



▶ ILO Brief

Date: 11 / May / 2022

▶ The impact of the Ukraine crisis on the world of work: Initial assessments

Key points

- ▶ **Massive employment losses in Ukraine:** Economic disruptions, combined with heavy internal displacement and flows of refugees, are causing large-scale losses in terms of employment and incomes. In the current situation of active conflict, the ILO estimates that **4.8 million jobs have been lost with respect to the pre-conflict situation, equal to 30 per cent of pre-conflict employment in Ukraine**. If hostilities ceased immediately, a rapid recovery could ensue, with the return of 3.4 million jobs, thus reducing employment losses to 8.9 per cent. In a scenario of further military escalation, employment losses would increase further to reach 7 million, or 43.5 per cent. Furthermore, the crisis has had a significant impact on the Ukrainian social protection system both in terms of increased expenditure and decreased revenue.
- ▶ **Refugees of working age:** There are an estimated 5.23 million refugees and those forcibly displaced from Ukraine who have moved to neighbouring countries. The ILO estimates that approximately 1.2 million of the total refugee population were working prior to the aggression. Two-thirds of those have an advanced (tertiary) level of education and 49 per cent were employed in high-skilled occupations. Most of the refugee population are women with children.
- ▶ **Neighbouring countries:** A continuation of hostilities in Ukraine would force refugees to stay in exile longer, creating further pressure on the labour market and social protection systems in neighbouring countries. In the absence of necessary measures, overall unemployment in many of these countries would increase considerably.
- ▶ **Central Asia:** The deterioration of the Russian economy could force migrant workers to return to their countries of origin, especially in Central Asia (for example, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), causing significant reductions in remittances and exacerbating employment challenges.
- ▶ **Global impacts:** The rise in food and energy prices, accelerated by the Ukraine crisis, threatens the employment recovery around the world, particularly in low- and middle-income countries, which have yet to fully recover from the pandemic. Heightened uncertainty and monetary policy tightening in advanced economies can negatively impact financial flows to developing countries, which are already reeling from high levels of debt and limited fiscal space.
- ▶ **Areas for immediate action:** While the focus of international solidarity is on easing the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine and beyond, medium-term reconstruction and recovery plans will need to be put in place with a focus on employment and social protection support for people in Ukraine and its neighbouring countries as outlined in the ILO's Employment and Decent Work for Peace and Resilience Recommendation, 2017 (No. 205) and the ILO's Guiding principles on the access of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons to the labour market.

This note provides an initial assessment of the impact of the Ukraine crisis on the world of work in Ukraine, its neighbouring countries and beyond. Following an overview of the ongoing humanitarian and economic crisis, it examines the impacts of the crisis on employment, incomes and livelihoods, with a focus

on Ukraine and refugees in neighbouring countries, as well as on migrant workers from Central Asia. It also offers a brief review of how the crisis could exacerbate the current global challenges in the world of work and outlines the key areas requiring immediate action.

► People and the economy

The Russian aggression in Ukraine has resulted in a devastating humanitarian crisis, triggering the fastest forced population movement since the Second World War. Since 24 February 2022, there has been an exodus of more than 5.23 million refugees¹ who have fled the hostilities to neighbouring countries, namely Poland, Romania, Moldova, Hungary and Slovakia. A significant number of refugees – more than 1.48 million – have moved onward to other countries. At the same time, around 7.7 million people are internally displaced due to the conflict (as at 17 April).² Overall, estimates indicate that up to 70 per cent of the Ukrainian population has potentially been impacted by the hostilities.³ Furthermore, 208,000 non-EU nationals, including many migrant workers and students, have fled from Ukraine to neighbouring countries.⁴

The Ukrainian economy has already been severely impacted by the aggression. Due to the damage to infrastructure and the closure of businesses, economic

activity has come to a standstill in many areas of the country. Some tentative estimates suggest that 50 per cent of businesses are closed,⁵ while between US\$60 billion⁶ and US\$100 billion⁷ worth of infrastructure, buildings, roads, bridges, hospitals, schools, and other physical assets were damaged or destroyed in the first month of the conflict. The closure of Black Sea shipping from Ukraine has cut off some 90 per cent of the country's grain exports and half of its total exports.

