

# PROSPECTS

Improving prospects for forcibly displaced persons and host communities



# IRAQ

# Country Vision Note

## **Inclusive Jobs and Education for Forcibly Displaced Persons and Host Communities Partnership of the Government of the Netherlands, IFC, ILO, UNHCR, UNICEF and the WB**

### **Iraq Country Vision 26 November 2018**

In September 2018, the Embassy of the Netherlands in Iraq notified five international organizations - World Bank, International Finance Corporation, UNICEF, UNHCR, and ILO - about a new global partnership on Inclusive Jobs and Education for Forcibly Displaced Persons and Host Communities (the “Partnership”). The Partnership will focus on three broad areas that are critical for refugees to overcome their specific vulnerabilities and for host communities to pursue their own development agenda in a transformed environment: **(1) jobs and social protection, (2) education and learning, and (3) protection and legal status**. What follows is a response by the partners in Iraq, laying out a vision for how this partnership could contribute to the goals and outcomes stated in the Vision Note.

#### **I. The Iraq Context of Forced Displacement**

##### Who and Where are IDPs and Refugees in Iraq?

Between 2014-17, the Global Coalition fought a war against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh, which at its height of control, occupied half the territory of Iraq. **Six million Iraqis were suddenly displaced** while the Government and international partners responded to one of the world’s most severe humanitarian crises. At the same time, **hundreds of thousands of Syrians fled** the war in that country across the border to Iraq. Many displaced Iraqis sought refuge outside the country<sup>1</sup>.

Even before large-scale military operations in Iraq ended in November 2017, the improved security and service environment allowed almost four million Iraqis to return to their areas of origin. Despite the scale of return, the rate of internally displaced persons (IDP) returning has steadily decreased in 2018. **More than 1.9 million IDPs remain displaced, of which over half have been displaced for more than three years**. It is those long-term IDPs that now make up most of the still displaced population. A significant majority of IDPs (71%) reside outside of camps, mostly within the Kurdistan Region and Ninewa, while the majority of IDPs come from Ninewa. IDPs are relatively evenly split between being displaced within their governorates of origin (49%) and in other governorates (51%).

As of 30 September 2018, Iraq hosted **250,184 Syrian refugees and 44,149 non-Syrian refugees**. The vast majority (97 per-cent) of Syrian refugees reside in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, mostly in the Erbil and Dohuk Governorates. Around 38 per-cent of Syrian refugees live in nine camps, while the rest live in out-of-camp settings. Almost 60% of the Syrian refugees come from Al-hasakeh, the rest from Aleppo and Damascus. Children represent 43% of the Syrian refugee population in Iraq.

Only about one-third of Syrian refugees live in camps managed by the KRG with NGO and UNHCR support. The majority live in urban areas with limited support from the UN and international donors, implying *a de facto* integration as they become self-sufficient. However, due to the economic crisis, an increasing number of vulnerable refugees are requesting entry into the camps due to the fact that most services in the camps are free.

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<sup>1</sup> According to the Dutch Refugee Council’s July 2018 report, the Netherlands received 6,034 applications from Iraqis (first and second asylum applications as well as family reunification requests) since 2015, and Iraq was one of the top three countries of origin in 2015.

Despite the security threats and legal barriers, local integration or inclusion is still the preferred solution for Syrian refugees. UNHCR's June 2018 Return Intentions Survey indicates that **only 6-8% of Syrian refugees intend to return to Syria** in the next twelve months. This requires longer-term solutions for refugees in Iraq, since other durable solutions such as resettlement, are available only to a very limited number of refugees (resettlement quota in 2018 is less than 1,000 individuals).

Many IDPs and refugees are hosted and reside in the same urban areas. KRI hosts some 790,000 IDPs who fled extremist groups in Ninewa, Saleh Al Din, Kirkuk, and Diyala Governorates. Should the IDPs and refugees decide to remain in KRI due to various reasons that could hamper their return, **the hosting communities will require significant support** to enhance the communities' capacity to provide services, infrastructure, and absorb this additional population. A favourable environment should be created to enable durable solutions across affected populations.

Gauging IDPs' future plans related to resolving their displacement is difficult to do with any accuracy, but reasons for continued displacement invariably include **destroyed, occupied or disputed housing, absence of livelihoods and services, social cohesion** (community tensions and fears of population change), **security** (blocked return or perceived insecurity), and factors related to **mental health and trauma**. It is becoming clear that **a significant majority of IDPs may not return to their area of origin** and data collection may be underestimating the number of those who wish to integrate locally or relocate in the long-term.

#### Jobs and Social Protection

**The private sector in Iraq is underdeveloped** due to the economy's heavy reliance on oil exports (99% of all exports), an abundance of cheap imports, and competition from state-owned enterprises. Private sector development is a central government priority, but a lack of productive investment in the formal private sector has resulted in inadequate creation of decent jobs for Iraq's growing labour force.

Even before the 2014 crisis, ILO survey data found **most MSMEs were operating informally, where workers are at heightened risk of exploitation**. This is particularly true among displaced populations, who were forced to find employment in new communities. Evidence suggests that time spent outside of the formal labour market creates additional barriers to access employment as skills go unused and qualifications become outdated. The war exacerbated institutional weaknesses and structural issues such as education and training systems that fail to deliver and certify demand driven skills.

**Women's participation in the labour force** is very low. According to ILO estimates, only 19% of women participated in the labour force in 2018, compared to approximately 75% of men. Women tend to be more affected by informality than men. Informally employed women are often found in agriculture as unpaid family labour.

