MANUAL ON
TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS
FOR EX-COMBATANTS

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FOREWORD

The successful reintegration of ex-combatants is a key factor for the stability of post-conflict countries. Indeed, ex-combatants, particularly those motivated by ideology, constitute a group with substantial human potential which, when not channelled into positive economic reconstruction and peace building, can pose a new threat to a fragile post-conflict political and economic environment. Comprehensive reintegration of former combatants will contribute not only to improving their social and economic situation in society but will also advance the cause of post-war rehabilitation and capacity building for economic reconstruction.

The ILO has been continuously receiving requests from member States emerging from armed conflicts for assistance in social and economic rehabilitation to war-affected populations, with ex-combatants as a priority in many cases. ILO assistance in the implementation of national programmes for reintegration of ex-combatants has been aimed at employment creation and promotion; skills training accompanied by the provision of instruments and/or credit to start production of goods and services; and institution building at the national and local levels for development and management of special programmes, including those for women, youth and the disabled.

The objective of this manual is to facilitate, through improved understanding and comprehensive planning, the timely launching of sound operational programmes for the reintegration of former combatants into civilian life. It should, however, be emphasized that since the intensity and impact of different factors vary from country to country, country-specific aspects would need to be added and imaginative approaches developed to tackle specific problems and obstacles. More importantly, reintegration policies and strategies should be mindful of the causes that originally gave rise to the conflict and should be addressed in a very careful manner at the national, regional and local levels.

The manual will be of use to a wide range of organizations and individuals involved in planning, developing, financing and implementing the reintegration programmes for ex-combatants. The ILO would therefore be interested in receiving comments and suggestions from users on such a complex subject. Exchange of experiences will also give valuable insights for ILO programmes covering other war-affected groups, such as refugees and internally displaced, as well as the disabled, youth and women faced with the difficult challenges of social and economic reintegration into normal life after armed conflicts.

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ACRONYMS

ADEMIMA	Mozambican Association of Disabled Veterans
AMODEG	Mozambican Association of War Demobilized
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CORE	Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilized Combatants
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
EGP	Employment Generation Programme
EIW	Employment-Intensive Works
ERRA	Eritrean Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FRP	Feeder Roads Programme
GDI	German Development Institute
GMT	Grass-Roots Management Training
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Cooperation
IFAD	International Fund for International Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
INTRAC	International Training and Research Centre
ISCO	International Standard Classification of Occupations
ISIC	International Standard Industrial Classification
JASPA	Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa
KI	Key Informant
KIA	Key Informants' Approach
KIS	Key Informants' Survey
LEI	Local Employment Initiative
LMI	Labour Market Information
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MES	Modules of Employable Skills (ILO)
NCR	National Committee on Rehabilitation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

PAFDE	Action Programme for the Training of Demobilized Combatants
REST	Relief Society of Tigray
RFR	Rural Feeder Road
SARDC	Southern African Research and Documentation Centre
SDF	Social Dimensions Fund
SDSR	Skills Development for Self-Reliance
SEDCO	Small Enterprises Development Corporation
SIDA	Swedish International Development Authority
TSS	Technical Support Services
UN	United Nations
UNCRC	United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UVAB	Uganda Veterans' Assistance Board
WEP	World Employment Programme
WFP	World Food Programme
ZANU	Zimbabwe Association of National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe Association of Peoples' Union
ZIMFEP	Zimbabwe Foundation for Education and Production
ZNLWVA	Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans' Association
ZWIFT	Zimbabwe Women's Finance Trust

I. THE PROCESS OF DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

Introduction

The purpose of this first section is to: (a) present briefly the principal obstacles to operating reintegration programmes in conflict-affected countries; (b) outline the component steps concerning employment promotion and training for the planning of reintegration programmes; and (c) introduce the discussions in the parts1 that follow.[1]

1. Post-conflict obstacles

In recent years, the character and scale of armed conflicts – from international wars to internal wars – have drastically increased the demands on humanitarian and development agencies of all kinds to assist in emergency relief and peace building. The major challenge which all conflict-affected countries must deal with is the re-establishment of a secure peace. Peace is not simply the cessation of fighting; it is the dynamic management of human, political and economic development and change by non-violent means.

Such non-violent management of change involves reintegrating a large number of population groups (demobilized combatants, internally-displaced populations, refugees and the resident population affected by the conflict) into normal civilian life. It also involves reviving a conflict-affected economy, generating new bases for secure sources of income and reconstructing social and political institutions.

1.1 Continuing hostilities

Even a limited continuation of hostilities poses an obstacle to reintegration efforts. Opportunities for peaceful development can become tangible only once a cease-fire or a comprehensive peace agreement is in place. Such an agreement must provide the first elements or steps for political and economic reconstruction and indicate a willingness on the part of all (former) rival warring parties to cooperate in the reintegration of conflict-affected people. Hence, provisions for peace-making, peace building and post-conflict reconstruction need to include a number of elements, including:

- political reform,
- revision of the military,

1. Throughout this text, the terms \'93demobilized soldier\'94, \'93former soldier\'94, \'93ex-soldier\'94, \'93ex-combatant\'94, or \'93war veteran\'94 are used interchangeably to mean all men, women and children who have been demobilized from the army, from the military or from formal and informal militia. In some countries, one or more of these terms is officially used. Their use here does not in any way imply a dimunition of these terms or the people they represent.

- social/medical rehabilitation,
- economic and trade reform, and
- the promotion of employment through both macroeconomic policy instruments and direct training and employment interventions.

The more detailed and operational the provisions are in a peace agreement on reintegration assistance for demobilized combatants and other conflict-affected groups, the greater the chances that in the initial years after the conflict these people can be helped through well-planned assistance. There is always a danger in the difficult and insecure period immediately following a peace agreement that heavy political demands will distract attention from measures to reintegrate ex-combatants. Thus, reintegration programmes may continue to be largely ad hoc, ill-planned, under-funded or insufficient, with the result that former soldiers remain unemployed and frustrated.

Once demobilized and with nothing to do, these "unemployed" men with fighting experience can, if organized among themselves, cause new security threats and a recurrence of conflicts on a national, regional or local scale. Such threats have indeed presented themselves on numerous occasions. Furthermore, the disadvantaged members of the former warring armies (child soldiers, women soldiers, war-disabled soldiers) may become marginalized and poverty-stricken if no appropriate reintegration programme is planned well in advance of demobilization.

The initial plans for reintegration (within a peace agreement, for example) should provide for the overall context of the demobilization of military personnel and comprehensive reintegration and rehabilitation. The agreement may indicate whether any overall national coordinating agency will be established to oversee reintegration. It may also include a timetable for demobilization followed by a timetable for transitional arrangements and the organization of a donor meeting to begin planning the funding of reintegration and rehabilitation work.

1.2 Social factors

The impact of violent conflicts on human society is usually devastating. Wars weaken social, community and family cohesion, with the consequence that traditional decision-making and income-earning structures as well as traditional and modern social security provisions are severely damaged, if not entirely lost.

The number of combatants to be demobilized (the target group) is large enough to justify the required investment of time and finances to plan, organize and provide comprehensive reintegration programmes that include employment promotion, labour market information surveys and various training strategies. For example, in 1995 there were some 250,000 ex-combatants in Angola; approximately 60,000 in Eritrea; 326,000 in Ethiopia; 60,000 in Liberia; and 146,000 in Mozambique. Uganda still had to deal with the reintegration of about 50,000 former soldiers. The number of other war-displaced persons

(returning refugees and internally-displaced) is on average five times greater. All these groups need employment and income opportunities.

In addition, any post-conflict situation leaves its mark on the economy in general and on the labour force in particular. Unusually large numbers of war victims and displaced persons (disabled, refugees and dependants) must seek new ways to enter productive life. In Ethiopia in 1994, for example, the UNHCR claimed that there were some 450,000 refugees returning from neighbouring countries who must find economically sustainable means to survive. Furthermore, in Ethiopia there are nearly 2 million persons (children, youth and adults) with disabilities, as well as over 50,000 disabled ex-combatants, who must all be supported. In other African conflict-affected countries, the situation is similar – if not in the number of displaced persons, then in the enormity of the task to create income-earning opportunities for the unemployed.

The effect of war on human psychology has a considerable impact on social and community stability. Conflict creates high levels of trauma which in turn distorts patterns of behaviour and adversely affects post-conflict social and economic development. Moreover, traumatic stress tends to exacerbate the already-existing segmentation of society along ethnic, religious, linguistic or regional lines. These aspects assume importance in decentralized planning and the implementation of reintegration programmes.

The difficulty in establishing or encouraging positive economic development and facilitating a reintegration programme is highlighted by an example from a study in Namibia.[2] Reintegration planning and programme activities by the National Committee on Rehabilitation (NCR) (which included United Nations (UN) and non-governmental (NGO) agencies) were hampered by social, racial and class-based animosity. This produced hostility and frustration among ex-combatants, especially the weakest among them (people with disabilities, women and youth). Social and economic discrimination led to negatively biased attitudes on all sides – government administrators, employers and the demobilized ex-combatants.

Among the many factors which should be taken into account in planning reintegration programmes are: (i) distrust and suspicion among the political factions and parties to the conflict; (ii) a high level of conflict-related trauma which affects all aspects of post-conflict life and work; (iii) an unstable social situation and insufficient social cohesion due to war-time population displacements; (iv) a weak capacity of the communities to support reintegration and assimilate demobilized combatants, refugees and migrants into their midst; (v) remaining military/ police insecurity or high levels of crime;

2. R. Hayne: \'93The Namibian experience\'94, in }{\plain \i\f1 Rehabilitation and reintegration of disabled ex-combatants}{\plain \f1 , prepared by R. Ransom (Geneva, ILO), April 1995, pp. 7, 9-10.

(vi) inaccessibility of some areas because of damaged roads and communication installations or because of landmines; and (vii) and weak administrative and institutional structures, restructuring of government agencies, limited capacity for employment creation and for social services under structural adjustment and economic reform programmes.

A variety of negative perceptions concerning the attitudes of the population towards former soldiers should be noted. Many communities refuse to accept ex-combatants because of the image of violence which they represented during conflict. Depending on local pre-war customs and traditions, and perhaps because of war-time experiences (pillage, rape, kidnapping, etc.), ex-combatants are sometimes rejected by the civilian population – being considered as "having blood on their hands". Other reasons for discrimination against the former soldiers include:

- because they were wounded, many have become permanently disabled or have failed to meet the civilians' expectations as war heros;
- they may have abandoned their communities when they were most needed to work and protect their families during the hardships of war;
- they obtain demobilization payments or reintegration assistance which their village/community members do not receive;
- some of the ex-combatants are either women who are spurned for having left the home or when they are boys and girls who have learned the soldier's way of life instead of civilian community life.

Sadly, former combatants who have become permanently disabled in combat-related activities are at times also discriminated against or abandoned by their families because they are regarded as a burden on often already poor communities.

1.3 Political factors

Following a major conflict, the political climate is usually fragile. Given the often uncertain and confused post-conflict situation, the governments which inherit national affairs may be unable for a variety of reasons to manage the immense tasks of post-conflict reconstruction, including the reintegration programmes for demobilized combatants.

Inexperienced administrations sometimes tend to over-estimate available capacities and their ability to coordinate programme development and operation. There is also a tendency to evaluate their national economy too optimistically in the short term and expect demobilized combatants to become rapidly independent by finding their own income-earning activities. The consequence is that financial needs for long-term benefit packages are frequently underestimated and that, hence, financial allocations for rehabilitation, training and reintegration assistance are inadequate.

Most post-conflict governments and their external partners are in a hurry to rebuild and move as quickly as possible from emergency relief to rehabilitation and development. In the process, there is a tendency to telescope different stages of programme formulation and implementation, sometimes ignoring some of the many constraints indicated in the preceding paragraphs. Setting unrealistic timetables is a continuing problem.

While demobilization can be completed within a few weeks, it is not sufficiently realized that reintegration may take many years. The reconstruction and rehabilitation of a conflict-affected economy and society could take one or more decades. What is initially planned as short term could take five to seven years to complete. The scale of infrastructure reconstruction, de-mining or other employment promotion schemes should therefore be based on realistic timeframes and the availability of finances.

1.4 Economic factors

Most conflict-affected countries have suffered from low economic growth during the years of conflict. In some, economic performance was unsatisfactory even before the conflict, and unemployment and poverty were already widespread. Many conflict-affected countries are classified as least-developed countries. It goes without saying that developing their economies is the most important element of any post-conflict reconstruction effort. Reintegrating demobilized combatants and other war-affected population groups is one essential component of such an effort. It requires creating income-earning opportunities through legislative and administrative policy reforms as well as active employment promotion policies and strategies.

In the post-conflict period, new economic and socio-political reconstruction policies tend to be based on assumptions of quick post-conflict recovery and economic prosperity. The ability of most post-conflict countries to implement enabling policies is limited because, for example, government ministries must design policies based on uncertain marketing gains or outcomes in a fragile economic environment. It is difficult, to say the least, for government legislatures and civil service institutions – already weakened by years of conflict – to cope with the complex task of designing and implementing new economic enabling policies and to facilitate the development of private small and medium enterprises.[3]

In some countries, "inappropriate" economic policies have discouraged private-sector development in general and individual initiative in particular. Several of the countries affected by conflict had

3. In this text, small enterprises are taken to be those registered and unregistered private businesses which have less than ten employees. More specifically, micro enterprises are more often informal, unregistered and operated by a single individual, a family or a group with a minimum of capital investment, while small and medium-sized businesses may formally employ staff and be owned, managed and operated by several individuals or by a community-based cooperative.

adopted policies involving centralization of economic decision-making and state ownership (e.g. Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique). Their economic strategy was based on direct controls, regulatory industrial policies, restrictive trade policies and price controls. Such policies resulted in a proliferation of the administrative apparatus and in the gradual dismantling of institutions, mechanisms and instruments for the development of private enterprise and small business.

In almost all conflict-affected countries, industrial activity suffers because the lack of foreign exchange has affected the supply of machinery, equipment, spare parts and imported raw material. Even where small enterprises do not depend directly on supplies of imported raw material, they are affected by the non-availability of second-hand equipment and recycled material in the domestic market. The system of foreign exchange allocation is more favourable to large enterprises and is often biased against small enterprises. Import policies may also discriminate against small enterprises by permitting foreign-made goods to enter the market when these same goods can be produced locally and thereby supply employment.

2. Component steps in reintegration planning

2.1 The demobilization process

Demobilization begins when combatants are brought to predetermined assembly points or transit centres for military debriefing procedures, processing and documentation. An important element of the demobilization phase, which must be planned in advance, is the collection of data on each combatant who leaves the formal government army or an informal military/guerrilla formation. The future reintegration programme is in large part based on the information gathered at the encampment site during demobilization. Interviews are usually held at demobilization encampment sites or transit centres to obtain information about the combatants' needs and their ability to re-enter civilian and economic life and to inform them about the opportunities for training and employment (see further the sample survey of ex-combatants in Annex 1).

2.2 Institutional and operational framework

The need for a high-level organization or principal agency to deal exclusively with demobilization has been recognized in many countries. Combatants who have spent years in the army have normally been supported financially by the military establishment or the militia organization. It is important that alternative support be developed for them after demobilization, and this should be provided by the agency.

In the first post-demobilization period (one to three years), a high-level organization or agency is often required, while over the

long term an organization composed of beneficiaries (such as an association of war veterans) could be the most appropriate body to carry out counselling and provide aid as well as assistance with socio-economic rehabilitation and integration.

Common elements of reintegration programmes which have been established to date are a high-level government-funded organization or agency and a more regionally and locally operated organization that is either entirely managed by official government bodies or run by the ex-combatants themselves.

In Angola, a separate ministry (Secretaria de Esrado dos Antigos Combatentes) to handle all questions relating to demobilized combatants of the liberation war was created in May 1982. Then in August 1985, an Association of Former Combatants was established with the President of the Republic as the head.[4] Following this, an Inter-Ministerial Committee for Assistance to Demobilized Soldiers was established by the Government of Angola in November 1991. This Committee comprises representatives of ten government ministries: the Office of the Prime Minster, the Ministries of Defence, Education, Territorial Administration, Planning, Public Works and Urban Areas, Labour, Public Administration and Social Security, Finance, Agriculture and Rural Development, and the Secretariat of State for Former Combatants.

In Zimbabwe, a Demobilization Directorate was established to plan and organize the demobilization programme. It was a high-level interministerial body supported by officials from former senior combatants and commanders of the respective armies.

In Ethiopia, a National Commission for the Rehabilitation of Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans has been established. The mandate of the Commission is to mobilize the resources necessary to expedite the resettlement of ex-combatants in their respective communities of origin. An Advisory Committee was appointed to assist this Commission and is composed of the Vice-Ministers of Agriculture, Education, Industry, Construction, Labour and Social Affairs, the Commissioner of Relief and Rehabilitation, and the Ethiopian Red Cross Society. Similar interministerial structures have been created at the regional level in Ethiopia.

In Eritrea, the principal responsibility for demobilization and reintegration is with the Eritrean Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (ERRA). A special section has been created to deal with the demobilization and integration of former combatants. Following an early study by the ILO in Liberia, a National Commission for the

4. M. Mukwewa and J. Mayer: \'93Mission report to the Republic of Angola on the socio-economic reintegration of former combatants\'94 (UNDP/ILO, Luanda, Aug. 1990), in }{\plain \i\f1 Reintegrating demobilized combatants: A report exploring options and strategies for training-related interventions}{\plain \f1 , by R.K. Srivastava (Geneva, ILO), 1994, p. 3.

Coordination and Implementation of the Reintegration Programme for the Demobilized (REPRODE) has been proposed. This office is to be assisted by one or more technical committees and community-level structures.

In Mozambique, a Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilized Combatants (CORE) was instituted. It comprised United Nations officials as well as representatives of both parties to the war – Frelimo and Renamo – as provided in the peace agreement. Its mandate was to facilitate the social and economic integration of demobilized combatants into civilian society and to plan, coordinate and monitor programmes that directly affect the reintegration process. Eleven offices were set up at the provincial level for counselling and referral services (including matching the needs of ex-combatants with available reintegration assistance programmes). Furthermore, a Veterans' Association was formed soon after independence from colonial rule and recently followed by a new Association for Demobilized Combatants of the Mozambique Armed Forces.[5]

All these diverse kinds of national commissions, committees or principal reintegration agencies are expected to be temporary. Once the process of reintegration is on its way, their tasks are to be taken over by normal government structures. The same is usually the case for veterans' associations; however, these tend to incorporate other functions in the years following a conflict and a reintegration programme. Their functions may be a long-term representation of ex-combatants at the central and local governmental assemblies, assisting its members in the use of government assistance, commemorating the fallen veterans in past wars, and acting as a communications channel between the veterans and the government.

The nature and timeframe of organizational arrangements have important implications for employment and training. For example, without a high-level coordinating mechanism, it often becomes difficult to disseminate assistance and information on available benefits across various sectors of the economy as well as across different social classes and rural/urban divisions. Also, only a high-level agency or other arrangement can determine and influence decisions of the various ministries involved and set national standards on the size of employment and training assistance programmes, the variety of programmes offered or the timeframe within which they are to be made available to ex-combatants.

2.3 Option-specific guidelines

The employment-creation options recommended in reintegration programmes by the ILO include the following: **skills training**, **employment-intensive public works programmes**, and **small enterprise development**. The common aim of these three options is to promote and facilitate the employment of ex-combatants.

5. Srivastava, op. cit., p. 4.

These three options are not the only ones available. For example, the reconstruction or promotion of agriculture has much potential and does provide many war-affected people with a sustainable livelihood. However, the development of agriculture is not considered here. But this option may be problematic in countries where landmines are widespread and render much arable land unusable until demining has taken place.

To achieve the aim of promoting and facilitating the employment of ex-combatants, labour market information as well as data on the needs and capacities of demobilized combatants to attend skills training and obtain or create their own employment are indispensable. Labour market analysis and needs assessments are processes which can be subdivided into the following four elements: (1) collecting information/data on the existing labour and policy environment, (2) discovering labour needs and trends through targeted studies such as Key Informants' Surveys (KISs), (3) indicating training and skill needs, and (4) carrying out feasibility studies and long-term monitoring of successful employment promotion as well as of the performance of reintegration programmes for war-displaced persons (see further IV, V and VI).

Reintegration depends critically on the ability of the economy to generate employment and income-earning opportunities whether in agriculture, the formal industrial sector or the multitude of informal activities. The total (re)employment task in conflict-affected countries is usually enormous, given the high levels of poverty, the usually unbalanced nature of the economy and the lack of economic growth.

Besides the high levels of open unemployment in the urban sector and under-employment in the rural sector, the number of new entrants to the labour market is large due to the resettlement of war-affected people – returning refugees, internally-displaced persons and demobilized combatants with their dependants. Each of these categories constitutes a large group in need of assistance in returning to a normal and economically sustainable life.

2.3.1 Skills training

To avoid massive unemployment and declining morale, it is important for all ex-combatants (as well as all other war-affected and displaced persons) to have the opportunity to develop a new sense of identity which is not linked to the war. A healthy civilian identity can be encouraged through vocational training and constructive work that contributes to individual and community well-being. Training and work activities also contribute to the re-establishment of values, behaviour and norms that regulate and give meaning to family and community life. While such comprehensive psycho-social rehabilitation is by no means simple, a well-planned and funded reintegration and employment creation process will enhance the ex-soldiers' self-esteem and thus also contribute to community capacity building and socio-economic development.

A considerable amount of preparatory reconstruction and rehabilitation work can be initiated through employment generation. However, information in the form of statistical data and labour market surveys is required to provide an overview of the kinds of employment and vocational training which will best facilitate economic and social recovery. At international donor meetings as well as in the preparation of proposals and requests for external financing of post-conflict reconstruction and development assistance, the topic of vocational training for war-affected people must figure high on the agenda.[6]

2.3.2 Employment-intensive public works programmes

The rebuilding of the infrastructure (road, rail, shipping or air transportation, communications, energy supply, providing water for households and irrigation, etc.) is one way of providing temporary wage employment for large numbers of unemployed people. The physical infrastructure is usually targeted for destruction during conflicts, and this has widespread implications for human development and makes the resumption of economic activity more difficult during the post-conflict period. Its reconstruction is therefore a crucial first step in the recovery process.

Most community and social services (schools, medical clinics, employment and business support) depend on a useable physical infrastructure, but these are among the first to suffer as they are targeted during conflicts. Estimates of damage to the infrastructure are usually made following conflicts, but it is difficult to measure the impact of war-time destruction on the economy (long-term effects of lost education, medical services, and employment). Damage to the infrastructure directly affects productive and economic activities (small and micro enterprises) by cutting off information and the supply of raw materials, as well as the transportation of products to markets.

In the post-conflict period, however, the restoration and reconstruction of the infrastructure can provide a much-needed boost to the small and micro enterprise sector through the injection of extra income which generates the demand for a wide range of products and services and stimulates local trade. Opportunities to improve technology may arise in construction, transport and manufacturing as a result of the emphasis on speedily restoring access to agricultural and related rural sectors. At times, such opportunities are the result of local and international NGO programmes intended to generate income and employment and of external aid programmes by various agencies targeted either to specific population groups or regions of a conflict-affected country.

2.3.3 Small enterprise development

A climate of business confidence and an environment of minimum security and stability are important for small entrepreneurs, especially those who are involved in manufacturing activities. In most cases, post-conflict political uncertainty increases the risk factor for private

6. Further information on feasibility studies for training is presented in IV and Annex 3.

entrepreneurs in both rural and urban areas, with the result that the overall environment for private-sector development is not yet favourable. Furthermore, insecurity and the displacement of the population have frequently interrupted production and trading systems. In areas of intense fighting, almost nothing is left of pre-conflict small and micro enterprise structures.

Wherever massive displacement of the population has taken place, the greatest damage is to agriculture and small enterprises in terms of output, income and employment. The disruption of agricultural activity and the loss of agro-processing facilities and livestock have severely curtailed food production and increased insecurity. The extreme cases of Angola and Uganda should be noted in this regard. These countries were self-sufficient in food before conflicts started but became increasingly dependent on food imports and have been on the verge of famine. A consequence which can be observed in most war-affected countries is that with lost agricultural and related incomes the demand for the products and services has declined drastically. With a decline in economic activity, unemployment and under-employment in urban and rural areas become problematic. The resumption of agricultural activity in post-conflict conditions is therefore the prime target for any reconstruction of the economy.

In general, the development of small rural and urban enterprises is affected by a variety of macroeconomic factors such as:

- high military expenditure;
- low economic growth and low per capita income;
- structural adjustment and economic reform;
- a narrow industrial base; and
- high inflation.

The more a war has damaged a country's socio-economic structures, the greater the effect each of these factors becomes. In addition, economic difficulties are exacerbated by an uncertain political environment, the breakdown or destruction of the economic and social infrastructure and markets and institutions, weaknesses in inputs, and increased demographic and social pressures.

The risks for private-sector and small-enterprise development are greatly increased as a result of a combination of the negative economic factors. Employment opportunities exist only if the people who could become economically active know (either through experience or learning) about the possibilities for marketing new products and services. This requires comprehensive information dissemination, training packages based on sound market assessments and employment counselling.

Institutional support, often eroded during the conflict, is vital for all sectors of economic activity to support post-conflict rebuilding. It is difficult to design formal institutional structures which adequately support and promote business activity in any political or social

environment. In a conflict-affected country, institutions left over from government administrations during and before the conflict are rarely able to provide comprehensive support to their public and private business communities. In most cases, Ministries of Finance, Industry, Trade, Communication, Transportation, etc. must be rebuilt and staffed with new and less-experienced personnel.

