







Public policies for the Social and Solidarity Economy: Towards a favourable environment

The case of the Philippines

Benjamin R. Quiñones, Jr1

Founder and Chair of the Asian Solidarity Economy Council (ASEC), the Asian continental network of RIPESS (Intercontinental Network for the Promotion of the Social Solidarity Economy).

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Publications, International Training Centre of the ILO Viale Maestri del Lavoro, 10 - 10127 Turin, Italy Telephone: +39 011 6936693

Telephone. +39 011 0930093

Fax: +39 011 6936352

E-mail: Publications@itcilo.org

Prologue

The International Labour Organization (ILO) has a long tradition and extensive experience on the Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE). In fact, the first official document making direct reference to social economy enterprises dates back to 1922. The ILO's commitment to the advancement of the SSE is grounded on its Constitution and on the 2008 ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, which states that, in a globalized world, "productive, profitable and sustainable enterprises, together with a strong social economy and a viable public sector, are critical to sustainable economic development and employment opportunities".

The SSE is a concept that is increasingly being used to refer to all economic activities, involving organizations like associations, cooperatives, foundations, mutual benefit societies and social enterprises, that are guided by principles, values and practices concerned with participation, democracy, solidarity and commitment to the environment, and that prioritize the pursuit of a social aim.

The social economy sector has not only proved to be resilient to economic crises in terms of employment, but also it represents a concrete response, from civil society, to its own needs through, for example, the provision of basic services that traditional welfare state systems are no longer in a position to provide and that the traditional private sector has no interest in providing.

The SSE continues to grow in many countries and there is increasing recognition of its role in sustainable and inclusive development. In fact, more and more governments see the SSE as an area of work that is relevant for tackling challenges related to employment, service provision and the level of social cohesion, among others.

This paper studies the case of the Philippines, where public policies, understood in the broad sense as legal frameworks, related to credit, taxation, training, education, health, infrastructure and public tendering have been formulated specifically to support the SSE. This paper aims to describe and explain the overall context and the evolution, from an historical and institutional standpoint, of the process that has fostered a more favourable policy framework.

The most important aspects covered are:

- the context for and the development of the SSE in recent years;
- the identification of key government measures (laws, public policies, programmes, institutional reforms, and so on) taken to support the SSE;
- an analysis of the key challenges facing the SSE.

In the Philippines, there are numerous civil society organizations of various types that constitute the main actors in the SSE sector. The Philippine population is highly active in this sector, to the extent that 83% of them are members of some organization within this sector.

This paper deals with the political economy of the SSE by examining the influence of public policies on the production, distribution and consumption of resources by SSE organizations, on the one hand, and by analysing the contribution of SSE organizations to policy-making, on the other.

SOCIAL AND SOLIDARITY ECONOMY ACADEMY

The ultimate aim of this study is to move towards a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the global picture for the SSE, to share examples of support given to this sector, and to highlight the role of the SSE in inclusive and sustainable development with decent work.

For our part, we would like to thank here the author, Benjamin Quiñones, for his research, and we hope that the contents of this paper will be of use to those readers who would like to understand better how the SSE is steadily contributing towards building a new model of production and consumption.

Vic van Vuuren

Director Enterprises Department ILO Geneva

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Abstract

On the world stage, the term Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE) is increasingly being used to refer to a sector of economic activities that is expanding rapidly. SSE organizations are distinguished by values such as inclusiveness, equity and sustainability.

In the Philippines, for several decades, there have been numerous civil society organizations of various types that constitute the main actors in the SSE sector. The Philippine population is highly active in this sector, to the extent that 83% are members of some organization within this sector.

This paper deals with the political economy of the SSE by examining the influence of public policies on the production, distribution and consumption of resources by SSE organizations, on the one hand, and by analysing the contribution of SSE organizations to policy-making, on the other.

This paper concludes by identifying the challenges facing this sector, namely participation, autonomy and policy coherence, among others.

Acronyms

4Ps Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Programme

ASEC Asian Solidarity Economy Council

CBCP Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines

CCT Conditional Cash Transfer

CDA Cooperative Development Authority

CGAP Consultative Group to Assist the Poor

CODE-NGO Caucus of Development NGO Networks

CSO Civil society organization

DSWD Department of Social Work and Development

FIDAP Farmers Integrated Development Assistance Programme

ILO International Labour Organization

IMF International Monetary Fund

KALAHI-CIDSS Kapit Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan (KALAHI)-Comprehensive and

Integrated Delivery of Social Services (CIDSS)

KKOK Kasama Ka Organik Kooperatib

Local Government Code

LGU Local Government Unit

LLOoP Life Learning Organization of Peace

MCPI Microfinance Council of the Philippines Inc.

MCW Magna Carta of Women

MFI Microfinance institution

MIBF Municipal Inter-Barangay Forum

SOCIAL AND SOLIDARITY ECONOMY ACADEMY

MSME Micro, small and medium enterprises

NAPC National Anti-Poverty Commission

NGO Non-governmental organization

PCA Philippine Coconut Authority

PCW Philippine Commission on Women

PMT Professional Management Team

PPP Public-private partnership

PRESENT Poverty Reduction through Social Entrepreneurship

PRRM Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement

PSEF Philippine Solidarity Economy Forum

Private voluntary organization

RA Republic Act

SE Social enterprise

SJCPPC San Juan Coconut Producers and Processing Cooperative

SRDDP Sustainable Rural District Development Programme

SRPA Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation

SSE Social and Solidarity Economy

UPLB-PAV University of the Philippines at Los Baños-Prelude Alumni Volunteers Association

UNITESSE United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on Social and Solidarity Economy

VCO Virgin Coconut Oil

WB World Bank

Part 1. The political economy of the SSE

Contemporary economics focuses on the rational action of individuals with the notion of a sharp divide between the political and the economic. Some argue that production and distribution of wealth has to be regulated by the legislative action of the sovereign or state, while others contend for minimum interference of the state in the "natural" functioning of markets. The reality is that political control and economic survival are inextricably linked. Control processes are broadly political in that they involve the social organization of relationships within a community. Survival processes are fundamentally economic because they concern the production of what the society needs to reproduce itself. (Mosco, 2009, p. 24).

This paper deals with the political economy – broadly defined as the intersection of economics and politics – of the Social Solidarity Economy (SSE) by examining the influence of public policies on the collective production, distribution, and consumption of resources by SSE organizations, on the one hand, and analysing the contributions of SSE organizations to policy-making, on the other. The SSE refers to the production of goods and services by organizations and enterprises of ordinary people that have explicit social and often environmental objectives, and are guided by principles and practices of cooperation, solidarity, ethics and democratic self-management (UNTFSSE, 2014).1

In international development discourse, the SSE is the term increasingly used to refer to an expanding field of economic activity of organizations driven by values and practices associated with basic needs provisioning, inclusiveness, equity and sustainability. From the perspective of the ILO, the SSE contributes to the four dimensions of the overall goal of creating Decent Work for all: productive employment, social protection, the respect for rights and social dialogue (Fonteneau et al., 2011). The pivotal actor in the SSE is generally referred to as the private voluntary "civil

society organization" (CSO). The private voluntary CSO does not belong to either the state sector or the private corporate sector. Having been legitimized by a cycle of UN summits (UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service, 2000) and integrated into the Philippine development discourse in the early 1990s, the term "civil society organization", or CSO, is generally understood to denote a non-state, non-corporate private voluntary institution that advances a variety of public causes (Serrano, 2009).

Many types of CSOs abound in the Philippines, but the more important types are people's organizations (membership-based associations of farmers, fisherfolk, professionals, students and labour unions, among others), cooperatives and development NGOs. People's organizations are independent, bona fide membership-based associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and with identifiable leadership, membership and structure. Members of people's organizations come from all sectors of society including the poor and the disadvantaged. Such membership-based associations are not classified as "cooperative" under Philippine law simply because they acquire legal personality through registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or, in the case of labour unions, with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), and not with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA).3

A cooperative is the legal identity accorded by the Republic Act (RA) No. 9520, otherwise known as the Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008, to a group of persons who have voluntarily joined together in an association duly registered with the CDA. Cooperative members are required by law to make equitable contributions to the capital required, to patronize the products and services of their cooperative, and to accept a fair share of the risks and benefits of the undertaking in accordance with universally accepted cooperative principles.

A relatively new phenomenon in the Philippine cooperative movement is the emergence of cooperatives organized by formal sector workers. One type is the Labour Service Cooperative, a cooperative that is engaged in providing a specific labour, job, or service to a principal under a contracting or subcontracting arrangement as may be defined under existing laws and in accordance with the cooperative principles set forth under the Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008. Another type is the Workers' Cooperative, a cooperative organized by workers, including the self-employed, who are at the same time members and owners of the enterprise. The principal purpose of the Workers' Cooperative is to provide employment and business opportunities to its worker-members and manage it in accordance with the cooperative principles.