Iraq hosts one of the youngest populations in the region but struggles to provide employment opportunities for them. ILO modelled estimates put male youth (15-24) unemployment at 14.8% and female youth unemployment at 24.4% in 2017. Challenges include a lack of work opportunities, skills mismatches, a strong preference for public sector employment among more educated youth, as well as a lack of effective and accessible career and job information systems. Altogether, these factors contribute to the fact that **almost half of unemployed youth in Iraq have been looking for a job for more than one year**.

Significant **mismatches between skills supplied by the education system and those demanded by the labour market** include technology, languages, as well as mid-level technical and vocational abilities. Moreover, Iraqi entrepreneurs identified a lack of business and management skills as holding back performance of their (micro) enterprises. The government has made efforts to reform the education system towards a more skills-based approach,<sup>2</sup> but key institutional challenges remain with regard to insufficient infrastructure, weak administration, and budget constraints.

**Reforming the social protection system** is a key government priority, and its current inability to cover IDPs and refugees requires dependence on fluctuating and unsustainable humanitarian assistance. Iraq made efforts to reform social safety nets over the past years, including a move away from universal food subsidies towards more targeted cash transfer programmes. However, food and fuel subsidies continue to account for the majority of social safety net spending. Moreover, cash transfers are not very effective in reaching those in need, often in remote, rural areas. While the number of those in need of assistance has increased sharply as a result of the crisis, pre-existing challenges in reaching them have also been aggravated. The social insurance system is inefficient and severely under-resourced.

**Coverage of contributory social security systems is limited.** Pending the adoption of revised legislation, social insurance excludes agricultural workers, self-employed, temporary workers, domestic workers and family workers as well as informal workers. A survey among MSMEs found that only 8% of responding businesses were registered with the Social Security Fund.<sup>3</sup> Workers in the informal economy are not covered by formal social security, and accessibility of social safety nets is limited. Moreover, the mechanisms and definitions used to determine eligibility to cash transfers and social assistance under Iraq's safety net programme is inefficient and fails to deliver for those it is intended to target.<sup>4</sup>

The new labour law significantly improved the legal framework, including an increase of the **minimum employment age** from 12 to 15 with higher fines and penalties. However, UN OCHA (2017) found that households are increasingly reliant on child labour: 68% to 74% of children under the age of 15 are working (though not all in activities characterised as child labour). A report covering the whole of Iraq shows 48% of IDP families in 2016 were living in locations where child labour was highlighted as the top child protection concern.<sup>5</sup>

### Education and Learning

At least 650,000 primary school children in Iraq are estimated to be out of school, and over 300,000 children who were held in ISIS-controlled territory are unable to enrol. The UN estimates that up to **3.5 million children of school age are either out of school or in school but not learning.** The most affected are children of IDPs and Syrian refugees along with children in host communities and return areas.

Despite progress in enrolment and retention of **Syrian refugee children in primary education**, secondary education for refugee adolescents remains a critical gap as the space in schools, level of enrolment, and completion rates are very low. For children aged 13-18, the reasons for not going to school include costs related to education, the need to contribute income support to the household, school regulations that do not permit children of a certain age who may have missed a number of years of schooling to re-enter formal education, differences in curriculum and language, child

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<sup>2</sup> ILO, n.d., *DWCP Outcome – IRQ 901 (2016-2017)*

<sup>3</sup> White, S., 2012, *Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in Iraq; A Survey Analysis*

<sup>4</sup> ILO, n.d. *DWCP Outcome – IRQ 901 (2016-2017)*

<sup>5</sup> IOM, 2016, *Integrated location assessment (Jul-Sep 2016), Protection enhanced displacement tracking matrix*

marriage, and lack of documentation required to register for school (residency permit). Some may have been refused entry due to disabilities, noting that very few schools have accessible premises or specific programmes for children with disabilities.

Access to education in return areas is constrained by a **shortage of learning spaces** as most schools were either damaged or fell into disrepair due to lack of maintenance. Government investment in school infrastructure has been almost non-existent. By end of 2018, there was a shortage of over 7,500 school buildings, leading to overcrowded classrooms, multiple shift schooling, and a decline in student performance. Quality of education is also affected by an artificial shortage of teachers.

Whereas the **national curricula** of Iraq and Kurdistan are relatively current, they are not fully responsive to the dynamic environment of the Iraqi context in terms of preparing students to play a meaningful role in fostering social cohesion and civic responsibility. That in turn calls for enhanced efforts to strengthen the co-curricular aspects of education to develop life skills among young people and to develop teacher capacity to nurture relevant values among learners.

Regarding the capacity of the education system to deliver on its mandate, there are concerns about over-centralisation of **decision making and inadequate capacity** to coordinate education interventions especially during protracted humanitarian crises. The situation is aggravated by low investment in education, a weak sector information system, and insufficient community participation.

#### Protection and Legal Status

The declaration of military victory in the last quarter of 2017 led to the decision to close some camps and **require populations to return** to their areas of origin. However, ongoing conflict in Kirkuk and Salah al Din governorates in 2018 resulted in new displacements, and large numbers of people still remain in camps and informal settlements. In Dohuk, **ethnic minorities** continue to remain displaced until their security can be guaranteed.

Among those who remain displaced, **women and children with perceived affiliations to ISIL/Daesh** are identified as the most vulnerable category. Distinguishing between legitimate security concerns and promoting the return and/or reintegration of these women and children is important to prevent future cycles of grievance. Meeting their needs as well as supporting programming which addresses gender-based violence, prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, access to civil documentation and national services, including government social protection and social safety nets, as well as accountability to affected populations form the core of protection concerns in Iraq.