In the case of promoting and facilitating industrial entrepreneurship, government institutions must provide for highly specific and demand-oriented needs that can broadly be divided into four categories:

- **information** relates to business opportunities, markets, prices and supplies;
- **training**, even very short but specific training, can help most small and micro enterprises provided it is specific to their needs and should be facilitated via government policies stimulation packages (legal acts), private investments and simplified wage/tax payment methods that make it easier for individuals to begin their own enterprises and employ people;
- c**redit** is a critical part of the operation of small enterprises and businesses; and
- **extension services** should seek to provide advice and assistance for business start-up, information on technology and production processes, input supplies and keeping of inventories, marketing, advice on licensing and other procedures, and advice on obtaining credit. In most conflict-affected countries, the provision of extension services has been weakened or broken down entirely.

This wide spectrum of institutional needs requires a variety of mechanisms. In some conflict-affected countries, government institutions attempt to perform some of these functions such as licensing and registration, training, and to some extent technical advice on technology and credit. In several African countries, a large number of NGOs, religious groups and private-sector organizations also provide support to small and micro enterprises, particularly in training, credit, technology and extension.

Conflict-affected countries require not only the maximum application of all human skills and knowledge, but also financial resources and material support of all kinds (building materials and tools, medical and office equipment, food processing and transportation facilities, etc.). Often, the financial resources required for a complete reintegration programme for demobilized combatants are not available, given that many other post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation projects (refugee resettlement, infrastructure rebuilding, etc.) make demands on the government and donor budgets. Such restraints call for careful and realistic planning.

II. EMPLOYMENT PROMOTION OPTIONS

Introduction

The creation of employment and income opportunities on a large scale at a relatively low capital cost is one of the greatest challenges in war-stricken countries. Employment opportunities are usually scarce, and their promotion should form part of national post-conflict economic reconstruction schemes.

In response to the usually large numbers of unemployed in the immediate post-conflict situation, governments often initiate programmes to provide rapid wage employment. This may be development of agriculture and food processing, reconstructing the public infrastructure and public industries, subsidizing private rural and urban businesses or developing the civil service.[7] However, formal wage employment can rarely satisfy all war-affected people. Most of them (refugees/returnees, internally-displaced persons and soldiers to be demobilized) need stable, long-term livelihoods and incomes.

Public labour-intensive works projects to rebuild a war-damaged infrastructure can provide temporary employment for large numbers of war-affected people (see V), but they rarely offer long-term employment to large numbers of people. Employment solutions need to be found in the (formal and informal) private enterprise sector, which usually implies that education and training programmes are required for large numbers of war-affected people (see IV and VI).

As can be seen in most countries in the industrialized and the developing world, small and medium-sized businesses provide the largest number of jobs. Whether in rural or urban environments, it is the private sector of the economy which must be promoted, encouraged and facilitated through government policies (i.e. macroeconomic instruments) and direct training interventions.

The majority of countries affected by war have fragile economies, a low level of development and a high level of poverty. A characteristic of most post-conflict countries is that they have rapidly increasing numbers of new young entrants into the labour market besides their existing numbers of unemployed and under-employed. While a large labour force may be an asset in economies where there is also large capital investment available, the economies of war-affected countries face the burden of weak employment capacity with a small formal sector of available wage-paying jobs.

Moreover, prolonged periods of conflict have usually caused widespread damage to the economic and social infrastructure as well as to agriculture and rural subsistence economies. Under-funding of

7. While there are still many other methods available to create employment, this text focuses on labour-intensive public works in so far as rapid wage-paying employment is concerned. Skills training and small enterprise development are further recommended here for the development of sustainable employment.

government services, especially in education and health, and weakness in administrative capacity are conspicuous in many post-conflict societies. While it is unrealistic to expect a quick development of capital investments and new employment opportunities in war-affected countries, some measures to promote employment can and must be taken as quickly as possible once a conflict has ended. The population must be helped to take up or create new income-earning activities.

1. *From labour market surveys to creating sustainable employment*

Since post-conflict reconstruction and the reintegration of ex-combatants depend to a great extent on the existence of employment and training opportunities, the labour market must be analysed as early as possible to assess what kind of jobs and training will most effectively contribute to sustainable employment. Such analytical work consists of two elements: studies of past economic performance and of the existing (immediate post-conflict) labour situation. The purpose is to see whether the essential enabling environment for employment creation and skill development exists and, if not, how to best promote its development.

Various methods for studying the labour market and providing information on training, education and employment needs exist. In the post-conflict situation, however, each method must be adapted to suit local capacities and needs. The KIS (discussed in III) and the training feasibility study (discussed in IV) are suggested below as means to promote direct skills training and employment-creation efforts. These methods of analysis may further support a development of internship and apprenticeship schemes by identifying the most useful and needed disciplines and skills, as well as identifying local skilled crafts people who may act as trainers-employers.

Post-conflict training strategies and employment promotion programmes should be developed with a dual objective in mind: to build a national capacity for developing flexible education and training methods which meet both short-term and long-term needs for post-conflict reconstruction and development and to contribute to the long-term development of training for sustainable employment.

Concerning the employment of former combatants, there are two main aspects which may be considered. Depending upon the scope and nature of the reintegration programme and the nature of training interventions planned or offered, these aspects are direct employment creation programmes and macroeconomic instruments. The best

strategy will be to achieve complementarity between these two approaches.

On the macroeconomic side, these instruments include, for example, legislative reforms to facilitate the development of private enterprises (i.e. business law, taxation and employment regulations), simplifying business licensing and related administrative procedures, subsidizing energy costs or lowering transportation costs and trade barriers, etc. Methods of direct employment creation are, for example, labour-intensive infrastructure repairs and public works projects, the expansion of the civil service, subsidizing or otherwise supporting wage employment in private businesses (employment subsidies, tax breaks, etc.), formal employment in the military or subsidizing specific economic sector activities (transportation, food production, etc.).

There are still a host of other instruments which the government and private institutions can adopt to promote employment, such as the training of teachers and trainers for educational and vocational programmes, offering or redistributing land for agricultural production, lowering the costs of education and medical care, etc.

In very simplified terms, the resettlement and employment of ex-combatants requires: (1) a survey in the different regions of the country to identify area-specific activities and economic development potential through labour market analyses and needs assessments; (2) feasibility studies for training for those activities which show growth, market demand and employment/entrepreneurship potential; (3) formulation of a training and employment promotion programme by defining the components, inputs, support mechanisms (raw materials, credit, technical back-up, markets) and outputs; and (4) follow-up studies of the indicators of success (income, sales, repayment of loans, etc.).

Information on economic performance before, during and after the war must be collected. Also included should be assessments of how the economy is expected to perform under public investment programmes or under structural adjustment programmes. In such studies, the impact of economic adjustment programmes on employment must also include estimates of the effects on reintegration assistance for ex-combatants.

2. Rural and urban development through the informal sector

The informal economic sector is perhaps the most important source of income for war-affected and displaced persons. Given that most

economies in the immediate post-conflict period can support only few formal wage-paying jobs, the majority of the population must find income-earning opportunities in informal activities and in agriculture. The capacity of the formal sector of post-conflict economies to supply employment is often severely diminished because of the weakened state of industrial production and because of the increase in the number of unemployed. In contrast, employment opportunities can be created in the (rural and urban) informal sector and in itinerant and indigenous micro enterprises.[8]

In Uganda, for example, the total number of persons employed in the formal sector in 1988 was 378,000. This works out to 5.3 per cent of the labour force. However, the informal sector was estimated to provide work for about 13.7 per cent of the labour force – about one and a half times more than the formal sector. In view of the very limited scope for absorption of workers in the formal sector, it is the informal sector which has to contain the situation and provide refuge to the growing labour force.[9]

In Ethiopia, itinerant, indigenous and traditional micro enterprises account for some 90 per cent of informal sector employment. Most of this is in self-employment, mainly in services, craft industry, transportation, retail trade, agriculture, etc.[10]

In Somalia, where the civil war of 1991 resulted in 350,000 internally-displaced persons, it was observed that the micro-enterprise and small-business sector has become the major source of employment creation. In many cases, this type of employment is a mechanism for coping with falling family incomes in the absence of tangible job opportunities and should be developed.

Since agriculture is the dominant sector in developing countries and sustains the largest number of working people, it is important that the rural sector generate productive employment.[11] For the large numbers of job seekers who are either war-affected or have been made redundant under economic structural adjustment programmes, the rural non-farm sector must provide them with alternative employment opportunities.

8. \'93Itinerant\'94 micro enterprises consist mostly of single persons who work for themselves in an irregular and impermanent manner, while indigenous and traditional micro enterprises are more structured and longer lasting. All such micro enterprises are usually informal, un-licensed and pay no government tax.
9. Manpower Planning Department, Ministry of Planning and Economic Development: }{\plain \i\f1 Manpower and employment in Uganda: Report of the National Manpower Survey}{\plain \f1 (Kampala, 1998). See also reports of the Ugandan Veterans\'92 Assistance Board (in bibliography) and }{\plain \i\f1 Reintegrating demobilized combatants: Experiences from four African countries}{\plain \f1 (Geneva, ILO), 1995.
10. For further information on Ethiopia, see for example: ILO/WEP: }{\plain \i\f1 Ethiopia: Towards sustained employment promotion}{\plain \f1 , report of an ILO TSS1 mission on employment and human resources development in Ethiopia, JASPA, 1993.
11. While commercial agriculture and private food production are most important in terms of providing income-earning activities, these are not discussed in this text as their development is usually aimed at all rural population groups.

However, various constraints hamper the development of rural non-farm activities and job-creation projects. The most important constraints are institutional, technological, capital availability, access to market information and lacking infrastructure services. Rural non-farm activities need to be supported by adequate policy measures such as macroeconomic policy instruments, self-employment training and labour-intensive public works.

3. *Facilitating employment through group organization*

Cooperatives and other traditional group formations have been playing an important role in most developing countries. They frequently provide essential agricultural commodities with additional goods and services and form at times the main source of cash income to extended families or villages.[12] Besides traditional support groups and modern entrepreneurial cooperatives, other formal and informal groups exist which support social integration, skills training and employment. Among these are local NGOs, religious communities, health-care networks, associations for certain target groups (i.e. women, orphans, disabled persons and ex-combatants)[13] or for specific purposes (health-care counselling, resettlement, housing, land, schooling, employment, training, etc.).

Ideally, and according to the ILO, support groups should be encouraged at all levels of society to build trust and socio-economic linkages. Trust and information exchange are of crucial importance immediately following a war or a regional conflict. Support groups can contribute to developing and improving the economic, social and cultural situation of persons of limited resources who have few opportunities otherwise to become economically self-sufficient. They can encourage a spirit of social initiative and entrepreneurial creativity and increase income and employment through a fuller utilization of resources, for instance in the implementation of agrarian reform systems and land settlements aimed to bring areas into more productive use or by facilitating skills training.

Cooperatives and support groups of all kinds can provide a base for further socio-economic advancement by raising awareness of potential new sources of information and constructive education as well as opportunities for small enterprise development. Studies of cooperatives in Zimbabwe and Nicaragua indicate that there is a great potential for developing cooperative enterprises. Projects implemented

12. See further, ILO Recommendation 127 (1966) concerning the role of cooperatives in the economic and social development of developing countries.
13. See VII, VIII and IX on the special groups of ex-combatants.

under the auspices or the participation of NGOs have contributed towards the creation of productive income-generating activities for ex-combatants and other disadvantaged groups. In order to achieve these objectives, it is important that there is a clearly defined government policy that facilitates the development of cooperatives.[14]

In the immediate post-conflict situation, however, the development of support groups and cooperatives of all kinds is often hampered by severe problems related to mutual suspicion, discrimination, and fear. On the one hand, communities that have suffered during violent conflicts frequently do not wish to see ex-combatants settle in their midst or participate in their economic activities. On the other hand, former combatants sometimes harbour feelings of animosity towards civilians, because perhaps they feel they sacrificed many years for the war and now find themselves without home, family or a community support structure (see VII and IX).

Specific target groups such as ex-combatants would benefit immensely from community support groups which could help them resettle, obtain appropriate skills training, find jobs or begin their own micro enterprises.[15] Such support groups do exist in various countries, such as Eritrea and Uganda, under different names. Most beneficial to ex-combatants, most appropriate for local communities and most useful for government reintegration agencies have been associations for ex-combatants organized and managed by the war veterans themselves. Given that they usually understand each other's needs better than external assistance groups, they are often the best placed to organize networks for their own information exchange, skills training, employment promotion, and psycho-social rehabilitation counselling.[16] Such mutual assistance associations can help each other and benefit from their cooperation by informing each other about official veterans' assistance programmes available as well as about labour market developments, education and training opportunities and employment possibilities throughout the country.

4. *Local employment initiatives*

Another method to support employment promotion is the local employment initiative (LEI). This is often one of very few sources, if

14. The framework for such a policy is outlined in ILO Recommendation No.127. This Recommendation applies to all categories of cooperatives. Here reference is made to agricultural production and processing, rural supply, rural marketing, fishery, land improvement, services, handicrafts and transportation.
15. While support groups are recommended here for ex-combatants in particular, all war-affected groups such as refugees, internally-displaced persons, unemployed former civil or industrial employees, farmers who have lost the use of their land because the danger of landmines, etc. can benefit by developing their own associations.
16. See VII and X for more information on the benefits which ex-combatants\'92 associations can provide for all parties concerned with reintegration.

not the only one, of new job opportunities in economically distressed communities. The people who embark on LEIs do not have the classical profile of the entrepreneur as regards education, previous business experience, availability of capital or networks of business relations.[17]

Since the early 1980s, international and national measures, especially in Western Europe through the European Community and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), have contributed to the success of local employment initiatives by providing direct or indirect support to people wishing to establish themselves in a small enterprise.[18] LEIs are significant with respect to what can be done (and how) to provide work for job seekers in regions affected by long-term unemployment. This refers "especially to young people in search of employment, and where the realization that work is no longer to be found elsewhere has given an added impetus to the self-reliant creation of work opportunities nearer home".[19]

In Eritrea, an example of local initiatives illustrates the possibilities which such LEI projects can give to local communities. In Senafe and Seraye Provinces, a group of 30 ex-combatants organized themselves, put their financial resources together and came to the MITIAS[20] government department for advice. The latter assisted them in a feasibility study, the formulation of a project, and obtaining land and building materials from the local authorities. The project was designed as a workshop to make metal windows, doors and frames.

Similar assistance was given to four groups of 19 ex-combatants engaged in small-scale economic activities such as bakery, grocery and irrigated agriculture in Seraye Province. Information collection and dissemination was another important part of the services given to the ex-combatants through radio, television and newspapers and by conducting public seminars. Beneficiaries were informed of the self-employment potential and opportunities in the selected localities.[21] These and other examples indicated that ex-combatants and other war-affected people can fit into various types of local employment initiatives if these are part of a comprehensive reintegration assistance and training programme.

17. Peter Kuenstler: \'93Local employment initiatives\'94, in }{\plain \i\f1 International Labour Review}{\plain \f1 , (Geneva, ILO), Vol. 127, No.4, 1988, p.464.
18. Local employment initiative projects have been developed in a large number of European countries such as France, Germany, Greece, the United Kingdom, Italy and Portugal.
19. Kuenstler: \'93Local employment initiatives in Western Europe", in }{\plain \i\f1 International Labour Review}{\plain \f1 , (Geneva, ILO), Vol. 123, No.2, March-April 1984, p.224.
20. \'93Mitias\'94 is a Tigrinya word which denotes the traditional communal support system that helps a member of the community to start a new life. It is the name of the semi-autonomous Department of Reintegration for Demobilized Fighters. (German Development Institute (GDI): }{\plain \i\f1 Promoting the reintegration of former female and male combatants of Eritrea}{\plain \f1 , 1995, p.34).
21. }{\plain \i\f1 Labour market assessments for the reintegration of ex-combatants in war affected sub-Saharan African countries, }{\plain \f1 ILO, Labour Market Policies Branch, Geneva, 1995, p.30.

Apart from employment creation, there may be other grounds for promoting LEIs. For instance, they can contribute to entrepreneurship management and socio-economic development, and they give people the possibility to acquire self-confidence and independence from external assistance. Furthermore, in the context of the recent shifts towards open market economies (such as in Angola, Eritrea, Mozambique, etc.), LEIs may provide a fresh dimension to the notion of individual initiative and to employment patterns in the labour market.

5. Providing employment through labour-intensive public works

A large number of conflict-affected countries have adopted labour-intensive public works programmes within the framework of their overall demobilization and reintegration policy (see V). Where these programmes have been effectively implemented, they have generated employment for ex-combatants as well as other groups. Such programmes entail a range of important social issues that go beyond the scope of this text.

To summarize, these programmes generally combine the construction of productive and social infrastructures and the use of locally available and mainly unskilled labour as well as local technologies. Their other advantages are that they provide on-the-job training for many workers, that popular participation, including that of women, can lead to larger capacity building for rural or urban communities, and that because of the economic activity which they initiate, larger related support activities may grow and support local economic and social development (food and supplies for the workers, services, trade, etc.).[22]

6. Promoting formal business development

While the informal enterprise sector provides many people with an income, it is the formal small and medium enterprise sector which most countries wish to see growing. Besides providing employment, formal businesses of all sizes pay taxes and can be included in government statistics and in labour market information analyses.

22. Jean Mayer: }{\plain \i\f1 Relevance and potential of labour-based community reconstruction and employment programmes in Mozambique}{\plain \f1 , (Geneva, ILO), Jan. 1995, p.10.

Furthermore, formal enterprises of all sizes can also act as a training ground by offering apprenticeships for young war-affected people such as demobilized combatants.

In many African countries, the decline in the rate of growth of wage employment leads to greater reliance on self-employment as a means of livelihood for displaced persons. A number of war-affected countries have adopted, or intend to adopt, economic reform programmes that promote the establishment of private micro enterprises and small businesses. In Eritrea for example, as the labour market cannot accommodate the present number of demobilized combatants, entrepreneurial business initiatives are being developed by the MITIAS government department through a credit programme supported by NGOs such as Oxfam UK and Accord UK.

Small enterprises provide income-earning activities not only for their owner-managers, but also for all those individuals from whom they require supplies and services.[23] Each small and medium-sized business requires resources and services which are often supplied by both formal and informal enterprises. At the same time, extended families or village communities may benefit from the establishment of a small formal enterprise by one of their members. However, the multiplier effect which thus arises requires that government policies are designed to facilitate the start-up and operations of private small enterprises and that they do not penalize informal micro and itinerant enterprises.

To formally register, an enterprise should be made attractive for all potential entrepreneurs. Through government legislation and macro-economic measures (license fees, taxation, etc.) as well as through incentives (access to information, services or training), formal entre-preneurial activity can be facilitated and even promoted. This is particularly important for all entrepreneurs who already successfully operate an informal economic activity and/or have capital to invest and for those potential entrepreneurs who may be able to obtain loans and credit support. By facilitating the establishment of formal businesses, small and medium enterprises can provide wage employment as they grow and contribute to government revenue through taxes.

7. *Supportive extension services and structures*

The success of private entrepreneurship depends to a very great extent on the quality and availability of extension support services. These take different forms in which existing employment promotion or

23. See also ILO: }{\plain \i\f1 Report VII: The promotion of self-employment}{\plain \f1 , 77th session (Geneva, ILO) 1990.

economic planning bodies – such as the chamber of commerce or a workers' organization – cooperate with the local and central government authorities, with NGOs and training institutions, as well as with labour market survey personnel.

In several war-affected countries, departments such as Ministries of Labour have set up specialized agencies at municipal, district or regional levels to develop their extension services. These institutions may offer a variety of assistance according to the mode of organization, the economic sector aimed at, the target population (i.e. ex-combatants), product and services marketing, as well as existing government policies and legislation (laws concerning enterprise creation, informal entrepreneurship, tax accounting and business administration). Support services are offered for individual or collective businesses, cooperative societies, workers' cooperatives, employers' associations or family micro enterprises.

In many post-conflict situations, employment promotion has had few successes because there is no service mechanism to assist job seekers, to provide business managers with information on where new employees may be found or to help potential entrepreneurs to know what product demands exist in the market in order to create income-earning activities for themselves. A simple example can be found in Namibia where most veterans found it difficult to obtain information on how and where to look for jobs. They were unaware of job opportunities offered outside of their region. As a result, a great number of them settled in the north of the country, while the majority of job opportunities were available in the south.

Assistance to private employers can be grouped into the following categories: information on business opportunities, identification and assessment of business ideas, market research to guide entrepreneurs and investors, skills training based on a direct relationship between marketable products and the specific technical skills to produce them, business training, production and technology, marketing sales and inventory control, costing and pricing, credit and follow-up services.

The following list illustrates the types of support services and structures that have proved useful to promote employment and to facilitate the establishment and operation of small and medium enterprises:

- information and advice by local employment exchanges and other community-based institutions, including feasibility studies, prospecting for openings and marketing, access to credit facilities, assistance in business start-up, and advice as well as support during enterprise development;
- short-term technical training to enable members to acquire needed knowledge and skills. Both technical and business training can enhance the possibilities of success for entrepreneurs;[24]
- support by regional and local authorities, especially those having the responsibility for employment matters through policies of

decentralization. This may stimulate the creation of LEIs and provide support in various forms such as basic technical training, advice and expertise, information on markets, and investment and finance (loans, guarantees, grants and fiscal facilities);

- action by the private-sector: employers' associations and private companies can play a role in helping create small local units (in the form of subcontracting or as agencies of the main firm) to supply services and provide small-scale employment for job seekers;
- support from trade unions: while unions normally work for the large units of production and wage employment, in the case of Africa there has been a substantial shift in attitudes. In Mozambique and Angola, for example, representatives of workers' organizations expressed their willingness to participate in concerted action against unemployment through the promotion of small enterprises at regional, provincial and village levels so as to encourage the development of new employment.

8. Required institutional reforms

In countries which were controlled by a central economic and decision-making authority before a war, severe restrictions on the private sector often still hamper business activity in the immediate post-conflict period. A common difficulty is often that the post-conflict government officially adopts free market principles, while its policy-making and administrative units continue to regard private small businesses with suspicion. An anti-private-sector bias in the government as well as in existing public and semi-private institutions and firms must be addressed if employment promotion is to include private entrepreneurship.

The only method to facilitate private entrepreneurship may be to introduce completely new government policies which aim at facilitating the establishment of small businesses. For example, policies may include legalizing the status of private micro enterprises and small businesses; providing for the legal protection of ownership and foreign investment; and streamlining and simplifying the business licensing, registration procedures, and taxation regulations.

Licensing procedures for private enterprises must be simple and offer incentives for formal methods of business administration (adherence to official regulations on taxation, accounting and bookkeeping, and employment). If this is not done, many private enterprises will avoid

24. UNDP/ILO employment generation programme: }{\plain \i\f1 Small enterprise development in demobilization and reintegration: The ILO experience in Cambodia}{\plain \f1 , draft case study by Matthew Davies, Jan. 1995, p.44.

registration and remain informal to avoid bureaucratic and procedural regulations.

Many individuals who manage small, little-organized, one-family micro enterprises see no advantage in officially registering their businesses unless such registration is accompanied by incentives and support structures. Such support could include:

- improving the flow of information on the availability of facilities and support services, business opportunities, and credit; and
- developing a product-to-market infrastructure that facilitates rapid and inexpensive delivery of goods and services.

At the local level, enterprises operate in a context in which problems and opportunities are interlinked and are largely conditioned by regional social and political circumstances. The socio-economic diversity of local situations and the heterogeneity of private business activities pose a challenge to the design of programmes which are responsive to actual needs.

For example, in some cases, disincentives to private entrepreneurship and even discrimination against those who try to start a business are indirect or invisible, while at other times they may be obvious, such as in multiple taxation (e.g. municipal tax, street tax, market tax) or in various pay-outs (including corruption).

At the local level, there are two major issues which need to be addressed to restore business confidence and encourage private entrepreneurship:

- improving individual attitudes and the administrative disposition of local authorities towards small private enterprises through education, training and awareness campaigns (which derive from participatory business opportunity identification exercises); and
- dismantling administrative constraints, especially as regards business location, property rights, registration, licensing and taxation (e.g. costs of transportation and resources versus import/export tariffs and taxation) that act as disincentives to enterprise development, investment and private entrepreneurship.

Business location and property rights are issues within the competence of local authorities, municipalities and urban or village councils. In many instances, these authorities ban small enterprises from operating within their territories and fail to suggest alternative possibilities.

Problems that must be resolved are political-economic conflicts of interest which produce counter-productive discriminatory effects against medium and small enterprises. For example, land areas occupied by small businesses have frequently been vacated by force in the interests of large industries without regard for the employment which such micro enterprises provide and the tax revenue which they can supply if properly supported.

Because of their inherent diversity, medium and small businesses and micro enterprises are rarely able to form interest groups or employers' unions to apply political pressure (lobbying) on the local authorities or national government. For this reason, it is important that networks of support structures are developed which reach from the highest government offices to the local village authority.

Small private enterprises suffer more from a lack of government administration or from its incompetence than do large independent companies. Small and medium businesses are also much more unstable because they cannot "buy" their organizational security with large physical and visible benefits (tax revenue, large employment volume, etc.). Nor can they pay for or sponsor community services and events as large companies (especially multinationals) can afford to do. All this indicates the fragility of the small enterprise (formal and informal) sector as well as its importance in terms of employment of war-affected populations. Furthermore, this also indicates that small and medium enterprises must be supported by local NGOs, special credit and extension services, existing private industries and employers' associations as well as international agencies.