As a result of this severe economic impact, Ukraine's GDP is expected to suffer a large decline in 2022, with current estimates varying. While the IMF estimated, in March 2022, a loss in the range of 25 to 35 per cent,⁸ the World Bank estimates a loss of 45 per cent of GDP in 2022⁹. In the event of a continuing and widening protracted crisis, 90 per cent of the population could face poverty or vulnerability to poverty a loss of 18 years of socio-economic achievements in Ukraine and a return to poverty levels last observed in 2004.¹⁰

¹ UNHCR, [Ukraine Refugee Situation](#), as at 24 April 2022.

² reliefWeb, [Ukraine Humanitarian Crisis: Topics](#).

³ The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw), [Russia's Invasion of Ukraine: Assessment of the Humanitarian, Economic and Financial Impact in the Short and Medium Term](#), Policy Notes and Reports No. 59, April 2022.

⁴ UNITED NATIONS IN UKRAINE, Key messages, 6 April 2022. EU-citizens have also left the country, however so far there are no numbers available on how many.

⁵ reliefWeb, [The Development Impact of the War in Ukraine: Initial projections](#), 16 March 2022.

⁶ Reuters, [World Bank estimates Ukraine physical damage at roughly \\$60 billion so far](#), David Lawder and Chris Gallagher, 21 April 2022.

⁷ Government of Ukraine estimate quoted in UNDP, [The Development Impact of the War in Ukraine: Initial Projections](#).

⁸ IMF, Ukraine: [Request for Purchase under the Rapid Financing Instrument and Cancellation of Stand-by Arrangement - Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Ukraine](#), March 2022.

⁹ World Bank, [Europe and Central Asia Economic Update, Spring 2022: War in the Region](#), April 2022.

¹⁰ UNDP, [UNDP's response: WAR IN UKRAINE](#).

► Employment, income and livelihoods


Ukraine

These economic disruptions, combined with the heavy flow of refugees and large-scale internal displacement, have caused massive losses in terms of employment and incomes. However, estimating the precise magnitude of employment losses is extremely difficult due to limited data availability and the highly uncertain and rapidly evolving circumstances affecting Ukraine. Taking full advantage of existing data and previous experiences of the impacts of conflict on employment, the ILO estimates that, in the current situation of active conflict in Ukraine, around 30 per cent of employment has been lost with respect to the pre-conflict situation (Figure 1). This is equal to 4.8 million jobs lost. If hostilities cease immediately, the recovery in employment could be

rapid, with the return of as many as 3.4 million jobs, thus reducing the overall employment losses to 8.9 per cent. In contrast, in a scenario of further military escalation, employment losses would increase further to reach 7 million, or 43.5 per cent (see technical annex on data and estimation methods).

In response to these losses, the Government of Ukraine has so far made considerable efforts to keep the national social protection system operational by guaranteeing the payment of benefits, including to internally displaced persons, through the utilization of digital technologies to this effect.¹¹

Figure 1. Employment losses in Ukraine (% , changes compared to the pre-conflict period)



Source: ILO estimates (see annex)

¹¹ Bozena Sojka, Paul Harvey and Rachel Slater, [Ukraine – Can social protection be sustained and support a humanitarian response?](#), 15 March 2022.

► Neighbouring countries


As noted above, millions of refugees have moved to neighbouring countries. While there are signs of population mobility, and some significant onward movement westwards, returns have been limited. The prospect of the crisis becoming protracted is now high, and the UN is projecting a continuous increase of refugees in the coming months. If the extension of hostilities forces refugees to remain in their host countries longer than expected, they may seek employment in the labour market in these countries.

In addition to Ukrainians, 208,000 non-EU nationals have fled from Ukraine to neighbouring countries¹², including between 37,000 and 60,900 undocumented migrant workers¹³ and around 61,000 students who found themselves caught in the middle of the crisis.¹⁴ Another group of concern is stateless persons, or people at risk of statelessness, which were estimated at around 35,875

in 2021 by UNHCR and which include Romani people but also children born in Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea who lack Ukrainian birth certificates.