**Girls and women**, particularly those from **female headed households** also remain at high risk of gender-based violence, such as sexual exploitation and abuse, rape and sexual assault. In addition, a substantial number of **boys and to a lesser extent girls**, have been arrested for perceived affiliation with ISIL, detained for significant periods without charge, and sentenced to years of imprisonment for affiliation and for acts they may have been coerced to commit. Legal representation, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes inside detention facilities and within communities are needed for successful reintegration with families. **Children who were either separated or unaccompanied** during the conflict continue to need follow-up either in alternative care, family tracing and reunification with their biological parents, or simply psychosocial support to increase their personal resilience.

In 2017, 667 incidents were reported to the Iraq Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on **grave violations of child rights**, affecting 3,481 children (1,084 boys, 302 girls and 2,095 sex unknown). The majority of reported cases were killing and maiming of children due to direct conflict. Children associated with ISIL or who lived under its control, have a high likelihood of having witnessed,

survived, and been forced to participate in some of the most extreme forms of violence, exploitation and abuse, including sexual violence, rape, and exploitation.

Although during 2018, the number and rate of violations has abated significantly, even now, a year after Mosul was retaken, children's experiences of violence and displacement continue and continue to negatively affect their **physical and psychosocial wellbeing**. A recent survey (MCNA IV) revealed that psycho-social distress among returnee and remainee children was significantly higher relative to IDP children<sup>6</sup>. While the majority of children are resilient enough to recover from these experiences with structured psychosocial support services (PSS), some children need higher level of specialised child protection services that complement and follow on to this.

**Trafficking of children** is an overarching concern, and trafficked children may become involved in forced begging, domestic work, drug trafficking, and commercial sexual exploitation. Given Iraq's history of conflict, forcible recruitment by military groups is a salient concern. It is reported that boys as young as ten have been recruited by armed groups, and in some cases girls (particularly in connection with Yazidi self-defence groups) (ILO CEACR, 2016b).

**Access to documentation** is also a major protection issue for forcibly displaced families. It is estimated that the majority of displaced persons are missing at least one of the four identity documents required for accessing social services (identity card, nationality certificate, residency document, and/or PDS card). These civil documents are a prerequisite to facilitate access to government protection services and non-contributory cash and in-kind assistance, such as the PDS. Access to civil documentation is a particular challenge for persons living in displacement (who find it difficult to access Civil Affairs Directorates in their areas of origin) as well as for persons who lived in areas formerly controlled by ISIL or who are perceived to be affiliated with extremist groups. While mobile missions of Civil Affairs Directorates and mobile legal assistance has increased access to civil documentation, there are still significant numbers of individuals in need of documentation.

The protection of refugees in Iraq is governed by the 1971 Political Refugee Act, with the granting of refugee status the responsibility of the Permanent Committee of the Ministry of the Interior. A **draft Refugee Law** was submitted to the parliament in early 2018, but in light of preparations for the May 2018 elections, consideration of the law was suspended pending the formation of a new parliament.

The majority of Syrian refugees in KRI have enjoyed a favourable protection environment, with newly arriving Syrians allowed into KRI on a 15-day entry visa. However, restrictions and control procedures for individuals returning to Syria and then coming back to KRI have been put in place. Access to documentation (**residency permits**) for over 10,000 Syrians was denied in mid-2018. Nevertheless, the KRG granted residency permits to over 200,000 Syrians, providing them with the right to work and freedom of movement. The timely issuance of residency permits is a concern, especially for refugees living out of camps.

Despite the favourable protection environment, serious challenges remain. UNHCR continues to advocate with the GoI and KRI authorities to maintain open borders and ensure access to safety, especially for the most vulnerable, for those fleeing conflict, and for family reunification. **Access to safety and asylum** remains an acute concern with intermittent border closures and restrictions on admission and access to registration.

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<sup>6</sup> For children's psychological distress, median percentage for returnees is 12.9%, non-displaced is 17.7%, while IDPs in and out of camps are 2.1% and 1.2% respectively (MCNA VI)

## II. Developing Durable Solutions for Protracted Displacement

As the main conflict began winding down, the scale of displacement and the cost to repair war damage (US\$88 billion) demanded innovative solutions to prevent further instability and migration. The amount of humanitarian aid to support displaced families was unsustainable, and the timeframe required for full recovery and reconstruction was too long. The Government of Iraq and its international partners developed a plan that coordinated disparate programming to accelerate recovery and create an environment to promote sustainable returns.

One element of this strategy was UNDP's **stabilization** program, which to date has completed 1,400 quick-impact projects assisting millions of Iraqis with water, electricity, and other services in damaged areas. A massive **demining** operation was also supported by international donors to facilitate stabilization projects and enable families to return to their homes and communities. Both the stabilization and demining programs are still underway with significant unmet resource requirements.

After surviving the existential threat posed by ISIL and responding to the resulting immediate humanitarian crisis, government officials across several ministries began engaging more actively in **planning for the country's future**. The Government embarked upon a 2030 Vision, a National Development Plan (2018-2022), the Poverty Reduction Strategy (2018-2022), and they are now assessing how to mainstream the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In parallel, preparations are beginning to draft the next UNDAF (to start in 2020), including an upcoming Common Country Assessment.

In the meantime, the bridge between immediate stabilization and long-term recovery was launched at the International Reconstruction Conference for Iraq in February 2018 held in Kuwait. Based on the Government's consolidated Reconstruction and Development Framework, a new **Recovery and Resilience Programme (RRP)** was presented and later elaborated with the specific intention of helping people see tangible improvements in their daily lives at the start of the reconstruction process, rather than waiting years to benefit from large-scale infrastructure projects and structural reforms.

