-15-15-15-15-15-15-15-15-15-15-15-	Total	423.141		129,357	61.834	67.522			33.202	-1.897	-32.494		269-	-1,606	.3057
124,509 180,600 10,700 1,000	MEDIUM	74.529		12,733	10:891	1,842		0 1	93.331	4. 1.000 1.000 1.000	-9.593		-1,607	-2.684	.5264
124 550 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 1	CANADIAN	71.155		29.277	51.436	18.879		n vo	48,807	-12.619	-27.030		3.913	-3.913 2.307	2843
75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75	CANADIAN	124,509		23	-	46,105	10,724	19.972		-4,464	-9.562	5.743	-1,629	-2,675	3.5555
155 156 157 156 157	ADIAN		3,501	11.752		1.229		11.551		-2.582	-5.530	3,488	139	-7.080	.3894
17.0577 10.664 10.1079 13.494 14.458 14.566 14.579 14.1721 15.01254 14.1721 15.01254 14.1721 15.01254 14.1721 15.01254 14.1721 14.17		155,466	179,494	24,028	22.71B 9.970	1.309		24,928	-35,570	10.280	-11,929	-4,840	2,054		.1546
12,013 25,025 25,025 2,027 1,027 2,079 2,025 2	::	250,577	310,684	2 %	53.694	26.413	19.860	8.968	-13.670	-1.721	20,256		1628	3,462	2674
35,090 45,231 10,241 5,128 5,113 3,022 1,569 -7,013 5,287 3,096 -6,625 1,930 -2,230 -2,248 -1,310 5,287 -2,248 -1,310 -2,248	LARGE	24,138 169,079 195,487	208.09		3.527 24.708 28.567	7.844	2.079 14.563	939	-28.685	479	14.927	1.169	175	2.449	1125
126.65 64.826 52.66 5.54 2.344 2.344 2.345 1.422 27.508 -1.310 3.227 1.686 -278 -222	SMALL	35.090	45,331	10.241	5.128	5.113	3,022	1.265	~	282.5	3.098	-865	1.930	2,137	29.62
22.065 31.914 9.849 3.524 6.625 1.990 858 -2.649 -791 1.948 1.069 -289 2.206 2.206 2.206 2.206 2.207 1.529 1.529 1.523 -2.49 -791 1.948 1.069 -289 2.206 32.208 3.546 7.206 1.573 2.533 -2.490 1.206 -4.907 1.771 2.178 1.253 -2.490 1.206 -4.907 1.771 2.178 1.206 -4.907 1.771 2.188 -4.907 1.771 2.188 -4.907 1.771 2.188 -4.907 -1.182 -4.907 -1.182 -4.907 -1.1791 2.170 -1.182 -4.907 -1.1791 2.110 -1.771 2.170 -1.182 -1.771 2.149 -4.907 -4.907 -1.1791 2.110 -2.168 -1.178 -4.907 -1.1791 -1.1791 2.110 -1.178 -1.178 -4.907 -1.182 -1.1791 -1.1791 -1.1791 -1.1791 </td <td>IGN.</td> <td>36,551</td> <td></td> <td>1,635</td> <td>5,541</td> <td>1.317</td> <td>3.14B</td> <td>1,422</td> <td></td> <td>-1,510</td> <td>3.227</td> <td>1,686</td> <td>-478</td> <td>-10,047</td> <td>1,7729</td>	IGN.	36,551		1,635	5,541	1.317	3.14B	1,422		-1,510	3.227	1,686	-478	-10,047	1,7729
136.871 168.603 11.732 20.001 11.731 11.789 5.323 -7.369 -4.907 12.084 -4.201 1.771 2.149 2.149	ADIAN	22,065	31,914	9.849		6.625	1.900	858		512	1.948	1.069	114		. 4464