9. Credit services

The importance of financial services and credit schemes should be stressed in all training for micro enterprise and small business management. A choice of finding assistance is often available (revolving funds, start-up-funds, etc.) and this must be explained to the demobilized combatants at the time of training.

In particular, it is important that information on available credit reaches the demobilized combatants who work in rural areas or in activities that do not bring them in regular contact with information regarding available assistance (government agencies or veterans' associations). Experience has shown that conventional credit schemes do not always reach the individual rural or informal micro-entrepreneur or the self-employed business operator. For diverse reasons, many efforts to improve the access to credit of micro enterprises through targeted programmes administered by banks and public agencies have not been successful. The causes are, for example: complicated and time-consuming procedures, insistence on collateral, formal loan appraisal or centralized decision-making. Even banks with many branches in rural areas have not been able to reach small enterprises unless they are induced to do so with an injection of funds from government or external donors.

In many NGO projects, credit arrangements are built in. They are frequently based on group lending (to cooperatives, extended families or community networks) with joint responsibility among the members

for repayment. This type of experience should be evaluated in the context of the reintegration of demobilized combatants.[25] In this regard, some education on credit repayment should be included in all training programmes for self-employment that are offered to ex-combatants either during their demobilization or later when they apply for training.

10. The role of locally-based organizations

In many war-affected countries, governments invariably develop links with locally-based organizations, especially with NGOs, for emergency and humanitarian reasons. These same networks can also serve as the lead towards NGO support for the development of new private entrepreneurship and, hence, employment creation.

For instance, there are about 100 NGOs in Angola and 300 in Mozambique, mainly national, which are engaged in solving the problems of the war-affected. They vary in size, capacity and competence from small village-based groups to national organizations. In most African countries, NGO activities cover a wide range of initiatives in the social and humanitarian fields as well as in vocational training, management training, self-employment and income generation.

As state institutions are often weak at the end of large conflicts, a major goal for reintegration programmes should be to cooperate with NGOs in promoting and channelling efforts towards supporting assistance programmes that benefit displaced and conflict-affected persons. When resources are limited and new reintegration and development efforts are being initiated, it is particularly appropriate that all those involved share their expertise and experience and mutually support each other. NGOs can be a tremendous asset to develop local economic self-reliance by providing expertise and advice, identifying viable business opportunities and conducting marketing feasibility studies.[26]

Other examples of effective cooperation among concerned agencies can be found in Africa as well as in the Middle East and Asia. In Lebanon, the NGO Forum – a consortium of NGOs – pointed out that its programme would consider the availability of information and statistics in chosen areas in order to assess the needs and social conditions as well as to develop a mechanism of cooperation with the target population in each village.[27] Experience in Cambodia and in

25. Various aspects of credit are discussed in ILO: }{\plain \i\f1 Report of the Director-General to the Eighth African Regional Conference}{\plain \f1 (Mauritius, Jan. 1994), pp.33-36.
26. ILO/SIDA: }{\plain \i\f1 Skill Development for Self-Reliance: A methodology for training for self-employment, guidelines for implementors}{\plain \f1 , Vol. II, Module one, Step one: Community Needs Assessment Process, 1993, p.9.

some African countries has demonstrated methods of sharing ideas and expertise on how vulnerable groups are helped to cope with reintegration and employment.

Demobilized combatants form a special group for whom grass-roots organizations can play an essential role by generating self-employment through projects related to community development, small-scale business promotion and community-based infrastructure works. In Ethiopia, for example, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) supported 122 project proposals in 1992 and 1993 in which ex-combatants were included. At the end of 1994, 37 projects were completed and 34 were under implementation. A total of 11,000 ex-combatants have not only obtained training for various saleable skills along with the necessary tools and equipment, but they have also been assisted to find or create employment. This effort was supported by grants and credit schemes for new businesses in various sectors, such as horticulture, cooperatives, food stores, bakeries, cinemas, tea shops, etc.[28]

In Angola, as the formal labour market is saturated and can only absorb a small number of job seekers, most of the demobilized combatants have to try to create their own employment outside the formal economic sector. Many NGOs have been engaged in the implementation of special programmes of poverty alleviation, support to the most vulnerable population groups, and employment promotion and reintegration of the demobilized military.[29]

11. The role of private enterprises

A greater involvement by the private sector itself in the promotion of and assistance to small enterprises is also desirable. Private business people and their institutions are generally better able to appreciate the practical and operational problems of starting new enterprises or expanding existing ones than are government or municipal institutions. However, as the private sector is usually weak in conflict-affected countries, creating "umbrella organizations" such as employers' associations or business councils are feasible options. When led by business people, such organizations may be well placed to identify commonalities among different types of small enterprises and to design promotional and assistance programmes.

27. UNDP: }{\plain \i\f1 Management and resettlement of internally displaced in Lebanon}{\plain \f1 , final draft, Project LEB/92/001. Mission Report by Dr. Mustafa Tag-eldeen (Beirut, July 1992).
28. Assefa Bersoufekad: }{\plain \i\f1 A study report on labour market assessments for the reintegration of ex-combatants}{\plain \f1 (Addis Ababa, Feb. 1995), p.54.
29. Manuel Da Costa and Alexandre Pogrebinski: }{\plain \i\f1 Avalia\'e7ao da Situa\'e7ao de Mercado Nacional de Emprego Na Optica da Reintegra\'e7ao Socio-economica Dos Ex-Combatentes em Angola}{\plain \f1 (Luanda, 1995), p.35.

The membership into employers' organizations by small enterprises can be encouraged through the formation of associations specifically designed for them that are affiliated with employers of large companies as well as government authorities. In Uganda, for example, associations of small enterprises have been established on the basis of sectors of activity. In some cases, employers' organizations have offered promotional training programmes for small enterprise development, realizing that these offer the best opportunity to expand the market for all sectors of the economy. Over the long term, such a policy does benefit large businesses as these programmes can make use of services and resources which small and medium enterprises supply.

12. The role of international partners

Post-conflict economic development programmes cover a broad agenda of employment- and training-related activities. In almost all post-conflict countries, the recipient acts jointly with external donors, international financial institutions and multilateral organizations. They reflect joint perspectives of the government and the external aid community whose partnership is often required in preparing the reconstruction programme and whose cooperation is needed in financing it. Foundations for such reconstruction are most often already laid in the course of peace and early reconstruction negotiations. Among principal external actors may be the World Bank, United Nations agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the ILO and bilateral development organizations and NGOs.

With many external donors and funding agencies involved in proposing and planning post-conflict reconstruction, differences of approach, interests and values usually arise. This is to some extent inherent in a conflict-affected environment, where national policies have not been developed and in which small and medium enterprises usually act across economic sectors and geographical regions. Attention must be paid that different approaches and conflicts of interest among external, national and local institutions do not have a counter-productive effect in the development of facilities and services for private enterprises and employment programmes.

Reintegration planning takes time, whether it be for ex-combatants only or for other groups of war-affected people. It is important therefore to encourage and facilitate the coordination of interests among potential foreign donors as well as national government and local community (including NGO) actors. This may be achieved if reintegration planning and employment promotion are based on credible labour market information (see III) which the donors can

accept, as well as on a sound analysis of ex-combatant needs (see Annex 1). On the basis of respected labour market information, greater agreement on priorities and interests may result. Furthermore, once consensus by the required donor agencies has been achieved on reintegration priorities, acceptable training feasibility studies and well-organized training for private entrepreneurship (see IV and VI) may then facilitate the releasing of funds for credit support and extension services to potential private entrepreneurs. For the ex-combatants who are willing and able to start their own enterprises, such coordinated assistance will prove most helpful.

Conclusion

Employment promotion is perhaps the principal feature of reintegration for any target group in the post-conflict situation. Meaningful employment is, to a great extent, a guarantor of social development, post-conflict rehabilitation and healthy community life, as well as political stability and national security.

The importance of promoting employment through all available direct and macroeconomic methods is often underestimated in post-conflict situations. Political reforms, democratic elections and/or rapid disarmament of combatants are sometimes given priority, while considerations for the economic survival of war-affected populations is neglected. However, few chances for political stability and security may be found if employment promotion is not given a high priority through labour-intensive public works projects, skills training and small enterprise development.

III. ASSESSING THE LABOUR DEMAND FOR THE REINTEGRATION OF DEMOBILIZED COMBATANTS

Introduction

The present section presents guidelines for labour market analyses and labour needs assessments for the reintegration of demobilized combatants.[30] While much literature exists on labour market information (LMI) and labour needs in developing economies, there is little information available that investigates LMI in the context of conflict-affected countries. The information here should be read as an introduction to this topic.

Employment creation programmes are a key element in the transition from war to peace. However, in many post-conflict countries such programmes have proven difficult to plan and implement. The lack of an effective labour market information mechanism has often rendered planning, implementation, follow-up and evaluation of employment and training programmes difficult.

In many cases, ex-combatants received training conducted by various agencies such as government departments, ministries, NGOs, or foreign organizations which was not linked to available employment or business opportunities (i.e. training was not based on LMI assessments and the actual demand for labour). The challenge in the post-conflict situation is to organize rapid labour market analyses and find out in which economic sectors there is a demand for labour. To respond to the training needs, feasibility studies must then be conducted to determine which kind of training will be most effective in preparing war-affected people (such as ex-combatants) to become employable or to establish their own income-earning enterprises.[31]

In almost any post-conflict situation, the employment needs for demobilized combatants are immediate and require enormous technical, financial and material resources. This implies a search for rapid solutions, in particular by means of special, well-tailored reintegration programmes and employment projects. Demobilized combatants need job placement services and the development of small and larger-scale employment programmes which are founded on reliable labour market data of potential labour needs (labour demand) and the employment needs of ex-combatants (labour supply).

30. Most of the information on labour market analysis for this section was taken from a study prepared by Jean-Bernard C\'e9lestin for the ILO entitled}{\plain \i\f1 Labour market assessments for the reintegration of ex-combatants in war-affected sub-Saharan African countries}{\plain \f1 : }{\plain \i\f1 Practical guidelines}{\plain \f1 , Labour Market Policies Branch, ILO, Geneva, 1995.

31. Methods for labour market information gathering are presented in this section, while feasibility studies for planning employment training are discussed in IV. Annex 2 presents detailed suggestions for LMI analyses which complements this section, while Annex 3 provides practical support to IV.

1. Definition and purpose of labour market information (LMI)

Labour market analyses are intended to provide information on the presently existing and the potential future employment opportunities that result from renewed economic growth. A simple definition of labour market information may be as follows: Any information concerning the size and composition of the labour market, the way it or any part of it functions, i.e. its problems, the opportunities which may be available in the labour market, and the employment-related intentions or aspirations of those who are part of it. In short, information is needed on: (a) existing markets, (b) future potential markets, (c) needs of people to be reintegrated and employed, (d) and the possibilities for education, vocational and business training.

The major criterion for judging the value of LMI is the extent of its usefulness for planning and decision-making. This measure is of particular relevance in the context of the formulation and implementation of reintegration programmes. The adequacy of LMI can be judged by the following:

- *comprehensiveness*: LMI must be sufficiently comprehensive – that is, it must provide an assessment of current employment patterns as well as employment opportunities at regional and local levels, especially for the target groups;
- *relevance*: LMI must be kept up to date for the intended programme such as the reintegration of ex-combatants;
- *availability to users*: LMI on both the formal and the informal sectors of the economy must be readily available to users;
- *reliability*: suppliers of LMI should provide reliable products, and the data provided should represent the reality of the situation;
- *cost-effectiveness*: the methods and techniques adopted in generating LMI should be rapid and cost-effective to meet the urgency of the post-conflict situation.

In developing countries, LMI systems do not often meet these requirements for a multitude of reasons, which include failure on the part of governments to develop policies which incorporate employment promotion as an integral part of the development process; lack of coordination among the ministries and institutions involved in employment and labour market policies; shortage of qualified and capable staff; and an absence of facilities for systematic training.

2. Investigating the employment situation in countries

Awareness of the need for LMI, in particular in respect of the situation of the most vulnerable groups, is fairly widespread among governments, employers and vocational trainers. Innovative experiments in data collection have been attempted (or are being proposed) in war-affected countries. Although at an embryonic stage, these attempts deserve particular mention because useful lessons can be learned for LMI assessments during reintegration programmes.

Countries in Africa emerging from civil strife may have over 25 per cent unemployment. And besides the war-displaced persons who must reintegrate into the labour market, large numbers of young people must find income-earning work annually, which most African countries appear unable to offer. For example, Ethiopia had a total population of about 55 million people in 1993; there have been 876,000 new entrants into the labour market every year between 1990 and 1995, of which 759,000 entered the rural and 117,000 the urban labour markets. The insertion of this labour force into productive employment constitutes a formidable challenge. If these new entrants are to have productive employment opportunities, output would have to grow by 6.3 per cent a year and employment close to 5 per cent a year. The under-employment rate is very high in the agricultural sector as well as in the rural non-food and the urban informal sectors.

In Uganda, the labour force in mid-1994 was about 8 million and growing at 3.4 per cent annually. The population was 18.2 million, with an average annual growth rate of 2.5 per cent. To prevent the employment situation from deteriorating, the Ugandan economy has to create 272,000 new jobs per annum. Other countries in Africa are confronted with similar employment problems. At the same time, demobilized combatants, refugees and unemployed civil servants must be productively integrated into the labour markets.[32]

In Mozambique, war-related migration movements have been further intensified by drought and the economic crisis which gave rise to an increasing shortage of jobs. About 100 private enterprises with a total of 11,000 workers were registered in Manica Province. Of these:

- 13 per cent had ceased their activities, affecting 1,430 workers;
- 10 per cent were in deficit, affecting 1,100 workers;
- 77 per cent were working in a normal way and employed 8,470 persons.

32. Further estimates on population in other countries are given in S. Srivastava, op. cit. According to the author, dependants of demobilized combatants are not included. A factor of 1:3 should normally be applied in most countries to estimate the number of dependants.

A survey of 34 per cent of these enterprises was made in order to determine their employment structure and trends. From the analysis of this survey, the conclusion was that 68 per cent of workers in the formal (agricultural) sector left their posts voluntarily, and only 9 per cent of employees were forced to leave their jobs for reasons beyond their own decision. Among those who left on voluntary grounds, 53 per cent were male and 47 per cent female. Their leaving the job had to do with the irregular and low wages, insecurity and lack of possibilities for long-term stability and promotion.

Although this study did not cover public administration which is one of the main employers in Mozambique, the survey showed that job seekers experienced great difficulty in finding employment in the formal sector. Mozambican labour market information shows that the market is characterized by high growth rates of unskilled labour, a rapidly growing urban informal sector as well as declining wage employment in real-term wages. Information made available by the Mozambican trade union shows that employment has been falling in all economic sectors. For example, agricultural employment – including sugar, which is the most important sector in the economy – declined by 28 per cent between 1990 and 1992. Official data published by the National Directorate of Statistics confirmed the heavy decline in employment in the modern sector as a whole.

3. *Assessing the employment needs of ex-combatants*

Attitudes, opinions, expectations and reactions of ex-combatants and special groups constitute vital information. For instance, it is important to know how these groups themselves perceive their handicaps and needs, the kind of supportive and promotional services and facilities they feel are most required, and how far the promotional measures designed for them actually benefit them. A survey of the demobilized combatants should establish their main characteristics, their social and economic expectations as well as their professional capacities (see sample questionnaires to conduct needs assessment surveys in Annex 1).

Mozambique again serves here as an example. In 1993, a sample survey was undertaken at the provincial level (Manica) on soldiers to be demobilized and their future social and economic reintegration as civilians. This survey was intended to:

- characterize the future demobilized population in demographic, socio-cultural and occupational terms; and
- ascertain their projects and expectations with regard to settlement areas, occupation and support.

First, a sample of 400 people was established. This covered 150 individuals settled in the provincial capital and 250 in those rural districts which are particularly attractive to the demobilized, namely Manica, Barue, Sussundenga, Gondola and Mossurize (50 in each). The ex-combatants are relatively young (the average age in 1994 was 32 years) and have heavy family responsibilities (about five dependants per person). They have spent an average of 12 years in the armed forces.[33] Most combatants joined the army when they were around 20 years old. Their average schooling level from before military service is very low, and the great majority had no previous professional experience.

As regards the social, cultural and occupational characteristics of the ex-combatants, the following figures show that the majority (88.7 per cent) were married.[34] Before joining the armed forces, 50 to 60 per cent had a professional activity giving them some professional experience of relevance for their reintegration (only 35 per cent were employees in the private or public sector). Before entering the armed forces, the ex-combatants were students (43 per cent), wage-earners (27 per cent), unemployed (10 per cent), family farmers (7 per cent), civil servants (7 per cent), self-employed (4 per cent), and some were active in handicrafts, fishing, domestic work, etc. During military service, 27 per cent obtained some vocational training and had other occupations besides active combat duty, which gave them some advantage in terms of entry into the labour market.

During their time in the military, the majority of combatants (73 per cent) obtained no specific training that could be helpful for civil/ economic reintegration. Some 10 per cent worked as radio transmitters for army communications, others (about 6 per cent) became drivers or auto mechanics, while others worked as nurse/first aid workers (3.6 per cent), typists/secretaries (2.8 per cent), and a very few worked in administration, logistics, photography, physical planning, cooking, etc. Concerning the expectations and needs of the Mozambican ex-combatants, 76.6 per cent of them intended to settle in a rural area after demobilization, while some 23 per cent desired to live and work in urban areas; 89 per cent were born in a rural area and about 76 per cent wished to resettle in a rural community.

The demobilized who wished to settle in rural areas expressed concern about their need for support in types of work with which they hoped to generate supplementary income or alternatives to paid employment. More than 83 per cent of the ex-combatants asked for assistance in obtaining farm implements, bank credit/financial support and tools for different crafts. This may imply the ex-combatants' desire to build a private basis of security with which to supplement their income from wages or from alternative sources of income. Ex-combatants expressed great interested in training; more than 50 per cent wished to

33. Inquiry to the military on demobilization, Manica, 1993-94.

34. For the purposes of this study, \'93married\'94 includes anyone with a partner, regardless of the legal status.

receive help in learning how to set up some form of informal income-generating activity. Comparatively few ex-combatants sought employment in formal government institutions (civil service) or in public and private enterprises.

In Uganda, several technical cooperation missions suggested that signals from the labour market should be obtained regularly at all levels and that the development of an integrated and organized LMI system would be an important and necessary element of the reintegration process. Furthermore, an ILO/UNDP project on employment creation for ex-combatants had recommended making an estimate of the available labour surplus. Through a series of surveys down to the level of the region (for example, Semuto of Luwero District), it was intended to apply a statistically precise definition of unemployment and under-employment.

However, a weakness of the employment data base in Uganda concerns the target groups at the local level (provinces, districts, municipalities, community-based programmes) which is reflected in the development of the overall LMI system. In Uganda, a human resources survey was conducted with a view to ascertaining the manpower and employment situation and making projections of employment requirements up to 1991 in the context of the Rehabilitation and Development Plan.[35] This survey was one of the means used by the Government to fulfil its commitment to reactivate human resources planning as part of its socio-economic development.

The survey covered all establishments in government, parastatal and private sectors that employ five or more persons. These establishments were classified into groups according to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). The occupational classifications were made on the basis of the 1988 edition of the ILO's International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88). The survey provided useful information on the number and the characteristics of all employed persons and on additional skilled manpower needs in the formal sector. Information was also sought in the informal sector on its characteristics and its linkages with the formal sector and, more importantly, its potential in terms of employment generation.

Apart from the macroeconomic approach, the survey also examined the employment situation in five key sectors: agriculture, industry, construction, health and public administration. These sectors were specifically selected on the basis of their role in economic development and because of the large numbers they employed. Additional assessments were made on the likely supply of skilled workers from training programmes which could meet the future employment requirements.

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35. This \'93manpower survey\'94 conducted in 1988 is the last one which provides information on the human resource situation.

According to the survey, there are about 115,000 to 120,000 new entrants into the labour market every year, looking for gainful employment opportunities. On the basis of the GDP growth rate projections and assuming that the public sector would continue to recruit additional staff, the increase in employment (new jobs) in the formal sector would amount to 40,670 per annum. This means that roughly an average of 75,000 persons would have to be absorbed every year either in the agricultural/rural areas or in the informal sector.

The 1988 manpower survey was the last attempt to generate some kind of bench-mark data on employment in the formal sector (civil service, parastatal and private) and in the informal sector of the economy. Since then, little effort has been made to strengthen the LMI capacity of the country. It can therefore be said that employment data for the last few years in Uganda are lacking, and very little is known about unemployment. Such serious shortcomings render any analysis of employment problems difficult and hazardous.[36]

The need for LMI can further be shown to exist in other African countries. In Ethiopia, in the first two months following demobilization, former soldiers had to report to the Government for identification. On the basis of this information, those who had served for less than one year and a half in the army were sent back to their respective communities, as it was assumed that they required less orientation and support to return to normal civilian life. Some 326,000 former soldiers were reported to have served in the army for more than a year and a half, of which 52 per cent were registered in the rural areas while 48 per cent originated from urban centres. All of these were men, as female soldiers were not admitted for registration.

Because a comprehensive data base could not be provided at the time of demobilization in Ethiopia due to the speed of political events, the initial programmes were based on aggregated numbers of target beneficiaries returning to either rural or urban areas. The baseline data were very limited. Combatants had been asked to fill in personal data forms. However, the information was not processed and released for use. The ex-combatants were simply repatriated to their places of origin on the basis of indications they gave. Even though baseline data were required to create employment opportunities, no systematic survey or comprehensive data collection was undertaken. It could therefore be assumed that the number of unemployed ex-combatants was high. Some data were collected for the formulation of individual projects, for example about educational qualifications needed in order to prepare training programmes and regarding the former soldiers' past activities. This was compiled in order to organize cooperatives for them.

36. G. Okutho: }{\plain \i\f1 Employment and manpower planning and monitoring in Uganda}{\plain \f1 , final draft report, Manpower Planning Department, Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, Kampala, Uganda, Oct. 1991, p.55.

Unfortunately, the training given by some development agencies was carried out without proper initial assessments of what kind of skills were needed to bolster up the most promising economic sectors and small industries. The objective of creating better opportunities for employment could thus not be realized to the extent desired. Impact studies later revealed that training in some areas of activity resulted in no tangible return. For example, it was noted that out of 15 former soldiers trained in water technology only five obtained jobs, although a rough assessment had been made to find out whether the skill would be in demand. It was felt that satisfactory follow-up and evaluation of the results from training and other assistance could not be undertaken because adequate employment data and an effective labour market mechanism were still lacking.[37]

Another example of limited data is Eritrea where a special governmental department named MITIAS was entrusted with the challenge of reintegrating the demobilized combatants. Its broad mandate included, inter alia, conducting surveys of those who are already demobilized and those who are in the process of demobilization. The objective was to obtain data which may be used in relocation, finding suitable training and appropriate employment as well as information on every combatant's aims and aspirations. With a network of 63 employees, MITIAS has now been established in all ten provinces of the country and a further decentralization to district level is under consideration.

Preliminary sample surveys of 1,200 combatants have already been completed. Though small in size, these have revealed useful points on the social backgrounds and aspirations of the demobilized combatants. The data collected will be appropriate in relation to the employment and training problems which the former soldiers face and will be used to target corrective measures.[38]

Another example of lacking labour market information is Namibia. Only limited attempts were made to gather LMI relating to reintegration. The integration of returnees into the labour market was hampered for a variety of reasons, including ignorance of how to go about finding employment, lack of access to job information and delays in reaching prospective employers once word came about vacancies or the possibility of work. The lack of funds to cover the cost of transport to job interviews was seen as a further impediment. This situation added to a low level of economic integration that generated strong resentment among job seekers, especially those with accredited professional qualifications. Furthermore, some studies on

37. A. Bersoufekad, op. cit., p.7.
38. }{\plain \i\f1 Report on Workshop on Demobilization and Reintegration in the Horn of Africa}{\plain \f1 , organized by the International Group on Disarmament and Security in the Horn of Africa (IEG) in cooperation with the ad hoc Committee for Peace and Development and Inter-Africa Group, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 4-7 Dec. 1994, p.2.

employment failed to take into account the situation of war-affected people.

In conclusion, there is no doubt that labour market information is vital if a post-conflict economic environment must be revived and people given the possibility to find meaningful income-earning opportunities. The following section discusses the institutional methods of LMI assessments and analysis, its purpose as well as the organization of the work required.

4. *Institutional framework for analysing the labour market*

Promoting employment for former soldiers implies a choice of appropriate approaches. This requires analysis and understanding of the functioning of the labour market, including the interaction between employment demands (human resource needs) and the supply of workers/employees. Labour market information analyses constitute an appropriate approach to address employment questions for general economic development as well as for sector-specific post-conflict rebuilding.[39]

Several factors justify labour market analyses and the work involved. For LMI users, especially those with immediate decision-making and operational responsibilities at regional, provincial and local levels, envisioning change ("signalling") is a vital output of LMI. Capturing early signals about labour market developments, turbulence and its causes, as well as appropriate ways of dealing with them, has become of particular importance. Labour market analysts therefore have a key role to play at all stages of employment policy-making and implementation.

Understanding how the labour market functions requires analytical work on economic indicators, their determining factors and intersectoral relationships. Moreover, labour market analysts need to look into decision-making practices within government policy-making institutions so as to determine the factors that facilitate or hinder employment creation. Policies must facilitate training interventions, formal employment and commercial transactions of all kinds (formal and informal). Also, labour market analysts, in cooperation with those responsible for reintegration, have to monitor the effectiveness of current programmes for ex-combatants in relation to employment generation and to identify alternatives and options.