The aim of the two-year RRP is to **fast-track the social dimensions of reconstruction and provide durable solutions for families and communities** most impacted by the conflict to restore confidence in the Government, revitalize areas at the highest risk of violence, and advance broad political participation and inclusive social harmony. The RRP is also forward looking, helping to lay the foundations in the social sectors and at the community level that will allow Iraq to reach its SDGs and other development objectives.

Of the nine integrated program components, four are directly related to the Partnership's goals: **Revitalizing Communities, Promoting Sustainable Returns, Decentralizing Basic Services and Engaging Youth**. There are currently 36 projects in these component areas, which make up 75% of the RRP's resource requirements.

Three of the RRP's components<sup>7</sup> are being implemented in **high risk areas where violent extremism may re-emerge** unless steps are taken to restore community trust, build confidence in the Government, and open economic opportunities. These projects are especially helpful for reducing protracted displacement because they target the same geographic hotspots where IDPs report the most difficulty with livelihoods, services, social cohesion, and safety. There are currently 23 projects in these component areas requiring US\$377 million in additional donor funding to be fully implemented.

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<sup>7</sup> Revitalizing Communities, Prevention of Violent Extremism, and Restoring Agriculture and Water Systems

The RRP is managed by the UN through a trust fund and operates in close coordination and collaboration with the Government, the World Bank Group, and development partners under the guidance of the Executive Committee for Reconstruction and Development. A results framework with four outcomes underpins the coordination and coherence of the RRP. These outcomes monitor improvements in accessibility of public services, livelihoods opportunities, protection and inclusion mechanisms, and conflict management. **The impact of the RRP’s projects on IDPs and refugees will be tracked** over the next two years through the RRP results framework and M&E indicators.

Thanks to recent improvements in data collection, **the problem of protracted displacement increasingly appears to be one of geography**. Using a range of indicators to calculate separate “livelihoods and services” and “social cohesion and safety” scores, an overall severity index for returns has been generated. By mapping these scores, the geographical clustering of the very high severity hotspots shows a concentration within five northern governates – Ninewa, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, Diyala and Anbar.




Figure 1 - Density map of all return severity index scores in Iraq.

Notwithstanding the significant continuing issue-specific challenges to achieving durable solutions for all IDPs described in Section I above, **it is critically important that key geographical bottlenecks be addressed and overcome in order to sustain momentum for returns**.

### III. Partners’ Current Engagement with Forcibly Displaced Persons and Host Communities

In addition to recognizing the framework already in place to coordinate interventions to increase inclusive jobs and education for forcibly displaced persons and host communities in Iraq, it is also important to understand what those interventions are, and how they operate in the existing humanitarian systems and government structures. Three of the Partnership’s institutions are **already heavily engaged on the ground in Iraq, delivering programs for the forcibly displaced and host communities** in the Partnership’s three focus areas.



In some cases, the programmes being implemented by UNICEF, UNHCR, and the WB are specific to IDPs, refugees, and host communities. However, in most cases, these programmes also serve some other regions and populations around the country. In all cases, these programmes **build the capacity of the Government** by planning and delivering with the engagement and support of federal, regional, and local officials.

UNICEF and UNHCR are also delivering programs through the RRP. To ensure coordination of interventions in Iraq, the World Bank is a partner in the RRP and serves on the program's Steering Committee. IFC does not have any activities that are directly related to refugees or IDPs, but the projects they finance in Iraq, such as power generation and expansion of the mobile network, could benefit IDPs indirectly in the future. Appendix A below provides a **summary of four partners' engagement** in the Partnership's three focus areas. Table 1 illustrates how their programming currently targets most of the Partnership's expected outcomes for Iraq.

It is important to note that in addition to the programs described in Appendix A, a vast humanitarian and development effort is fully underway across Iraq involving hundreds of **other international agencies, international and national NGOs**, each with their own programs and resources. These non-Partnership organizations are making a significant positive impact on displaced persons and host communities, but their activities are not reflected in this paper. However, the Partners themselves coordinate their planning and programming with these non-Partnership organizations through the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Humanitarian Country Team, and the NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq. Furthermore, the role and contributions of these non-Partnership organizations were considered during the design of the RRP, and the RRP's governance structure includes many major non-Partnership actors.

#### IV. Vision and Value Added of the Partnership

**The purpose of the global Partnership is to facilitate a transformation from a humanitarian to a development approach to forced displacement**, supporting refugee/IDP inclusive strategies that improve the prospects for refugees, IDPs, as well as host communities. Specifically, the vision of the Partnership is to (1) enhance the enabling environment for the socio-economic inclusion of forcibly displaced persons (to mitigate their plight during years of exile and to best prepare them for their return), (2) enhance access to education and child protection for vulnerable children on the move, and (3) strengthen the resilience of host communities through inclusive socio-economic development that also benefits forcibly displaced persons.

**The expected added value of the Partnership is (1) innovative approaches, (2) strategic coordination, (3) mutual learning, and (4) leveraging or amplifying existing programmes funded through each organization's own resources.** Due to the advanced planning, existing coordination structures, and programmatic response to the enormous refugee/IDP crisis as the war began winding down, the transformation from humanitarian to development strategies was already well underway before the Partnership began. The current response to increase inclusive jobs and education for forcibly displaced persons and host communities in Iraq is innovative, synergistic, and being delivered through new structures to learn from results and reduce duplication of effort.