Development NGOs are intermediary organizations between the people and the State that facilitate access of the poor and disadvantaged to public services, speak or work on behalf of the poor and disadvantaged, and provide a wide range of developmental services to primary organizations, communities and individuals. Development NGOs are generally not membership-based nor registered with the CDA, but they must have at least five incorporators to be registered with the SEC.⁴

In recent years, CSOs have introduced the concept and practice of "social enterprise". In February 2012, the Poverty Reduction through Social Entrepreneurship (PRESENT) Coalition was established by leaders of social enterprises, networks and social institutions to work together for the passage of the PRESENT Bill, which seeks the development of social enterprises as a key strategy for reducing poverty and enabling inclusive growth in the Philippines.⁵

Based on a report by the Asian Development Bank (2013), the number of CSOs in the Philippines was estimated at 249,000–497,000 in 2001. Of this number, 60% were registered (including the CDA-registered cooperatives) and the rest were unregistered. In terms of population outreach, a study by the Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO, 2011) found that 46% of the population considered themselves as active members of at least one CSO, 37% were inactive

members, and only 17% did not belong to any CSO. Annex Table 1 shows some data on the performance of cooperatives.

Classification of CSOs by size

Together with other enterprises registered as single proprietorship, or partnership, or company/corporation, CSOs are classified by size in terms of the number of employees. As of 2011, the Philippines had 820,255 registered enterprises classified into micro-enterprises (90.6%), small enterprises (8.6%), medium enterprises (0.4%) and large enterprises (0.4%). The total number of employees of all registered enterprises stood at 6,345,742 in 2011, of which micro-enterprises accounted for a share of 28%, small enterprises 26%, medium enterprises 7%, and large enterprises 39%.6

Quite likely, the distribution of CSOs by size will be skewed towards the category of micro-enterprises (1–9 employees) with a few small enterprises (10–99 employees). Development NGOs may be operators of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) and/or they may serve as development partners of MSMEs. As noted by the UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Social and Solidarity Economy (UNTFSSE, 2014), CSOs can facilitate access to finance, inputs, technology, support services and markets, and enhance the capacity of producers to negotiate better prices and income. They can also reduce power and information asymmetries within labour and product markets, and enhance the level and regularity of incomes. he above employment figures do not include jobs in the informal sector, the bulk of which are generated by unregistered microenterprises, and where CSOs play a significant developmental role. As borne out by employment data in 2012 (see Annex Table 2), self-employed workers in the informal sector constitute a huge proportion of employed workers in the Philippines, of which 41.6% are women. The rising cost of living is one of the factors that push Philippine women to seek employment in the informal sector.7

In a country like the Philippines where CSOs are plentiful and 46% of the population consider themselves to be active members of at least one CSO, a survey is certainly needed to ascertain the

comparative outreach of people's organizations and development NGOs. However, this step is beyond the scope of the present study.

This paper's focus is on examining the impact of public policies on SSE development and the contributions of the SSE to policy-making.

Part 2 examines some public policies and their impact on SSE development. Part 3 analyses the influence of CSOs on public policy formulation. Part 4 deals with the key challenges that impinge on the relationship between the State and SSE organizations. Finally, Part 5 presents the paper's conclusions.

Part 2. Public Policies For The Sse

Policies reviewed in this section were those adopted in the post-Marcos administration period (1965–1986), the Marcos era being characterized largely by suppression of political and civil liberties as well as economic repression. The onset of the post-Marcos era was marked by the passing of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, which established the legal framework for civil society in the aftermath of the 1986 People Power Revolution. It was formulated to guarantee the freedom of speech, association and assembly.8

The 1987 Constitution was cooperative-friendly. The constitutional provisions on cooperatives were enforced on 10 March 1990 with the enactment of RA No. 6938 (Cooperative Code of the Philippines) and RA No. 6939 (Cooperative Development Authority Act). Placed under the supervision of the Department of Finance, the CDA took over the functions of the Bureau of Cooperative Development of the Department of Agriculture.

The 1987 Constitution corrected the State's past mistake of using cooperatives as instruments for political and anti-insurgency purposes. It provided for the promotion of the growth and viability of cooperatives as instruments of equity, social justice and economic development under the principles of subsidiarity and self-help. The Corazon Aquino administration (1986-1992) recognized cooperatives as self-governing entities that have the responsibility of initiating and regulating their own affairs (Sibal, 1998).

Specific laws and ordinances supportive of CSO participation

Bolstering the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are specific laws and ordinances that enable government agencies to engage the CSO sector. Pertinent major laws and ordinances are discussed below.

The Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008

Cooperative development in the country took a decisive turn with the enactment into law of the Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008 amending the Philippine Cooperative Code of 1990 and RA No. 6939, which created the Cooperative Development Authority as the regulatory body for cooperatives. The new law was aimed at strengthening the thousands of cooperatives in the country and enabling them to provide better and more services to their members. The law also sought to create a more conducive environment for the growth and development of cooperatives that would encourage the private sector to undertake actual formation and organization of cooperatives.

Policy impact

The new law provided the impetus for the reorganization and consolidation of cooperatives in the country through the deregistration or merger of inactive cooperatives with the more active ones. This resulted in the increase of members, workers employed and total assets of cooperatives.¹⁰

The political freedom brought about by the 1986 People Power Revolution encouraged the cooperative movement to organize their own party-lists and contest for posts in Congress. In the 2010 national elections, four cooperative party-lists garnered one seat each in the Legislative Assembly. However, the gains brought about by the policy shift from government subsidy to market-oriented development were under threat, as many cooperatives were unprepared to compete in a more liberalized market environment. 12

A promising solution to the Philippine cooperative's development dilemma is a public-private partnership (PPP) that recently emerged in the country's coconut industry development programme.

The primary stakeholders of the PPP are the San Juan Coconut Producers and Processing Cooperative (SJCPPC), the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), and a consortium of professional helping non-governmental organizations.¹³

The emergence of labour service cooperatives and workers' cooperatives are also responses to the de-standardization of work resulting in the individualization of work, i.e. workers need to negotiate terms of work individually rather than collectively, and the increasing practice of labour outsourcing by large companies (e.g. Dole Philippines).

As of 2013, there were 285 labour service and workers' cooperatives in the Philippines, the bulk of which were operating in the National Capital Region (Metro Manila, 35.1%), Region IV (Southern Luzon, 19.3%), and Region II (Cagayan Valley, 15.1%). They had 200,167 members, 118,791 employees, total assets of 5.46 billion Philippines pesos (PHP) or US\$ 124 million, and PHP 5.3 billion (US\$ 120 million) in gross revenue (Elevazo, 2015). Although small in number, labour service and workers' cooperatives are growing robustly. Their impact on employment and inclusion of informal labour into the formal labour market will be an interesting agenda for future research.

The Magna Carta of Women

On August 14 2009, the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women was renamed the Philippine Commission on Women (PCW) by virtue of RA No. 9710, otherwise known as the Magna Carta of Women (MCW). The PCW is the primary policymaking and coordinating body on women and gender equality concerns, and the lead advocate of women's empowerment, gender equity and gender equality in the country. The PCW also acts as a catalyst for gender mainstreaming and an authority on women's concerns. On July 8 2010, the PCW launched the Magna Carta of Women Implementing Rules and Regulations together with its partners and stakeholders. A special feature of the PCW is the equal representation of the national government and CSOs in its governing body. Of the 21 members of the Commission, ten are representatives of the government, ten are from NGOs, and the

Chairperson is appointed by the Philippine President.¹⁴

Policy impact

The passage of the MCW was in itself a by-product of a solidarity initiative by women's groups and a means for further advancing their continuing struggle for equality. The then chairperson of the Commission of Human Rights, Leila de Lima (currently the Secretary of the Department of Justice), pointed out that the MCW categorically acknowledges that women's rights are human rights

which embody the principles of non-discrimination, equality and participation (Alvarez, 2013).

The law has contributed to the improvement of the participation of Filipino women in electoral politics. It has given women the freedom to express their powerful sentiments, to voice their opinions as citizens, and to put into action their own advocacies. All this in turn made several Filipino women politicians known to the public and the electorate. Indeed, the Philippines has gone beyond the Asian average on the gender indicator (Alvarez, 2013, p. 67). Notwithstanding this, Filipino women continue to face great challenges as men still dominate governance and decision-making in the country. Overall, the ratio of top posts held in government is 2:1 in favour of men (Civil Service Commission, 2011).

The greatest gains in gender equity have been among credit cooperatives and microfinance institutions (MFIs). The majority of the members of the National Confederation of Cooperatives (NATCCO), the country's largest cooperative, are women. MFIs have a higher proportion of women (over 95%) as member-clients. Women's participation in savings and credit cooperatives as well as in microfinance is widely acknowledged as a major success factor of credit programmes for the poor.

The National Strategy for Microfinance

In 1997, the Government laid the foundations for its microfinance policy known as the "National Strategy for Microfinance" with the following principles: (a) an enabling policy environment that induces increased participation of the private sector in microfinance; (b) market-oriented financial and credit policies; (c) non-participation of government line agencies in the implementation of credit/ guarantee programmes; and (d) a greater role for the private sector/MFIs in the provision of financial services.

Policy impact

The Philippine microfinance industry has grown over the years across key indicators

(i.e. outreach, loans and savings). Microfinance has become the domain of development NGOs while the outreach of cooperatives remains relatively small. Internationally, the country's microfinance industry was declared by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) as the best in implementing microfinance programmes to *reduce poverty* during the International Year of Microcredit 2005, a special event of the United Nations held in New York City (Micu, 2010). More recently, Global Microscope 2014 ranked the Philippines among the three countries worldwide (along with Peru and Colombia) with the most conducive environments for financial inclusion. (EIU, 2014).