683.106 701.137 218.031 70.597 147.423 41.611 78.990 47.624 -4.171 -3.851 6.116 -1.522 980 121.885 120.437 146.772 24.245 10.699 14.637 -5.570 -1.82 -1.87 5.015 412.887 120.437 12.230 10.699 10.699 14.697 -1.697 -5.629 11.83 -1.87 5.015 412.887 6.0574 10.296 12.564 10.521 12.569 12.569 12.569 12.569 12.569 12.569 12.704 -1.762 -1.762 -5.399 1.569 -1.762 <td< td=""><td></td><td>136,871</td><td>39,492</td><td>31,732</td><td>0.4</td><td>11.731</td><td>11.789</td><td>5,323</td><td>-31,316</td><td>4.907</td><td>12.084</td><td>-4.261</td><td>1.771</td><td>9,133</td><td>23.18</td></td<>		136,871	39,492	31,732	0.4	11.731	11.789	5,323	-31,316	4.907	12.084	-4.261	1.771	9,133	23.18
11.895 12.61.036 40.142 17.813 12.22.29 10.499 19.370 -14.657 -2.497 -5.497 -5.629 -5.139 -5.135 -5.135 -5.299 -5.135 -5.299 -5.135 -5.299 -5.135 -5.299 -5.2	Total	483,106	701.137	218.031	70,597	147,433	41.611	78.990	47,434	-4.171	13.851	6,116	1.522	980	.4513
147.500 275.605 275.605 2.554 106.550 12.704 24.117 110.201 -5.288 -1.176 6.802 -1.772 3.877 -358 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.581 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 2.583 -1.176 -1.181	MEDIUMCANAGECANAGE	121.895 212.927 412.615	162.036 260.378 605.164	40,142	17.815	22,329 16,336 132,253	10.499	19.930	-14.637 -48.717 62.260	4.450	-1.697	5.904	1,624	-3,156	2223
785 5.817 2.553 115 2.418 68 128 586 118 -6 56 5 586 118 -6 56 5 56 5 56 5 56 5 56 5 56 5 56 5	: :	147.500	275.405	127,905	10.501	15,180	6.072	11,526	110.201	10.621 -5.288	-562	-1,742	3.877	-368	3615
16.762 155.599 38.637 17.092 21.545 10.074 19.124 -4.193 -932 5.665 -1.531 -5.029 4.932 6.437 1.505 21.650 4.558 12.761 24.224 -33.897 -5.311 -1.181 -4.613 -1.939 -611 64.932 174.160 26.008 21.650 4.558 12.761 24.224 -33.897 -5.311 -1.181 -4.613 -1.939 -611 64.932 174.160 26.008 21.650 4.558 12.761 24.224 -33.897 -5.311 -1.181 -4.613 -1.939 -611 64.932 1.322.434 182.351 166.601 15.749 -35.162 7.239 36.709 -10.748 12.32 -4.348 -2.159 -25.953 65.588 641.299 4.910 92.996 -19.627 5.802 -16.561 12.32 -4.348 -1.933 -17.270 65.588 641.299 4.910 92.996 -19.627 5.802 -16.561 12.39 -2.159 -2.159 -2.159 65.588 641.299 4.910 32.996 -19.627 5.802 -16.564 4.588 12.539 2.9599 -1.03.897 65.588 641.299 4.910 32.996 -19.627 5.802 -16.564 4.588 12.539 2.5959 -1.0378 65.588 641.299 4.910 32.996 -19.627 5.802 -16.564 4.588 12.539 -2.5959 -1.0378 65.588 641.299 4.910 32.996 -19.627 5.802 -16.564 4.588 12.539 -1.0378 65.588 641.299 4.910 32.996 -19.627 5.802 -16.564 4.588 12.539 -1.0378 65.588 641.299 4.910 32.996 -19.627 5.802 -16.564 6.589 -10.548 12.539 -1.0378 65.588 641.299 4.910 32.996 -19.627 5.802 -16.564 6.589 -10.548 12.539 -10.548 -10.548 12.539 -10.548 12.	MEDIUM	785	3.317	2.533	115	2.418	69	128			9		M	27	3.2269