The **eight outcomes** of the Partnership organized under the three results areas are:

##### (1) Jobs and Social Protection

- Enhanced livelihood opportunities for forcibly displaced persons and host communities;

- Increased private investment in targeted areas;
- Enhanced enabling environments for inclusive and job-rich labour markets and entrepreneurship, underpinned by decent work principles;
- Reduced number of refugees dependent on humanitarian assistance for their subsistence (number of persons who would be below poverty line in the absence of humanitarian assistance);

## (2) Education and Learning

- Improved access to and quality of education for forcibly displaced children and host communities;

## (3) Protection and Legal Status

- Improved availability and access to functioning child protection systems offering preventive and response services accessible for children on the move
- Reduced number of refugees without adequate documentation and associated legal protections; and
- Enhanced capacity of national systems for the protection of refugees.

As noted in Section III above and in Appendix A and Table 1 below, several partners are already delivering programmes in these outcome areas. **In Iraq, the Government and international community have coalesced their efforts to address these outcomes through the RRP.** In particular, four of the nine integrated RRP programme components directly correspond to the Partnership's goals:

- **Revitalizing Communities** improves community safety, upgrades informal settlements and degraded neighbourhoods, repairs damaged and destroyed houses, rebuilds community networks, and expands livelihood options;
- **Promoting Sustainable Returns** advocates for safe, dignified and voluntary returns; identifies and clears unexploded ordnance in return areas; provides legal aid and facilitates family reunification; helps build the capacity of national institutions responsible for civil documentation, compensation, and land and property restitution;
- Decentralizing **Basic Services** procures life-saving medicines, training health technicians and modernizes health management systems; trains teachers, supplies learning materials and upgrades education management systems; upgrades water, sanitation and hygiene management systems; and trains urban planners and provides technical assistance on urban renewal; and
- **Engaging Youth** helps establish a national volunteer youth corps; expands youth networks; promotes youth entrepreneurship; and builds the capacity of national institutions responsible for juvenile justice.

Given the limited resources and timeline of the Partnership, the most effective use of new funding, consistent with (4) in the value added, is to **stretch existing programs that are already working well to cover more beneficiaries or build more capacity in the Government.**

The support provided by external partners has been crucial to mitigating the gaps in essential services in Iraq. Nonetheless, needs persist and the **likely reduction in funding inflows due to the transition from humanitarian to recovery and development may result in significant deprivations and reversals in results so far achieved.** In education for example, external support by UN agencies and

other partners enabled the Government of Iraq and KRG to sustain primary school net enrolment rates of 94%.

Given the similarities between this global partnership and the current strategy in Iraq to promote durable solutions for protracted displacement, most of the partners are already engaged in **programmes that can be enhanced through additional resources** provided by the Partnership. In other cases, new projects could be initiated to complement ongoing efforts. A summary of indicative programmes that could be enhanced or initiated by the Partnership are included below in Appendix B and in Table 2. These could be further elaborated in a multi-annual country programme. This list of possible programmes is not exhaustive, and projects from other partners could be added in the country programme.

In many cases, the possible programme proposals supported by the Partnership can be **integrated through the RRP**, which is organized to deliver programmes through bilateral funding or through the Iraq RRP Fund, with a governance structure, results framework, and M&E indicators already in place. As noted in Section II above, in order to be most effective, these proposed interventions through the Partnership will need to be delivered in the geographic hotspots where IDPs report the most difficulty with livelihoods, services, social cohesion, and safety.

## Iraq Country Vision Appendix A

### Summary of Partners' Current Engagement with Forcibly Displaced Persons and Host Communities

#### (1) Jobs and Social Protection

- The WB's Emergency Social Stabilization and Resilience Project (ESSRP) increases livelihood opportunities in liberated areas and strengthens the systems to expand the provision of **social safety nets**. The program also provides **microloans** to returnees and the existing population to carry out **income generating activities**.
- The WB's Maximizing Finance for Development (MFD)-enabled Reconstruction Strategy for liberated areas of Iraq focuses on vital sectors such as water and energy to encourage and **increase the engagement of the private sector in construction and infrastructure projects**.
- The WB's Inclusion of Conflict-Affected Iraqi Youth project promotes the social and economic inclusion of conflict-affected Iraqi youth (ages 15-29) through **engagement in entrepreneurship** and youth-led community development activities.
- The WB's Iraq Social Fund for Development (SFD) improves access to basic essential services and generates **short-term employment** opportunities in targeted communities. The project aims to support participatory planning and facilitates **access to essential services and short-term employment** opportunities at the community level.
- The WB supported the Government to reform its business registration scheme at the national level in Baghdad and at the subnational level in the Kurdistan region by providing recommendations for the business registration online portal and establishing a viable One-Stop Shop in Baghdad and Erbil. The program **reduced the time and cost for registration of new businesses** and **enabled young entrepreneurs to enter the Iraqi market**.
- The ILO carried out a number of activities in 2017-2018, many of which are ongoing, including:
  - **Assessment of labour inspection and occupational safety and health (OSH)** as well as capacity building on the implementation of C87, C98, and C187
  - Policy support and capacity building in the areas of **labour statistics and labour market policy**, including an employment policy for KRI
  - Legislative support for amending Iraqi Federation of Industries' Law #34 of 2002 for **improving IFIs' governance structure**.
  - ILS and Labour Law tripartite training on **the national labour policies** in light of the adoption of the new labour code and the new commitments undertaken with regard to ILS following the ratification of the Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health.
- The ILO strengthened capacities of Iraqi officials on the implementation of **inclusive and rich job labour market policies** and on the Promotional Framework for the OSH Convention (C187).

#### (2) Education and Learning

- UNICEF's Adolescent Development and Participation (ADAP) program targets the most disadvantaged and vulnerable/marginalized young people with a focus on returnee adolescents. It includes **skill-building and capacity development** for adolescent and youth groups and networks, specifically focusing on **life skills and access to non-formal vocational training**.