Although most of the MFIs in the Philippines have abandoned the group lending approach and are currently using the individual lending approach, anecdotal evidence provided by an ILO study indicates that large MFIs are reinventing the group lending approach in partnership with farmers' cooperatives with the view to strengthening the local commodity supply chain (Quiñones, 2015). Such a partnership between MFI and cooperative exemplifies a more sustainable SSE solution in contrast to the market-oriented competition prevalent in the country's microfinance industry.¹⁸

The Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Programme (4Ps) – Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT), 2008

The Pantawid Pamilya Programme (4Ps or Pantawid Pamilya) or Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programme is considered the Government's flagship anti-poverty programme. It is modelled on the conditional cash transfer system of Brazil and Mexico. Implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the objectives of Pantawid Pamilya are to provide assistance to the poor to alleviate their immediate needs and to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty through investments in human capital (i.e. education, health and nutrition). Cash incentives are given to poor households on the condition that parents regularly bring their children to preventive health check-ups and enrol them in school. Pregnant beneficiaries are required to seek pre- and post-natal care, and should be attended by a health professional when giving birth.

A strategic measure by the DSWD that contributed to accelerating the outreach programme is the PPP involving the DSWD, the local government units (LGUs) and CSOs (i.e. people's organizations, cooperatives and development NGOs). The objectives of the PPP are to: 1) promote cooperation between the government and the CSOs; 2) assist the DSWD in the implementation and monitoring of government anti-poverty programmes; and 3) institutionalize mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability in the delivery of basic social services to the poor.

In September 2011, 61 accredited CSOs signed the "CSOs and Volunteers Statement of Commitment to the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program" (http://pantawid.dswd.gov.ph/ images/csostatement.pdf). In this statement, the participating CSOs commit to undertaking the following actions in support of the 4Ps: a) enlist volunteers from their own organizations to assist in the implementation or monitoring of the programme; b) participate in Community Assemblies as part of the beneficiary identification process; c) an on-the-ground audit of the Compliance Verification System; d) assist in the Beneficiary Updating System; e) assist in the implementation of the Grievance Redress System;

f) enhance and implement the Family Development Session modules; g) participate in advisory committees at the municipal/city, provincial, regional and national levels; and h) initiate the formation of an oversight structure and undertake measures to sustain the gains of the programme.

Policy impact

As of June 2013, the programme had 3.93 million registered household beneficiaries. The programme was carried out in all 17 regions, covering 1,484 municipalities and 143 major cities in 79 provinces (Liao, 2013). A recent World Bank report indicated that the 4Ps was on track to meet the goals of keeping children healthy and in school, citing that poor households under the programme spent 38% more on education per capita and 34% more on medical expenses per capita than their non-*Pantawid* counterparts (Tupaz, 2013).

Although Pantawid Pamilya is aimed at the delivery of basic services to the poor, the participation of CSOs with a proven track record in community organizing and in supporting community-driven projects often leads to communal unity and cooperation (commonly called "Bayanihan" in the Filipino language) in undertaking community-based enterprises, thus advancing the SSE. The case of the villagers of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, can be cited as an example of an SSE initiative arising from Pantawid Pamilya interventions. The villagers joined forces to build houses for 20 Pantawid Pamilya households who were identified to be most in need of safer homes. Representatives from LGUs, CSOs and the Pantawid Pamilya beneficiaries themselves shared their resources and technical expertise in building the houses. The DSWD cites this "Pabahay" (housing) project as a big collaboration of minds and resources by the community (DSWD, 2015).

The Kapit Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services (KALAHI-CIDSS) Programme

Another programme designed and implemented by the DSWD is KALAHI-CIDSS. It is a focused, accelerated, convergent and expanded strategic poverty reduction programme that aims to build the capacity of local communities to design and implement their own poverty reduction projects and to enhance their participation in local governance. Under the programme, the Barangay Development Councils of participating communities prepare their respective village development plans to be submitted to the Municipal Inter-Barangay Forum (MIBF) for review and prioritization for programme funding. Participating communities are enjoined to work hard on their proposals and to aim for excellence because only those development plans that meet the programme criteria and standards get funding support (DSWD, 2014).

As per the report of the Asian Development Bank, the first phase of KALAHI-CIDSS (KC-1) was implemented from 2003 to 2010 at a cost of US\$ 182 million, 54% of which was funded through a World Bank loan. The rest was sourced from beneficiary communities, participating local governments and the DSWD. KC-1 was implemented in the country's 42 poorest provinces, representing over 50% of all provinces in the Philippines. In early 2011, the programme was extended to cover 48 provinces, i.e. the original 42 plus six additional provinces. The extended programme labelled as "KC-1/Ext" has received funding from the World Bank and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a donor from the United States (ADB, 2012).

Policy impact

An assessment by the ADB of the KALAHI-CIDSS interventions (see details in Annex 1) concludes that KALAHI-CIDSS is an effective and well-managed project, with positive effects on several dimensions of poverty. Communities recognize the significant contribution of volunteers to the programme.

From a different perspective, the KALAHI-CIDSS community-driven development approach strengthens solidarity and cooperation among community residents in identifying, formulating, and implementing community-based projects and enterprises, thereby boosting the development of the SSE at the village and municipal levels.

The Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991

The Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 decentralized the implementation of government development programmes that were hitherto concentrated at and controlled by national government line agencies. The LGC devolves authority, assets and personnel from various national government agencies to LGUs to provide primary responsibility for basic services and facilities. It has specific provisions establishing the role of people power at the local level, the process of accreditation of people's organizations and NGOs at the local level, and a minimum level of representation (one quarter) from civil society or the private sector on special bodies at the local level.

It further provides for the participation of CSOs in local government planning and policy-making and in the delivery of social services. The LGC mandates the formation of Barangay (village) Development Councils, which play a lead role in local planning, and it also provides for the formation of other local special bodies, including the local health and school boards, all of which must also have CSO members. Several administrative orders of the central government, implementing the constitutional provisions and the LGC regarding public participation, require that all local councils at all levels should be represented by various NGOs and people's organizations such as farmers' cooperatives and fishers' associations (Co, 2012). To bolster both the developmental and supervisory role of LGUs, President Fidel Ramos issued Executive Order No. 96 in 1993 specifying the functions of LGUs with respect to the promotion, organization, development and supervision of cooperatives.¹⁹

Policy impact

The LGC has paved the way for LGUs to engage in active collaboration with cooperatives and CSOs at the local level through poverty alleviation programmes such as the 4Ps/CCT, KALAHI-CIDSS, the capacity building of cooperatives and people's organizations, the promotion of microfinance services, and the implementation of PPPs with CSOs.

In effect, the LGC has empowered LGUs to advance the SSE in local communities through the strengthening of cooperatives. In most cases, however, LGUs underestimate and have poor appreciation for the cooperatives, partly because of past performance of cooperatives that was riddled with mismanagement, inefficiency and bankruptcy. A case study of 20 best practices for cooperative-LGU collaboration indicated, among other aspects, that: (1) cooperatives have a huge potential for unleashing the local economy. When appropriately engaged in local governance processes, cooperatives could push forward local economic development; and (2) cooperatives can be indefatigable partners and a sustainable mechanism for local development (Co, 2012).²⁰

The Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation Act of 1997

The Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation (SRPA) Act of 1997 created the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), a coordination and oversight body headed by the Philippine President to ensure that social reform addresses the basic inequities in Philippine society. The 28 members of the NAPC are divided equally into 14 representatives of national government departments and the presidents of local government leagues, and 14 basic CSO sector representatives are elected by and accountable to their respective assemblies, networks or councils.

Having supported and lobbied for the creation of the NAPC, the basic CSO sectors consider the NAPC as a mechanism for participatory governance. The NAPC has institutionalized basic CSO sector

representation at the highest level of governance, through which they learn to engage in policy-making within the government. Reciprocally, government representatives learn to engage in ongoing policy dialogue with CSOs especially on poverty alleviation matters.

Policy impact

An important result of institutionalized government—CSO engagement under the SRPA is the passage of laws and policies and the implementation of programmes that benefit the basic CSO sectors (see Annex Tables 4 and 5) other than those reviewed in the previous section. Laws that provide a favourable policy environment for SSE development include RA No. 09178 (An Act to Promote the Development of Barangay Micro Business Enterprises), RA No. 09481 (An Act Strengthening the Workers' Constitutional Right to Self-organization) and RA No. 09281 (An Act to Strengthen Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization in the Philippines).

The NAPC has not totally realized its full potential as the national coordinator of the country's poverty alleviation programme. The NAPC continues to face pressing challenges and institutional weaknesses that it needs to address. Fast leadership turnover has negatively affected its coordinating and monitoring roles. Politics has marred the selection process of basic CSO representatives to the NAPC such that broadness and inclusiveness in the selection process are not always ensured. In addition to lack of resources, the NAPC does not have the authority to oversee the allocation of resources for poverty reduction, nor is there a systemic mechanism for allocating resources to various development sectors strategically involved in poverty reduction.