39. L. Richter: }{\plain \i\f1 Upgrading labour market information in developing countries: Problems, progress and prospects}{\plain \f1 , a synthesis of the results of an ILO/DANIDA inter-regional seminar, ILO, Geneva, 1989, p.28.

Hence, the wide spectrum of labour market analysis covers not only the immediate relationship between labour supply and demand but also the relationships among government economics/employment ministries, actual labour trends, training needs and the long-term effectiveness of policies to facilitate employment creation and reintegration programmes. Labour market analysis, as presented here, is composed of four principal elements:

1. collection of information/data on the existing labour and policy environment;
2. discovering labour needs and trends through targeted studies such as KISs;
3. indicating training and skill needs; and
4. feasibility studies (see IV) and long-term monitoring of successful employment promotion as well as of the performance of reintegration programmes for war-displaced persons.

5. *Adapting the data bases to the needs of war-displaced persons*

In conflict-affected countries, some LMI may be available from government ministries and other agencies, but it is very often fragmented and disorganized because of the ad hoc manner in which it was collected and stored. In most developing countries, the labour market data used come from the modern sector of the economy. This approach has serious limitations because only a small proportion of the population works in modern establishments. Most workers have to look for jobs in the informal agricultural/rural sectors. Therefore, the majority of the labour force is ignored in the official statistics.

How can LMI based only on the organized formal labour market be effective? Effective analysis should also include the source of employment problems and obstacles. In war-affected countries, the lack of employment is the principal problem, and poor legislation based on inadequate LMI is the principal obstacle.[40] Analysis must cover possible new programmes for employment generation and look to the emerging private sector as a source of labour demand as well as a potential provider of training.

From the above, it can be observed that what is needed is reliable and up-to-date information about the state of the labour market in various

40. ILO:}{\plain \i\f1 New approaches to manpower planning and analysis}{\plain \f1 , edited by P. Richards and R. Amjad, Geneva, 1994.

economic sectors and on job opportunities for qualified as well as unskilled workers. Meeting these information needs should be one of the main objectives of those responsible for designing, implementing and monitoring reintegration programmes which include employment generation.

6. *Institutional labour market support*

In most African countries, employment and labour market monitoring activities are generally delegated to a large number of agencies within or outside ministerial departments. Their data and analysis are distributed mainly among ministries and offices in charge of education and vocational training. The operational capacity of government institutions involved in labour market analysis and policy administration is often weak because qualified staff and logistical support are missing. In Ethiopia, for instance, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs expressed concern not only for the activities of its employment exchanges which must deal with record numbers of job seekers, but also with the dire need for a more effective LMI system.

Attempts should therefore be made to set up sound coordinating central bodies to administer all matters pertaining to employment and labour market issues and to advise on concrete programmes and activities of interest to the target groups. A major consideration concerns the composition of such bodies and where these should be located to be effective. This will depend on the country concerned.

For example, while Ministries of Planning could consider the macro aspect of employment creation, there is no doubt that Ministries of Labour should have a key role to play in the preparation and execution of labour market policies and employment promotion programmes, as well as in LMI collection and analysis. It would seem particularly relevant for Ministries of Labour, in collaboration with central statistical offices, universities and research institutes as well as local institutions such as NGOs and cooperatives, to initiate a coordinated approach that combines research on employment trends and opportunities, feasibility studies and KISs.

The central statistical offices have primary responsibility for the provision of basic employment data (e.g. from household surveys). National universities and locally-based institutions should be associated with special surveys and investigations regarding employment promotion and labour market monitoring. National research institutions could carry out specific studies and integrate such investigations in their research programmes.[41] In this respect, the

41. H. Haaf: }{\plain \i\f1 Urban informal sector information: Needs and methods}{\plain \f1 , edited by J-B. Celestin, ILO, Geneva, 1989, p.37.

conduct of surveys on ex-combatants' problems and expectations by the Institute of African Studies of the Mondlane University in Mozambique is a good example which might be applied in other countries.

In summary, an effective institutional framework is needed to contribute to solutions for labour market problems. It must have the capacity to carry out research, propose employment policies and programmes or projects to be implemented at sectoral, provincial and local levels. It must also have the mandate to propose policies that will ensure that development programmes are designed to orient investment and resources towards the promotion of small-scale enterprises, the informal sector, family-based agricultural and rural activities, and public works programmes. Grassroots organizations such as NGOs and cooperatives, particularly those involved in ex-combatants' reintegration programmes at the regional level, should take part in this process. Finally, the LMI institutions should take part in evaluation and monitoring of developments in the labour market and in reintegration programmes.

7. *Practical guidelines for LMI collection, analysis and dissemination*

As pointed out above, available information on the labour markets in war-affected African countries should meet the requirements for implementing employment-oriented reintegration programmes. Information is especially lacking in respect of the informal (urban and rural) economic sector and for particular target groups. Planners, implementers and evaluators of reintegration are often forced to operate in an information/knowledge vacuum. However, it is here that employment policies can be translated into concrete promotion of new employment and training initiatives (see IV, V and VI).

The statistical methods currently used to gather labour market information, such as censuses, labour force surveys and other household and establishment surveys, are useful. These will continue to form the basis of employment information systems even if there is often considerable room for improvement with regard to coverage, periodicity and methods of data collection and processing. The difficulty for economies that need to rebuild rapidly (as after a conflict) is that traditional statistical surveys cannot capture actual labour market signals and trends clearly and promptly enough to guide reintegration and employment generation programmes. It is therefore necessary to establish a close network of sources on labour market intelligence that relate directly to employment promotion projects and national policy-making.

The recent emphasis in war-affected African countries on the promotion of community-based projects as a means of reintegrating displaced persons and demobilized combatants has made appropriate labour market information systems more necessary than ever. Experience in Nicaragua, Uganda and Zimbabwe indicates that reintegration programmes could have been better supported if some basic labour market and employment information had been widely available to NGOs, ex-combatant training institutions, cooperatives and private entrepreneurs. This brings us to the crucial problem of obtaining and supplying qualitative labour market information.

Efforts have been made by the ILO to improve the collection and analysis of labour market information through a method of surveys that involves actual developmental contributions in all economic sectors, occupations and regions as well as with the war-displaced, the disadvantaged and the most vulnerable population groups. In this context and based on field experience, some LMI and data on the possibilities to create employment could best be collected through a KI approach.

The Key Informants' Approach/Survey (KIA/KIS)[42] is a method of rapid appraisal of a regional labour market, its salient trends as well as its possibilities for future development. The KIA can be a practical and innovative instrument to collect information on employment opportunities as well as to design and implement income-generating development projects. Guidelines are presented here for planning the stages and activities which can be undertaken in war-affected countries (see also Annex 2).

When quick, regional information about the labour market and its prospects or possibilities for rapid development are needed, this KIA may be the most suitable. However, should more in-depth information be needed besides that which local KIs can offer, a feasibility study for training and employment might be appropriate (see IV). As there may be little time and planning capacity available in a war-affected country or region, the KI method should be considered and perhaps tested in an initial pilot programme.

The KI approach or method is based on two premises:

- First, in every country there are persons in key positions, such as public, semi-public and private individuals (e.g. businessmen, officials, farmers, teachers, employers' and workers' organizations, village and community leaders), who possess an intimate knowledge and understanding of the local economy and developments in employment and markets within their particular sphere of work and who have socio-economic and marketing contacts. These individuals constitute an often untapped source of

42. The suggestions which follow here are based on previous ILO studies, such as W. Mason and L. Richter}{\plain \i\f1 : Reporting by key informants on labour markets: An operational manual}{\plain \f1 , ILO, Geneva, 1985.

valuable knowledge and expertise which can provide information to supplement conventional sources of information, statistics and data.

- Second, there are some areas, such as the informal and rural sectors, for which conventional information is generally lacking because it is inherently difficult and costly to collect through normal standard methods. Informal approaches – tapping knowledgeable persons in the economic sectors of interest – are often the most inexpensive and effective means to obtain labour market information.

In both these cases, information collected through knowledgeable persons – through KIs – can be pieced together into a meaningful mosaic which, in a conflict-affected region, might be the only significant source of labour market information available. Such information may constitute an essential supplement to current orthodox data collection methods.[43]

To test the practicality of the KIS, the ILO initiated a series of experiments (test pilot projects) in Asia and Africa. They covered employment in cities, villages, districts, rural areas and communities, and their main objectives were to assess the available human resources and the needs for training. This was then followed by the introduction and support of training opportunities, the creation of new income-generating activities as well as the promotion of local employment planning. The results revealed the practicality of the KI method as a complementary source of LMI. These projects also highlighted that the smaller the basis of the existing employment information available, the stronger was the case for making use of the KIS method.

Information obtained from KIs can be used primarily to:

- identify locally expressed needs for specific employment creation activities;
- detect local problems and constraints such as equipment and credit which obstruct the development of local employment potential;
- elaborate, interpret and update employment and unemployment data from other sources;
- identify target groups more precisely in the labour market;
- identify and explain imbalances in local labour markets, such as shortages of skills and related training requirements;
- monitor the impact of existing programmes on the local employment structure;
- identify the scope of and priorities for planning employment creation, especially public works programmes and informal sector activities;

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43. L. Richter: }{\plain \i\f1 Some old and fresh thoughts on labour market information in developing countries}{\plain \f1 , ILO, Geneva, 1977.

- explore the possibilities and requirements for the expansion of informal employment and private entrepreneurship;
- assess the extent to which shortages can be met by improving informal sector skills, particularly for the self-employment and cooperative work groups.

8. Potential use of KISs in war-affected countries

The above indicates that the KI method can be a practical and rapid instrument of labour market information collection. This implies that it can be useful for local decision-making as well as national policy-making regarding employment promotion programmes at all levels and in all economic sectors. Since there rarely exists an up-to-date mechanism of labour market observation and data collection in war-affected countries, the KIA is of particular relevance.

Surveys have been conducted and used in Angola, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe to assess the socio-economic characteristics of the combatants to be demobilized, determine their future career interests and ascertain where they want to settle.[44] However, in the post-conflict situation, the traditional KIS recommendations may apply only partially; each surveying endeavour will need to be modified to fit local circumstances.[45] Still, while the objectives of each KIS will necessarily vary among countries and communities, there are common areas of interest, needs and information which apply to most war-affected countries.

Depending upon the scope and nature of the reintegration programmes, there are two main approaches that may be taken in tackling the employment problem of ex-combatants. These are either macroeconomic instruments or direct employment creation programmes. The best strategy will be to achieve complementarity between these approaches (see also IV and V). The important issue remains the creation of sufficient income-generating activities and wage-paying jobs to absorb the demobilized military, as well as the war-affected and vulnerable groups.

The KI guidelines (presented in Annex 2) fit within the second approach. By promoting direct employment-creation efforts, training programmes, work internships and apprenticeship schemes may become the most useful means to advance locally and regionally

44. World Bank: }{\plain \i\f1 Reintegration of military personnel in Africa: The evidence from seven country case studies}{\plain \f1 (African Regional Series, Report No. IDP-130), Discussion Paper, Oct. 1993, p.55.
45. This is particularly important when following the recommendations as outlined in Annex 2.

relevant disciplines and skills (see also VI). The KI method suggests ways in which the functions of local labour markets can be understood and linked to the demand and the need for employment. Furthermore, the KIS can provide information on the potential demand for labour following the development of local markets and new enterprises. The information gathered from KIs can provide appropriate information to encourage entrepreneurship and local initiatives, particularly for all qualified former combatants who want to establish their own (formal or informal) businesses.

It must be remembered, however, that the KI approach does not necessarily fulfil all information needs. It is a method to supplement and interpret conventional sources of employment statistics and not to substitute these. The KI method is essentially a qualitative source of employment data collection based on the perceptions of individuals in local communities. It does not include information on economic and financial details, such as the availability of credit and loans, marketing prospects of new products, or the survival chances of new enterprises. In other words, the KIS on its own cannot satisfy the need for information on how to create new training and employment opportunities for ex-combatants or other war-affected populations.

In most post-conflict countries or regions where unemployment is high and economic development at a stand-still, special units need to concern themselves with employment promotion programmes for ex-combatants and vulnerable war-affected groups. Local institutions such as research institutes, agencies in the public and private sectors, local and national NGOs, cooperatives and community-based projects should be closely associated with the official market research and KI survey programmes in order to render LMI more comprehensive and useful.

IV. TRAINING INTERVENTIONS

Introduction

Training interventions are concerted efforts to re-establish and expand the skill base of the target group with the objective to promote employment and private entrepreneurship. In both urban and rural sectors of formal and informal economic activities, some of the most promising and effective means to promote long-term socio-economic development are interventions for literacy education and vocational skills training.[46]

However, training does not create employment. It is a tool – a facilitating mechanism – to improve the capacity of the trainees (in this case, the ex-combatants) to find work or create income-earning work opportunities for themselves. It is prudent to emphasize this, as large numbers of demobilized combatants often go through a variety of training courses which heighten their expectations to be offered wage-paying jobs. Even with the best training methods and support services, it is not possible to offer large quantities of stable jobs in a short period of time. Nor can previously inexperienced combatants become self-employed entrepreneurs or small business managers merely through a few weeks or months of training.

Several alterative training strategies must be combined with employment promotion schemes as well as employment-creating projects over a long period of time (see also V and VI). These must be supported by adequate funding, sound labour market analyses and training feasibility studies.

In this section, two training responses are discussed: a "first-line response" strategy and "short-term response" strategy. The first strategy is intended to be an immediate operational response, a pilot programme of sufficient magnitude, spread over the first eight-12 months following the end of a conflict. The purpose is to test methods and evaluate results. During this period, the technical preparatory work for the second category – the short-term response strategy – can be completed. In the latter, larger numbers of demobilized combatants (or other war-affected target groups) along with a longer duration of training projects can usually be envisaged.

The best approach to design training and educational programmes is to place them in the context of income-generating activities. The most important element of any reintegration programme remains the creation of sufficient income-generating activities and wage-paying jobs to absorb the demobilized military as well as the war-affected and vulnerable groups.

46. Information on training interventions for this section was derived from R. Srivastava, op.cit.. Information on employment promotion was taken from the same study as well as from other ILO publications.

Many countries that have recently emerged from war are constrained by structural adjustment programmes in which the government's capacity for direct investment in short-term employment creation is severely curtailed. An example is Mozambique where the annual income per capita is among the lowest and the economic marketplace has been hurt over two decades by war and inappropriate economic policies resulting in severe social destabilization (1 million dead, 6 million war-displaced persons). The dilemma which Mozambique faces is that of reintegrating some 100,000 ex-combatants into a market which suffers from high unemployment and chronic shortages of skilled and middle/higher-level technicians and professionals. Its reconstruction and poverty elimination plans now include the provision of training for skills targeted to unskilled unemployed veterans and members of poor households, as well as training in business management, budgeting and accounting. At the same time, small lines of credit and start-up grants are offered to labour-intensive small businesses in the private sector. Furthermore, public employment programmes focus on development and maintenance of the basic economic and social infrastructure in both rural and urban areas. These reconstruction and development efforts are not simple or short term by any means, but positive steps have been taken in initiating these programmes.[47]

1. The overall socio-economic context

War, mass migrations and poverty produce a strong migration trend towards urban centres. The greatest income-earning opportunities, however, are usually in rural areas as small-holder agricultural workers/farmers, as well as in the related rural non-farm micro enterprises, small businesses, regional markets and local community and cooperative services. In most African countries, over 50 per cent of all working people were active in the rural sector before war began. Once these conflicts come to an end, large numbers of war-displaced persons travel to urban areas to look for employment.

To counter the post-conflict urbanization trend, especially among former combatants, a training-oriented rural reintegration programme can create opportunities to resettle demobilized soldiers (and other war-displaced persons) in agriculture and non-farm economic activities. By doing so, rural economies can be revitalized and attract more people. Training, infrastructure construction and health services are principal means to make life in rural Africa more attractive to war-displaced persons.

47. Srivastava, op. cit., p. 19.

It is important to facilitate rural non-farm employment creation and training programmes because, under pressure of limited resources, the typical agricultural promotion programme in post-conflict African countries has provided demobilized combatants with only a bare minimum package of initial assistance. Seed, fertilizer, hand tools, livestock, etc., as well as a minimum allocation of land and cash allowances, have usually been given for a limited period. Such minimum assistance has had the consequence that as soon as either the financial benefits expire or crops do not yield as expected, the ex-combatants travel to cities in search of other sources of income.

Besides the possibly meagre income which agriculture may provide, many ex-combatants and war-displaced families need other sources of income. Hence, non-farm entrepreneurial (self-employment) opportunities must be developed in which individuals – men and women, as well as extended families – can create their own employment. Informal and formal micro enterprises and small businesses constitute a vast source of employment. The development of such new private businesses must be encouraged and facilitated through government legislation and a simplification of tax laws and formal employment regulations.

2. *Assessing the existing employment opportunities*

The most important economic sectors after the farm small-holder are the informal micro enterprises in both rural and urban areas. They provide the bulk of urban employment and are second only to small-holder agriculture as a rural employer. They are extremely diverse and are found in great numbers in all the main economic sectors, most of all in trade and services, but also in manufacturing, construction, transportation and urban agriculture.[48]

The demand for many products and services of rural non-farm activities arises from incomes generated in agriculture. Hence, prospects for this sector of the rural economy are best when agricultural production is rising. Depending on the density of the population, a group of villages can be sufficient to drive demand and supply for a local market. For other products, however, larger markets and a transportation infrastructure are necessary. Trading accounts for up to half of all non-farm income-generating self-employment, while the rest consists of artisan micro enterprises and local cooperatives that use local resources and material for their energy needs, production and labour.

48. ILO: Report of the Director-General to the Eighth African Conference, Mauritius, Jan. 1994, p.6. Taken from: Srivastava, op. cit., p.17.

Many non-farm activities are taken up as secondary income-earning ventures on a small scale, while some activities consist of seasonal full-time work (farm labour, harvesting, etc.). Depending on marketability and opportunities, rural people extend their trading beyond their immediate village or local markets. Examples of such trading in rural areas and between the rural and urban territories are: food processing, trading in agricultural products, processing cash crops (cotton, sisal, tobacco, cashew nuts, coconut, sugar cane, etc.), raising livestock, producing handicrafts (shoes, soap, household utensils, etc.), creating textiles, garments and related products, blacksmithing, welding and tools production, manufacturing or trading in construction materials (sand, roofing sheet metal, bricks, tiles, wood, etc.) as well as services such as baby-sitting, nursing care, repair of tools, transportation, etc. The urban informal sector is characterized, like its rural counterpart, by a wide range of activities. The principal activities are trade, services, small-scale manufacturing, repair, maintenance, construction and transportation.

In most post-conflict countries of Africa, efforts must be made at the highest government levels to promote and foster the informal urban and rural sectors. The reason for this is straightforward: the formal sector employs relatively few people and remains a smaller factor in the employment prospects for demobilized combatants. While jobs in the civil service or large industries are very desirable and offer security, the possibility to create such employment opportunities is difficult through mere reintegration programmes.

In Zimbabwe, for example, the Demobilization Directorate recommended that preference be given to demobilized combatants in government and parastatal employment. In Eritrea, projected industrial manpower needs are reported to be well in excess of available trained personnel. The Eritrean Government offers formal employment opportunities in civil service posts with small allowances that are complemented by food rations and housing in barracks. In Angola, potential opportunities for employment in the railways, bus transport and postal service have been identified as available to ex-combatants. For those former soldiers with more than secondary-level education, small enterprises and businesses are an option, because for such individuals their reintegration programme might offer them training in business administration or technical manufacturing.

The difficulties in the method of creating income-earning work opportunities in any war-torn economy are great. Decisions on reintegration planning must carefully assess the feasibility of training in order to avoid wasting precious teacher resources and time. Training interventions that focus on employment in the formal or in the informal sector of an economy can in certain circumstances contribute to increasing production and services in both sectors at once. Increased activity in either sector contributes to increased demands for services and goods in the other, whether in rural or urban areas. This implies that an offer of more training opportunities can – if a need exists in the market – open up more employment and business

possibilities at more than one level of industry and in both the formal and informal and the urban and rural sectors. However, training must be focused on those markets or gaps where the greatest potential demands exist for related spin-off trade and services.

3. Planning training assistance

On the basis of information gathered through labour market data and information on the ex-combatants (usually obtained through questionnaires at the time of demobilization), agencies that can offer training must know as early as possible what kind to provide.

Which type of training should be offered and what kind of training will best promote employment and entrepreneurship for war-displaced persons? These questions must be paramount in the planning of reintegration and employment creation programmes. To simply offer some training because teachers and institutions are available or because donors propose target-specific funding can have results that are as negative as offering no training at all.

Before training can be offered, the war-displaced target groups as well as the communities in which they settle must be evaluated regarding the type of training that is most needed and which promises the best economic results. For this, labour market analyses and KISs are necessary to discover what the civilian communities need where war-displaced persons are to settle and what kind of employment creation will be most expedient to support community-wide economic development (discussed in III above). These two surveys – labour market and community needs – should precede initial decisions about the extent of training budgets and the type of training to be offered. Furthermore, it would be ideal if the findings on both the labour market and needs are substantiated by feasibility studies (discussed below). A feasibility study can provide information on the training options which should be made available and which types of wage employment and self-employment possibilities exist.

Usually, a feasibility study is conducted in combination with or following a labour market analysis and a community needs assessment. In such studies, the employment, business and marketing opportunities are looked at to find out which kind of training interventions can best prepare unemployed war-affected people to become not only economically independent but also, through their activity, contribute to general community-wide capacity building.

The first step is the community needs or KIS. Its purpose is to identify economic and human resource needs and to learn what kind of wage-employment and self-employment opportunities exist or could be developed within a given community. For this, a participatory

group interview approach that avoids complicated survey instruments and data analysis is most useful and practical.[49] Such a study may be prepared and carried out through the seven following steps:

1. A general socio-economic description of the community including the composition of its population, existing training facilities (if any), and NGOs active in the area.
2. An inventory of existing natural resources, their present use, alternative use and possible implications for self-employment/ small-enterprise activities.
3. An analysis of future development plans in the community and their possible effects on wage-employment and self-employment prospects.
4. An inventory of existing businesses, their needs and constraints.
5. Identification of viable income-generating activities through focused group work; an inventory of business ideas.
6. Validation of identified income-generating activities and identifying related training needs.
7. A preliminary feasibility study of various business ideas and selection of the most feasible income-generating activities for target groups; identification of specific training needs for each activity support measures required.[50]

Besides the labour market study and the needs assessment, additional information on training and marketing may be obtained from existing local and national institutions (existing NGOs, humanitarian and church groups, government institutions, etc.). Any organization that is already active in local medical, economic or social assistance can provide some valuable insight into the needs of local communities. Such organizations usually are well aware of what the local market can provide in terms of resources, what the people need and what sort of training would be most appreciated and most productive for economic amelioration.[51]

By investigating the economic needs and potential for development and growth with appropriate training interventions, feasibility studies can provide additional information on the marketability of new businesses or industries for which training is intended to provide new skills.

49. While the proposal here is different from the KIS suggested in III, the objective is similar and the two information-gathering methods can complement each other.
50. These seven points appear in Srivastava, op. cit., Annex 2. Source: }{\plain \i\f1 ILO/Swedish International Development Authority, Skill Development for Self-Reliance (SDSR) 1993: A methodology for training for self-employment}{\plain \f1 , Vol. II, Guidelines for Implementers, Module 1, Step 1, Community Needs Assessment Process.
51. Annex 3 provides a sample questionnaire which can be given to NGOs and other groups to obtain information and help in establishing training methods and programmes and to solicit their cooperation.

4. Studying available options

A careful study to determine available market and enterprise development options is useful to determine whether training will bring the economic rewards which are expected of it. Such a study is here termed a feasibility study. Its objective is to provide a framework within which all aspects of a training proposal (for starting a business or a cooperative employment project) can be evaluated in a coordinated and systematic manner.

Those economic activities which show growth, market demand and employment/entrepreneurship potential need to be identified. This will then help the training and reintegration agencies to plan and provide specific training to the most appropriate target group. Such a study may be structured as follows:[52]

- Market area descriptive background.
- General description of proposed self-employment/micro-enterprise/ small-business activity.
- Competitive and marketing analysis: suppliers, competitors, customers and partners or backers.
- Operating requirements:
  - *Management*: leadership, specialization and responsibilities, personal relations, financial controls and planning.
  - *Production*: conditions, i.e. premises, tools and equipment, stores, i.e. raw materials and stocks in process, material utilization, product quality, product output, product and delivery schedules.
  - *Marketing*: customer satisfaction, advance orders, promotion, pricing, competitive position.
- Training needs analysis.
- Cash-flow analysis and financial requirements.

Feasibility studies should be enhanced and complemented by information from already established local and national NGOs, religious groups, humanitarian/medical agencies and government institutions. These organizations may be able to provide valuable information on the local needs, what resources are available and what the reintegrating ex-combatants will need to learn in order to become economically independent.

At times, feasibility studies may be conducted in conjunction with pilot test projects in which small numbers of demobilized combatants or other war-displaced persons are supported in their reintegration into education and training. The purpose is to learn in advance of the actual large reintegration, training and employment programmes, which kind

52. ILO/Swedish International Development Authority, op. cit.. Feasibility studies of potentially viable projects, 1993.

of training is most successful and which kind of businesses or enterprises have the greatest possibilities of becoming self-sufficient and sustainable.