148.152 174.160 26.008 21.650 4.358 12.761 24.224 -5.311 -1.181 -4.613 -1.939 -611 1.140.083 1.322.434 182.351 16.601 15.769 -5.579 10.591 -10.482 -2.017 3.562 -2.077 1.140.083 1.322.434 182.351 166.601 15.769 -5.5162 7.239 26.709 -10.748 12.212 -4.348 -2.159 -25.963 2.23.720.975 2.279.975 2.66.607 15.729 -8.635 11.485 2.99.776 -9.665 -1.211 -1.188 -1.348 -1.221 -1.211 -1.348 -1.348 -1.221 -1.321 -1.348 -1.521 -1.321 -1.348 -1.321 -1.348 -1.348 -1.321 -1.348 -1.348 -1.321 -1.348 -1.348 -1.321 -1.321 -1.348 -1.348 -1.348 -1.348 -1.348 -1.348 -1.348 -1.348 -1.348 -1.348 -1.348 -1.348 -1.348	IGN	4.932	155.599	38.637	8.2				4	-4,193	198			-3,029 -128	.3303
11/40.083 1.222.434 182.531 166.601 15.749 -35.162 7.239 36.709 -10.748 12.212 -4.348 -2.159		148,152		26.008	2.4	4,358	12.761	24.224	-33.897	9.760	-1,181	19	3,562	-611 -267	. 3311
223.720 218.678 -5.062 32.692 -77.54 -6.900 1.953 -26.864 -5.881 12.579 -1.181 -5.928 641.899 4.910 92.996 -890.086 -19.627 5.802 -145.604 4.758 12.579 22.959 -4.765 16.623 145.001 38.757 145.001 38.75	: :	1,140,083	1,322,434	182,351	166.601	15.749	-35,162	620	36,709	-10.748	12,232	-4.348	-2.159	-25,963	
978-579 1.60-516 181-757 2.535 2.001 28-736 2.0181 4.046 2.55.082 6.829 8.796 2.5035 161-550 182-718 614 23-601 23-73-887 2.088 2.08	MEDIUM	223,720	218.678	2.00.5	32.69.5	-27.754	006.91	100	-26.863	188.5	874	-15.429	-1,933	-17,270	
	CANADIAN	978,579	1,160,316	181.737	143.001	38,736	130.181	0.00	70.256	-35.082	6.829	-8.796	956	-23,033	

ALU78 AL	ALUB6 OB	TOTAL	GROWTH	-		EFFECTS			·	SELECTED INTERACTIONS	TERACT ION		RATE OF
		A CA	RATE EFFECT (B)	TOTAL A-B	REGION	INDUSTRY	FIRM	CONTROL	INDUSTRY	SIZE REGION	COTL	INDUSTRY S12E	GROWTH (A)/(1)
l			-										
₩.	454,098 1	176.334	40.590	135.744 5.825	-8,567 -68	1,455	207,525	19.958	-1,319	-11.775	-2,000	-17,393	2.7806
۰.	11.365	-6,936	31,016	-35,953	-6.546	1,875	-25,486	1.609	350	-14.647	-1.528	-3.494	-,0233
Q, \7	498,905	10.339	71,395	-61,056	-15.068	3.085	-111.783	-17,515	7,625	17,626	-3,518	-2.147	.0212
UU 0	22,385 1,114 23,995 64	90.09 90.095 1067 1087 1087	2,268 1,942 2,16 2,249 1,349	74. 74. 74. 74. 74. 74. 74. 74. 74. 74.	1 441 4 644 14 804404	00000000000000000000000000000000000000	9,580	11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	-2.262 -1.937 -2.262 -2.244	#####################################	100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100	24.821 24.958 24.79 20.79	1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.