Although poverty reduction is the overarching theme of the Medium-term Philippine Development Plan, poverty remains a concern of only those in the social welfare sectors. Worse, public policies are formulated without due consideration to their poverty effects (Aldaba and Sescon, 2010).

Part 3. CSo Contributions To Policy-Making

The diversity and broadness of CSO contributions to policymaking can only be fully grasped by recognizing laws that were promulgated even during the Marcos administration (see Annex Table 3) on the basis of CSO advocacies brought to bear at the international level during the Martial Law period (Serrano, 2009). These laws covered the areas of ecological conservation, economic sustainability, population and health.

During the post-Marcos era, more environmental, social and economic laws were formulated by the Philippine Government in response to CSO advocacy and political pressure (see Annex Tables 4 and 5). These laws do have far-reaching implications in advancing the SSE although they may not have been consciously designed by CSOs specifically to stimulate the development

of the SSE in the Philippines. Notably, those laws that seek to improve environmental quality are consistent with the SSE aspiration of an ecologically balanced society. There are also social legislations that advance SSE values of protecting the human and development rights of economic stakeholders; these are exemplified by laws that aim to enhance the productive capacities of the poor, economically disadvantaged and the socially excluded, and to protect their economic gains. Furthermore, there are policies that enable the SSE to move closer towards its goal of sustainable communities, such as the economic policies that strengthen the capacity of ordinary people to self-organize, enable them to have access to resources required for development, and ensure the sustainability of solidarity-based community enterprises.

Part 4. Key Challenges

This section is devoted to an analysis of some key issues that could influence the direction and strength of relationships between the State and its regulatory function and the CSOs, and the survival of their SSE initiatives. These issues are state capacity, participation, autonomy, policy coherence and institutionalization.

State capacity

The People's Power Revolution of 1986 put a stop to the repressive regime of Marcos and to the impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations. It also enshrined the partnership between the State and CSOs as an important foundation of a new democratic Philippine society. The administration of President Corazon Aquino struggled to showcase a model of State-CSO partnership that aspires to a more participatory and socially responsible system of governance. While the State-CSO partnership cannot be said to have reached a certain level of maturity and stability, it has laid the foundation for a State-CSO dialogue and cooperation that has produced a number of laws and regulations beneficial to the basic CSO sector and to the development of the SSE in the country.²²

The question is: will the State-CSO partnership Philippine style continue to prosper in the coming years and become firmly established? The likely scenario is an uncertain future, considering that the successors of Corazon Aquino have made use of the State-CSO partnership model to gain power and to hold on to it for as long as possible. The biggest challenge to the democratic elements of Philippine society and supporters of the State-CSO partnership is how to overcome the threat posed by political dynasties (i.e. families whose members hold key positions in the government, whether national or local), at the same time and/or in succession, who could marginalize the role of CSOs in public governance as they (political dynasties) gain greater control of the State.

Participation

During the Marcos era of political suppression, domestic NGOs continued to exert their influence on public policies through sympathetic international organizations and forums with which they were associated. For example, the 1972 Stockholm Conference inspired the environmental legislations of the Marcos regime. These legislations were obviously a response not only to mounting scientific evidence of environmental decay but also to a growing environmental movement (Serrano, 2009).

The EDSA I and EDSA II People Power Revolutions demonstrated the capability of ordinary citizens to change the Government with the organized support of a strategic collaboration between CSOs, the Church, and patriotic elements of the private corporate sector. CSOs, particularly the faith-based organizations led by the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), provided the main force that carried through the 1986 People's Power Revolution. The CBCP issued strong pastoral statements against the dictatorship of the late Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, leading to the 1986 People Power Revolution that installed Corazon Cojuangco-Aquino as president of the Philippine revolutionary government from February 1986 to June 1992. The CBCP and CSOs played prominent roles in the second People Power Revolution that removed Joseph Ejercito Estrada to be replaced by Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in 2001, as well as in the transition to the present administration of President Benigno Aquino III.

The People Power Revolution changed the political landscape in the country. The active participation of faith-based organizations and CSOs in national elections laid the foundation for partnership building between CSOs and the State in the formulation of public policies favouring the active participation of CSOs in national governance. Not a few of the hitherto social activists and CSO leaders who were once at odds with the State have been appointed

to Cabinet posts and/or elected into the legislative assembly of the post-Martial Law governments. With their integration into national governance, CSOs have gained greater access to and influence on policy-making. (See Annex 2 for an expanded view of the favourable policy environment for CSOs in the post-Marcos era.)

Autonomy

The alliance between CSOs and the State has been premised on a principled stand in favour of poverty reduction, anti-corruption and sustainable development. As such, the State has to contend with constant pressure from CSOs to orient and strengthen public policies and programmes focusing on such priorities.²³ The CSO–State alliance has fared well or badly according to the political will and material resources devoted by the State in implementing such policy priorities.

However, the country's political landscape is more complicated in reality than what it appears on the surface. There exists a CSO–State alliance forged by the political party in power that pits itself against social democratic CSOs and other CSO–politician alliances wielded by opposition parties (Reid, 2010). As government administration changed hands from one political party to another in the post-Martial Law era, CSOs made their own choices on which political party to side with and support.²⁴

Considering the alliances built between the political parties and CSOs whose actions tend to substitute the State, Serrano posed the question whether Philippine CSOs have contributed to the privatization of government and become instruments of the neoliberal ideal of "less state and more markets". Attempting a more realistic view of CSOs, Serrano cautioned that CSOs are not the saint some of us paint them to be, but that in fact they are less civil than civic at times and not entirely free from bad practices, even moral pollution. Still, and all things considered, he concurs with CIVICUS that CSOs probably are one of humanity's best hopes for building healthy civil societies in a fast globalizing world (Serrano, 2009).

Policy coherence

As shown in Part 2, the more CSO-friendly policy environment provided by the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines defined and institutionalized people's participation and empowerment, the important role of CSOs in nation and democracy building, and the advancement of the SSE in particular. These constitutional provisions have survived the rotation of ruling parties throughout the post-Martial Law era. Specific laws and regulations reviewed in Part 2 are consistent and coherent with these constitutional provisions. They have been put in place to instruct and equip the State machinery in carrying out the broader policy direction.

Notwithstanding this, one cannot overemphasize the point raised earlier that public policies in general are formulated without due consideration to their poverty effects, and despite the fact that poverty reduction is the overarching theme of the Mediumterm Philippine Development Plan. Poverty remains a concern of only those in the social welfare sector. This quandary reflects the overriding tension between the Government's pro-poor policies and the people empowerment policies espoused by CSOs on the one hand, and the market-oriented policies advanced by the "Wall Street boys" on the other.²⁵

Institutionalization

Having gone through almost 30 years of partnership with the Government on public governance, Philippine CSOs are widely seen today as some of the most vibrant and advanced in the world (ADB, 2013). The establishment of CODE-NGO and its efforts to raise the standards of CSO performance in the country do contribute to the institutionalization of the CSO role in nation building.²⁶

The strategy of developing individual CSO institutional capacities is undoubtedly important, but if it is done at the expense of a collective effort of working out together the development of the SSE as an alternative development model, the net effect would be a CSO sector deprived

of the experience and expertise in designing and implementing large-scale development projects. This strategy may have also unwittingly encouraged the formation of small, if not micro, NGOs with small annual project budgetary outlays. As a result, CSO participation is almost nil in the area of bidding for and carrying out large-scale government development projects that are packaged and funded through PPP build-

operate-transfer arrangements. Strengthening the collective capacity of the CSO sector to access and participate in PPP projects will not only improve the image of CSOs as long-term development partners. It will also lessen CSO dependence on international donor grants, the competition for which at the national and international levels has intensified as official development assistance has dwindled over the years.

Part 5. Conclusion

A striking statement from a policy study is worth recalling here: "If the appropriate institutions cannot be funded or if they cannot operate freely the poor will generally be served best by no aid at all. Only when the fixation on the quantity of aid disappears can the quality of aid begin to improve." (Hellinger et al., 1988)

This statement might well be called the "paradox of development aid". This development paradox seems to aptly describe the social dilemma in the country. The situation of the CSO–State partnership in the Philippines today is best described in the words of a leading Filipino CSO leader as a "paralysing social stalemate" (Serrano, 2009). While both the social mission oriented CSO–State partnership and the market-oriented private corporate–State partnership are taking strategic – but often independent and noninclusive – steps to lift the country out of the doldrums, neither of these initiatives could lead to greater social cohesion, eradication of poverty, closing the rich-poor divide and saving the environment.

In such a situation, we might find hope in the agenda of the SSE as a collective project of all sectors of society. A collective initiative in transitioning to the SSE could provide a way out of the paralysing social stalemate. This collective initiative could be the subject of dialogue between the State, the private corporate sector and the basic CSO sectors in such

gatherings as the Philippine Solidarity Economy Forum (PSEF).