5. *Organizing the training intervention: The first-line response and the short-term response strategies*

Following the studies on the labour market, the needs of the community and the feasibility study, employment and training programmes should be developed in at least two stages. First, a small and short-term test-pilot project for training and employment creation can gather responses on various training options before launching large-scale training programmes. As the training options offered in large-scale programmes should correspond to the income-earning work opportunities that exist for demobilized combatants, and since these should be strictly need-based and demand-led, a test project is the most suitable strategy to ensure expedient training interventions. A two-stage approach is also desirable, because in post-conflict economic and employment conditions it is inherently difficult to collect accurate data for planning and operating employment and training programmes. Furthermore, during the initial pilot project, NGOs and other agencies which already have their own education and training courses may be contacted, for these external agencies can make a valuable contribution in training ex-combatants (locations, tools, teachers, accommodation, etc.).

Based on the information obtained from KIs, feasibility studies, agencies that can offer training as well as from the ex-combatants themselves at their demobilization, an initial pilot training "first-line response" strategy can be initiated. It is usually conducted for the first eight-12 months after demobilization and consists mainly of (pilot) training-for-work programmes. Then, based on the responses from the target groups and the agencies involved in training and employment, an evaluation can be produced that may prove useful as a guide for the larger training programmes that are to follow.

On the basis of the evaluation of the programmes implemented during the first-line response period (eight-12 months), it should be possible to develop a "short-term training strategy" (two or three years) based on an evaluation of the programmes developed under the first pilot projects. This second period will involve further expansion and strengthening of the initial training and employment programmes.[53]

53. Sirivastava, op. cit., p. 24.

What follows after these initial years of emergency employment support and economic reconstruction are usually various forms of national development efforts that may, depending on the severity of war-related damage, include further rehabilitation and assistance programmes.

The first-line-response strategy may include the following training projects:[54]

- *In the rural non-farm sector*: Programmes of eight-12 weeks' and ten-24 weeks' duration are suggested which may contain different activities and skill categories. They build upon existing experience of programmes being conducted by NGOs and religious groups. Where available, government training institutions can be used as well. The total training input is expected to be relatively small and the content of training is limited to:
  - the specific skill required for the activity and the minimum business skills for setting up production and marketing arrangements; or
  - comprehensive training extending to the skill groups as a whole in combination with minimum business skills.
- *In the urban informal sector*: Several alternative models of work-specific training are suggested in a triangular relationship that involves the demobilized combatant as apprentice, the training centre and the entrepreneur who will act as the trainer-motivator.
- *In the formal sector*: A classical institutional training approach is modified to provide accelerated training for wage employment using existing networks of educational institutions and employee/employer associations.

During the following short-term response strategy, the following alternatives are suggested:

- *In the rural non-farm sector*: Following evaluation of the test programme, an evaluation for further expansion of training was begun under the previous strategy; introduction of mobile training and resource units and open workshops are supported by selective institutional assistance to expand the programme.
- *In the urban informal sector*: Training is expected to play a catalytic role in expanding informal markets, trade and services once the additional product groups and services are identified.
- *In the formal sector*: Apprenticeship programmes that facilitate closer linkages among training agencies and training programmes, the apprentices and actual income-earning opportunities could be initiated under this strategy.

54. ibid., pp. 38-39.

Given the many kinds of options and strategies available, it is crucial that training methods are planned well in advance of their actual operation. It is also important to limit the parameters within which training is concentrated and to ensure that programmes are need-based and demand-led. There are many past experiences to learn from and pre-tested methods to choose from.[55] It is estimated that approximately 50-60 training classes for different skills may be planned along with some ten training packages for business-related skills.

The following section presents proposals for the implementation and organization of training programmes that aim directly at facilitating employment and entrepreneurship.

6. *Implementing the training programmes*

In most post-conflict regions of Africa, skilled staff necessary to plan and operate reintegration programmes and training for employment are difficult to find. The same is usually the case for experienced teachers/trainers who are not only qualified teachers but also have their own business experience. Few alternatives exist besides finding and training teachers and trainers must be found.

Some form of training of teachers and vocational trainers will most often be required through external interventions (NGOs, bilateral and multilateral development organizations, etc.). A trainers-of-trainers programme is necessary in most cases and must therefore be incorporated into any comprehensive reintegration effort. To organize such programmes and not run the danger of training too few or too many people in one field of expertise and neglect other fields, it is necessary to work out clear agreements between the principal national reintegration agency and concerned government ministries and domestic or external training institutions run by NGOs or bilateral and multilateral agencies.

The availability of trainers and instructors in implementing the above strategies could become a constraint if adequate steps are not taken in time. A training-of-trainers programme should be an integral part of every strategy. Trainers will require orientation on how to train adults and especially demobilized combatants. They will also require orientation on training methods for employment and business

55. The ILO\'92s worldwide experience in the planning and execution of vocational training programmes has led to the development of a universal and flexible concept represented in training modules. These come in the form of self-contained instructional booklets, each covering a specific learning objective. Many such training modules have been developed by the ILO under its Modules of Employable Skills (MES). These have been created with normal development conditions in mind; for the post-conflict situation in the case of ex-combatant reintegration, such modules must be adapted to local conditions and demands. (More information on these is available from the ILO\'92s Training Policies and Systems Branch, Geneva).

operations. Some instructors may need orientation on how to train less-educated trainees (less than prescribed schooling level for normal pre-employment training) through accelerated or modular programmes.

Diverse methods can be used for the preparation of training staff. These men and women must be instructed on how to impart vocational skills and raise awareness of the available resources as well as the various training approaches and options. Methods for such training of trainers are, for example:

- determination of the precise skill profile for each skill in light of local conditions and production possibilities;
- comprehensive training to cover all skills in one skill group;
- adoption of an action-learning method to focus on practical content of the skills; and
- basic training in business-related skills.

Training must be work-specific and focused so as to avoid waste of precious teaching personnel, time and funds. Training for employment creation can be organized following different approaches: the classical institutional method in which students go to the teacher/trainer and meet in groups/classes, the small community method where teachers/trainers go to the students instead, and the on-the-job training through an apprenticeship/intern method in which one or more students learn while working with an experienced mastercrafts person or in a formal enterprise. Training should provide basic operational skills which are sufficient for entry into self-employment and to sustain a minimum level of activity. The training content should not be pre-packaged but put together on the basis of the actual requirements of the work.

7. Developing specific training packages

The content of work-specific training must be focused in order to be cost-effective. One method to ensure training focus and proper follow-up is to make financial support conditional on the performance of trainers and students. While this requires some special institutional needs in the informal sector, entrepreneurs, micro enterprises and small businesses may be persuaded to take in an agreed number of trainee apprentices in return for a grant, a subsidy per trainee or possible tax breaks. Such financing conditions could also take account of various training improvements which the employer, entrepreneur or mastercrafts worker can provide (such as supply of raw materials or pocket money for the apprentice).

A training schedule should also be designed for the trainee with the active involvement of the entrepreneur in developing content and material for specific work activities. Part-time skills training can be provided as a supplement to an apprenticeship so that the apprentices/trainees are encouraged to report on their performance.[56] It is dangerous, however, to allow too many demobilized combatants to attend the same employment and business management courses in the same geographical region and/or economic sector without considering the arithmetic of likely opportunities to either find wage-earning jobs or start small enterprises.

In all training for business administration or formal/informal private entrepreneurship, it is advisable to design a total package: identification of income-earning work opportunities, needs assessment and feasibility studies, skills training, business training, evaluation of current experience, evaluation of training institutions, training of trainers and mastercrafts workers, group formation (cooperatives, for example), practical apprenticeship wherever possible, support services (credit, advice, networking, etc.), raw materials, tool kits, technical back-up for production and problem solving, and marketing and monitoring arrangements. The possibility of adding a food-for-training component should also be explored if costs of training programmes are surpassing available funding.

In post-conflict countries, the large numbers of new entrants into the labour market in the rural/urban, informal/formal sectors can be best served by the establishment of training programmes that are not necessarily stationed in permanent locations, but that are mobile and target rural artisans and entrepreneurs. By moving the training to the people, programmes provide not only much-needed support to rural communities, but they also help stem the rural-to-urban migration. Furthermore, training in rural communities can contribute to the development of the apprenticeship system for which mastercrafts workers are trained to accept apprentices and interns.

Concerning the duration of training courses, there are many options to choose from: classical class-room teaching and training may take up to a year or more, but will usually be quite expensive if the students are to study full time and be housed and fed. It may be less expensive to have short training sessions of a few days or weeks near the home communities of the students so that all ex-combatants can live at their homes and continue to be active (part time) in their work. Training can also be conducted during apprenticeships where the student follows a course in a specified institutional location for a few days at a time and then spends most of the working time with his/her craftsmaster.

56. The experience of the National Open Apprenticeship Scheme in Nigeria (NIR/87/024) is a useful example. The ILO project prepared a manual containing training programmes for 83 skills; orientation courses for trainees; training courses in entrepreneurship development, business and financial management, simple book-keeping and marketing techniques; as well as training of trainers. The ILO also developed a field inspection system.

The duration of training programmes also depends on whether the ex-combatants already have basic education and literacy or whether such general education must be incorporated into vocational or business-related training. For the demobilized combatants who will settle in rural non-farm activities, the training input will be intensive but of short duration. Basic technical and business-related skills can be imparted in eight-12 weeks for some two-thirds of the activities if the trainees have functional literacy or primary-level schooling. For the other one-third, ten-24 weeks may be required.

The classical institutional training approach is usually given through national structures for pre-employment technical and vocational training. It is often organized at the national (governmental/college) level and is geared to formal-sector wage employment. However, given that in the post-conflict situation the objective here is to settle demobilized combatants in formal wage employment, it must be remembered that most African countries have few formal-sector wage jobs available. Hence, any training programmes that focus solely on this economic sector must be carefully tested in pilot projects before being offered on a wide scale. The worst is to provide ample education and training that prepares war-displaced persons for entry in formal wage-paying jobs without there being such employment opportunities available.

Training must be adapted to the region and the dominant economic sector in which skills are to be taught. The structure of subjects taught and the institutions which offer training are bound to differ, depending on whether they address agricultural communities, the rural non-farm and small enterprise sector, or whether training is intended to support economic development of war-displaced persons in rural/urban formal wage employment or informal self-employment activities.

In the rural non-farm sector and in the urban informal sector, training input is usually of short duration and intensive because of the geographic and/or infrastructure conditions which do not permit trainers and trainees to meet for long periods of time on a daily or weekly basis. It is important at all times that training is limited to the very specific skills required to fulfil the demand for business training, production and marketing. It is also important that follow-up and evaluation are conducted to learn whether the trainees have managed to become self-sufficient.

One option for the informal sector is on-the-job training. Usually, training by employers is considered as an element in formal wage-employment positions but, as usually only a minority of war-affected unemployed people can obtain wage-paying jobs, training must be promoted in such a manner that self-employment in the informal sector remains an option. Whether in rural or urban areas, apprenticeships in formal medium and large enterprises provide an opportunity for training that must not be overlooked. The apprenticeship system has proven effective in many industrialized as well as developing countries, as it leads to both formal wage

employment within the enterprise which conducts the training or in other similar enterprises.

In some cases, after a certain period of apprenticeship experience, trainees may set up their own enterprise. This is the most important aspect of the apprenticeship system to be promoted in countries where very few formal wage-employment opportunities exist. In many countries apprenticeship legislation already exists. Administrative and financial arrangements then need to be negotiated with each enterprise in the case of demobilized combatants. It would be desirable to ensure that legal and procedural conditions are simplified so that apprenticeship arrangements do not place an unduly heavy burden on the enterprises which can take on trainees but do not necessarily have the means to pay full wages to their student apprentices. Instead, the reintegration programme or a similar employment promotion strategy may subsidize apprentices' incomes or offer other incentives to expand and facilitate the work of mastercrafts workers and entrepreneurs who take on apprentices.

Training in the formal sector is usually differentiated from that in the informal rural and urban sectors by the focus of strategies and subjects. In most countries (even those which have suffered from war) a classical institutional training approach usually exists already. It is most often based on a national structure of pre-employment technical education (colleges) and vocational training in enterprises. In the case of offering training for ex-combatants, such training must be shortened in duration and incorporate an accelerated modular programme. The objective is not to offer comprehensive college-type education, but to resettle the former combatants in formal-sector wage employment as soon as possible.

8. *Training structures and institutions*

On the basis of surveys, labour market and feasibility studies as well as the pilot fist-line response projects, it should be possible to develop a short-term training strategy that expands and strengthens initial successful responses. Through such structures as "mobile training" and "resource units" or "open workshops", as well as with selective institutional support for training-of-trainers and mastercrafts workers, training can most effectively be brought to the war-affected target groups.

The role of mobile training and resource units may be both initial training (in areas not fully covered by the first-line response strategy programme) and upgrading where required. The role of open workshops will be to provide access to shared common facilities for groups or trained demobilized combatants to enhance their production

and income. If possible, both upgrading, training and open workshops can charge fees for their services.[57]

The key to both strategies is to take the training to the trainee and not bring the trainee to a training institution. The only exception to this should be those cases where the training centre is village-based and the trainee can easily travel to it. In turn, this requires a maximum utilization of locally available training resources such as mastercrafts workers, community centres, NGO facilities and informal apprenticeship arrangements. For institutions under the government, it may be necessary to obtain a general policy agreement from the concerned ministry (i.e. the Ministry of Education or Labour) to approve the application of such training methods by supplying standardized test/exam projects with which trainees can obtain nationally recognized diplomas or certificates of accomplishment.

Because of the informal nature of many NGOs which offer rehabilitation or vocational training, their contribution to employment generation is not officially recognized. There are various reasons for this: NGOs and external agencies are often involved in training only as part of their general humanitarian assistance or community development programmes. In this context, they often offer composite support for promoting local economic self-reliance, literacy, general education, information on technical support and perhaps on credit facilities for new entrepreneurs. Within the limits of their operations, NGOs tend to perform effectively and often better than government or donor programmes.

There are several reasons for this difference in performance: flexibility and an open-ended learner-centred approach which allow a great deal of innovative design and development work, ability to adapt and learn on an ongoing basis, a strong “people” focus, a flexible environment through which transfer of skills becomes easier, and the ability to transfer motivational attributes. One important difference between government training programmes and NGO initiatives is that NGOs bring training to the people, while governments bring or demand that people travel to training institutions. While both official and NGO training have their merits which must not be neglected, for resettled ex-combatants or other war-affected populations a combination offer of both types of training structures is best. This is particularly the case for rural communities which do not have ready or inexpensive access (transportation) to urban centres where most official government training is usually offered.

To illustrate the need for officially recognized NGO training, the Ethiopian post-conflict effort may serve as an example. A project proposal for the reintegration of demobilized combatants in the Tigray region was prepared by the ILO in line with the first-line response

57. Recent ILO experience of training through \'93open workshops\'94 in a Vocational Training for Income-Generation Project in the Sudan (SUD/88/025) is relevant in this respect. It provided the shared use of available workshop facilities in the local training centre to self-employed persons after working hours.

strategy outlined above. It was conceived as an action-research project for the initial settlement of 3,000 demobilized combatants (of an estimated total of 40,000 to be settled in the Tigray region). The proposed Ethiopian project foresaw a composite package of assistance: identification of income-generating activities and their economic viability and profitability, training of trainers (local artisans), designing the training wage- and self-employment programme for each skill (task analysis and specification, level of technology required, production work programme), and designing employment-resource packages (assistance in work-site selection, raw materials, credit, technical support, follow-up on-the-job training and problem solving, marketing, etc.).

It was envisaged that the project would be implemented by a local NGO, and for this the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) was given the task. The NGO was established during the war to provide relief and social services to the people in war-affected regions and was closely associated with the combatants. In addition, community committees were operated at the village and sub-district levels which would take an active part in the development and implementation of the programme, including rehabilitation of 20 community skills training centres on a self-help basis. The project was furthermore to develop a monitoring and analysis framework to determine project relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and equity by task and by sector. This evaluation should then form the basis for developing the short-term response strategy for the reintegration in the same region of a further 37,000 demobilized combatants.[58]

9. *Business training*

The objective of "own account" private entrepreneurship (self-employment) and business training is to provide a combination of technical and entrepreneurial skills to enhance opportunities for income-earning work. Different models of self-employment training can be designed, depending upon a number of factors. It may be possible to combine technical and business skills in a single training programme followed by exposure to practical production in the business environment. This will be a first-line response, using existing institutions, teaching materials and instructors.[59]

The training content must be flexible and adaptable to the work situation with the objective of matching training programmes and

58. Srivastava, op. cit., pp.28-29.

59. A wide variety of technical and management training material has been developed by the ILO. Besides Modules of Employable Skills (MES), considerable development work has taken place in country-specific technical cooperation projects both for small industrial and business-related skills. The grass-roots management training (GMT) method designed for micro-entrepreneurs in the informal sector also has wide applicability.

methods to the needs of the market. The choice of business activity must be limited to technically and financially viable options, considering the ex-combatant's education and the economic growth potential in the chosen sector. The combination of technical and business skills can be need-based and will depend on the capacity of the demobilized combatants to absorb information and understand its applicability for an entrepreneurial activity.

Conclusion

The options that exist for training strategies and their institutionalization should be selected and established in accordance with market needs and demands – that is, the needs among the war-displaced target groups, the needs of the communities in which they are to settle, the needs of local and national economic rebuilding and development, and the demands in the labour market for new skills, new private entrepreneurship and new goods and services. On the basis of this information, training programmes can be planned and provided in accordance with employment promotion strategies and the opportunities for small and medium enterprises to expand and provide new employment opportunities for war-displaced populations.

A careful institution-by-institution study will be required to determine available capacity in terms of teachers, workshops and classrooms before the programme of training demobilized combatants can be implemented. There will certainly be additional requirements for teachers/instructors, workshop equipment and consumable materials. The need for direct financial support to some training institutions, beyond the subsidy per trainee, will have to be considered as well.

Most national systems for technical education and vocational training have experienced a number of constraints: inadequacy of funding, inability to upgrade training equipment, limited practical and industrial experience among teachers and instructors, rigid entry requirements and inflexible and outdated curricula with little regard for the needs of the labour market. In addition, most systems suffer from poor internal efficiency (low workshop utilization, low teaching load, high per capita training costs, etc.) and low external efficiency (difficulty in placing the graduates in jobs with the consequence that long waiting periods result, followed by slow earning or productivity gains). Reforms of any training system are not as easy as has often been assumed in the past. Change is difficult for most institutions which receive assured funding, regardless of how well they perform in relation to market demand for their products.

Still, reforms of training programmes and training interventions within the framework of a comprehensive employment promotion strategy constitute the best method to reverse post-conflict economic

stagnation and poverty. The opportunity which the reintegration of demobilized combatants presents to any war-afflicted country can be used to introduce curricula reforms that are market oriented and flexible and which better utilize teaching and apprenticeship capacities. But to be sustainable, training must favour post-conflict economic reconstruction that facilitates the development of new employment opportunities and private entrepreneurship.

V. EMPLOYMENT-INTENSIVE PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMMES

Introduction

This section examines the relevance and potential of employment-intensive works (EIW) programmes as one of the option-specific methods to create employment and generate income for demobilized combatants during their reintegration into civilian life. The purpose of this text is to emphasize the need for careful planning and to highlight why EIW programmes are relevant and why they can be of interest to demobilized combatants. Drawing from the ILO's experience in post-conflict situations, the section summarizes policies, operational issues and recommendations. Information is taken from an earlier ILO study[60] which draws upon three country case studies in Cambodia, Mozambique and Uganda.[61] Other material has also been included here from recent publications on employment-intensive works programmes, infrastructure rehabilitation and construction in post-conflict countries.

The experience of the International Labour Office in developing and assisting employment-intensive works programmes during the past two decades in over 40 countries has demonstrated that this approach provides considerable scope and flexibility for the creation and promotion of employment. EIW programmes can offer small- or large-scale job creation and benefits for war-displaced persons and demobilized combatants. These programmes have contributed to the rebuilding of roads, canals, water wells, irrigation, civilian housing, schools, public sanitation, sewage disposal systems, government services, and any other reconstruction efforts for which large numbers of workers can be employed.

The advantage of EIW programmes is that, if well planned and managed, they stimulate local market demand for goods and services and they support the development of the private sector. In consequence, a well-managed programme contributes to the reconstruction of the national economy and, at the same time, facilitates the rehabilitation of war-displaced persons. This implies, however, that labour-intensive works programmes must be carefully planned and supported by appropriate government policies and funding.[62]

EIW programmes are usually designed to support local economic development. This may be in the form of facilitating transportation, communication, agricultural irrigation, or to improve living conditions

60. }{\plain \i\f1 Relevance and potential of employment-intensive works programmes in the reintegration of demobilized combatants}{\plain \f1 , prepared by Mr. R. Srivastava in collaboration with Mr. M.A. Zekrya of the ILO Development Policies Branch, Development and Technical Cooperation Department, Geneva, 1995.

61. S. Guha: }{\plain \i\f1 Cambodia: Country report and case studies}{\plain \f1 , ILO, Dec. 1994; S. Guha: }{\plain \i\f1 Uganda: Country report and case studies}{\plain \f1 , ILO, Dec. 1994; and J. Mayer: }{\plain \i\f1 Mozambique: Country report}{\plain \f1 , ILO, Jan. 1995. The information in these reports includes ILO experience in designing and implementing employment-intensive public works programmes.

through the construction of housing, clinics, schools, the supply of safe drinking water, etc. And when key infrastructures such as roads are opened through mine clearance and made safe to travel on again, refugees and former combatants can return to their home communities and places of employment. EIW programmes can thus provide benefits (salary, payments in kind or food-for-work) to local populations as well as war-displaced persons and former combatants while making it possible for them to settle – perhaps at the new place of work – and reintegrate into the socio-economic life of the area.

The EIW approach to rehabilitation and maintenance of the rural infrastructure provides scope and flexibility for two aspects: (1) direct employment creation through construction and maintenance works, and (2) support for "downstream" indirect employment through the self-reliant and affordable use of that same infrastructure. In other words, the injection of cash into a conflict-affected rural economy at the household level creates spin-off productive activities in other economic sectors such as new services for those employed in EIW programmes. In this manner, an EIW programme can create a market for goods and services by the mere fact that its workers require housing, food, clothing, entertainment, etc. and may have an income with which to procure what they need in the local communities where they are active.

It becomes clear then that, when organized in conjunction with training programmes and reintegration assistance, EIW programmes constitute a potent strategy for addressing the multiple economic demands of demobilized combatants and other war-affected people. And besides the immediate work and incomes which an EIW project provides, opportunities can be included for general education (literacy, for example) as well as vocational training to facilitate the integration into civil and economic life for those workers who do not have professional experience and skills. In this manner, EIW programmes may contribute to enhancing a region's productive capacities and human resources.[63]

62. Employment or labour-intensive works (EIW) programmes provide employment and typically generate public goods such as physical infrastructure through labour-intensive means. Most programmes are to varying degrees supported by public funds (domestic, bilateral or multilateral). Other support may come from NGOs or industries with local interests. The implementation and operation of EIW programmes is often carried out by private-sector or community-level initiatives, while the underlying policy and planning decisions are made at the central and regional government level with support from international agencies such as the ILO. (Adapted from: Braun, Teklu and Webb: \'93Labour-intensive public works for food security in Africa\'94 in }{\plain \i\f1 International Labour Review}{\plain \f1 , Vol, 131, No.1, 1992, pp.20-21).

63. For a more detailed discussion, see J. Gaude and H. Watzlawick: \'93Employment creation and poverty alleviation through labour-intensive public works in least developed countries\'94 in }{\plain \i\f1 International Labour Review}{\plain \f1 , Vol. 131, No.1, 1992.

1. The post-conflict situation

War ruins human, social, physical, and economic capital and, by its destruction in the areas of battle, it nullifies many – if not most – earlier investments in social development, markets, food production and infrastructure. Post-conflict reconstruction is not possible without efforts to rebuild the national economy. This requires the rehabilitation of the principal infrastructure facilities (transport and communication networks) as well as the provision of programmes for employment creation and the resettlement of displaced populations. Decentralized and local investments are necessary to rebuild communities, and soldiers must be demobilized and helped to reintegrate with job training and employment opportunities.[64] Employment-intensive works programmes are one kind of decentralized investment that creates employment, rebuilds the local economy and helps former soldiers to integrate into civilian community life.

In the post-conflict situation, the economy is usually severely disrupted; large population groups are unable to provide for themselves and many among them are disoriented and not in their original home communities. Wars usually bring about a rapid decline in economic performance, which implies that a post-conflict country rarely has the capacity to absorb and offer income-earning opportunities to the war-affected and displaced persons.

In Africa and Asia, conflict-affected groups such as refugees, internally-displaced persons, and demobilized combatants as well as their dependants mostly originate from rural communities. Following the conflict, many wish to return to their homes and become economically independent. The task of promoting local development, creating employment and supporting a resettlement of displaced persons requires considerable financial investment and planning.

However, conflict-affected governments usually have very constrained budgets due to their massive post-conflict reconstruction needs. For this reason, EIW projects must be cost-effective and draw upon local human, material and institutional resources. As they provide urgently-needed employment and income opportunities to large-numbers of war-affected people, they can stimulate renewed economic activity and contribute to post-conflict rehabilitation.

Public investment in infrastructure rehabilitation and construction is generally a valuable means to provide the much-needed economic stimulus to war-affected communities. This is particularly so when EIW programmes reconstruct basic services that facilitate the development of formal and informal economic activities.