2	22.330	9,122	1,930	7,192	-407	-3.202	9,868	-473	-1.925	9 K 9 K 1 K 1 K	-95	-4.928	. 3239
-	9 8	1333	210	1543	41	1349	1173	182	-210	661	-10	44	1.2315
	560	781-	601	-297 0	-23	183	-171	-27	-109	27	S, O	92	2507
88 14 17 17 17 17 17	88.207 19.412 11.558 57.236 60.864	19.630 13.110 3.136 3.534 17.147 2.683	9,992,1 1,231,1 6,088,0 6,088,0	8 + 6 + 6 + 6 + 6 + 6 + 6 + 6 + 6 + 6 +	1.109 1.109	13,969 -1.288 -1.721 -1.721 -1.961 -1.961 -1.961 -1.961 -1.961	18.578 1.3011 12.275 1.920	2:148 -124 2:251 -1:567 3:716	20.950 1.981 2.580 16.438 17.594 7.594		22.1 22.2 23.2 24.2 24.2 24.2 24.2 24.2 24.2	NW - 9 CM W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W	2.08900 2.08900 2.08900 2.0800 2.08900 3.0800 3.0800 3.0800
7 2	14,984	5,883	84.1 830	3,803	-178	1.176	4.301	-20¢ 82	1,764	-246	171	3,230	1,6028
≎~	10,169	3,483	977	2.506	1206	1.366	80%-	-240 262	2,048	1461	-48 53	-1,071	.5210
55	25,711	4.437 -853	5,270	-4.123	1965	6,389	-7,155	3,372	9,582	1,128	-225	-4.707	0381
20 mm - 4.24	182,875 35,137 31,903 115,836 42,764	2.268 15.876 -971 -12.637 9.556 -7.288	26,392 2,815 2,815 4,804 19,078 14,078	1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	18. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1	-7.737 -1.408 -1.408 -5.504 -2.144	1.8.951 13.947 129.894 18.188	2.8861 1.5897 7.5897 7.5897 7.5897	14.100 1437 12.917 12.964	- 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11	875 1128 120 120 1940 1515	23.982 2.948 1.289 1.6641 1.601	00126 8243 1,0295 1,0984 1,0732 1,456
m	34.447	15,544	2.762	12,782	-583	6 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2	14.123	-678	-429	-801	-136	2,893	.9283
63	3,253	-1,108 137	4,348	-5,457	-918	-1,275	-3,573	-1,067	-676	-2.054	-214	-262	0372
L- M3	77.015	-4,879	11,967	-16.847	-2.526	-3.508	-18.737	7,018	-1,859	2,955	1,410	-4,233	0596
₽ W ← W ·	93.488 52.135 18.289 23.063	-17,695 10,176 -12,635 -15,236	6.132	-33,942 4,044 -17,154 -20,832	11,294	136,765 110,226 112,664	18.873 31.349 -3.713	1,297	-16.354 -6.172 -4.549	12.531	1111	1,606	2425 - 4086 - 3978
90		-4.064	2,107	-6.171	16.384	-4.767	-3.143	2.172	-2.120	454	1 4 4	612	

INDUSTRY BY INITIAL	ALU78	ALU86	TOTAL				EFFECTS			, ,	ELECTED IN	SELECTED INTERACTIONS		DATE OF
TIRM SIZE & CONTROL	(1)	(2)	GROWTH (A)	RATE EFFECT (B)	TOTAL A-B	REGION	INDUSTRY	FIRM	CONTROL	INDUSTRY	S12E REGION	CNTL	INDUSTRY SIZE	GROWTH (A)/(1)
CONSTRUCTION														
CANADIAN	41.862	51.987	10,126	6,117	4.008	1,291	-13,842	31.276	-1.501	-6.157	4-775	, 0 1 0 1	-7,000	0.2419
CANADIANFOREIGN	30,369	18.166	-12,203	4,438	-16.641	-937	-10,042	-3,647	1,089	-4,467	-2,096	-219	1,578	4018
CANADIAN FOREIGN	13.763	12.983	-11,553	3,585	-15,139	-757	-8.113	-5,614	-880	7.609	885	-177	\$.069 600	4709
Total	14,351	23.	2,943	21,075	-18,133	14,448	-18.728	-17.670	-4.303	4.137	2.799	-864	-3.444	.6313
LARGE. CANADIAN. FOREIGN. SMALL	139,572	110.959	2.721	17.201 20.396	123.952	14.805 14.805 14.805	-15,285 -18,124 -604	-1,460 -26,932 -16,764 -906	W W W W W W W W W	849 8,377 4,004	-839 4.247 2.717 82	-705 -1,005	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	.0521 0573 .0195
CANADIAN FOREIGN	14.274	23,346	9.072	2.086	6,986	1440	-1,854	10.665	-512	409	-605	-103	2-297	.6355