- UNICEF supports the MOE and DOEs in ten governorates (including four governorates identified by this concept note) to provide **education services to children affected by conflicts**. These include internally displaced children, children in host communities, children in retaken areas and Syrian refugee children.
- UNICEF implements cash for education (C4E) to **increase school enrolment, attendance and retention** among out of school children and children at high risk of drop out from refugee, returnee/IDP and host community categories by removing monetary barriers to school enrolment and increasing household spending on children needs.
- UNHCR, UNICEF and partners have developed a 3-year refugee education strategy with the KRG which is aligned with the KRG Education Development Plan (2017-2020) to ensure **access** to all levels of education, provide high **quality** education, increase relevance and success of **TVET**, increase **transparency and accountability**, and build on improvements in **higher education**.
- UNHCR promotes sustainable refugee education to ensure that refugee education is accounted for in **education planning, development, and monitoring**.
- UNHCR will continue promoting quality education for refugee adolescents at the secondary level through providing catch-up classes, awareness raising campaigns with a focus on education for girls and children with disabilities, the rehabilitation of school facilities and provision of school supplies, language classes, and other educational opportunities targeting adolescents and youth.
- UNHCR implements the DAFI program which supports refugees to **access tertiary education**.
- The WB's Additional Financing for the Emergency Operation for Development Project (EODP) includes **rehabilitation of damaged schools** in liberated areas, provision of equipment and teaching materials, and **training for teachers** and school leadership. It also includes support for out-of-school youth as a principal element to address **skills development and employment** for youth in targeted districts.
- The ILO conducted an actuarial evaluation of the social security schemes for public and private sector workers aiming at the extension of social security coverage and benefits, and ensuring the financial sustainability of the schemes. Comprehensive policy recommendations for the reform of the social security system were provided based on broad stakeholders' consultations, the actuarial valuation, international Social Security Conventions and worldwide good practices.
- The ILO supported the Government to draft its new social security law, which once adopted, will be the first to cover all public and private sector workers. Considerable changes have been introduced in this draft law. It promotes gender equality and aims at equalizing maternity leave periods and maternity benefits; it furthermore will contribute to reducing the difference between the pensions received by private and public sectors. As such, it foresees to cover injury benefits and a number of social, educational, health services, thereby contributing to the support of the private sector and the support of workers' rights.
- The ILO carried out a rapid needs assessment for the Central Statistics Office on labour and child labour statistics.

### (3) Protection and Legal Status

- UNICEF promotes resilience and psychosocial wellbeing and protection of IDP, refugee, returnee, and host community children through direct **service delivery and systems strengthening for child protection**. UNICEF supports the government to improve three main areas:
  - The **enabling environment for child protection** including legal and policy framework. For example, UNICEF works with the government to develop a comprehensive child rights act to bring Iraq's legal framework for the protection of children in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international standards;

- **Social work capacity** and systems to deliver high-quality **child protection services**, including PSS, case management, and specialized services such as caring for child survivors of gender-based violence, children without civil documentation, and children who are without parental care. UNICEF also directly supports delivery of such services in the absence of government capacity, the development of Child Protection Information Management System for case management, development of case management standard operating procedures, and community structures to raise awareness about child protection risks and initiate community-based solutions; and
- The **child justice system**, particularly for children who are in detention so that it meets international standards, so that children are detained only for the shortest periods possible and as a last resort, and so that children within the system are treated consistent with their needs and vulnerabilities. UNICEF also supports the government to provide services within detention focused on rehabilitating children and preparing them for reintegration.
- UNICEF also co-leads the Iraq Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Grave Violations of Child Rights (MRM), along with UNAMI, and with the support of other UN agencies including UNHCR. By **monitoring and verifying grave violations**, UNICEF has timely and accurate information on children affected by armed conflict that can help inform advocacy and programming to address the needs of children who have been affected by armed conflict as they recover.
- UNHCR supports both refugee and IDP children, families, and communities to ensure that children and adolescents at risk, including those who have experienced extreme distress, are assisted to **overcome the effects of conflict and displacement** and that they are subsequently **protected** from further violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation. UNHCR's contribution to a favourable protection environment and the search for solutions includes:
  - Supporting the Government of Iraq to **strengthen the legal framework for the protection of refugees**, including through reform of the 1971 Political Refugee Act and support to registration and documentation of refugees and asylum-seekers country-wide so that they can access health, education and other services and enjoy freedom of movement. This includes support to the Permanent Committee of the Ministry of Interior (PC-Mol) and to the KRG Residency Directorate.
  - Cooperating with UNICEF and other key protection partners to support **strengthening of national and regional child protection systems and services** to ensure that these efforts benefit all displaced children, including refugee children. This includes capacity building and technical support to the Ministries of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) and the Directorate for Combating Violence against Women (DCVAW), but also direct provision of case management and psycho-social support services for refugee children survivors of violence, exploitation and abuse in the absence of government capacity.
  - Providing **legal assistance** to IDPs, returnees and refugees so that they can access their rights, including freedom of movement and access to services through legal counselling, representation and advice, as well as awareness-raising sessions in camp and non-camp settings. The legal assistance programme is focused on supporting the issuance of vital civil documentation, preventing child marriage, and supporting women's rights, particularly with regards to divorce, inheritance and custody.
  - Supporting government institutions to **deliver identity documents** to IDPs, returnees and refugees to reduce the risk of statelessness and ensure access to rights and services. Special efforts have been made to support the issuance of birth certificates, especially for children born in territories formerly under the control of extremist groups, as well as the registration of marriage, divorce, guardianship and custody documentation. UNHCR works closely with civil status departments in order to deliver documentation of legal identity.