64. From steps outlined to rebuild destroyed economies in: }{\plain \i\f1 World Bank News}{\plain \f1 , Vol. 15, No.6, 15 Feb. 1996, p.1.

2. Infrastructure and war

In most conflicts, the physical infrastructure is a prime target for damage or destruction. Opposing forces aim at roads, bridges, railway tracks, energy supplies and communication systems to isolate an enemy or population supporting it, as well as to obstruct supplies and reinforcements. In the process, schools, clinics and health centres, the drinking water supply, irrigation works, communication networks, and personal and community property are damaged. This disrupts or brings to a halt all forms of urban and rural economic activities.

An assessment of the damage to the infrastructure in the immediate post-conflict period is vital for quick reconstruction. However, conducting an investigation is not without its difficulties: most post-conflict governments lack the capacity to undertake comprehensive damage assessment. Financial resources and trained and qualified staff are often in short supply, and government priorities are frequently focused on the re-establishment of central structures and services in the capital city, which leaves rural communities and their rehabilitation needs at a disadvantage.

The difficulty in conducting infrastructure damage assessment and planning the repair or reconstruction is often compounded by the length and breadth of the war. In the war-affected rural sector, infrastructures may be too remote for rapid damage assessment and rehabilitation. Moreover, war-related dangers can make any approach to rural infrastructure facilities time consuming if roads and bridges are destroyed and even dangerous if landmines are present. In these conditions, insecurity is a major factor that has frequently led to ongoing problems related to poverty and social dislocation. The transportation of goods and services may have come to a halt and local businesses may have ceased operation, with the consequence that the inability to revive economic activity leads to greater poverty.

Adding to the insecurity and poverty of rural populations is the problem of the former combatants who have not settled, who have no new income-earning work and who may remain involved in violent activities before or after their official demobilization. Easy availability of arms, widespread unemployment and shortages of food have contributed to increased banditry and crime in fluid social situations where population groups have not settled down.

For example, in Uganda the major cause of insecurity for many months after the war was the influx of large numbers of refugees and internally floating populations who had no work and who, often out of desperation, participated in looting and banditry. A similar situation existed in 1990 and 1991 in Ethiopia when the war came to an end. In Mozambique as well as in Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire, insecurity has been caused largely by a massive movement of population groups who initially fled the violence and found themselves unable to reintegrate

into a new community. As in African conflict-affected countries, Cambodians have also been plagued by continued conflicts since the summer of 1994. Ongoing regional violence between the new government and the Khmer Rouge has hampered the demobilization of combatants, the elimination of landmines and the reconstruction of key infrastructure networks.

In many post-conflict situations, regions affected by great violence remain insecure and relatively isolated for months or even years. Organizing employment-intensive construction or rehabilitation works is an effective response to encourage renewed economic activity, remove landmines and other war-related dangers (possibly with local labour), and facilitate healthy cross-regional communications. This can promote the creation of new social structures as well as the rehabilitation of civilians and ex-combatants.

3. *Objectives and relevance of employment-intensive works*

The scope for undertaking employment-intensive infrastructure construction, rehabilitation and maintenance is enormous. A large number of such programmes have been conducted in the past and the pioneering work of several donors and EIW project organizers (NGOs, the UNHCR, the UNDP and the ILO) has helped to increase the acceptance of this approach in conflict-affected countries. The reason for the success of EIW programmes is their socio-economic rationale: "they constitute one of the few means of intervention which can address *simultaneously* the problems of employment generation, poverty alleviation, rural asset creation and food security".[65] Moreover, because of the close link between productive assets, agricultural growth and sustainable livelihoods, infrastructure development plays a key role in rural development strategies. EIW programmes can furthermore be very cost-effective when investments for them are based on locally available human and material resources.

Employment-based investments can be cost-effective as well as sustainable and replicable. Cost-effectiveness implies a least-cost method, which should be true in both economic and financial terms at the earliest possible date after start-up of an EIW programme.[66] Comparisons between labour-based versus equipment-intensive approaches have indicated that EIW programmes are not only less costly but also make efficient use of local resources in general and of

65. J. Majeres: }{\plain \i\f1 Implementation of employment programmes: Key issues and options}{\plain \f1 , IFPRI International Policy Workshop: Employment for Poverty Alleviation and Food Security, Washington, 11-14 Oct., 1993, p.3.

66. ILO:}{\plain \i\f1 Labour-intensive public works in sub-Saharan Africa}{\plain \f1 , Working document, text ref. no.1206o/v.4, ILO, Geneva, Oct. 1991, p.7.

local labour in particular. For example, feeder road construction carried out in Rwanda, Ghana and Botswana indicated that these methods were, in financial terms, 10 to 30 per cent less costly. Moreover, they reduced foreign exchange expenditures by 50 to 60 per cent and created some 240 to 320 per cent more employment than equipment-based methods.[67]

"Given the importance of the infrastructure sector in most developing countries (typically some half of gross fixed capital formation and as much as 70 per cent of public investment expenditure), the employment and income-generating effect of well-designed programmes can be very considerable indeed."[68] Such programmes are of particular relevance in situations where there is a labour surplus and when EIW programmes are targeted at unskilled and semi-skilled workers who are in need of an income-earning opportunity following a conflict. In this manner, such programmes contribute to the monetization of a local economy.

EIW programmes also address several objectives which simultaneously show distinct advantages over mechanized (low labour content) infrastructure construction methods. For example, an EIW programme can provide advantages to workers and their community in that they create large-scale and immediate employment, improve working conditions (because of the generally included international checks on labour rights), support the health and safety of the workers, facilitate access to economic and social services, establish a basis for durable and longer-term employment, and stimulate local economic and vocational activities that can favour community-wide capacity building.

Advantages to government institutional rehabilitation and national economic development also result from EIW programmes, such as improved balance of payments, public and private institutional capacity building, a decentralization of government institutions and the release of transportation and production bottlenecks. When well planned, EIW programmes will stimulate local trade and commerce, provide new access to public markets for private entrepreneurs, reinforce backward and forward linkages in the local economy through the promotion of micro- and small-enterprise activities and strengthen the public infrastructure service sectors.

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67. B. Martens: }{\plain \i\f1 Etude compar\'e9e de l\'92\'e9fficacit\'e9 \'e9conomique des techniques \'e0 haute intensit\'e9 de main-d\'92oeuvre et \'e0 haute intensit\'e9 d\'92\'e9quipement pour la construction de routes secondaires au Rwanda}{\plain \f1 , BIT/ILO, Geneva, 1990. See also P.H. Bentall: }{\plain \i\f1 Ghana feeder roads project: Labour-based rehabilitation and maintenance}{\plain \f1 , WEP-CTP 116, ILO, Geneva, 1990. See also M. Zekrya: \'93The employment-intensive works programme\'94, in }{\plain \i\f1 Policy advice and information dissemination to member States on the employment-intensive works programme}{\plain \f1 , Employment Promotion Seminar, Harare 19-21 Sept. 1995, Seminar Report, ILO/SAMAT, Oct. 1995, pp.51-52.

68. ILO: }{\plain \i\f1 Towards full employment}{\plain \f1 , contribution of the International Labour Organization to the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the World Summit for Social Development, New York, 22 Aug.-2 Sept. 1994, (ILO, WSSD/1994), Geneva, p.20.

When planned in a comprehensive manner, an EIW will directly raise the socio-economic capacities of war-affected populations. An EIW programme will strengthen the vocational skills of many workers, encourage social cohesion among the local and the war-displaced persons, and bring about greater social stability in the post-conflict environment (especially where large population movements have taken place). By virtue of their increased work-related activities, these targeted individuals transfer or introduce their new skills to others in their community and thus facilitate wider capacity building. In this context, capacity building implies a process of human development (vocational, professional and social skills) which, in a cumulative manner within a community, can be understood as forming the combined pool of human resources.

A specific capacity-building aspect which can be promoted during an EIW programme is the selective training of individual workers for specific tasks. Qualified workers might be trained to become part of a future maintenance crew (upkeep of roads, communications networks, canals, etc.). In this manner, the EIW project produces skilled workers who may eventually work as employees for the infrastructure operator or as private entrepreneurs.

For example, during initial EIW reconstruction of a rural road, individuals from each community along the road may be selected to undergo technical training. Once the EIW project has been completed, these individuals become the local maintenance crews. Training workers for future maintenance (or perhaps continued infrastructure development) can be done in almost every kind of EIW programme, and it has proven cost-effective and useful for local capacity building.

4. Examples of EIW programmes[69]

Capacity building and vocational training were part of an ILO project in Cambodia. It was a labour-based infrastructure rehabilitation and development project initiated in October 1992 as part of an umbrella employment generation programme (EGP). It aimed at rebuilding the essential rural infrastructure, in particular rural roads and irrigation schemes. While contributing to the rehabilitation of 56 km of canals for irrigation systems in Cambodia, the ILO programme provided training to more than 150 road and irrigation engineers. Furthermore, ten small contractors were given special training for future long-term rehabilitation/maintenance work.

69. Many discussions of past EIW programmes can be found in the development and employment literature. For an indication of the assistance provided by the ILO, see for example: }{\plain \i\f1 International Labour Review}{\plain \f1 , Vol. 131, No.1, 1992, which contains numerous articles and bibliographic references to the subject. However, most EIW programmes have been conducted in peace-time (normal) situations, while the examples in this section are of employment programmes in war-affected countries.

Given the huge task of construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of the infrastructure in Cambodia, the ILO programme concentrated its attention on demonstration and replicability and the acceptance of the EIW approach by national authorities and funding agencies. The work was undertaken in the four provinces which had the highest concentration of demobilized combatants (30,000), returnees from refugee camps in Thailand (20,000) and internally-displaced persons (about 90,000).[70]

By the end of 1994, the Cambodia project had constructed or rehabilitated 220 km of secondary roads and employed up to 6,000 workers per day. Nearly 60 per cent of the workers were women. The project was not targeted to demobilized soldiers alone, but a good proportion was drawn from them as well as from returnees and internally-displaced persons.

The EIW programme provided literacy training to about 1,000 persons, and the project established linkages with NGOs and other organizations in both planning and implementation in order to enhance its reach and its benefits. It introduced safety standards at work sites and prepared guidelines for worker compensation in case of work-related injuries and accidents. The project developed special guidelines for employing disabled persons on road, irrigation and agricultural works, including adaptation of tools for their use.

In Mozambique, employment-intensive technology for rural road construction, rehabilitation and maintenance was also well-received and effective. ILO projects assisted the Government in introducing labour-based road improvement and maintenance systems which eventually developed into the Feeder Roads Programme (FRP). This programme sought to remove one of the principal constraints, that of limited access to agricultural and rural areas in the country.[71]

The FRP is organized on the basis of district labour brigades. Starting with two labour brigades of about 300 each in 1989, it developed to 23 brigades of 150 to 250 each in 23 districts in 1994. A gradual expansion of the programme to the entire country has been planned by the Government and involves up to 40 brigades. The programme is not specifically targeted towards demobilized combatants but is open to all conflict-affected groups. Women's participation has averaged 10 per cent. To expand programme capacity-building scope and coverage, it created new linkages with many ongoing activities of NGOs, bilateral and multilateral agencies.

In Uganda, an employment-intensive approach has been applied for a long time in rural roads construction, rehabilitation and maintenance.

70. S. Guha: }{\plain \i\f1 Cambodia}{\plain \f1 , op. cit.

71. UNDP: }{\plain \i\f1 Mozambique feeder roads programme}{\plain \f1 , Report of the Joint UNDP/SIDA/ILO/MOZ evaluation mission, 29 April 1994; J. Mayer: }{\plain \i\f1 Mozambique}{\plain \f1 , op. cit. UNDP/ILO: }{\plain \i\f1 Management assistance to labour-based feeder roads rehabilitation and maintenance programme (FRP)}{\plain \f1 , Phase II, Draft Project Document, Oct. 1994.

The earliest ILO-supported projects started in the 1980s on a pilot basis. In all, six ILO-supported projects have contributed to the development of EIW programmes.[72] These projects demonstrated the technical feasibility and economic viability of the employment-intensive approach as well as its replicability, cost-competitiveness and cost-effectiveness.

There is an enormous need for infrastructure construction, rehabilitation and maintenance in the rural sector alone which forms an important element in post-conflict national reconstruction. Some steps have been taken by post-conflict governments and their partners (bilateral and multilateral organizations and NGOs) to undertake comprehensive planning for this purpose and to develop policy and action frameworks. In each case, the beneficiaries have been conflict-affected groups in general. This implies that projects specifically targeted to demobilized combatants through EIW infrastructure rehabilitation have been rare.

To maximize an EIW programme's relevance for demobilized combatants, the operating authority should be as decentralized as possible and maintain close contact with the communities in which ex-combatants intend to settle. The EIW operating authority can serve the reintegration of war-displaced persons best if it has some autonomy over employment and the allocation of funds. It should be able to distribute work and benefits to all sectors of the worker population by assigning jobs in community-related infrastructure projects that benefit all local residents and new settlers equally. The purpose is to facilitate a smooth integration of the incoming former combatants (or other war-displaced persons) into the local resident community. Should local resentment exist against the returnees or newcomers, then the EIW programme can be executed in such a way that representatives of all resident communities and members of the displaced population take part in planning implementation and operation.

5. *Government policies for EIW programmes*

Immediately after a conflict, governments are often slow to recognize the importance of rehabilitating key infrastructure networks and services – that is, when these are not directly relevant to economic and political life in the principal urban areas. And when national authorities decide to invest (perhaps with foreign support) in the reconstruction of national transportation, communications, energy and food distribution networks, they do it through expensive, often mechanized, low-labour-content methods.

72. S. Guha: }{\plain \i\f1 Uganda}{\plain \f1 , op. cit., pp. 20-31.

The war-related devastation to the transportation infrastructure in Mozambique was, for example, the single most limiting constraint to national economic and social recovery. To favour the re-employment of a large unemployed and often displaced population, the Government adopted policies that encourage labour-intensive public works. Another example is the EIW experience in Cambodia. The Government's policy formulation was actively supported by external agencies (the UNDP, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and bilateral donors) and included considerations such as intensity of war-related damage; concentration of target groups (demobilized soldiers, returnees and internally-displaced persons); and rapid employment creation.

The preparation of national policies for employment-intensive works is an important task in formulating the Government's post-conflict reconstruction objectives. Among the elements which need to be considered at the highest government level are the following:

- the Government's adoption of labour-based technologies for rehabilitation as a preferred means to reconstruct the war-damaged physical infrastructure;
- the Government's support for sustainable labour-intensive construction and maintenance of the physical infrastructure in the future;
- commitment to decentralize the EIW operational authorities and provide them with a fair amount of autonomy for local implementation, operation, funds allocation and employment in EIW programmes;
- concentration of benefits for the intended target group(s) (demobilized combatants, returnees, internally-displaced persons and/or local residents) by careful selection of the infrastructure work to be undertaken;
- creation of immediate employment for the conflict-affected population;
- government commitment to employ as much as possible local workers and locally available resources; and
- national emphasis on capacity-building techniques at the level of rural and urban communities by officially supporting coordination among local employment and development agencies (for example, managing an EIW feeder roads programme in conjunction with projects for vocational training, schooling, health services, etc.).

Once the different elements have been deliberated for policy formulation, the following principal objectives should be considered for inclusion:

- *Conflict-specificity*: Consideration of the conflict-specific context should be included in policies for post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation. The criteria for selecting appropriate employment creation should address security problems, the displacement and

resettlement of war-affected populations, the damage to the infrastructure, the danger of landmines, and related aspects. Because conflict-affected populations often require immediate assistance, government policies should favour labour-intensive employment schemes so as to provide benefits to as many people as possible as soon as possible.

- *Clear objectives*: Government policies should emphasize three mutually reinforcing goals – employment creation, infrastructure construction, and capacity building – and should lead to the removal of social and economic bottlenecks.
- *Programme prioritization*: While institutional and political considerations are important in the context of what is feasible given available finances, these must not over-shadow the economic needs of war-affected communities which any policy should give priority to.
- *Targeting*: The improvement of economic conditions of war-displaced groups through reintegration must figure at the top of post-conflict government priorities regarding employment promotion programmes. To the extent possible, the direct beneficiary population (demobilized combatants and their dependants, returnees, internally-displaced persons, etc.) should be targeted in the policy statement.
- *Technology and economics*: Choices of technology are important for both engineering and economic considerations. In all conflict-affected countries, the need for engineering and technical expertise is too large to be handled by a single government agency, whether at the central, provincial or local level. Hence, dividing the responsibilities among different government agencies and perhaps specialized NGOs at the national level and in local communities is advisable – government policies should permit such a distribution of tasks.
- *Linkages*: It is important to build contacts and linkages between labour-intensive works programmes and other ongoing development activities, NGOs as well as private enterprises. Again, policy statements on all post-conflict development and assistance activities should include a recommendation for wide inter-agency cooperation.

6. Planning EIW programmes

When planning, assessing needs, implementing and operating employment-intensive works programmes, the following priority question must be asked: Is a programme intended to rehabilitate the war-damaged infrastructure, to support war-affected people and/or to start economic activity? These areas of attention are most often combined to some extent in larger EIW programmes. In small work projects, however, local economic rehabilitation and labour are frequently neglected in favour of rapid, mechanized infrastructure reconstruction.

The selection of priorities (infrastructure or beneficiary population) presents some obstacles. In most countries, differences of interests and values lead to diverse perceptions of priorities. Depending on the source of funding and its prescribed allocation, government priorities for EIW programmes and decisions by the donors might diverge. Moreover, political interests have often clashed in the past with local socio-economic needs; careful planning and inter-agency coordination can help to prevent this.

According to the priorities set, the type of employment programme work must be defined and correspond to the local infrastructure rehabilitation needs and available funding. Then, an overseeing agency or office needs to be established, the composition of a local operating authority must be staffed, and the body of employees/workers should be defined. Further considerations will be whether economic development and wider capacity building should be an aspect of the programme. If so, general (literacy) education should be provided, life skills taught in special classes or discussion groups, and qualified and motivated workers should be given the opportunity to obtain further vocational and specialized skills training in order to establish the future local maintenance or construction crew. Finally, close coordination of the EIW programme with other social and economic (multilateral, bilateral, local NGO) development assistance agencies is recommended.

Selection criteria and targeting

Before programme planning can begin, specific infrastructures in selected regions of a war-torn country must be targeted for construction or rehabilitation. The first and most crucial question is to decide which projects should be selected for employment-intensive works. For this, selection criteria must be prepared. Such criteria might stress the need for rebuilding vital networks and services for human survival (main roads, hospitals, supply of food and drinking water, cooking fuel, etc.) or, depending on the war-time destruction, focus only on less urgent repairs (bridges, electricity supply, rural roads, etc.).

The selection criteria can be divided into four broad areas for consideration:

- *conflict-related factors*: the extent of war damage to the infrastructure, concentration of returnees, internally-displaced persons, demobilized soldiers, parallel programmes for the elimination of dangers (clearance of landmines), roads in secure areas where reconstruction activities can safely take place, etc.;
- *economic feasibility*: the relevance of access over roads and railways or through airports, harbours, rivers and canals, etc., potential for local agricultural and small industry development, availability of labour for the EIW programme, etc.;
- *social criteria*: the participatory potential of local communities, the concentration of a target population (demobilized combatants, war-displaced persons) in a specific region, very poor areas where employment creation would benefit a vulnerable population, communities that are willing and committed to labour-based road maintenance, etc.;
- *institutional and political criteria*: the availability of local government institutions and their capacity to organize labour-intensive works programmes, the linkages with parallel economic and social rebuilding activities, etc.

For example, the selection of future feeder roads construction or rehabilitation in Mozambique and in Uganda is based on specific economic and social criteria. The economic criteria include existing road conditions, existing traffic volume, estimated future traffic volume, estimated cost of rehabilitation up to maintainable standards, ensuring access to rural areas, increasing access to potentially productive areas, and promoting agricultural, livestock raising or other economic activities of importance in the region. Among the social criteria are the population served, the availability of community services (water, shelter, schools, public health facilities, etc.), access to rehabilitation programmes and capacities of social services to respond to natural calamities.

The most significant aspect of the selection approach is to try to give priority to employment considerations and to support the workers where necessary with light equipment and tools rather than heavy equipment and machinery. This is especially important when the objective is to create employment and stimulate a war-damaged economy. This often requires a shift in emphasis from technology-driven to labour-intensive programmes. In Uganda, the Government envisages an increase in contracting and a reduction in force account public works to maintain and build infrastructure facilities.

The local socio-economic needs of war-affected communities must figure in the planning and targeting of EIW programmes. Many difficulties in targeting specific groups can be anticipated and dealt with through a flexible design of assistance and training programmes.

This requires an understanding of the needs and capacities of the targeted community to cooperate and provide labour. The community's psycho-social aspects and the level of poverty and unemployment are elements to be considered. And if the infrastructure rehabilitation programme is intended to assist the war-affected in particular, then a maximum number of people who were homeless or unemployed due to the conflict must be included (widows, women ex-combatants, war victims/ disabled and young soldiers).

Regarding the reintegration of demobilized combatants, experience from recent reconstruction efforts shows that it is difficult and perhaps counter-productive to target an EIW programme exclusively for them. Usually, infrastructure rehabilitation occurs in communities which consist of a mixed population that resides in a war-affected district. In those areas that house large concentrations of demobilized combatants, it is possible to include this target group in significant numbers but, to help their integration into the resident community, it is generally advisable to include all local people in the same employment programme.

In any employment scheme or other assistance effort, attention must be given to how the war-displaced persons and the resident community are represented. Important for consideration are: voluntary recruitment of labour, avoiding disparities in benefits, setting adequate remuneration systems and/or benefit payment mechanisms that include timely payment, maintaining reasonable proportions of cash wages and food aid, arranging for measurement of works completed, a careful task- or output-based system, technical standards for rehabilitation and maintenance, standardization of procedures, contract agreements and forms, and careful monitoring of numbers employed, outputs achieved, costs, and benefits (vehicle traffic, impact of cash incomes, increase in trade, establishment of small craftsmen's shops and small businesses).

Special arrangements may be required for women workers and the disabled. If the training of small contractors is included, this would then involve assistance in developing appropriate contracting and business procedures, assuring a timely cash flow and initial help in credit and equipment.

Information requirements

Because in the near-emergency conditions immediately following a war in which employment and assistance projects are initiated, a lack of information on local conditions and war-related damages is unavoidable. For this reason, EIW programmes must be planned with the post-conflict conditions and the limitations clearly in mind, i.e. incomplete information, few logistical capacities and probably seriously lacking technical and administrative resources.

It is advisable to develop a specific conflict-related focus in the planning, designing and implementing of EIW programmes. This is because many of the aspects that affect employment programmes in a

post-conflict region are markedly different from their counterpart in a peaceful development context. For example, investment capital may not be readily available for infrastructure construction projects when war-related emergency work is still under way in parts of a country.

Appropriate EIW programme planning requires information for assessments of the human, societal, economic and environmental needs. This may include:

- the needs and aspirations of demobilized combatants and other war-displaced persons (supply-side needs assessment);
- the locations for successful (re)settlement of ex-combatants and the capacity of existing communities to accommodate them (demand-side societal needs assessment);
- the employment opportunities, vocational training and self-employment possibilities for ex-combatants (demand and supply sides of labour availability and market assessments);
- possibilities and utility to assist war-displaced persons together with local residents through employment in EIW programmes; and
- sustainable environmental carrying capacity in terms of available (local) natural resources to supply raw materials for the EIW programme itself and, once it is completed, to feed, house and provide income-earning opportunities for the workers.

Because information requirements are often lacking in conflict-affected situations, planning assistance and projects in such a context require that government policies – as mentioned above – clearly support EIW programmes. The policies must underline the importance of EIW programmes and thus permit their implementation even in difficult circumstances.

Circumstances that can be considered as "difficult" are, for example, local and regional access for damage assessment and reconstruction, danger on roads and less travelled paths because of landmines, insecurity because of the remaining proliferation of weapons and ammunition, dismal economic conditions, an inactive labour market and logistical constraints.

Logistical and labour constraints

Following a war, wages for EIW programme workers are generally low and frequently consist of food only. The consequence is that many of the ablebodied men in rural communities leave in search of work elsewhere; women, children and the elderly may then be left to grow food and work on infrastructure rehabilitation. Such labour constraints are often an obstacle that must be dealt with.

Another problem encountered regarding logistical and labour constraints in conflict-affected regions is that private and government institutions are often unable to adapt quickly enough to the near-emergency needs of a post-conflict situation and provide employment and other assistance to displaced persons. The reason, on the one hand, is that war-time aid agencies are specialized in

emergency assistance (i.e. food aid, refugee resettlement, demobilizing combatants or reintegrating war-displaced persons) while, on the other hand, peace-time development agencies focus on people who are settled in their home communities (i.e. vocational training, increase of agricultural production, social welfare projects, etc.). EIW programmes in war-torn countries, however, fall in between the two traditional international assistance schemes. This implies that planning and implementation procedures must combine what appear to be operational contradictions: logistical administrative organization with post-conflict instability, insecurity with infrastructure construction, and employment creation with resettlement.

It has often been the case that when external assistance projects of any kind are planned, initial assumptions about the availability of administrative and logistical capacity as well as available labour are over-optimistic.[73] To avoid unpleasant surprises and logistical constraints in implementing EIW programmes, small-scale test/pilot projects could be initiated. This then would allow for gradual logistical and institutional capacity building through "learning by doing".