The refugee population comprises primarily women, children, and persons over the age of 60. The ILO estimates that among the total refugee population, approximately 2.75 million are of working age. Of these, 43.5 per cent, or 1.2 million, were working prior to the onset of the conflict and left or lost their jobs during the conflict (Figure 2). More than 87 per cent of these previously employed refugees were working in full-time jobs (see Table A1 in annex). The great majority (88 per cent) were employees of enterprises, and the remaining 12 per cent were self-employed. Two-thirds have an advanced (tertiary) level of education. Nearly half (49 per cent) were employed in high-skilled occupations; only 15 per cent were in low-skilled occupations.

Figure 2. By age and previous labour force status



Source: ILO estimates (see annex)

¹² reliefWeb, [Ukraine: Humanitarian Impact Situation Report](#).

¹³ reliefWeb, [Forced displacement from Ukraine: notes on humanitarian protection and durable solutions](#), 4 March 2022.

¹⁴ franceinfo: Afrique, [Guerre en Ukraine: le désarroi des étudiants africains réfugiés en France](#), 29 March 2022.

Poland is facing the largest labour market integration challenge in terms of sheer numbers, with an estimated 410,000 previously employed refugees currently living in the country, including 200,000 high-skilled, 146,000 medium-skilled and 64,000 low-skilled refugees who had been working in Ukraine before the conflict (Figure 3). Romania is hosting an estimated 140,000 Ukrainians who lost work during the hostilities.

Another way of observing the labour market challenges is to add the number of refugees who were working before the conflict to the pre-crisis level of unemployment in host countries. As a hypothetical exercise, adding these refugees to the number of unemployed would raise the unemployment rate in Poland from 3 per cent to 5.3 per cent. In Moldova, the unemployment rate would rise from 2.5 per cent to 6.9 per cent. Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, and Czechia would all see an increase of more than 1 percentage point, while in all other countries, the impact based on the current refugee count would be less than 1 percentage point (see technical annex on data and estimation methods).

To support Ukrainian refugees, as at 8 April 2022, 39 countries have implemented a total of 519 measures, most of which concern areas such as education, health or access to other key services. Social protection cash


and in-kind transfers account for approximately 30 per cent of these measures. Currently, Ukraine has bilateral social security agreements for the maintenance of social security rights (mostly old-age pensions) with many of its neighbouring countries, including Poland, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Estonia, Lithuania, Czechia, and Slovakia.¹⁵ At the European Union level, the granting of a “temporary protection” status to Ukrainians who fled the country following the Russian Federation’s aggression, aims to allow displaced persons to enjoy harmonized rights across the EU.¹⁶ These rights include residency, access to the labour market and housing, medical assistance, and access to education for children.

Central Asia

The large economic and employment disruptions following the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine are having significant ripple effects on Central Asia, especially countries whose economies depend heavily on migrant workers’ remittances from the Russian Federation

In 2020, people from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan represented 22 per cent, 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively, of the 11.6 million international migrants (of all ages) living in

Figure 3. The scale of the refugee crisis from a labour market perspective



Source: ILO estimates (see annex)

¹⁵ World Bank, [Tracking Social Protection Responses in Ukraine and Other Countries](#), Living Paper v.3, 8 April 2022.

¹⁶ CEPS, [The EU grants temporary protection for people fleeing war in Ukraine: Time to rethink unequal solidarity in EU asylum policy](#), CEPS Policy Insights No. 2022-09/March 2022.

the Russian Federation. All four countries rank among the top ten countries of origin of migrants in the Russian Federation.¹⁷ Many of these migrants send a significant share of remittances to their home countries. For example, in Kyrgyzstan, remittances in 2020 accounted for 31.3 percent of GDP, and 26.7 percent in Tajikistan. In 2021, remittances from the Russian Federation accounted for 83 and 56 per cent, respectively, of total remittances for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The World Bank estimates that remittances may decline significantly in 2022 due to the Ukraine conflict, by an

estimated 33 per cent for Kyrgyzstan and 22 per cent for Tajikistan.¹⁸ If the conflict and the sanctions against the Russian Federation lead to job losses for migrant workers in the Russian Federation and these migrant workers return to their countries of origin, there will be severe economic losses in Central Asia as a whole. Returning migrant workers would also put additional pressure on their home-country labour markets, many of which already suffer from high unemployment, low wages, and high levels of informality.