CANADIAN FOREIGN	11,400	11.551	151	1.666	-1,515	1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3	-1,480	1,369	114	22.	-787	22.2	1,932	.6354
CANADIAN FOREIGN	113.898	3.563	-6,501	16.644	-23,145	13.53	-14.790	-26.059	-4.083	3.267	4.109	-820	-5.037	0571
Total SMALL MEDIUM LARGE CANADIAN FOREIGN	103.737 27.499 25.738 50.500 88.078 15.659	105,993 40,439 23,196 42,358 91,361 14,632	2.256 12.940 -2.542 -8.142 3.284	53,159 4,018 5,761 7,380 12,871 2,288	1 1 6 6 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	11.72. 1.72.	1 1 20 5 5 5 1 1 1 20 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 20 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1 1 2 3 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8	11111111111111111111111111111111111111	11111111111111111111111111111111111111	114	13,406 -2,128 -2,304 6,027 -4,571	. 0218 - 4706 - 0988 - 1612 - 0373
CANADIAN FDREIGN	26,946	39.169	912.21	3,928	8,286	-831	-3,065	20.132	996-	-1,787	-1.142	1941-	-6.984	1.2945
CANADIAN FOREIGN	23.371	21.066	-2.305	3.415	-5,720	-721	-2.641	-2.806	1828	-1.550	-1.633	-168	-2.092	0986
FOREIGN	12,739	11,232	-6.635	5.518	-12,153	-1,165	-4.267	-8.640 -2,915	1,919	-2.505 -845	1.362	386	1,520	-,1757
SMALL SMALL HEDIUM LARGE CANADIAN FOREIGN	191.889 66.155 32.404 93.130 169.239 22.650	256,310 101,117 34,807 120,385 230,163 26,148	24,421 24,863 2,403 27,155 60,923 4,98	28,041 9,682 4,735 13,624 24,731	25, 380 12, 381 13, 332 14, 533 14, 53	1.5.9 1.2.0 1.2.0 1.2.0 1.2.0 1.2.0 1.2.0 1.2.0 1.0.0	50.780 10.628 14.958 14.955 27.147	24,239 -21,339 -29,231 -29,231 -4,921	-2.656 -2.355 -1.018 -6.067 3.413	12.501 2.316 2.111 6.074 11.026	-1,681 -2,809 -2,236 3,363 -2,409	1,219 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010	111 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	.3357 .0742 .0742 .3600
	109	100,685	34.539	9,666	24.873	-2,040	10.610	49,419	-2,371	4,309	-2.804	-476	-1,621	.5222 2,9675
FOREIGN	773	1,135	2,041	4.622	-2,582 250	9261	5.074	-3,798	-1,134	2.061	-2,183	-228	-3,110	.4692
FOREIGN	21.768		24.344	10.443	13.901	-2.204	3,492	-16.550	3.280	4.656	2.578	659	2,686	.3407
SMALL MEDIUM LARDE CANADIAN FOREIGN	8 5 3 1 4 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	108,543 10,809 69,151 100,867		13.910 2.845 1.782 9.283 12.791	1 1 (4 M W - 1 4 M W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W	24 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	1 2 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	1 1 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	-10.842 -2.218 -1.289 -7.236 -9.991	. 1 60 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10	1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	15 400000 400000000000000000000000000000	1403 11134 11324
									261.	7.8	14	767	7	0200.

RATE OF	GROWTH (A)/(1)		0.4712	1178	7660		. 1274 . 3842 . 3663	.9441	.1021	.0806	.1510 .6173 .0450 0311		.0465	0189	1	.5841	3355	4989	2.0360 2.4:16 1.1592 1.1497 1.0073
	INDUSTRY \$12E		-5,301	1,193	3,769	2,421	-1.749 -372 -419 -118	2,414	-1,705	-291 -81	-18.807 -13.367 -1.792 -3.648 -16.139		-1.699	-1,217	11 1 24 40 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 2	-4.506	96	748	1,574