The capacity in designing and implementing EIW projects varies greatly among today's post-conflict countries in Africa and Asia because of the different methods by which agencies introduce planning and operational techniques. For initial planning purposes soon after a conflict has come to an end, some estimates of infrastructure damage must be made. Often aid agencies in the context of humanitarian relief will provide assessments of the damage to the key infrastructure.

Contrary to assumptions about post-conflict difficulties and problems, experience shows that most countries have some basis on which to build their new institutions. Public sector offices as well as international agencies (the World Food Programme [WFP], the ILO, etc.), bilateral agencies and NGOs are often already present in the country and perhaps even engaged in some form of refugee repatriation, reintegration of war-displaced persons or the opening of important roads.[74] An emergency programme to rehabilitate some essential roads, bridges, clinics, health centres, food distribution centres or warehouses may be developed in this context. Still, there is no doubt that for an employment situation to become durable and economically promising, local and national institutional capacity must be strengthened over the long term. This often requires that assistance is provided by external experts and local development partners.

73. J. von Braun, T. Teklu and P. Webb: \'93Labour-intensive public works for food security in Africa: Past experience and future potential", in }{\plain \i\f1 International Labour Review}{\plain \f1 , 1992, Vol.131, No.1. p.31.
74. Braun, Teklu and Webb, op. cit., p.30.

7. Coordination and partnership

In a recipient country or war-affected community, the number of external humanitarian, development assistance agencies can be very large. In the construction and rehabilitation sector, there are as many as eight multilateral agencies involved in funding, supporting or implementing infrastructure-related activities in various ways: the UNHCR, UNICEF, the WFP, the World Bank, IFAD, the UNDP, the FAO and the ILO. In addition, there are often more than ten major bilateral donors and regional organizations, along with a very large number of international NGOs and consulting firms.

The number of other internal partners and institutions is also large. Among these are several government agencies involved in the infrastructure sectors, local NGOs and regional institutions as well as private-sector firms and contractors. Among the most important partners are the local communities and beneficiary target groups; however, these are often regarded as "victims" and not consulted in the planning of infrastructure rehabilitation programmes.

To avoid heavy-handed implementation of external assistance programmes into a target community, developing linkages among the different agencies, partners and local target groups is highly recommended. The various employment projects, donor agencies and other local and national authorities must know of each other's needs, capacities and responsibilities. Reasons for establishing linkages are, for example, to:

- share and pool the experience of working in a post-conflict environment;
- pool together data on post-conflict conditions and the work of each agency in a central information centre;
- facilitate the building up of the local and national institutional capacity for future employment creation and vocational training;
- promote complementarity – especially between road rehabilitation and other investments in agriculture, education, health and housing;
- monitor the spatial coverage of individual projects and thus avoid conflicts of authority over a specific area;
- reconcile technical approaches;
- avoid disparities in benefits (e.g. wage payments, food aid, work standards);
- support various elements of capacity building through education, vocational training, etc.

In other words, linking different programmes so as to coordinate their assistance in a region or an economic sector will help to avoid unnecessary duplication of work or misunderstandings. Regarding the involvement of international donors and agencies, their activities must

be carefully coordinated in respect of the post-conflict needs among the target groups.

In war-ravaged regions, where communication is often very difficult and administrative capacities are weak, foreign agencies and donors work to implement their emergency aid or development schemes often with good intentions, but with little agreement amongst each other as to objectives, complementarity and methods. International donors, multilateral and bilateral organizations and NGOs are all vital contributors to an EIW programme – coordination among them and with national government authorities is indispensable.[75]

With the above in mind, discrepancies among standards of work, quality of work, cost, benefits to the local population, community participation, etc. can be prevented. This is recommended so as to achieve a normalization of civil and economic life as soon as possible in a war-affected region.

8. *Financing EIW programmes*

From the very beginning of national and local reconstruction and reintegration planning, it is important to remember that investment capital for the rehabilitation of the infrastructure will always be insufficient in relation to requirements. Its availability will depend on competition with other post-conflict programmes. Hence, it must be justified on both economic and social grounds. As capital investments for reconstruction and rehabilitation tend to taper off after initial post-conflict assistance projects, careful priority setting for infrastructure investments by national authorities is indispensable.

Wage payments represent a high proportion of the cost of labour-intensive methods infrastructure programmes. They vary from 45 to 65 per cent of project costs. Because funds for wage payments are usually seriously limited, the need for an adequate level of financing on a sustained basis should be examined at the planning stage. Budgets of the appropriate ministry/agency should include the required level of recurrent costs. Financial constraints are often sought to be reduced by donors funding the project and by food aid to substitute part of the wage costs.

However, workers should be paid some wages if at all possible because simple food-for-work programmes that do not contain at least some proportion of financial remuneration can be humiliating in all

75. }{\plain \i\f1 War-to-peace transition in sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from the horn, the heart, and the cape,}{\plain \f1 prepared by Nat J. Colletta for The World Bank, Poverty and Human Resources Division, Technical Department, Africa Region, Oct. 1995, pp.18-19.

but extreme (food shortage) circumstances.[76] When EIW programmes are organized in conjunction with a disbursement procedure by which the flow of funds to the project is assured systematically, many people will benefit besides the workers themselves.

9. Building institutional capacity

The availability of labour, skilled and unskilled, is influenced by a variety of factors, not least the planning strategy and the population groups targeted for assistance and employment. Whether an EIW programme is specifically targeted to demobilized soldiers or is intended to help all conflict-affected people in general, estimates of labour availability and levels of skill will greatly vary and must be considered in project planning.

Qualified and experienced staff is only one, albeit a very obvious, aspect of institutional capacity and competence. Engineers, managerial personnel, technicians, supervisors, foremen, surveyors and accountants are as necessary as a large population of labourers. Because of the difficulty to find qualified personnel, many posts in EIW programmes may remain unfilled, with the consequence that projects as well as other reintegration and rehabilitation posts are excessively influenced by external experts. The resulting long-term problem under foreign-dominated programmes is that local and community-level capacity-building tasks are neglected. The danger is then that, once the external experts leave, the local population is incapable to continue the work (maintain the physical infrastructure in good condition, obtain or manufacture machinery spare parts and run repair shops, etc.) that was introduced to them.

Hence, the most important factor in planning, implementing and operating EIW programmes is the capacity of the (domestic) central agency, the provincial or district-level units, and the local organizers and supervisors who have responsibility for daily work and labourers. To build human capacity, EIW programmes should, as far as possible, be preceded and accompanied by education and relevant vocational and professional training.

Training is particularly important in situations aggravated by war or prolonged regional conflict. In such instances, the shortages of skilled and experienced workers, engineers and administrative staff are felt most acutely. Wars encourage a national “brain drain” of trained professionals, which causes a shortage of middle-level technical and managerial personnel. The result is that the institutional capacity of local government (decentralized departments, urban councils) to

76. Comment made by the Director of the Centro de Estudios Internacionales in communication with the ILO, 23 April 1996.

provide the technical, social and financial support becomes very weak.[77] The challenge of decentralization can only be tackled through training at the local level of government and with the provision of funds to support local development initiatives.

While a decentralized authority for implementation and operation of any assistance to an employment programme is recommended, the shortage of middle-level experts can lead to inadequate links between upper and lower tiers of decision-making. A result is that poor assessments of infrastructure damage and rehabilitation needs, for example, leave central administrative staff, project planners and external donors uninformed of the often desperate post-conflict economic conditions in rural communities. This suggests that other strategies for programme planning, implementation and operation must be found – strategies that can be adapted to war-affected situations and that remain flexible throughout their existence to accommodate changing needs.

For example, when planning EIW programmes, skilled labourers can be attracted through publicity, benefits and pilot test projects that encourage representatives from all local resident and displaced groups to participate. These individuals, then, can help in recruiting skilled and unskilled workers. A training plan with training material and training methods that conform to local needs can be organized in advance and made widely available.

The offer of short-term work and training possibilities or long-term employment accompanied by benefits will attract labourers. Of these, some will be skilled individuals who exhibit a promising potential to become future skilled workers, trainers and own-account entrepreneurs. With such capacity-building methods in mind, EIW projects can be established that go beyond the immediate needs of infrastructure rehabilitation.

In this sense, a wide dissemination of training materials will benefit future infrastructure programmes in that a larger population of potentially skilled workers can be trained and aided to become self-employed once the EIW is completed. Not only will a larger future pool of qualified workers become available in this manner, but these individuals will, in turn, contribute to wider capacity building in their communities.

Still, there are factors that will influence the availability of labour and that should not be overlooked in planning employment and training strategies. For example, in the rural sector agricultural cycles impose time constraints on EIW programmes. This may especially be the case where project-induced employment is temporary and secondary to the workers' main economic activity (food production).

77. M. van Imschoot: }{\plain \i\f1 Employment generation for poverty reduction in Africa: Infrastructure sector}{\plain \f1 , working document, Development Policies Branch, ILO, Geneva, Aug. 1995, p.7.

Furthermore, in communities where there is a high proportion of households headed by women, special steps need to be taken to encourage their participation in infrastructure projects (and possibly provide for child care and schooling). And if there is a high proportion of war-disabled ex-combatants or civilians, arrangements need to be made to facilitate and even promote their involvement in employment and public works projects. For the Cambodian landmine victims, for example, guidelines and tools were especially prepared for the many civilian and ex-combatant victims. In the context of any employment programme, adequate provisions to deal with security problems on the job and work-related injuries (including compensation) must be made available in accordance with international labour standards.[78]

10. Safety, sustainability and the natural environment

An analysis of risk factors must never be overlooked in the design of EIW programmes. An operational unit of trained safety personnel should take responsibility for overseeing proper planning and operations. For example, construction work in post-conflict regions might occasionally need the services of an ammunition-clearing team (bomb diffusion squad) and a landmine clearance programme, as well as fire and medical provisions linked to a safety-at-work assistance policy.

The safety, sustainability and development of employment and social development is intimately linked to the natural resources available in the region concerned. Wars usually lead to a radical exploitation of natural resources and a neglect of valuable community assets (food storage facilities, water wells, wooded areas, etc.) in regions of high population density. For example, prolonged conflicts have done much to damage agricultural production, destroy livestock and food processing facilities, cause the pollution of drinking water or the neglect of water wells because of population displacements.

When planning EIW programmes (or any employment and training project), common problems to be dealt with are the safe storage of oil and fuel, spillage and leakage of toxic materials, dumping of damaged military hardware, etc. Moreover, there is little use in planning an EIW programme to rebuild a rural road for the transportation of fresh produce and livestock where war-time deforestation has led to a sunken water table and barren dry land. This kind of war-time

78. See, for example, ILO: }{\plain \i\f1 Guidelines for employing disabled workers on road, irrigation and agricultural works}{\plain \f1 , Project CMB/92/008, July 1994; and ILO: }{\plain \i\f1 Draft guidelines for employment injury coverage for local workers}{\plain \f1 , Project CMB/92/008, Nov. 1993.

deforestation (for quick profits or fuel wood) and other problems of neglect, natural resource exploitation and pollution are common to all war-affected countries.

An assessment of risks, replicability and sustainability is recommended in all projects but is especially important in EIW programmes in the post-conflict environment. When such programmes are planned, several aspects of sustainability must be taken into account (i.e. agricultural irrigation works and reforestation may be more important than roads) – for example, the risk of livestock over-grazing, deforestation, the regeneration of burrow pits, the extension of cultivated land to new territories that may adversely affect fragile eco-systems, damage to wetland and natural water-flows, soil erosion or pollution due to an over-use of pesticides and fertilizers, etc. Environmental impact assessments and routine environmental monitoring may be necessary before and/or during the operation of an EIW programme.

After any initial EIW test or pilot programmes and/or the full-scale programmes, follow-up evaluations are recommended. Evaluation and monitoring of the beneficiary groups are useful, especially when food aid was combined with other benefits such as material assistance and cash/wage payments. F urthermore, follow-up assessments are also important for measuring – at a later stage – the social and economic impact beyond the direct benefits of access to the rebuilt physical infrastructure (roads, bridges, public transportation, etc.).

11. Flexibility and timing

The time required for the identification and formulation of EIW programmes is always one of the most difficult aspects during the planning phase. Time may be used more efficiently if, in a preparatory (pilot/test) assistance phase, questions of access, security, landmines, the lack of data, as well as the socio-economic aspects are examined in advance so that information and the necessary provisions are included in programme design. This would require the examination of existing surveys and reports and data collected through, for example, the departments responsible for rural roads, sanitation, employment, training and education. This could be done in cooperation with other ongoing humanitarian or post-conflict development projects.

Flexibility, implementation schedules and programme adaptability are important considerations in design and planning. At times, a rapid response may be required to changing needs such as, for example, a sudden demobilization and influx of ex-combatants or the arrival of refugees. Also to be considered is the possibility of a resumption of hostilities in some areas. Regional or local circumstances also dictate changes in priorities and work responsibilities which may not be

foreseen in the initial planning of EIW programmes. For instance, inadequate local capacities, difficulties of organization and procedure (e.g. delays in flow of funds, wage payments, approval of food aid, custom clearance of equipment, etc.) may pose obstructions to the execution of work according to fixed timetables. Time delays need to be taken into account in the timeframe which funding agencies may demand or the priorities for the work which must be completed first.

Conclusion

The following can be deduced from the discussion and from field studies upon which this section is based: employment-intensive works programmes in countries such as Cambodia, Mozambique and Uganda need to be seen in a conflict-specific focus. This implies that several factors must be considered in the context of widespread and serious damage to rural and urban social cohesion and economic markets, as well as the physical infrastructure.

Employment-intensive works programmes can make a significant contribution to the rehabilitation and construction of the infrastructure and thus support economic development. They can provide a large-scale generation of employment and income opportunities as well as contribute to local capacity-building efforts (vocational training, education, etc.). The benefits of EIW programmes can be accelerated and prolonged well beyond the actual works programme if complementary investments are also made for the areas and populations covered.

However, there are limits to the expansion of these programmes or the benefits which a local community can derive from them. This may be because of the constraints on available investment capital, the lack of institutional capacity or of administrative and organizational competence or the control over programmes by external agencies. No doubt, through continuous adaptation to local conditions and needs, the technical feasibility, the economic sustainability and the social benefits contributed by each EIW programme remain to be improved upon and carefully examined for each future project.

VI. SMALL ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

This section discusses the role and potential of small enterprise development as one option for the reintegration of demobilized combatants into civilian life.[79] The report upon which this section is based stems from documentation prepared for the ILO Expert Meeting on the Reintegration of Demobilized Combatants (Harare, Zimbabwe, July 1995). It presents approaches and strategies to small enterprise development which were drawn from two country case studies – Cambodia and Mozambique.[80]

In the countries which have recently emerged from conflict, reconstruction policies and government efforts have rarely made explicit mention of the role of small businesses and micro enterprises. There is a general lack of information, analysis, policies and programmes that promote and support the development of small enterprises in post-conflict economies.[81]

The following pages deal with the development of formal and informal micro enterprises and private small businesses because, as is argued here, these comprise a vital element in every national labour market. In the past, many countries have embarked on centrally-planned economic development programmes that emphasized heavy industry, infrastructure construction and international trade. Such programmes are most often planned and initiated by the highest national authorities in conjunction with international financial and development assistance institutions. Generally, such large-scale projects leave out the small and locally-based enterprises. Still, central economic planning has rarely provided satisfactory employment and wealth creation for the majority of the populations in war-affected and often poverty-stricken countries. Examples of failed central planning, often through authoritarian political systems, can be found in African, Latin American and Asian countries.

Today, the emphasis has shifted to liberalized trade, capitalism and free labour markets. In countries which adjust their policies to the demand and supply of goods, services and labour, the majority of their working-age population find employment or employ themselves in

79. In this text, small enterprises are taken to be those registered and unregistered private businesses which have less than ten employees. More specifically, micro enterprises are more often informal, unregistered and operated by single individuals or members of one family or of a small cooperative with a minimum of capital investment, while small businesses may formally employ staff and be owned, managed and operated by several individuals or by a community-based cooperative.

80. ILO: }{\plain \i\f1 Reintegrating demobilized combatants: The role of small enterprise development, }{\plain \f1 prepared by R. Srivastava for the Entrepreneurship and Management Development Branch, Geneva, 1995, p.36.

81. Some studies on the subject have recently been published. See, for example, ILO reports and employment advisory missions to conflict-affected countries (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Sudan, Uganda). These contain some information on small enterprise development (see IV and bibliography).

small businesses and micro enterprises. For this reason, it is advisable to consider the development of small enterprises as one of the most important elements in reintegration programmes for demobilized combatants.

A recent ILO report has estimated that small businesses and micro enterprises together provided employment to about 61 per cent of the labour force in Africa. In contrast, 21 per cent of employment is in the modern sector which consists of government civil service, public services and large and medium private enterprises. It has also been estimated that 93 per cent of the additional urban jobs in Africa are in small enterprises of the informal kind.[82]

Examples of the numbers of people employed in small enterprises, particularly the informal ones, indicate the vitality of such small private endeavours and the need to facilitate and promote their development. In Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Cambodia, for example, small and micro enterprises accounted for 30 to 40 per cent of total employment (excluding agriculture). A large proportion of the urban and rural population are engaged in informal sector activities, including those who already have employment in the formal sector.

1. Objectives and potential of small enterprises

There are three major objectives of small enterprise development:

- stimulating economic growth;
- creating employment and income opportunities; and
- empowerment of a large number of persons who are often disadvantaged in economic and social terms.

These objectives assume greater significance in conflict-affected economies which are struggling to come out of economic stagnation and to reverse economic decline.

Stimulating economic growth

Stimulating economic growth is a major objective in all conflict-affected countries (see IV). Given the problems facing them, small and micro enterprises have shown a remarkable ability to survive as well as produce and market essential products and services under trying conditions. Given basic tools and a chance to learn about income-earning opportunities, most people will readily take up whatever trade to provide for themselves and their families.

82. ILO: }{\plain \i\f1 Report of the Director-General to the Eighth African Regional Conference}{\plain \f1 , Jan. 1994, p. 7.

Although failure rates of small businesses and micro enterprises are high, they have demonstrated catalytic self-generating effects in the local economies of conflict-affected societies. The survival of the majority of people ultimately depends on their own (private) enterprise and perseverance.

The flexibility of micro enterprises and small businesses derives in a large part from their anchor in locally available skills, raw materials, resources and indigenous or adapted technologies. Another reason for the promise of economic development is their ability to take advantage of market and business opportunities as they arise; e.g. failure of large enterprises, scarcity of basic products, ability to produce substitutes, use of recycled materials, etc. Small enterprises serve to improve forward and backward linkages between economically, socially and geographically diverse sectors.[83] In particular, they create valuable inter-sectoral linkages between the traditional and modern sectors, between agriculture and industry and between urban and rural sectors, and they build vertical linkages between suppliers, producers, distributors and traders in a dispersed market.

The importance of small enterprises in decentralizing economic activities and in strengthening the rural and urban production systems as well as their ability to expand in line with growth in local incomes (especially from agriculture) with access to labour market information, with a new infrastructure and with services should be noted.

The growth of small and micro enterprises during the 1970s and 1980s was partly a result of the crisis in the modern sector and stagnation of employment and earnings in the formal sector. In sub-Saharan Africa, the main outcomes were: curtailment of modern wage employment growth as public sector cuts reflected reduced public sector expenditure and as parastatal and private-sector enterprises retrenched to maintain productivity; declining real wages across the board in modern sector employment; growing unemployment in the urban areas, particularly amongst the young and often amongst those educated to secondary school level; and a shift in the structure of employment back towards the more traditional pattern of a large agricultural sector and a small modern sector but, in addition, with a growing informal sector.[84]

Creating employment and income opportunities

The prospects of increasing employment and entrepreneurship through the development of small and micro enterprises are encouraging in most conflict-affected countries. At the country level, the size of the informal sector and the role of small businesses and micro enterprises in employment creation is greatly underestimated. This may principally be due to problems in obtaining data on employment in general and in small and micro enterprises in particular. Although

83. ibid., p. 6.
84. OECD: }{\plain \i\f1 Micro enterprises and the informal sector}{\plain \f1 , documents DCD/DAC/M(91)1, Development Cooperation Directorate, Paris, Sept. 1991, p.21.

many partial surveys have been made, it is difficult in conflict-affected countries to put together a detailed profile of existing enterprises in terms of products, employment, prices and transaction costs.[85]

The problem of defining what small businesses and micro enterprises are has complicated the task of data collection and analysis in many countries. As small enterprises are found in many industrial sectors (manufacturing, trade, transport and services), they can be defined by size of capital or by the number of employees. These considerations vary across activities as well as among local environments and countries.

Empowerment and capacity building

Through the creation of employment and incomes, small and micro enterprises serve as vehicles for the empowerment of a large number of persons in both rural and urban areas. Firstly, small and micro enterprises are instrumental in spreading economic opportunities in and across various population groups through multiple linkages. As principal users of domestic resources and indigenous skills and technologies, they reduce economic barriers to employment and income and act as natural safety nets in times of crisis. Secondly, their role in social empowerment is significant through the development of a complex web of participatory relationships: at the family level, through sharing of responsibilities (e.g. home-based production, transport of products for marketing) and at the community level by linking together a number of partners and actors along a chain of transactions (goodwill effect). Thirdly, small and micro enterprises provide the opportunity to control and manage the economic situation at the individual and household level and generate confidence and self-reliance. Furthermore, the empowerment effects of small enterprises are considerably enhanced where they are an integral part of a community-based reintegration and reconstruction programme in the post-conflict situation; they maximize the positive effects of the above development factors.

Such empowerment or capacity building is important in conflict-affected countries which move away from centralized political, economic administration to decentralized participatory systems. This is also important for persons who have faced conflict-related hardships and who are trying to re-establish themselves as self-reliant individuals or households, independent, if possible, from humanitarian aid or welfare programmes. Small enterprises are particularly important for women and female heads of households, who are disproportionately affected by conflict. They also tend to become the first group of "survival-oriented" entrepreneurs who supplement family income.

Dynamic entrepreneurship usually facilitates community capacity building (empowerment) by mainstreaming some of the small enterprises into the regional or national economy. It is therefore

85. Methods to conduct labour market assessments and KISs are suggested in III.

important to promote and facilitate the growth of small and micro enterprises in situations of special economic and social difficulty.

2. Linkages and synergy

Stimulating employment creation in the context of post-conflict economic and social disruption requires a comprehensive strategy with a number of interlinked components. Small and micro enterprise development is an important component of such a strategy. The effect of component programmes can be greatly increased by careful sequencing and linking. For example, considerable synergy can be generated when skills training and business training are linked to a well-identified demand for the products and services of small and micro enterprises. The feasibility of making joint or coordinated assessments of the market demand for skills and products should be examined in this context. A combination of skill and business training is especially important for enterprises involved in manufacturing and construction.

Increased access to information, supplies and markets for small and micro enterprises can be facilitated by rapid rehabilitation of the damaged infrastructure in many parts of conflict-affected countries. Labour-based infrastructure construction and rehabilitation injects cash incomes in the local economy which, in turn, stimulates the demand for products and services produced by small and medium enterprises, thus facilitating private-sector development. At the same time, the demand for skilled and semi-skilled construction workers, technicians, supervisors and small contractors can be included in the assessment of vocational training needs. It is important to promote such complementarities in post-conflict situations to accelerate the benefits of investments in the local economy.

In most conflict-affected countries where large industries and civil administrations have suffered most heavily from war-time destruction, the small enterprises sector represents the largest employment and constitutes the backbone of the non-agricultural sector in terms of generating both output and livelihoods. Furthermore, small enterprises have also proved to be the “shock absorbers” of the negative consequences of structural adjustment programmes, as these can absorb the greatest number of unemployed workers from large industries and the civil service.

However, facilitating the development of small enterprises which can employ war-displaced persons (including ex-combatants) is not without its difficulties. Following a war, economic production, trade and small enterprise development are hampered by various factors such as: demographic and social dislocation (refugees, high unemployment, poverty, demobilized combatants, etc.), security and

political concerns, high military expenditures, low economic growth and low per capita income, infrastructure damage, macroeconomic constraints, a narrow industrial base, anti-private enterprise attitudes among some politicians, a lack of foreign exchange, few credit and extension services, high inflation, imposed structural adjustment programmes and economic reforms, and inappropriate economic and social policies left over from a war-time administration or implemented by a fledgling post-conflict government.

Examples of recent conclusions of conflicts in Africa indicate that cease-fire or peace agreements are signed under considerable economic and political (domestic and international) pressure. In the rush to appease former military and political rivals, realistic macro-economic considerations vital to economic rebuilding and employment are left out.

Experience of designing and implementing small and micro enterprise development programmes in conflict-affected environments is still very limited. Under the wider rubric of "income-generating activities", several bilateral donors and NGOs have financed and implemented a large number of small and micro enterprise projects for vulnerable conflict-affected groups in the context of humanitarian relief operations. Usually, such income-generating activities are a part of broader programmes, including food distribution, medical, education and shelter-related activities, which aim at promoting community self-reliance. Such projects are often continued and expanded in the post-conflict phase of national rehabilitation and reconstruction. No systematic technical assessment of this valuable experience, however, has been undertaken at the national or local level.[86]

3. The policy options

The continuing nature of the economic crisis in many conflict-affected countries has resulted in a situation of short- and long-term changes in the structural and functional relationships within a significant number of households. Raising the income-generation capacity by increasing household participation in the labour market through small enterprise development is one option for employment creation.

In considering the potential for the growth and development of small enterprises, a great deal of attention has been focused on the enabling environment.[87] One aspect consists of interventions, both direct and indirect, to promote the growth and establishment of small enterprises.