► Global impacts

Coming on top of the COVID-19 crisis, which had a deep impact on labour markets around the world, and an uneven recovery in 2021, the aggression in Ukraine is not only devastating for Ukraine, but has also created a new shock to the global economy through several transmission channels. Commodity prices have risen rapidly, especially food and fuel, while supply chains are experiencing continuing disruptions. The heightened uncertainty and the impact on investor and consumer confidence will further dampen aggregate demand during the recovery from the COVID-19 crisis.

The rise in global food and energy prices observed already in 2021 has accelerated even further since the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine. Recent simulations suggest that global inflation could increase by close to 2.5 percentage points in the first full year after the start of the conflict.¹⁹ Higher rates of inflation will have a negative impact on incomes and poverty, especially among the poor who rely on wages as their main income source.

The impact on global food prices reflects the important role of the Russian Federation and Ukraine as producers of key agricultural commodities, especially in the cereal sector. During the period 2016/17–2020/21, these two countries accounted for 19, 14 and 4 per cent of average global output of barley, wheat and maize, respectively,

while providing just over half of world output of sunflower oil.²⁰ Driven by rising cereal and vegetable oil prices, the FAO Food Price Index averaged 159.3 points in March 2022, up 17.9 points (or 12.6 per cent) from February 2022, representing the highest level since the start of the Index in 1990²¹ and jumping 34 per cent from the same time last year.

Some countries face not only higher prices, but also real shortages, particularly in grain, as they are heavily import-reliant on Russian and Ukrainian production (for example, Egypt, Pakistan and some countries of the South Caucasus), which in turn can contribute to local supply chain disruptions. Based on the assumption that the conflict continues beyond April, the World Food Programme estimates that an additional 47 million people are at risk of acute hunger in 2022 on top of a baseline of 267 million people.²² Moreover, the shock is likely to occur in waves, the first due to current shipments not being delivered, and the second due to a potential lost harvest in Ukraine, prolonging the economic impact of the hostilities possibly beyond its duration.

This additional inflation spike, combined with the continuing disruptions in global supply chains, is likely to diminish employment growth and real wages, while creating additional pressures on social protection

¹⁷ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, [International Migrant Stock 2020](#).

¹⁸ KNOMAD–World Bank, [Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Implications for Remittance flows to Ukraine and Central Asia](#), Policy Brief 17, 4 March 2022.

¹⁹ OECD, [Economic and Social Impacts and Policy Implications of the War in Ukraine](#), OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report, March 2022.

²⁰ FAO, [The importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for global agricultural markets and the risks associated with the current conflict](#), Information Note, 25 March 2022 update.

²¹ FAO, World Food Situation, [FAO Food Price Index](#).

²² World Food Programme (WFP), [Projected increase in acute food insecurity due to war in Ukraine](#), April 2022.

systems. In many high-income countries, which have recently witnessed signs of a stronger labour market recovery, the fallout from the Ukraine crisis may worsen labour market conditions and reverse some of the gains made. The situation would be particularly hard in low- and middle-income countries, many of which have been unable so far to fully recover from the impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The latest GDP growth estimates indicate that emerging market and developing economies will grow at just 3.8 per cent in 2022, down from 6.8 per cent in the previous year.²³ Beyond these aggregate trends, the economic and labour market impact within low- and middle-income countries

will be uneven, depending on whether countries are commodity exporters or importers. In developing countries dependent on food and fuel imports, the price and trade shocks will have a negative impact on growth, jobs and poverty, while in exporting countries, the benefits of higher commodity prices will depend on the distribution of the gains of trade. In the latter group of economies, the poor, especially in urban areas, can still suffer if their real incomes fall. At the same time, heightened uncertainty and monetary policy tightening in advanced economies can negatively impact financial flows to developing countries, which are already reeling from high levels of debt and limited fiscal space.

► Areas for immediate action

The various impacts described above pose multiple challenges in the medium and long term and call for a differentiated set of responses:

- Due to the disruption of economic activity in the country, the most imminent need is for **humanitarian assistance**, including food, shelter, health and access to cash and in-kind transfers for the displaced and those who remain but who have lost their incomes.
- Immediate and large-scale **support from ILO constituents** is crucial. Despite the difficult situation, social partners in Ukraine have offered direct humanitarian support to conflict-affected populations. Ukrainian trade unions, for instance, have offered shelter and support services for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in different regions. To distribute assistance most effectively, social partners could re-organize the use of their physical infrastructure and professional networks to support the needs of displaced workers and enterprises attempting to relocate to safer areas. Beyond humanitarian help and re-allocation assistance, employers and workers can, through their respective organizations, play an important role in ensuring the continuation of work where possible.