INTERACTIONS	CNTL REGION		139	-8 -13 -13	-407	-508	-423 90 -1,496 655	4 E	-474	5.98	-22.580, -23.680, -23.694, -22.812	-6,948	1,135	-11.035	7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00	-424	-225	513	250 119 279 651
SELECTED IN	SIZE REGION		8 8	181	2.038	-4.439	14.45 14.05 16.05	-3.026	-4,543	2,544	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	-1,632	-5.957	5.067	1286	100	-278	88.5	158 210 218 218 39
Ø	INDUSTRY REGION		-2.197	-1,339	-6.435	15.082	4.440 5.935 13.659	4.694	4.329	4.636	2.627	2,809	-868	1.053	8 1 1 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	-3,985	-2,114	-2,004	1,520 1111 1,297 1,097
	CONTROL		-691	-422	1.060	-4,186	-2,106 -7,448 3,261	-2.559	-2,360	-2,528	-4.877 -6.815 -3.769 5.707 -23.274	-7.089	1,158	-11,259	11911	-433	-230 38	-218 51	112 111 111 1285 -409
	FIRM S12E		14,409	-1,412	-12.924	53,485	29.196 29.196	53,333	-7.905	-16,131	34,048 149,090 -17,424 -97,617 59,376	147,733	-16,502	-71,855	1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	9.023	-769	-1,389	-2.370 861 -141 -3.090 -1.497
EFFECTS	INDUSTRY		750	457	2.197	57.502	14,757	11,672	10,765	11.528	2.4430 2.496 3.8881 1.4645	2.570	1,090	-2,015	12.961 -1.615 -1.615 -1.615 -1.615 -1.615	-2.928	-1.553	-1.472	2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
	REGION		-595	1 2 6 3	-1,742	-7,074	-2.083 -2.783 -6.407	-2.202	-2.031	-2.174	11.83 12.062 12.062 19.964 19.964	0,0 10,0 10,0	-2.109	-4.819	1388	-185	86-	. 96 - 15 - 15 - 15 - 15 - 15 - 15 - 15 - 15	-243 -18 -207 -175 -175
	TOTAL A-B		6.268	-3,104	-2.622	52.912	13,184	56.963	-2,897	2.930	3,741 94,026 -14,674 -75,612 25,692	91.215	-13,693	-51.830	1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	5,133	-3,085	-3.917	2.743 2.610 2.957 1.585 1.585
NATL	RATE EFFECT (B)		2,818	1.718	8.255	33,517	9.868 13.189 30.355	10,431	9,621	10,503	29,161 29,161 21,205 62,348 94,871	28,895	20,082	45.893	3.694 1.784 973 3.588	1,765	936	887	2.313 168 171 1.974 1.669
TOTAL	GRCWTH (A)		9,087	-1,385	65 65 61 65 61	86.430	6.683 11.498 79.801 6.629	67,395	6,724	5,681	116,455 123,187 6,531 -13,264 120,264	120.119	6.389	-5,937	13.364	6.897	-2,149	-3.030	2,778 2,778 -186 -2,022 84
AL UB 6			28,572	10.373	62.121	315,79	74,209 101,749 287,526 28,269	138,779	1,648	76,186	887,770 322,739 151,641 415,391 769,378	8.712	143.815	308,118	26.369 19.030 4.296 3.043 26.272	18.974	4.256	3.043	16.399 3.930 3.930 11.485 4.895
ALU78	3		19.285	11.759	56,489		67.526 90.252 207.725 21.640	71.584	1.689	19.747	771.316 199.551 145.109 426.655 649.215	197,735	137,426	314.055	25,280 12,211 6,660 6,409 24,554	12.076	6.405	6.073	15.829 1.152 1.152 13.506 11.420
INDUSTRY BY INITIAL	FIRM SIZE & CONTROL	PRAIRIES & NWT FINANCE	CANADIAN	MEDIUM CANADIAN	CANADIAN	SERVICES Total	MEDIUM. LARGE. CANADIAN.	CANADIAN CANADIAN FOREIGN	MEDIUM CANADIAN	CANADIAN	TOTAL DIVISIONS TOTAL DIVISIONS TOTAL MEDIUM LARGE CANADIAN FORETEN		MEDIUM CANADIAN	CANADIAN	PRIMARY TOTAL SMALL MEDIUM LARGE CANDIAN FOREIGN	SMALL CANADIAM	MEDIUM CANADIAN	CANADIAN	HINES Total. SMALL MEDIUM. LARGE CANADIAN FOREIGN

INDUSTRY BY INITIAL	AL U78	AL D86	OBSERVED							,				RATE OF