Since its inception in 2012, the PSEF has focused inter-sectoral dialogue on the development of value chains of solidarity-based community enterprises operated by cooperatives, people's organizations, community associations or NGOs. The PSEF features existing examples of solidaritybased community enterprises where substantive contributions of people's organizations, government agencies, private companies and NGOs to value chain development are accounted for. One of the results of the PSEF-inspired SSE dialogue is the adoption of a "Call for One Strong Cooperative Movement" (see Annex 3) by the National Convergence of Billionaire and Top Millionaire Cooperatives, held in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, on June 17 2014, which states, among other things: "We will promote and advance the Social Solidarity Economy through cooperativism which is the preferred economic model, where the people and the environment are the priorities rather than business and profit and thereby debunk gross inequities to have inclusive growth, and never exclusive".

More work needs to be done in order to enjoin the other 13 CSO sectors to adopt a similar declaration proclaiming the SSE as the CSO's preferred economic model.

End notes

- ¹ The term "solidarity" is synonymous with *Bayanihan* in Filipino. *Bayanihan* denotes solidarity among members of a group of people in a common, collective action. It portrays oneness of purpose, moments of togetherness, caring and sharing, and the synergy of working together. It represents a "shared responsibilities" approach to building inclusive and sustainable communities (Quiñones, 2013). This perspective is quite similar to that in Korea where the SSE is construed as human economic activity carried out in the spirit of mutual caring, sharing, the principle of reciprocity and redistribution of economic means (Ki, 2009).
- ² The CSO sector includes self-help groups and cooperatives; neighbourhood associations and community organizations; religious and spiritual societies; professional associations; business foundations; local philanthropies; private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and NGOs; and a wide variety of organizations of workers, farmers, fishers, indigenous people, urban poor, elderly citizens, disabled people, media workers, religious and church people, men, women, young people, children, and students. The list covers a larger scope than the major groups identified in the Agenda 21 (UN Conference on Environment and Development, 1992).
- ³ Under Presidential Decree No. 442 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, the DOLE is mandated to process applications for registration of labour organizations in order for them to acquire legal personality and to enjoy the rights given to legitimate labour organizations. Union registration refers to the process of determining whether the application for registration of a labour union organized for collective bargaining complies with the documentary requirements prescribed under Rule 3 and 4 of DOLE Department Order No. 40-03 and the rules implementing Book V of the Labor Code, as amended.
- ⁴ Many development NGOs are also involved in tackling climate change. They undertake disaster relief and rehabilitation work to help disadvantaged groups of people recover from the damage to crops and properties caused by the typhoons and natural calamities that frequently visit the country. As intermediary organizations, the services of development NGOs are paid for not by the poor beneficiaries but through development programmes funded by government agencies and/or international organizations. From this angle, development NGOs are sometimes viewed as organizations that hand out charitable contributions of goods (e.g. free livestock, meal packages, clothes and blankets, and so on) and services (e.g. free medical and dental treatment, feeding programmes, skills training, and so on). However, development NGOs go beyond the act of doling out charitable contributions. While they often participate in distributing relief goods in times of calamity, development NGOs gear a good part of their services towards enabling the poor, disadvantaged and socially excluded to gain access to productive resources (e.g. technology, finance, technical and management skills, market outlets, and so on) that empower them (the poor, disadvantaged and socially excluded) to help themselves.
- ⁵The social enterprise development strategy aligns with the ILO's position on social enterprises as a component of the social economy that provides a solid foundation for promoting decent work and the interests of the weakest stakeholders in society who otherwise would have been at risk of being excluded from mainstream economic life (Fonteneau et.al., p. 89).
- ⁶ Micro-enterprises have one to nine employees. Small enterprises are defined as having 10 to 99 employees; medium as having 100 to 199 employees; and large as having over 200 employees (source: the National Statistics Office and Small and Medium Enterprise Development Council Resolution No. 1, Series 2003).

- ⁷ The National Network of Informal Workers, also known as Homenet Philippines, estimates that there are 7 to 9 million homebased workers in the Philippines doing both piece-rated and own-account work in rural and urban areas. See http://www.homenetseasia.org/philippines/about intro.html.
- 8 Three sections of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, quoted below, define and institutionalize people's participation, empowerment and the important role of CSOs in nation and democracy building. Article II, Section 23: "The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sector organizations that promote the welfare of the nation." Article XIII, Section 15: "The State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means. [...]" And Article XIII, Section 16: "The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms."
- ⁹ A component of the Marcos regime's cooperative development programme that survives to this day is the establishment of electric cooperatives for the implementation of the rural electrification programme. Unlike the agricultural cooperatives that were used as conduits for the government's subsidized credit programme, electric cooperatives were not as politicized.
- ¹⁰ From a high of 63,181 in 2003, the number of cooperatives decreased sharply to 23,672 in 2013, a 63% decline over a period of 10 years, as inactive cooperatives were deregistered or merged with the more active cooperatives. Meanwhile, the members of cooperatives increased by 4.5 times from 2.8 million in 2003 to 12.7 million in 2013. Likewise, the number of persons employed by cooperatives increased threefold from 89,992 in 2003 (includes 18,796 part time workers) to 259,567 in 2013. Total assets of cooperatives also increased 3.5 times from 76.1 billion Philippines pesos (PHP) in 2003 to PHP 267 billion in 2013 (CDA, 2014).

- ¹¹ The four cooperative party-lists are the Adhikaing Tinataguyod ang Kooperatiba (ATING-Koop) Party-list, the Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC) Party-list, the Butil Party-list, and the COOP-NATTCO Party-list. These cooperative party-lists recognize the importance of cooperative participation in the formulation of laws and government policies that would promote cooperative growth and development.
- ¹² Sibal (1998) cited examples of the difficulties faced by cooperatives in the liberalized environment. Electric cooperatives were up against private electric utility distributors which were eyeing joint ventures with or buy-ins of electric coops. Cooperative banks could hardly cope with the trend of consolidation and mergers in the banking industry in response to Central Bank regulations for increased capitalization and more prudence in lending to achieve greater financial stability and resilience. Consumer cooperatives which catered mostly to university students could hardly compete with, and subsequently lost their clients to, franchise operators like Jollibee, Chowking, McDonalds, and so on, whose centralized supply chain management system enabled them to mass produce fast food at lower prices. Agri-based cooperatives, particularly those in the agrarian reform communities and in plantations, could hardly preserve the gains under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law beset as they were by problems of mismanagement and lack of professional and technical expertise.
- ¹³ Under the PPP, a 20,000 nuts per day capacity coconut processing plant is currently being established by the SJPCC to produce Virgin Coconut Oil (VCO) for export to Japan. The machinery and equipment required for establishing the VCO plant are donated by the PCA, but the ownership of the VCO plant will eventually be transferred to the cooperative. To overcome its lack of professional and technical expertise in running and managing a VCO plant, the SJCPPC entered into a management agreement with the consortium of professional helping non-governmental organizations composed of the Asian Solidarity Economy Council (ASEC), the Kasama Ka Organik Kooperatib (KKOK), the Life Learning Organization of Peace (LLOoP), and the University of the Philippines at Los Baños-Prelude Alumni Volunteers Association (UPLB-PAV). Under

the agreement, the consortium of professional organizations will be responsible for hiring and engaging a Professional Management Team (PMT) that will operate the processing plant and manage the horizontally and vertically integrated supply chain of the project. The PMT will also oversee the research and development on multicropping in the coconut farms and the production of VCO byproducts (to include coconut water, coconut vinegar and coco sugar). The PCA has acknowledged the PPP model of the SJPPC as a promising template that can be emulated by coco-hub projects in the country.

¹⁴ Government representatives are heads of the following Departments: Labor and Employment (DOLE); National Economic Development Authority (NEDA); Social Welfare and Development (DSWD); Agriculture (DA); Education, Culture and Sports (DECS); Health (DOH); Foreign Affairs (DFA); Interior and Local Government (DILG); Trade and Industry (DTI); and Budget and Management (DBM). On the other hand, the ten members from the NGOs represent the following sectors: Labour; Business and Industry; Science and Health; Education and Academe; Urban Poor; Indigenous Peoples; Peasants and Fisher Folks, Elderly and Disabled; Media and Arts; Youth; and a representative of the National Council of Women in the Philippines. Qualifications for NGO nominees have been set by the Philippine Commission on Women as follows: (1) Nominees should be recognized champions of women's issues and concerns in the following sectors: labour, business and industry, science and health, education and academe, urban poor, indigenous peoples, peasants and fisher folks, elderly and disabled, media and arts, culture, and youth; and (2) Moreover, they should be active officers/members/advisers of reputable NGOs or networks working on the sector for which they are being nominated to represent and can help implement RA No. 9710 (Magna Carta of Women), the Women's Empowerment and Development Toward Gender Equality Plan for 2013-2016, and other frameworks on gender and development (GAD).

¹⁵ In the aftermath of the People Power Revolution, the Philippines has had two presidents who were women. The top posts in several departments under the administration of Benigno Aquino III are held by women (e.g. Department of Justice, Department of Labor and Employment, Department of Health, Department of Social Welfare and Development, Commission on Higher Education, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Mindanao Development Authority, Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, Securities and Exchange Commission, Commission on Human Rights, National Commission on Muslim Filipinos, Climate Change Commission, Commission on Filipinos Overseas, and others). The leading presidential candidate in the 2016 national elections is a woman, and there are several women-nominees for the post of vice-president. More women are also running for a post in the Congress of Senate.