The individual and collective efforts of social partners can positively contribute to cohesion and, in the medium term, foster stability and inclusive economic, social and political development.²⁴ Global support needs to be mobilized to facilitate these efforts.

- In the **areas of Ukraine less affected by conflict, targeted employment support** can be provided, including by building on the ongoing government-sponsored programme to relocate workers and enterprises.²⁵ While the focus of re-allocated enterprises at this point is on the production of essential products and services for humanitarian needs, workers and enterprises can harness new opportunities in those areas of the country where re-located economic activity may restart even before the formal end of the conflict. ILO-supported Local Employment Partnerships (LEPs) can help create job opportunities that reflect specific local needs and combine worker-centric interventions (activation, mobility and reskilling programmes for workers to move into prioritized sectors and geographic areas where they can help meet skills and labour shortages) with enterprise-centric interventions. In this respect, it is also important to ensure learning continuity for children and students,

²³ IMF, [World Economic Outlook, April 2022: War sets back the global recover](#), April 2022.

²⁴ ILO, [Managing Conflicts and Disasters: Exploring Collaboration between Employers' and Workers' Organizations](#), 2020.

²⁵ Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, [Enterprise Relocation Programme](#). Enterprises selected for relocation to one of nine regions (Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Ternopil, Khmelnytsky, Chernivtsi, Vinnytsia, Volyn and Rivne regions) receive a package of support services from the Government of Ukraine, including logistics and procurement of raw materials. As of mid-March, more than 300 enterprises had relocated through this programme.

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including in technical and vocational education and training (TVET).²⁶ Local job creation programmes (for example, employment-intensive investment programmes and public works) with domestic and international funding could also be considered.

- **Refugees and migrants, who have fled Ukraine, and other forcibly displaced persons,** need assistance in the short and medium term, including access to the labour market and social protection as called for in the ILO's 2016 tripartite- Guiding principles on the access of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons to the labour market and ILO Recommendation No. 205 (see Text Box 1). Such assistance can be clustered along five main dimensions:
 - **Providing refugees and displaced persons with social protection,** including cash transfers, so as to ensure income security as well as access to health protection.
 - **Enabling the exchange of Ukrainian currency for host-country currency:** some of the central banks in Ukraine's neighbouring countries have extended swap lines at a fixed exchange rate.
 - **Ensuring childcare and access to schooling** to minimize human capital losses in the long run and enable parents to enter the labour market in host countries.
 - **Enabling integration into formal labour markets,** by minimizing legal barriers and facilitating recognition of prior learning, work experience and qualifications for refugees, migrants and other forcibly displaced persons.
 - **Providing support for finding work** through public employment services in host countries, which can play a crucial role in mapping and matching the skills of refugees with the needs of the host labour market and easing job searches for refugees.
- **Support for the social protection system in Ukraine,** including from international partners, needs to be mobilized to ensure that it continues

to pay benefits, including newly-established cash transfers, to past and new beneficiaries. Beyond financial support, it is essential to align planned humanitarian interventions with the national social protection system. Assistance should also be provided to facilitate the continuation of entitlements for displaced persons in host countries and, in the medium term, support their return and resumption of social security entitlements in Ukraine, particularly in the case of pensioners.

- **Preparations for a post-conflict reconstruction strategy** need to start, taking into account: (1) the rebuilding of infrastructure (including through employment-intensive investment) and human capital; (2) the structural challenges of the Ukrainian labour market which pre-dated the hostilities and which can be addressed through the creation of decent and productive employment; and (3) an assessment of the situation of the social protection system, including the costing of the most relevant forms of social protection, which would need strengthening in the context of the reconstruction of the country.
- **International solidarity** is needed for Ukraine and for neighbouring countries. The UN and other international relief organizations have already set up mechanisms to ensure that global solidarity is reaching those in need. Beyond Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees, global solidarity is also vital for developing economies, which will require additional financial assistance from high-income countries to effectively absorb the economic and trade shock induced by the conflict. In developing countries affected by these shocks, support is needed for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises and workers, especially those operating in the informal economy, to cope with the impact of rising prices and disruptions to supply chains.
- The **ILO** is providing **emergency support** that comprises shelter for refugees and prevention campaigns on human trafficking, food and drinkable water for people living in some of the cities affected by the conflict and retraining of labour inspectors to provide psychological first aid to workers.