KM SIZE & CUNTRUL	3	(2)	GROWTH (A)	RATE EFFECT (B)	TOTAL A-B	REGION	INDUSTRY	FIRM	CONTROL	INDUSTRY REGION	SIZE	CNTL	INDUSTRY	GROWTH (A)/(1)
S YUKON MINES									-					
CANADIAN	1,032	1,022	1.876	151	1.726	12.	211	771	-37	98	9.1	-36	579	1.8183
CANADIAN	1,005	292	-283	72.22	73	2 2	205	121	25.05	97	-44 -7	135	-161	2816
CANADIAN FOREIGN	9.383	7,874	-1.510	1.371	-2.881	-144	1,917	-2,147	-326	362	151	609	-1,412	1609
Total	181,162		- 12	26.473	-38,460		-7.761	-22.593	3,932	-14.785	1.002	3.854	26895	0662
MEDIUM	125.549 129.128 125.260 55.902	22.869 116.331 128,740 40,435		3,733 20,332 18,304 8,169	-6,413 -43,140 -14,824 -23,636	12.1	15.094 -25.366 -2.395	-3.068 -31.834 -10.387	4,916 -4,491 8,423	11.355	2,245	7.4.00 1.4.00 1.4.00 1.4.00 1.4.00 1.4.00	7.192 -2.178 -2.178	1.1639
CANADIAN	16.153	29,304	13,150	2,361	10,790	-248	-692	12.069	-579	1.518	133	87	2,473	1,0853
CANADIAN	23.068	21,227	-1.842	3,371	-5.213	1354	-988	-2,770	-827	-1.883	-1,000	-811	-203	8610
CANADIAN	53,099	78,210 38,120	-7,828	12,573	-20,401	-1.320	-3.686	-19.685	-3.084	-7.022	1,388	1.842	-4,447	0910
Total SMALL MEDIUM LARGE CANADIAN SMAL	48.627 23.210 12.096 13.321 44.850	67.237 82.363 84.408 64.408 64.5382 27.532	1	7.400 1.400	847,496 187,496 187,496 187,496 187,496	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	16,080 -4,675 -4,000 -14,831 -17,249	12.840 17.341 -1.652 -3.068 13.685	-1.039 -821 -411 -411 -1.608	124.061 12.254 12.254 12.254 12.582 17.064	+ 1 0 + 2 0 + 2 0 + 2 0 + 2 0 + 3 0 + 3 0 0 + 3 0 +	-1,018 -805 -403 -190 -1976 -1978	7. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4.	0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0
CANADIAN	23,152	35,308	9,156	5. 8. 8. 8.	5.773	1355	-7.656	17,298	-830	-4.314	-191	-814-	'	80 80 80 F. I
CANADIAN	11,976	8.257	-3,719	1.750	-5.469	- 184	-3,960	-1,438	-429 18	-2.232	-519 -5	-421 18	622	3106
CANADIAN FOREIGN	3,599	3.967	-5,755	1,421	-7.176	149	-3.215	12,224	545	-1.912	157	-342	424 157	5920
Total SMALL MADIUM. CANDIAN.	102,009 11,651 10,064 80,494 84,684	104,466 17,626 9,990 76,838 85,056 19,408	2,655 6,185 1,186 1,565 2,656 2,083	14,907 1,673 11,763 12,375 2,532	12,452 115,44 12,003 14,003	111111111111111111111111111111111111111	13.246 -1,487 -1,487 -10,453 -2,250	11.070 8.556 -1.208 -7.347 -3.723	-425 -382 -205 -3.036 -3.036	1,095 -1123 -108 -1964 -1966	7 68 1 4 2 9 9 1 1 2 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9	-417 -374 -201 158 -2.976 2.559	12. 12. 12.00. 13.00. 13.00. 13.00. 13.00. 13.00.	
CANADIAN	11,298	17,476	. 6.1	1,651	4.527	173	-1.467	8,441	-405	121-2	861	1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	-235	.5469
	836	420 4	88		-1,510	-142	-11198	-1,108	126	66 i	-400	455	1,564	0175
FOREIGN	16.33	18 19 75	1,989	2.387	15,020	-984	-2,121	-14.679	2,461	-689	1.035	-2.254	-2.838	-,0880
Total SMALL MEDIUM	60,721 17,957 17,716	60.679 27.415 15.884	9.458	8.875 2.624 2.589	-8,927 6,834 -4,420	111	-6.862	5.556	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	-11,186	-512 -148 -768	1528	13.050	0009 5267
LARGE		17,380	1.179	3,662	-11.340	1284	-2.831	-5,733	120	9.9.	404	424	2,990	1.306

		TOTAL				EFFECTS			¥7	SELECTED INTERACTIONS	TERACT IONS		!