- The WB's ESSRP increases access to **psychosocial services** in liberated areas, including psychological support and Interventions to help address mental health among the vulnerable population.
- The WB contributed to refugee documentation through the Economic and Social Impact Analyses (ESIA), which provided the Government with an **impact analysis** of the current crisis at the regional level to identify and quantify the social and economic impacts and stabilization costs in KRI from the inflow of refugees and internally displaced people as a result of the Syrian conflict and the ISIS crisis.

## Iraq Country Vision Appendix B

### Indicative Programs, Activities, or Other Interventions That Could Be Initiated or Enhanced Through the Partnership

#### (1) Jobs and Social Protection

- UNICEF could continue its work already underway and further increase engagement of adolescents by **building skills for employability**. UNICEF would like to explore interventions around social and business entrepreneurship. Participation of girls, and the inclusion of adolescents from disadvantaged and deprived communities, such as returnees, IDPs and refugee groups, will be promoted.
- The World Bank could launch a **Youth National Volunteer Service Programme** to increase social cohesion as well as improve employability and social service delivery throughout the country. The proposed programme, which can target poor and vulnerable populations (including IDPs, returnees, refugee groups, etc.), could also include a social entrepreneurship component, to enable participating youth (who are already social conscious) to become social entrepreneurs, thereby creating employment and contributing to sustainable social service delivery. The proposed program would be directly linked to critical issues in Iraq, including preventing violence extremism (by bringing youth out of inactivity), rebuilding the social contract through improved social cohesion and trust as well as service delivery, and improving youth employability.
- The ILO could conduct rapid market assessments and value chain analysis at the national and governorate levels, with a view to inform evidence-based decision making.
- The ILO could support **entrepreneurs and SMEs** through integrated interventions, including improving the policy, legal and regulatory framework and enhancing Iraqi entrepreneurs' access to markets and financial business services and to create better and decent jobs to IDPs, refugees and host communities.
- The ILO can scale up some **employment creation projects** implemented by different agencies in geographical areas where IDPs report the most difficulty with livelihoods through a labour-intensive approach and compliance model support decent work principles for IDPs, refugees, returnees and host communities.
- The ILO could help establish **Employment Service Centres** in some areas with large numbers of IDPs, returnees, refugees and host communities to provide job matching, referrals and other active labour market programmes.
- The ILO could design and implement demand driven, on-the-job training, vocational training and recognition of prior learning methodology which contribute to improved living conditions of the poor and the most vulnerable youth and women by providing them with alternative and sustainable livelihood opportunities as a basis for restoring stability and economic recovery in Iraq.

#### (2) Education and Learning

There is significant complementarity in the possible interventions supported by UNICEF, UNESCO and UNHCR. Some of the interventions, like supporting the development of a sound Education Management Information system, are jointly supported. Others (primary-secondary-TVET-tertiary) would provide complementary routes that expand access to education and offer pathways for further education and increased potential for gainful employment.



- UNICEF could provide technical support and resources towards strengthening the capacity of the Ministries of Education and Governorate Directorates of Education in education management information systems (EMIS) and decentralized delivery of education services. The support would go towards **improving quality of primary education** by providing teaching and learning materials in schools with highest identified needs; training teachers in psychosocial support, life skills and other relevant pedagogical trainings; supporting continued roll out of the school-based management (SBM) model, building capacity of staff, principals, parents and communities to make decisions at local level; supporting the MoE to review and update mechanisms for non-formal education, and expand to areas in need of services; and supporting a government-owned social protection programme to increase access to primary education through government-led pilot cash transfer intervention focusing on most vulnerable locations.
- UNHCR jointly with UNICEF, UNESCO, Ministry of Education and Higher Education could support the KRG MoE to continue **ensuring access and quality of education for refugees**. Accelerated education (AE) for adolescents who have dropped out or who have never been to school would be scaled up. Active promotion of and programming for secondary education would be prioritized. With more funding and strategic partnerships, UNHCR could strengthen access to tertiary education for refugees through increased scholarships, connected learning programs, and the establishment of complementary pathways to protection for refugees through higher education opportunities in third countries.

In light of the improved security situation, UN agencies in Iraq envisage supporting the Iraqi and KRG Ministries of Education to gradually take their mandated roles to provide quality education for all children in Iraq. Accordingly, the **exit mechanisms** of the agencies include:

- Encouraging international NGOs to mentor and build the capacities of local/national NGOs and civil society organizations;
- Building the capacities of duty bearers at community and household levels and empowering them to demand for quality education for the children;
- Supporting the subnational institutions to strengthen their capacities in planning, coordination, data management and analysis, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation;
- Supporting the MOE to participate actively in education cluster activities, with the view to securing senior level decision makers to take charge of cluster activities; and
- Supporting the process to establish an Education Sector Working Group that will eventually take over coordination of education activities in development and humanitarian settings.

Specific to Syrian refugees, the tentative exit strategy is to mainstream refugee children into national education systems (although the issue of language of instruction remains contentious).