¹⁶ The number of active microfinance borrowers more than doubled in six years from 1,508 million at the end of 2005 to 3.6 million at the end of 2011. Total microfinance loans outstanding grew almost threefold from PHP 3,478 million in 2005 to PPH 20,605 million in 2011. Savings deposits of microfinance clients also heftily increased from PHP 2,715 million in 2005 to PHP 9,225 million in 2011.

¹⁷ Development NGOs accounted for 68.8% of the total number of microfinance borrowers in 2011, banks had 28.7%, and cooperatives 2.5%. The corresponding shares in microfinance outstanding loans were: NGOs – 61.6%; Banks – 35.0%; and Cooperatives – 3.4%. On savings deposits, the corresponding shares were 54.2%, 42.2% and 3.6% (Habaradas and Umali, 2013).

¹⁸ Market-oriented competition has resulted, in many cases, in multiple loan exposure of the same clientele base and increasing indebtedness. An empirical investigation based on data from 362 MFls in 73 countries (including Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Middle East and North Africa) for the period 1995–2009 revealed that competition is growing in the microfinance market worldwide. Moreover, the empirical results showed that competition is negatively related to outreach, it is associated with rising default rates and with declining efficiency and deteriorating financial performance (Assefa et al., 2010).

¹⁹ The functions of LGUs specified in Executive Order No. 96 of 1993 with respect to cooperatives are as follows: (a) Appoint the local cooperative development officer; (b) Assist in the promotion and organization of cooperatives within their areas of jurisdiction with the assistance of other established cooperatives; (c) Assist the CDA's Cooperative Development Specialist in the evaluation of any proposed cooperative's economic survey, and requirements for registration, and recommend its registration or non-registration; (d) Assist in the following regulatory powers of the CDA: (1) Collection of annual reports and audited financial statements of cooperatives; (2) Mediation and conciliation of disputes between members of a local cooperative; (3) Conduct preliminary investigation for violation of any provision of the Cooperative Code; (4) Monitor the compliance of cooperatives with the CDA rules, regulations, and other issuances; and (e) Initiate and implement a cooperative promotion and development programme.

²⁰ Three important issues impinge on CSOgovernment collaboration in community development according to the Philippine Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness held in July 2010 in Metro Manila. (Crescini-Tablang, 2010). These are: 1) CSOs filling in the gap of government in providing social services: participants found it significant that CSOs perform to an extent some government functions. They clarified the need to distinguish clearly the primary role of government and of the CSOs in service delivery provision; 2) CSO legitimacy: participants recognized that CSOs cannot just assert their legitimacy based on the recognition of members and constituencies. Achieving legitimacy means going to the government regulatory bodies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the DSWD and the Philippine Council for Accreditation, but the accreditation process is stringent and small CSOs find it difficult to comply; and 3) Maximizing spaces within government processes for CSO development effectiveness and CSO sustainability: participants noted that various mechanisms or ways exist by which CSOs operationalize their principles and guidelines - e.g. giving value to and placing emphasis on solid organization as a means towards building self-reliance, networking and partnerships

with government bodies, and doing both. The bottom line, participants agreed, is the CSOs' tight grasp of their development principles.

²¹ The 14 marginalized sectors are: farmers and landless rural workers, artisanal fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities/indigenous people, workers in the informal sector, workers in formal labour and migrant workers, women, youth and students, persons with disabilities, victims of disasters and calamities, senior citizens, non-government organizations, children, and cooperatives.

²² For many years, market-oriented policies have boosted the role of the market as the prime regulator of economic activity and sought to limit the intervention of the state in economic life to a minimum (Bello, 2009). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) are the key institutions that put these policies to work in developing countries. Such policies brought about loss of export incomes and jobs; reduced revenues and capacities of states to deliver social services; reduced social services (healthcare, education and eldercare); increased income inequality; loss of worker protection (informalization of labour, lower wages and benefits, and lower rates of unionization); environmental degradation; and increased frustration and insecurity (Garrett-Peltier and Scharber, 2008). It is thus no wonder that suppression of human rights often accompanies the enforcement of market-oriented economies policies in developing countries, as was the case in the Philippines. Nonetheless, CSOs have developed the capacity to provide ordinary citizens an alternative space to advance the agenda of inclusive and sustainable development. The government administrations in the post-Marcos era have come to realize this potential, and they have embraced CSOs as legitimate development partners. Such partnership has somewhat strengthened the State capacity to design and implement policies conducive to the development of the SSE.

²³ CSOs abandoned their support for President Joseph Estrada when mounting evidences of his malversation of public funds were brought to light. Likewise, CSO support for President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo dwindled and turned against was laid bare. While respecting their alliance with the ruling party, the "democratic left" within CSOs carefully guard their independence and are not shy to show their disagreement with the President over sensitive issues. For example, on 11 March 2015, Lawmaker Walden Bello resigned from his post as AKBAYAN Party-list representative and declared his withdrawal of support from President Benigno Aquino III. He said he could no longer support a President "engaged in a brazen cover up of his role in the Mamasapano tragedy" (see Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 11 2015: "Bello resigns as Akbayan representative, calls Aquino disgraceful". Available at: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/678184/bello-resignsas-akbayan-representative-calls-aquino-disgraceful). Another example is the political rally staged by activist CSOs during the final State of the Nation Address (SONA) of President Benigno Aquino III.

her when her complicity in the 2004 electoral fraud

²⁴ The party in power brought with it the CSO network to be its partner in public governance and the CSOs were given the reins of government agencies dealing with social welfare and people empowerment issues. Some policies resulting from such partnership tilted in not a few occasions in favour of the sector represented by the partner CSOs. Such mutually beneficial reciprocity has tended to constrain criticism of State policies and performance from the partner CSO. However, social activist CSOs and CSOs allied with opposition parties weigh in and raise unconstrained calls on the government to account for its performance.

They burned an effigy of the President symbolizing

their discontent for him.

²⁵ Policy coherence is less felt as one proceeds from policy formulation to policy implementation and coordination. The case of the NAPC illustrates this point. Whereas the NAPC is enshrined in policy as the manager and chief coordinator of the government's poverty reduction programme, it lacks resources to carry out effectively its functions. As stressed earlier on, the NAPC does not have the authority to oversee the allocation of resources for poverty reduction, nor is there a systemic mechanism for allocating resources to various development sectors strategically involved in poverty reduction.

²⁶ Among the CODE-NGO members is PRRM, one of the more mature development CSOs in the Philippines that has existed for over 60 years, and about which Serrano wrote: "[PRRM] roots trace back to what Korten [1990] described as a legendary development movement organized by Dr Y. C. James Yen first in the European warfront in 1916-1918 and then later in China. Founded in 1952, PRRM is a civic movement that envisions a society of equity and sustainability. The long future is one where ignorance, poverty, disease, and powerlessness shall have been eradicated and development takes place within the carrying capacity of the environment. PRRM's basic strategy addresses the interlocking problems of poverty, environmental degradation, and social conflicts rooted in what it considers a flawed development model. Like many other CSOs, PRRM is rooted in local action around very specific issues concerning social and environmental justice. Its core field programme, called Sustainable Rural District Development Programme (SRDDP), seeks to affect through a coalition of efforts some structural change at a certain scale of sustainability at the sub-national level. The central element of this programme is community empowerment, a long and complex process designed to bring about the eventual shift of power to the people and their communities. At every step, this process translates into increasing the capacity of communities and local authorities for self-governance and communitybased management of resources. The hope is to be able to install a mode of governance that is accountable to the citizens, can bring about eradication of poverty on site, and improve the

The SRDDP is a concrete example of an NGO programme that promotes the development of the SSE at the district level. Latter day CSOs have tried to replicate the SRDDP in their own target areas, but funding and institutional capacity constraints often frustrate efforts to sustain the initiative. CODE-NGO apparently has not taken decisive steps to forge unity and cooperation among CSOs in the country as far as replicating the SRDDP in a big way is concerned. CODE-NGO is focusing its resources more on upgrading the standards of performance of individual CSOs.

living and natural environments." (Serrano, 2009)

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Appendix 1. Salient results of the KALAHI-CIDSS interventions (ADB, 2012, p. vii-xi)

On community participation

- Village assemblies provide a means for citizen participation in planning and budgeting, but the time and effort spent can be costly.
- The Municipal Inter-Barangay (inter-village) Forum (MIBF) is an effective mechanism for subproject selection and the allocation of development resources.
- Women are actively involved in the implementation of KALAHI-CIDSS and actually may be more active than the men.
- Communities recognize the significant contributions of community volunteers. They are valued for their honesty, commitment to serve the community, good moral values, and facilitation skills. Community volunteers are perceived as a new type of community leader for whom residents have different expectations.

On the utility and sustainability of subprojects

- Most residents consider their community subprojects to be useful, especially in terms of transportation and access to goods and services, and have positive effects on household income.
- Residents support their subprojects in various ways, including provision of voluntary labour, cash contributions, in-kind contributions, strong patronage of common service facilities, and compliance with subproject policies.
- Residents consider the construction of subproject infrastructure to be of high quality.