(1)	(2)	GROWTH GROWTH (A)	RATE RATE EFFECT (B)	TOTAL A-B	REGION	INDUSTRY	FIRM	CONTROL	INDUSTRY	SIZE	CNTL	INDUSTRY	RATE DE GROWTH (A)/(1)
17.395	1,000	9.020	2.542	6,478	-267	11.955	12.996	-624	-3.204	-144 -5	-611	-4.509	0.5185
5.978	14.221	-1.717	2.529	-4,046	-245	-1.801	11.914	-571	-2.936	-691	-560	-1,427	1077
17,923	11.799	-6.124	2.619	-8.743	-275	-2.025	-4.101	1.075	13.301	289	1,054	2,139	2417
074	67.122	29.534	17.547	22.038 15,535	-1.842 -691 -322		18.732 33.628	-2,732		-407	-2.678	1994	. 4913
54,109 111,642 8,432	68.926 143.233 16,426	14,817 31,591 7,994	7,907	6.910 15.276 6.761	-1.713	8.679 17.908 1.353	-12.580 20.501 -1.769	-509 -4.002 1.270	13,340 27,525 2,079		1.245	1,214	2738
44,921	66,349	21,428	6.564	14.864	1689	7.206	33.562	-1,610	11.075	-371	-1,578	196- 1965	7.6561
20.280	22.682	2.402	2,964	-562	- F	3,253	-2,435 -81	102	5.000	-879	100	-1.994	.1184
7.669	54.202	7.761	6.786	5.935	-713	7.449	-10.626	1.155	11,450	749	1,632	1.745	.9201
67.607 15.152 8.220	79.116 22.916	7,765	9,879	5,530	-1.037		11.320	-1,236	335		-1.211	٠	.5125 .2218
3638	46.156 73.379 5.738	1,922	6.464 8.949 930	-4.543 3.190 -1.560	940 1980	1.720 2.382 248	1,418	-2.195	978 1.354 141	714 163 70	-514	2.952	1982
205	22.083	7.136	2,184	4.952	-229	581	11.167	-536	188	-123 -2	-525	-4,109	3.0714
7,749	9.326	1,577	1,132	944	-119	301 18	126-	-278 71	171	-336	-272	786	.2035
5.692	41,969	3,426	5,632	-2.206	-591	1,499	-8.819	-1,382	852 126	622	-1.354	2.572	.0889
149,997 56.932 42.680 50.384	224.672 102.370 55.556 66.746	74.676	21.919 8.320 6.237 7.363	52,756 37,118 6,619 8,999	-2.302 -874 -655	24,525 9,309 6,978 8,238	25.883 42.535 -15.125	-2,451 -2,009 -1,362 919	11,225	-1.507 -470 -1.850 813	11.969	1.925	.4978 .7981 .3017
.510	204.627	4.358	19.627	50,691	-2,061		1.39.12.06	2.364	10.051		2,317	690	.5235
6,760	102,028	45,268	8.294	36,973	-871	9.280	42.407	-2,035	4.248	-469 -1	-1.994	1.920	.9888
41.777	54.060	12,283	6.105	6.178	1641	6.831	-5.016	-1,498	3.126	-1.811	-1,468	-1.082	.2940
35,773	48,549	12.767	5.227	7.539	156.9	5.849	-8.185	-1.282	2.677	577	-1,257	-148	, 3569

Note: ALU78 (1) Average Labour Units in 1978. ALU86 (2) Average Labour Units in 1986.

(A) Total Observed Growth is (2) minus (1).

(B) National Growth Rate Effect is (1) multiplied by national growth rate 1978-86 (0.1461).

Total is (A) minus (B); total observed growth minus the national growth rate effect. Region, industry, firm size and control effects are the computed effects of these factors on employment growth as described in text. Effects: Effects:

Selected interactions: The effect on employment of some of the two-way interactions is given and explained in the text.

Additional interaction effects occur which are not listed.

The allocation or disproportionality effect (r...-r...) is a constant proportion of the 1978 employment base and is not listed.

Source: Small Business and Special Surveys, Statistics Canada.