### (3) Protection and Legal Status

- The partnership with the Netherlands would enhance UNICEF's ongoing and planned **child protection interventions** by providing support that extends into the medium term. UNICEF could continue supporting the government to strengthen the child protection system, workforce and enabling environment, and provide direct services to respond to existing child protection risks that will further promote the resilience and psychosocial wellbeing of IDP, refugee, returnee and host community children. UNICEF's ongoing work in these areas would continue, and support from the Netherlands could support strategic interventions such as:
  - Working with the government to engage in re-organization of the MOLSA social workforce and other **policies and structures** as well as establishing technical guidance and

- implementation of standard operating procedures for handling cases of violence, exploitation, and abuse of children;
- Initiating a comprehensive mapping and assessment of the **child justice system**, including budgetary allocations, human resources capacities, coordination between central and governorate level juvenile justice bodies and data systems, and the engagement of the government and Juvenile Care Council in development of a national child justice policy/strategy and plan of action for further implementation.
  - Systematically using Communication for Development (C4D) methodology to change **attitudes and social norms** that encourage violence, discrimination, and harmful traditional practices against children.
  - Working with government, communities and families to increase opportunities for safe and compassionate **rehabilitation and reintegration** of children who were associated with armed actors, including ISIL, and to prevent re-recruitment.
- Through the partnership with the Netherlands, UNHCR could continue supporting existing **protection systems and services** and strengthen the **policy and legal framework** for the protection of refugees and other displaced populations. UNHCR would continue working with key government partners such as MoLSA, DCVAW, the PC-MoI, and civil affairs directorates to provide quality protection services while also providing protection services to prevent and respond to protection risks for displaced and conflict affected populations. This would include:
    - Continued support to building the capacity of the **social workers** of DoLSA/MoLSA and DCVAW to provide quality child protection interventions for children at risk and survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in camp and non-camp settings in partnership with UNICEF and UNFPA. If funding is received, this will include expanding the number of social workers engaged in mentoring and on the job training.
    - Scaling up efforts to design and implement multi-channel awareness raising and community-based capacity building activities for refugees and host communities on **protection concerns** (back to school campaigns, awareness-raising on the risks and consequences of child marriage and other forms of SGBV (including domestic violence and SEA) using a behaviour change approach with the active involvement of the community in the design, planning, roll out and evaluation of activities. This would be supported through strengthened protection monitoring and reporting, improved community outreach through mobile child protection teams, trained community outreach volunteers, and strengthened community-based structures.
    - Expanded **legal assistance** to IDP, refugee and returnee populations, with a particular focus on ensuring access to legal documentation. UNHCR will work closely with UNICEF to support issuance of birth certificates, as well as marriage, divorce, guardianship and custody documentation. UNHCR would seek to increase the number of mobile civil documentation missions conducted by civil affairs departments to facilitate documentation for those displaced from their governorates, and would build upon a proposed baseline study to systematically track progress, while also identifying challenges to obtaining civil status documentation for IDPs and returnees. UNHCR could also seek to develop an advocacy strategy with partners to identify legal obstacles to birth registration and strategies to overcome them as part of its global objective to prevent and reduce statelessness as part of the #IBelong campaign.
    - Strengthen the capacity of the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government to **protect and document refugees and asylum-seekers** through increased support to the PC-MoI's registration capacity country-wide, and through increased outreach to key government ministries to improve inclusion of refugees in government services and systems in line with the principles and approaches outlined in the Global

Compact on Refugees and UNHCR Iraq's Comprehensive Protection and Solutions Strategy for Refugees.

- The WB could conduct an **Economic Analysis of Syrian Refugees Mobility**. The study aims to analyse mobility decisions of Syrian refugees to assist the international community allocate its resources efficiently, in both human and financial resources.
- The ILO could support countering the recruitment and use of child soldiers in order to prevent the recruitment of children and youth as child soldiers and sustainably reintegrate children formally associated with the conflict in Iraq.
- The ILO could support the government in strengthening its work against child labour, including the labour inspection department of MOLSA. The work would focus on mapping and analysis of the scope and characteristics of child labour, identifying key legal, human rights and economic issues affecting those children, and propose policy options as well as targeted interventions.

Table 1 - Partners currently engaged in programs contributing to the Partnership's expected outcomes. Where applicable, based on the parameters given in the Vision Note, the outcome is further specified for target populations - refugees ("Ref's") and internally displaced persons ("IDPs").

Currently Operating or Planning to Implement Programs or Activities in These Areas:													
Partner	(1) Education for forcibly displaced children and host communities		(2) Child protection systems and services for children on the move		(3) Livelihoods for forcibly displaced persons and host communities		(4) Private investment in targeted areas		(5) Enabling environments for labour markets and entrepreneur-ship		(6) Reduce refugee dependence on humanitarian assistance	(7) Refugee documentation and other legal protections	(8) Capacity of national systems for the protection of refugees
	Ref's	IDPs	Ref's	IDPs	Ref's	IDPs	Ref's	IDPs	Ref's	IDPs	Refugees	Refugees	Refugees
<b>UNHCR</b>	X		X	X					X		X	X	X
<b>UNICEF</b>	X	X	X	X									
<b>WB</b>		X		X		X		X		X		X	

Table 2 – Possible future programming for the partners by expected outcome based on support through the Partnership

Programs, Activities, or Other Interventions in These Areas That Could Be Initiated or Enhanced Through the Partnership:													
Partner	(1) Education for forcibly displaced children and host communities		(2) Child protection systems and services for children on the move		(3) Livelihoods for forcibly displaced persons and host communities		(4) Private investment in targeted areas		(5) Enabling environments for labour markets and entrepreneur-ship		(6) Reduce refugee dependence on humanitarian assistance	(7) Refugee documentation and other legal protections	(8) Capacity of national systems for the protection of refugees
	Ref's	IDPs	Ref's	IDPs	Ref's	IDPs	Ref's	IDPs	Ref's	IDPs	Refugees	Refugees	Refugees
<b>UNHCR</b>	X		X	X								X	X
<b>UNICEF</b>	X	X	X	X						X			
<b>WB</b>						X				X		X	
<b>ILO</b>			X	X	X	X			X	X			