On transparency and accountability at the village level

- Residents believe that KALAHI-CIDSS is relatively free of corruption.
- Residents think that village officials are honest in handling villages' financial resources, a belief that contrasts with the popular view that village officials ae corrupt. This belief may be due to the extensive experience gained as a result of the financial transparency and accountability that KALAHI-CIDSS encourages.
- Residents believe that their officials involve them in decision-making and disclose financial information to residents.

Institutional impacts at the village level

- KALAHI-CIDSS has facilitated the expansion of Barangay Development Councils, which are responsible for preparation of the village development plans, to include citizen representatives.
- KALAHI-CIDSS interventions have institutionalized participatory planning processes and have resulted in development plans that community members know and understand.

Institutional impacts at the municipal level

- All three municipal governments that were part of the assessment, Barotac Viejo, Mulanay and Talaingod, reported improvements in their planning processes and the resulting development plans.
- Of the three assessment municipalities, Talaingod has crafted the most progressive legislation to institutionalize community-driven development principles and practices.
- All three assessment municipalities are trying to increase tax revenues and, at the same time, are seeking funds from national agencies and legislators.

Appendix 2. Favourable policy environment for CSOs in the post- Marcos era

The favourable policy environment for CSOs during the administration of President Cory Aquino encouraged the international donor community to increase Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) for Philippine projects that featured public–CSO partnerships. As a result, the number of CSOs grew during this period. However, the massive inflow of donor funds also enticed politicians, businesspersons and bureaucrats to set up their own organizations in a bid to capture ODA funds for purposes of advancing their political careers or personal agendas. As a countervailing measure, ten of the largest NGO networks formed the Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO) in 1991 to promote professionalism as well as to expand the reach of CSOs and increase their effectiveness. In the same year, CODE-NGO established the Code of Conduct for Development NGOs. It was the first CSO coalition in Asia to adopt a code of conduct, and probably one of the first in the world.

President Fidel V. Ramos, a Protestant who served from 1992 to 1998, won the presidency by a slim margin. He therefore sought to expand his base of support among various sectors of society, and appointed some CSO leaders to his Cabinet. Among them were Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary, from the Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino), Ernesto Garilao (Department of Agrarian Reform, from the Philippine Business for Social Progress), Juan Flavier (Department of Health, from the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM) and the International Institute of Rural Development), and Jaime Galvez Tan (Department of Health, from the Health Futures Foundation and Rural Missionaries of the Philippines). President Ramos advanced the Social Reform Agenda to engage CSOs in national policy development processes. During this period, the influence of CODE-NGO on the development agenda of CSOs and on the government's development policy grew stronger.

Some of the CSOs campaigned for Joseph Estrada in 1998, and a few of their leaders were appointed to Cabinet positions, notably Horacio Morales (Department of Agrarian Reform, from PRRM) and Fernando Barican (Presidential Spokesperson, former leader of the activist organization Samahan ng Demokratikong Kabataan). However, many other CSOs soon became disenchanted with President Estrada over various issues, including cronyism, corruption, inept governance, poor economic performance and limitations on press freedom. Responding to the call of Cardinal Sin to stage a mass protest against corruption at the highest level of the government, a civilian uprising (EDSA II) led to the collapse of the government of Joseph Estrada in early 2001. The main CSO confederation, CODE-NGO, constituted itself as the secretariat of the People Power II coalition (Reid, 2010).

The involvement of CSOs in national governance was continued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who came to power in 2001 with strong civil society backing. Among the CSO leaders in the Arroyo Cabinet were Horacio Morales (Department of Agrarian Reform, from PRRM), Leonardo Montemayor (Department of Agriculture, from the Federation of Free Farmers), Corazon Soliman (Department of Social Welfare and Development, from CODE-NGO), Florencio Abad (Department of Education, anti-Martial Law activist and a human rights advocate, and worked as a trade unionist at the Federation of Free Workers) and Rigoberto Tiglao (Presidential Chief of Staff, Political Prisoner during Martial Law and co-founder of Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism), among others. Government–CSO relations, however, soured after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was accused in 2005 of electoral fraud in her victory in the May 2004 presidential election.

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Her declaration of a state of emergency in February 2006 amid strong opposition to her administration raised concerns about a threat to civil liberties.

In the May 2010 national elections, CSOs supported the anticorruption and antipoverty platform of Benigno Simeon "Noynoy" C. Aquino III who was subsequently elected president for the term 2010–2016. The administration of President Noynoy Aquino marked improvements in the openness of the government to CSOs based on constructive engagement – both as watchdogs to help ensure that government policies and guidelines are followed and as support groups helping to implement government projects and deliver public services. Included in his Cabinet are several CSO leaders and human rights activists who served in previous administrations, such as Corazon Soliman, Florencio Abad, Ronald Llamas (presidential adviser on political affairs, from the AKBAYAN Citizens Action Party) and Dr Jaime Aristotle Alip (presidential adviser on economic empowerment of the rural poor, from CARD, a microfinance institution), among others.

In response to CSO clamour for increased accountability and transparency in government, President Noynoy Aquino approved in 2011 the Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Plan 2012–2016 that includes a programme to help strengthen the Department of the Interior and local government partnership with CSOs. The government further decreed CSO participation in budget preparation, execution and audit by virtue of National Budget Memorandum No. 109 in 2011 issued by the Department of Budget and Management requiring six national government agencies and three government-owned and controlled corporations to partner with CSOs in undertaking a participatory process for the formulation of the national budget for 2012.

Appendix 3

PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, PALAWAN DECLARATION A Call for One Strong Cooperative Movement "CONVERGENCE OF BILLIONAIRE AND MILLIONAIRE COOPERATIVES" Puerto Princesa City June 17, 2014

With a firm collective intent to establish one strong cooperative movement in the country, we, the cooperative leaders attending the National Convergence of Billionaire and Top Millionaire Cooperatives, are sending forth from Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, a clarion call to the more than 23,600 cooperatives nation-wide with some 13 million members to debunk divisiveness, competition and apathy as such are fiction to the cooperatives whose strength lies on solidarity, cooperation and societal concern and whose identity relates to social justice, equity, sustainability and social transformation.

Knowing that social change has been elusive all these years despite 14 years of Martial Law and two people-powered revolutions; there may be "changing of the guards" but the structures that perpetuate poverty, social injustice and gross inequities are as formidable as ever, where poverty has become second skin to 50% of our people while a few elite, fronted by cartels, monopolies and conglomerates, tightens its stranglehold of the economy, where vested interest and corruption reign supreme despite the sincere effort for reform while the vast majority are left sharing the shrinking pie and are puzzled no end why 70% of the GDP in 2012 were pocketed by only 50 families;

Conscienticized on how business elite works closely with the political elite, shamelessly giving credence to the dictum that economic power begets political power and vice versa, preserving their gains and hold of the country's economy and wealth;

Conscious that the dominant development paradigm anchored on the neo-liberal capitalism, which is based on the individual pursuit for self aggrandizement and wealth, following the growth-at-all-cost strategy, where money is used to make more money instead of using it to enhance the well-being of the people and the environment, is not economically and ecologically sustainable, which is only successful in sacrificing the people and Mother Earth to the altar of greed and profit;

Fearful that in the absence of a major change, the global system will collapse in less than one hundred years as the earth's tipping point has been reached as manifested by the increasing warming of the earth, the rising of the seas, the extinction of species and ecological disasters becoming the new "normal";

Mindful of the International Co-operative Alliance's blueprint for a Cooperative Decade to address the "growing social unrest, economic stagnation, iniquities, resource depletion and the insecurity of the future generations in meeting their basic needs," it has become imperative for the Philippine cooperatives to participate in the strategic agenda that position the cooperatives as "builders of sustainability";

Realizing that for us to survive and succeed the Asian Economic Community by 2015 where there will be free flowing of products, services, capital, investments and skilled labour, we must now effect paradigm shift where the cooperatives harness their collective potentials, where the marginalized sectors are drawn into the mainstream of development processes and where the people have access and control over their resources and utilities and where wealth and power are democratized;

Today, we serve notice to one and all that we have awakened and that we will not allow anymore the culture of poverty, corruption, inequity and powerlessness to continue as we launch a collectivist counterculture through one strong cooperative movement.

We firmly commit to forge our oneness, to effect paradigm shifts, building among the thousands of cooperatives a strong alliance of an empowered people. With our highest adherence to the tenets of cooperativism and with utmost dedication, we now create a united front as a leading edge in social transformation to advance the following agenda:

- 1) We will promote and advance the agenda of **Social Solidarity Economy** through cooperativism which is the people's preferred economic model, where the people and the environment are the priorities rather than business and profit and thereby debunk gross inequities to have inclusive growth and never exclusive.
- 2) We will harness collective efforts to create a strong cooperative movement through integration and consolidation pursuing unrelenting efforts and unwavering campaign for amalgamation of services, programs and even organizational to optimize the strength in numbers and maximize benefits or economies of scale. To concretize this amalgamation, we are declaring PCC as the apex organization of cooperatives. We encourage NATCCO and MASS-SPECC, CLIMBS and CISP and all cooperative banks and federations to put this agenda in motion within one year and for CDA and PCC to jointly monitor the consolidation of these champions which will inspire all others to follow which will be the threshold of unification towards one cooperative movement.
- 3) We will work towards building strong support structures and mechanism be it on establishing liquidity, investment and stabilization fund or in cooperative insurance to strengthen our cooperatives.
- 4) We will enhance linkaging and networking, introducing state of the art technology and internet including e-trade.
- 5) We will be the coping mechanism to the challenges posted by AEC by promoting value-chain approach in cooperative system whereby the complementation of production, processing, marketing and financial cooperative systems are established in a dynamic system from exclusive to inclusive growth.
- 6) We will work on the standardization, connectivity and integration of technology run by the cooperative movement common brand for international competitiveness and research and development initiatives.
- 7) We will follow a code of ethics to scale up standards of good governance and cooperative operations.
- 8) We will integrate other services through establishment of joint ventures in: health, production, marketing.
- 9) We will integrate the asset/investment group of federations and utilize portion of the funds to advance a social solidarity economy.