²⁶ As at April 29, 1556 educational institutions have been damaged from bombing and shelling, and 102 of them have been completely destroyed. Buildings of 6 VET institutions have been destroyed, 86 have been damaged. The estimated damage cost is approximately EUR 10-12 million per facility. In 18 oblasts of Ukraine (out of 24), TVET is carried out completely in remote mode. In 7 oblasts TVET in schools has been partly resumed. Source: [Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine](#), Overview of the current state of education and science in Ukraine in terms of Russian aggression, April 2022.

Box 1. ILO's policy frameworks

- **The ILO's Employment and Decent Work for Peace and Resilience Recommendation, 2017 (No. 205)**²⁷ constitutes an international normative framework that provides guidance for addressing world-of-work issues in response to crises. Efforts to mainstream decent work in the conflict response in Ukraine should build on a phased multi-track approach that accounts for the spatial differentiation of the conflict while focusing on decent work promotion, labour market access and integration, capacity development and institution building.
- **The ILO's Guiding principles on the access of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons to the labour market** is a set of voluntary, non-binding guiding principles rooted in International Labour Standards and universal human rights instruments which provide practical guidance on the application of policy measures to improve access for refugees and other forcibly displaced persons to the labour market and national social protection systems.

It aims to address the need for more “equitable responsibility sharing” with countries impacted, and to support and assist States in considering the access of these populations to their labour market, and the creation of decent and productive jobs, whilst balancing the needs and expectations of their own citizens.²⁸

- **The ILO's General principles and operational guidelines for fair recruitment** also offer guidance on preventing exploitation and abuse, including risks of human trafficking, and on helping both the refugees and national populations affected to better integrate into labour markets.²⁹ To anticipate the impact of large numbers of migrants leaving Ukraine and the Russian Federation to return to neighbouring countries, the ILO can provide guidance and support for the labour market reintegration of returning migrants.

²⁷ ILO, [Employment and Decent Work for Peace and Resilience, Resource page on Recommendation No. 205](#).

²⁸ ILO, [Guiding principles on the access of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons to the labour market](#), 28 November 2016; and video, [Guiding principles: Access of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons to the labour market](#).

²⁹ Refer especially to principles 12 and 12.1 of the ILO's [General principles and operating guidelines for fair recruitment](#), 2019.

► Statistical annex

A1. Estimated labour market characteristics of the Ukrainian refugee population

Labour force status	Distribution (%)	Full-time or part-time work	Distribution (%)
Employed	43.5	Full-time (>35 hours/week)	87.4
Unemployed	3.7	Part-time <35 hours/week)	7.7
Outside labour force	52.8	Not classified	4.8
Total	100.0	Total	100.0

Occupation (skill level) - Main job	Distribution (%)	Education (aggregate level)	Distribution (%)
Skill level 1 (low)	15.5	Basic	15.3
Skill level 2 (medium)	35.5	Intermediate	18.5
Skill levels 3 and 4 (high)	49.0	Advanced	66.2
Total	100.0	Total	100.0

Occupation (ISCO-08) - Main job	Distribution (%)	Status in employment - Main job	Distribution (%)
Managers	8.3	Employees	88.3
Professionals	25.2	Self-employed	11.7
Technicians and associate professionals	15.5	Total	100.0
Clerical support workers	5.7		
Service and sales workers	21.7		
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers	0.6		
Craft and related trades workers	4.3		
Plant and machine operators, and assemblers	3.2		
Elementary occupations	15.5		
Total	100.0		

Note 1: All indicators except labour force status pertain to previously employed refugees.

Note 2: Numbers may not tally due to rounding.

Source: ILO estimates (see technical annex).

► Technical annex: data and estimation methods

Full details about data and estimation methods are available on the ILO web page located at:

https://www.ilo.org/europe/publications/WCMS_844294/lang--en/index.htm