Indeed, the road ahead will be long and tedious, the climb will be steep but we carry deep in our hearts a strong abiding faith that we will get there because the cooperatives are that beacon of light amidst the darkness of poverty as its DNA is members-owned, value-based and sustainable. Yes, where we are now is of no moment, where we are going is what is important.

It is the biblical faith found in Matthew 17:20 that, "If you have FAITH as small as a mustard seed, and if you tell a mountain to move from here to there, it will move."

Highly committed and inspired by that unwavering faith, we wholeheartedly hereunder affix our signatures this 17 day of June, 2014.

Annex Table 1. Performance of cooperatives in the Philippines, 2013				
Item	As of end of year 2013			
Total no. of registered cooperatives	23 672			
Total no. of members	12 676 828			
Total amount of assets	PHP 266.84m (US\$ 6.3m)			
Total turnover	PHP 437.61m (US\$ 10.31m) MM MM)			
Total no. of employees	259 527			
Contribution to national GDP (%)	4.87%			

Source: Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), 2014. Philippine peso amounts were converted into US dollars using Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas average annual exchange rate of US\$ 1.00 = PHP 42.45 in 2013.

Annex Table 2. Employment, unemployment and underemployment in the Philippines, 2008-2012						
Item	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
EMPLOYMENT						
Total employed persons ('000)	34 089	35 061	36 035	37 192	37 600	
% wage and salary workers	52.4	53.3	54.5	55.2	57.2	
% self-employed (% to total)	47.6	46.7	45.5	44.8	42.8	
Total self-employed persons ('000)	16 241	16 380	16 409	16 654	16 108	
% women	39.3	40.0	40.4	41.0	41.6	
UNEMPLOYMENT						
No. of unemployed ('000)	2 716	2 831	2 859	2 814	2 816	
Unemployment rate (%)	7.4	7.5	7.4	7.0	7.0	
UNEMPLOYMENT						
No. of underemployed ('000)	6 579	6 692	6 762	7 163	7 514	
Underemployment rate (%)	19.3	19.1	18.8	19.3	20.0	
No. of overseas Filipino workers (′000)	8 188	8 579	9 543	10 456	10 490	

Source of basic data: Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), 2013.

Annex Table 3. Key policies, legislations and programmes during the Marcos era **Presidential Title** Year enacted Decree (PD) **ENVIRONMENT, ECOLOGICAL CONSERVATION** Pollution Control Law - Provides guidelines for the prevention, PD 705 1976 abatement and control of pollution of water, air and land Philippine Environmental Code (First mention of concept of environmental impact system) - Provides guidelines on land PD 1151 1977 use, air quality, water quality, waste management and natural resources management. Vehicular Emissions Control Law - Prevention, control and PD 1181 1997 abatement of air pollution from motor vehicles **Coral Reefs Conservation** PD 1219 1977 Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System (EIS) -PD 1586 Mandates EIS for government and private sector projects affecting 1978 the quality of the environment Environmentally Critical Projects and Environmentally Critical PD 2146 1979 PD 600 Marine Pollution (1976 - as amended by PD 1698) 1980 **ECONOMIC SUSTAINABILITY** Fisheries Code revised and consolidated all laws and decrees PD 984 1975 affecting fishing and fisheries in the country PD 705 Forestry Code 1975 **POPULATION, HEALTH** PD 1067 Water Code 1976

Sources: a) Philippines Environment Monitor 2000, the World Bank, July 2000; b) Rio in Retrospect: The Philippines and Global Agenda 21 1992 – 1996, PCSD, 1997

1977

PD 856

Sanitation Code

Annex Table 4. Key policies, legislations and programmes in post-Marcos era, 1987-1999

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Executive Order (EO)/Republic Act (RA) No.	Title	Year enacted				
ENVIRONMENT, ECOLOGICAL CONSERVATION						
EO 192	Creation of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources	1987				
RA 7279	Urban Development and Housing Act	1992				
RA 6969	Toxic Substances, Hazardous and Nuclear Waste	1992				
RA 7586	National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS), which paved the way for the Philippine Strategy for Biodiversity Conservation in 1994	1992				
Phil. National Communication to UNFCCC	Ratification of Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC)	1993				
RA 7942	Mineral Exploration, Development and Conservation	1995				
	Comprehensive Air Pollution Control Policy (otherwise					
RA 8749 and Resolution No. 25	known as the Clean Air Act), based on Senate Resolution No. 25 dated 10 March 1993 ratifying the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer	1999				
EO 291	Improving the EIS System established in 1978	1996				
ECONOMIC SUSTA	INABILITY					
RA 6657	Comprehensive Agrarian Reform – Exempts lands devoted to reforestation, wildlife, etc. from land conversion	1987				
RA 7076	People's Small Scale Mining Program	1991				
RA 7648	Electric Power Crisis Act	1993				
EO 15	Creating the Philippine Council for Sustainable Development	1992				
RA 8048	Water Crisis Act	1995				
EO 247	Bioprospecting	1995				
EO 263	Community-based Forestry Management Strategy	1995				
RA 8435	Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization	1997				
RA 8371	Indigenous People's Rights Act	1997				
RA 8550	Fisheries Code	1998				
POPULATION, HEALTH						
RA 8172	Act for Salt Iodization Nationwide (ASIN)	1995				
POPCOM 6-year plan (1998-2003)	Setting the blueprint of the Philippine Population Management Program	1998				

Sources: a) Philippines Environment Monitor 2000, the World Bank, July 2000; b) Rio in Retrospect: The Philippines and Global Agenda 21 1992 –1996, PCSD, 1997

Annex Table 5. Key social legislations, 1999-2009					
Republic Act (RA) No.	Title	Year enacted			
CHILDREN AND WOMEN					
RA 8980	An Act promulgating a comprehensive policy and national system for early childhood care and development	2000			
RA 9208	An Act to institute policies to eliminate trafficking in persons especially women and children, establishing the necessary institutional mechanisms for the protection and support of trafficked persons, providing penalties for its violation and for other purposes	2003			
RA 7279	An Act providing for the elimination of the worst forms of child labor and affording stronger protection for the working child, amending for this purpose RA No. 7610, as amended, otherwise known as Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination	2003			
RA 9255	An Act allowing illegitimate children to use the surname of their father, amending for the purpose Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines	2004			
RA 9262	An Act defining Violence Against Women and their Children, providing for protective measures for victims, prescribing penalties therefore, and for other purposes	2004			
RA 9288	An Act promulgating a comprehensive policy and a national system for ensuring newborn screening	2004			
RA 9344	An Act establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System creating the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council under the Department of Justice, appropriating funds therefore and for other purposes	2006			
SENIOR CITIZENS AND	SENIOR CITIZENS AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES				
RA 7696	An Act amending certain provisions of RA No. 6948 otherwise known as an Act Standardizing and Upgrading the Benefits for Military Veterans and their Dependents	2001			
RA 9257	An Act granting additional benefits and privileges to Senior Citizens amending for the purpose RA No. 7432, otherwise known as "An Act to Maximize the Contribution of Senior Citizens to Nation Building, Grant Benefits and Special Privileges and for Other Purposes"	2007			
RA 9442	Act granting other privileges and incentives for Persons with Disability (PWDs), amending for the purpose the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons"	2007			
FORMAL AND INFORMAL WORKERS, FISHERFOLK					
RA 8759	An Act institutionalizing a National Facilitation Service Network through the establishment of a Public Employment Service Office in every Province, key city and other strategic areas throughout the country	2000			

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RA 9178	An Act to promote the establishment of Barangay Micro Business Enterprises (BMBEs), providing incentives and benefits therefore, and for other purposes	2002
RA 9422	An Act to strengthen the regulatory functions of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), amending for this purpose RA No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995"	2007
RA 9481	An Act strengthening the workers' constitutional right to self- organization, amending for the purpose PD No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines	2007
RA 9281	An Act to strengthen Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization in the Philippines by extending the effectivity of tax incentives and its mandated funding support, amending for the purpose Sections 109 and 112 of RA No. 8435	2004
POPULATION, HEALTH		
RA 9275	An Act providing for a Comprehensive Water Quality Management	2004
RA 9286	An Act further amending PD No. 198, otherwise known as the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973 as amended.	2004

Source: Aldaba and Sescon, 2010.