86. Recently the International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC) has undertaken a one-year research and workshop programme on small enterprise development methodologies in the African context. See D. Hurley: }{\plain \i\f1 Income generation schemes for the urban poor}{\plain \f1 , Oxfam, 1990.

Indirect interventions

Indirect interventions include improvements in the overall environment both at the macro and the micro level through policy formulation and training. Most discussions on macroeconomic policies deal with foreign exchange, trade, taxation, monetary and fiscal issues. Indirect interventions to create a favourable environment for small enterprise development tend to be top-down and may be influenced by the external actors' perception of the economy as a whole.[88] National government or external actors rarely have an intimate understanding of the labour market in which small businesses and private micro enterprises operate and of the adjustments required by these in light of national structural adjustment policies.

When structural adjustments are demanded in war-affected economies, micro enterprises and small businesses suffer disproportionately because they have neither the savings to survive a difficult period nor ready access to resources and information which large public or multinational enterprises do.[89] When enabling policies (subsidies, tax breaks, labour market information, soft loans, etc.) are instituted to correct unfavourable effects for small enterprises, these benefits may not be felt in the short term when small entrepreneurs need help the most. Other problems that arise from unclear government policies in war-disrupted economies are, for example, badly designed regulatory arrangements and procedures which, because of the lack of a communications infrastructure, are not effectively disseminated to inform small enterprises. An unfavourable attitude in government and among local officials towards small private enterprises, particularly the informal ones, also contributes to a poorly coordinated policy environment that hampers employment creation. Indirect interventions are usually slow in producing the favourable economic conditions which small enterprises need.

Direct interventions

In some cases, governments have adopted direct interventionist approaches for small enterprise development. These include the establishment of special government structures, parastatal or semi-autonomous institutions. Most administrative arrangements provide a combination of facilities that vary from country to country. In some instances, a secretariat was created to identify small enterprises and their privatization or restructuring needs. Thus, in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Uganda, institutes to support small enterprises have been established by various government ministries or special bodies to assist in legal, financial and technical matters.[90]

87. For a discussion of enabling policies, see ILO: }{\plain \i\f1 Report of the Director-General}{\plain \f1 , op.cit., pp. 15-24.
88. M. Dessing: }{\plain \i\f1 Support for microenterprises, lessons for sub-Saharan Africa}{\plain \f1 , World Bank Technical Paper No. 122, Africa Technical Department Series, 1990.
89. P. Hugon: }{\plain \i\f1 The impact of adjustment policies on microenterprises}{\plain \f1 , paper presented at the World Conference on Support to Microenterprises, Washington DC, June 1988.

The most important elements in direct intervention relate to promoting training facilities for small entrepreneurs and facilitating their access to business information, finance, markets and technology. How best can these elements be brought together to provide sound facilitating strategies is a question which should be examined in the light of actual experience in conflict-affected countries. Today, raising awareness of the needs and difficulties involved in planning and promoting programmes to support small and micro enterprises is imperative. Comprehensive and carefully-planned facilitating strategies to support the development of human resources for small business and micro enterprises are the best method to provide for all war-affected people, including ex-combatants.

The facilitating strategies should help to improve the business environment and assist small and micro enterprises to develop successfully. Some facilitating strategies can be considered and implemented at little cost. While these do require special governmental policies and implementing procedures, an analysis of their contribution to national economic output and employment should help to promote and justify such strategies.

4. Support and extension services

To assist the creation of opportunities for self-employment and small enterprise development means to facilitate the employment of the largest proportion of working-age people in most countries. A comprehensive package of services can produce great benefits at all levels of economic activity and lead to greater employment and political stability over the long term.

Setting up support services in post-conflict countries requires labour market information services, statistical data on unemployment, legal protection for private enterprise development, a physical infrastructure, and government administrative competence. If well planned and organized, a package of extension services may prove to be of great benefit to post-conflict countries, not only for the reintegration of demobilized combatants but also for economic development.[91]

90. Examples of direct interventions in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Uganda are provided in ILO: }{\plain \i\f1 Reintegrating demobilized combatants: The role of small enterprise development}{\plain \f1 , op.cit., pp.16-17.

91. See III for a more detailed discussion of labour market information services and IV for a presentation of facilitating support and extension services.

5. Principal steps for small enterprise development

This section outlines the principal steps for small enterprise development during a reintegration programme. When planning employment creation for demobilized combatants and other war-affected people, the following four tasks are required: *project identification*, *project formulation*, *implementation*, and *monitoring and evaluation*.

Project identification

A number of planning issues can be addressed during the identification phase of a proposed project. Fact-finding and assessment missions are usually fielded to undertake project identification tasks. While the time available for this purpose is usually short, a checklist of tasks to be accomplished or issues to be explored during this period can be developed and adhered to. The following points should be noted in this regard:

(i) Assessing the post-war political and economic environment

An important starting point for fact-finding activities is to explicitly recognize the conflict focus of the proposed project at the outset. This implies to take account of foreseeable difficulties and constraints (insecurity, inaccessibility, unstable social situation, frequent population movements, etc.) in the country's post-conflict reconstruction as a whole and in the economic sector in particular. This should facilitate programme formulation by allowing for and incorporating margins of manoeuvrability in different project activities.

Data and socio-economic information on the opportunities and limitations for small and micro enterprise employment creation programmes should be collected and analysed during the fact-finding and assessment mission. Recent experience from reintegration programmes for demobilized combatants shows that only a general appreciation of the macroeconomic situation was required. Still, important changes and objectives such as central to locally planned reforms, environmental considerations and the sustainability of small enterprise development programmes must be kept in mind.

Government administrative policies that affect businesses and private entrepreneurship must be clarified by central and local authorities to facilitate post-conflict economic development and to support labour market assessments. Private organizations such as small businesses, NGOs and business councils or employee associations which are already established must be consulted to obtain their involvement in a proposed reintegration programme. These will benefit from clarifications of government administrative policies as well as from becoming linked to new employment creation programmes. Linking the private social or economic/business organizations to employment

creation efforts within reintegration programmes has several further advantages such as offering demobilized soldiers (as well as other war-affected people) information on employment and training opportunities, supplying new entrepreneurs with clearer data on government policies, and offering existing businesses and NGOs a larger pool of prospective new employees from among the demobilized combatants.

The policy environment will also need to be redefined in light of the economic growth and the employment which small enterprises create. The importance of a favourable policy environment for small enterprise development increases as conflict-affected countries move out of the immediate post-conflict phase into medium- and long-term national reconstruction programmes.

As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to collect economic and employment data in a conflict-affected country. There are many reasons for this, such as the geographic dispersion, the heterogeneity of the sector, the inter-linkage with all other sectors of economic and social activity, the unofficial and informal nature of many existing micro enterprises, etc. However, without a better understanding of the local profile of the small and micro enterprise sector and the potential for expansion as well as obstacles and constraints, skill and business training may not provide the demobilized combatant with the right choices. Moreover, neither the training authorities nor the target population may be able to make an informed judgement on their respective roles and on the opportunities for income-earning work. In such circumstances, the survival rates and the number of new small enterprises may fall.

(ii) Targeted labour market analyses and needs assessments

The importance of effective market surveys cannot be over-emphasized. Fact-finding and assessment missions to plan appropriate surveys and data analysis are vital to the development of new employment and entrepreneurship opportunities.[92] The methodology, questionnaires and timetable for business opportunity identification surveys can be planned during the initial technical preparatory work to plan a reintegration programme. In the case of Cambodia, for example, such surveys were carried out during the preparatory assistance phase and the results were used in the design of training programmes.

In a targeted employment promotion programme, more specific information on the labour market and on potential economic development opportunities is required for the areas where the combatants are to resettle after demobilization and for the activities to be undertaken to facilitate their economic reintegration into civilian society.

92. For labour market information surveys and assessments (demand for labour), see III and Annex 2. For training feasibility studies (opportunities for employment training), see IV and Annex 3. For ex-combatant surveys (labour supply), see Annex 1.

Whether an employment creation programme for small enterprises is targeted to specific (unemployed) people such as ex-combatants should be clarified during fact-finding and assessment surveys. In a targeted programme (e.g. Mozambique), it is possible to undertake a process of identification, screening and selection for both skill and business training. In a non-targeted programme, the demand for short business training courses would be higher (e.g. Cambodia). In general, it is very difficult to limit a programme to demobilized combatants alone, unless funding is solely allocated for this group.

If organized surveys and data analysis are not feasible, an alternative method is to carry out a series of sector assessment workshops with the main stakeholders (small entrepreneurs, training institutions, target groups, NGOs, government agencies, service and support institutions, community leaders). The main purpose in such workshops is to collect a maximum of potentially useful information for a specific geographical region or for an income-earning activity with the purpose to plan specific training and support interventions. Such workshops can also be organized on an ongoing basis during project implementation to update information and approaches to training.

Ideally, workshops should complement the information obtained from labour market surveys. In this manner, both may render a more complete picture of employment opportunities, available resources, infrastructure carrying capacity and the human resources available among the ex-combatants as well as among other war-affected displaced and resident communities.

The importance of obtaining an understanding of the existing market needs and what capacities demobilized combatants have or can acquire to find and create employment opportunities for themselves cannot be overstated. This requires not only effective labour market assessments and updated (post-conflict) information on market opportunities, but also an evaluation of the combatants' present skills, their levels of education and their motivation to create their own employment opportunities. Furthermore, to understand how employment creation projects can best be established, the economic needs as expressed by local (urban and rural) business leaders and community elders must be considered through KISs.[93]

(iii) Target group needs assessments[94]

For a targeted employment creation programme, the skill profile of the target group (demobilized combatants or other war-affected people) is important so as to determine the size and content of the programme. It is also important to find out the number of people who wish to start their own enterprises following enterprise training programmes; hence, the target group must be identified by:

93. For more information on labour market assessments, needs assessments and KISs, see III.
94. See also Annex 3.

- age, education and skill profile;
- pattern of settlement in different areas; and
- preferred economic activity.

Special groups, e.g. women or disabled combatants, need to be included. For a targeted programme, it is important to have rapid access to such data, which should be examined during the project identification phase.

Skill and business training depends upon the skill profile of the target group. The typical profile of demobilized combatants shows the following features:

- age group (25 to 35 years);
- education (illiterate to primary school);
- skill (none to some familiarity arising out of family background or work in the army);
- prior employment and entrepreneurship experience (none); and
- location for settlement and work (semi-urban area preferred).

The occupational choice of the demobilized combatants is more influenced by personal interests or ideas that circulate among military personnel than by actual market opportunities. If the target group is wider and includes other conflict-affected groups, their profile would change significantly and include both first-time entrepreneurs as well as existing entrepreneurs.

(iv) Staff requirements

The question of staffing for the formulation and the operations of education and training must be considered in an initial planning phase. Most useful is to identify the staffing needs and to discuss local and sectoral staff requirements (local and international experts, survey and data collection staff, short-term consultants, training of trainers, vocational trainers and educators, translators, and specific-needs health care professionals for the disabled) with the relevant reintegration authorities during project formulation.

Training of trainers or retraining of existing trainers is usually required in order to deliver expertise to different kinds of target groups as well as to master local language requirements. Trainers need to be oriented for teaching demobilized combatants. While many staffing needs can only be identified during project implementation, organizing and maintaining large communication networks that cover development in all economic sectors can be used as a pool of new support staff when these are needed.

Project formulation

To begin this section on project formulation, it might be useful to consider some factors which clarify good design. The most important factor is that a reintegration and employment creation programme becomes as much demand-driven as possible. What does this mean? A demand- or supply-driven programme implies who or what “drives” or

"commands" the reintegration programme. The logic of this is simple: if training or assistance is provided simply because it is available, without considering whether the target group needs it, waste and failure will result. This often occurs in various humanitarian or development assistance programmes. External donors, international financing conditions or domestic political interests tend to impose (top-down) the type of assistance programmes without understanding first what the target or recipient community needs.

When people must be relieved from starvation, the question of whether food is needed does not arise. However, when it comes to vocational or business training, local urban or rural economic and social conditions will dictate whether or not people will be able to start a business and find employment. The best business training services will fail to have beneficial effects if the resources are not available or if the infrastructure needed to operate a business does not exist. Hence, employment creation and reintegration programmes must, as much as possible, follow a demand-driven approach. For this, extensive labour market information and needs assessments of the target groups must be obtained in advance so as to establish what local communities can offer and what the target groups need.

Often, in the post-conflict context, the decisions on assistance are made in a top-down manner, and target beneficiaries are regarded as victims of conflict or recipients of charity rather than as participants in their own reintegration programme. Some ways to reduce the top-down bias are to periodically survey trainees to assess the impact of training programmes, evaluate training or assistance programmes and monitor their results by assessing the performance of the trainees in their economic integration. This implies that programmes with their education and training curricula must permit sufficient flexibility so as to respond to these assessments.

During past planning phases for the reintegration of demobilized combatants, the nature of the programmes has frequently changed depending on the nature of the conflict, the conditions of the labour market and the needs of war-displaced persons (including ex-combatants). Flexibility is necessary when delays in demobilization become apparent, when negotiations between the (formerly rival) parties to the conflict cause political problems, or when a new post-conflict government introduces new legislation concerning social or economic policies. Further modifications may concern the programming of reintegration schedules, the analysis of labour market assessments and the start of training programmes. All these may require flexibility from the authorities and agencies responsible for reasons that are often beyond their control.

One approach to provide for greater flexibility is to divide the project into two or more phases, with the first phase (core component) limited in time (two-three years, as in Cambodia) or in coverage (a specified number of demobilized combatants or certain districts covered) followed by a second phase (expansion component) to be undertaken

later, should funding become available. This approach facilitates the integration of special or targeted programmes into the longer-term national reconstruction programme.

The sequencing of activities is likely to influence their nature during project formulation and, hence, a more important determinant may be whether projects are intended to be short-term, medium-term or long-term endeavours. The mix of type of interventions also depends upon the timeframe adopted. Skills training and business training can be separated or combined into one project, for example. Experience shows that only a small part of the target group can be covered in the first phase. The actual number of beneficiaries is directly dependent on funding, and within the funding special attention should be given to the needs of women and disabled persons.

An alternative approach is to rely on a demonstration (pilot) trial project for the first target group and seek to cover larger numbers of demobilized combatants and more financial support thereafter. This is a strategy to be closely examined during project formulation. The objective of a pilot project is to demonstrate the capacity of small enterprise development programmes to make a real contribution to the reintegration effort. The aim is to create a programme that can be replicated for other groups of ex-combatants (or otherwise war-affected people) and that can be sustained over the long term.

The suitability of training packages to promote small enterprises and employment should be assessed and adapted to local needs as well as to local capacities (human resources) and economic criteria. One approach is to supplement basic training packages with information on local resources, examples of successful businesses, etc. that are based on specific products of small entrepreneurs and the local regulatory environment. Information needed for such an approach to local employment development can be obtained through the help of key informants.

Also, using grass-roots resources and training techniques that accommodate local needs can greatly benefit the reintegration and training of less-educated or illiterate ex-combatants (child/adolescent soldiers, women combatants, and other war-displaced persons). This is because when reintegration programmes accommodate local needs, the communities in which war-affected people are settling will also find it easier to accommodate the needs of these special target groups.

It is important to ensure that the approach towards reintegration planning, training and employment creation for small enterprises is the most appropriate choice. Alternative approaches should be examined at the project formulation stage for discussion with the relevant reintegration planning authorities or principal agencies.

(i) Delivery of educational assistance and training

In most cases, the adoption of a timeframe for training and employment creation dictates the choice of education and training courses. For skills training, this may mean three- to six-month classes with perhaps a period of work-study with an experienced mastercrafts person or in a business training course of a day or perhaps a month.

Basic start-up kits can be included in business and skills development projects. In Mozambique, various types of kits were made available at subsidized prices to demobilized combatants who successfully completed their training programmes. A similar approach was also taken in Angola in the Action Programme for the Training of Demobilized Combatants (PAFDE) in 1991.

It is important to learn through test cases or pilot projects how much training is required to help the target groups find their niche in economic life. For example, are skill-cum-business training courses and start-up kits sufficient to assist demobilized combatants to set up their own enterprises? Part of the answer lies in the amount of motivation and determination of the target group to make their utmost effort to learn new skills and succeed economically. Another part of the answer lies in the quality of extension and support services offered.

The availability of more comprehensive business start-up support, including information and assistance regarding supplies, technology, markets and problem solving, should facilitate the stability and success of new enterprises. However, it is always difficult to provide for such support within the early phases of a reintegration programme. Nevertheless, methods to provide such assistance later must be explored, because without continued support many well-intentioned and motivated war-displaced persons and former combatants will find themselves unable to keep themselves in business. With careful planning of effective delivery mechanisms, support can be organized through already-existing channels of communication instead of establishing costly new networks. Local business institutions, employers' associations, ex-combatant (veteran) associations, or NGO programmes may be able and willing to become involved in employment creation, and support services may also benefit them.

The choice of delivery system would depend upon the mix of interventions and the relative emphasis on skill and business training. If, as is the case in Mozambique, three-month skills training is combined with five-day business training, the existing network of training institutions would need to be used. Business training programmes can be delivered by a variety of local institutions including NGOs.

To ensure that the approach is demand-driven and not simply imposed from "above", delivery options should be explored within the specific context of the local situation based on information supplied by key informants and labour market assessments. In each case, developing

linkages with other ongoing and planned activities needs to be promoted.

Through established linkages and networks of support, the demand for products and services by and for small and micro enterprises can positively influence the development of a market in which demobilized combatants can begin to earn their livelihood. Among the associations to be linked are, for example, area or community development programmes, special programmes of assistance to refugees and internally-displaced persons, infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction schemes as well as programmes implemented by bilateral donors and NGOs. The possibility of networking with such programmes through sharing information, facilities or services and avoiding disparities in benefits should be explored.

(ii) Credit and extension services

Access to credit is a special item to be carefully examined during project formulation. Rebuilding of war-destroyed economic structures and markets and institutional mechanisms to provide market information services and investment opportunities require a variety of mechanisms.

In some conflict-affected countries, government institutions attempt to play some part of these roles and provide more special licensing and registration procedures as well as training and, to some extent, advice on technology and credit. A large number of NGOs, church groups and private-sector organizations often provide similar support to small businesses and micro enterprises.

Indigenous saving and lending systems and flexible practices and procedures are an important aspect to be examined in this regard. In the post-conflict situation, there are little or no household or community-level savings for small entrepreneurs to draw upon. Thus, both start-up and operating capital are required, and training on credit should be included as an integral part of business training.

The provision of extension services is usually also weak or has broken down entirely in conflict-affected countries. Extension services should seek to provide information on the labour market and business administration tools, advice and assistance in business start-up, data on available technology for production processes, input supplies and keeping of inventories, marketing, technical counselling that covers licensing and other procedures as well as advice on obtaining credit.

For most informal sector enterprises, both start-up and operating capital are required as most new enterprises require access to some form of financial support. If a credit component or a revolving fund cannot be built into a reintegration programme or employment creation project, alternative ways of obtaining credit should be explored so that information on sources of credit, use of credit and procedures for obtaining and repaying credit can be provided during business training. This is important because demobilized combatants

and informal sector entrepreneurs may not be familiar with banking or similar practices and procedures in financial institutions.

Project implementation

The possibility of implementing a project may prove too difficult for a single agency. To facilitate the complexity of the task, the project implementation phase may be divided into so-called "preparatory assistance stages" which provide specific services.[95] In such stages, further refining of specific training interventions and programme modifications should be initiated in light of needs assessments and labour market information analyses.

The creation of separate preparatory assistance stages has been useful in past reintegration and employment programmes for war-displaced persons. Such stages may specialize in the following activities: the recruitment of staff for all aspects of a reintegration programme from the principal government agency down to field offices; capacity building and training of staff (particularly those who will guide small enterprise promotion and the training of trainers); analysis of the data on the target group for selecting training programmes; identification of special groups requiring specific training support (e.g. women, disabled persons, child combatants); identification of training institutions and developing/initiating contracting procedures for training delivery; setting training and testing standards; establishing links with other ongoing programmes and agreeing on ways of collaboration and information sharing; creating general awareness among the target groups with specific information on training options and procedures for accessing training; and undertaking business opportunity identification surveys.

If specific preparatory assistance stages are not approved, the above activities would be commenced during project implementation. The following principal components would form the core of project implementation:

- capacity building and training of national staff;
- collection and analysis of data and information on the target group, survey of training institutions and business opportunity identification;
- business and skills training;
- support services, including kits and credit;
- organizational arrangements, e.g. project steering group;
- monitoring arrangements, e.g. management information system; and,
- links with similar or related programmes.

Special measures would be required during project implementation to take account of stress-related behavioural factors. Demobilized

95. In the study prepared by R.K. Srivastava, this stage is called \'93initial preparatory assistance phase\'94. See ILO:}{\plain \i\f1 Reintegrating demobilized combatants: The role of small enterprise development}{\plain \f1 , op. cit., 1995, pp. 35-36.

combatants may not be easy clients for training. They may not repay credit or may misuse tool kits. Trainers, instructors, extension officers and others would invariably require orientation to deal with demobilized combatants.

Project monitoring and evaluation

To conclude, the above discussion has shown that a project for the development of small and micro enterprises in a conflict-affected country will encompass a variety of activities. It is therefore recommended to monitor and analyse a number of indicators: physical achievement (e.g. number of trainers trained, number of small enterprise promotion officers trained, number of demobilized combatants trained); technical indicators (e.g. material developed for training, testing, etc.); financial indicators that relate to the progress of expenditures; and effectiveness indicators that include numbers of new small businesses or micro enterprises established by the resettled war-displaced persons. The further elaboration and design of future management information and extension support services should also be based on the information of the selected indicators.

VII. REINTEGRATION OF FEMALE EX-COMBATANTS

Introduction

This section presents the socio-economic situation of women war veterans in light of training and employment options for ex-combatants and enumerates some of their most important needs. Since up to 1995 few studies existed on the specific needs of this category of war-affected persons, the ILO carried out a tracer study of women war veterans in Zimbabwe,[96] from which this section draws extensively. A small sample of male war veterans was also included for comparative purposes. Some other studies which have become available since then also identify similar problems and needs and reinforce the importance of providing special reintegration assistance to women ex-combatants.[97]

The ILO report draws much of its information from the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans' Association (ZNLWVA) as well as from data collected through group and individual discussions held with women ex-combatants. At the time of the study, the majority of female ex-combatants were between the ages of 30 and 37. The study reveals that the experiences of female ex-combatants upon re-entering civilian life are quite different from those of their male colleagues. The latter usually meet with more positive responses from the accommodating civilian communities and face less discrimination than female war veterans even in the case of liberation wars.

The Zimbabwean liberation struggle involved a large number of young women who left the country alongside men in the 1970s to work and support the war effort. Some voluntarily abandoned school, college or university to join the liberation struggle. Constant threats against the lives of the people in these border villages by the former Rhodesian army also drove many young women and men to run away and join the liberation struggle. However, most were "abducted" as part of whole schools and taken to Mozambique to join the army.

96. This study was conducted for the ILO Vocational Training Systems Management Branch by P. Maramba and entitled }{\plain \i\f1 Tracer study on women ex-combatants in Zimbabwe}{\plain \f1 , Dec. 1995 (as yet unpublished).

97. See, for example, Centro de Estudios Internacionales:}{\plain \i\f1 Demobilized soldiers speak: Reintegration and reconciliation in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Mozambique}{\plain \f1 , 1995; German Development Institute: }{\plain \i\f1 Promoting the reintegration of former female and male combatants in Eritrea}{\plain \f1 , 1995; GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft f\'fcr Technische Zusammenarbeit): }{\plain \i\f1 Proposals for implementing reintegration programmes for female NRA veterans and veterans\'92 wives}{\plain \f1 and }{\plain \i\f1 Needs assessment on female NRA veterans and veterans\'92 wives in Uganda}{\plain \f1 , 1995; Ugandan Veterans\'92 Assistance Board Reintegration Unit: }{\plain \i\f1 A situation analysis of wives of veterans and female veterans}{\plain \f1 , 1995; and studies on reintegration conducted in Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda by the World Bank, Africa Region, Poverty and Human Resources Division, Technical Department, forthcoming 1995-96.

1. The situation of female ex-combatants

The majority of the female war veterans in all African conflicts were young at the time they joined military combat activities. In Zimbabwe, most girl and women recruits were between 14 and 19 years of age – about ten years younger on average than their male counterparts. When they entered the military, many had not finished their primary education. Female ex-combatants included the literate and illiterate, the skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled in all walks of life and of various ages. They differed greatly in their capacities to perform military activities as well as their ability to readapt to civilian life after the conflict was over. The large majority of female ex-combatants were demobilized either because they did not qualify to remain in the army or because they preferred to return home to care for children and family, work in a traditional occupation or take up a new career.

Unlike other Zimbabwean war-affected women (refugees, etc.), former combatants have much more trouble obtaining support form their extended families. Many were rejected by their families and in-laws because they are seen as having participated in "unsuitable" activities. The situation is worse for single mothers who, apart from the demobilization funds or the generosity of their own parents, rarely have other sources of income.

The majority of those surveyed are married, but they frequently live alone with their children.[98] Many allege that on reaching Zimbabwe after the war they were deserted by their spouses. Many cannot afford to take time away from their household and family responsibilities to pursue general education or vocational training. The result is that most women ex-combatants were not able to take advantage of demobilization benefits and continuing assistance (such as free education) in the first years after independence. This inability to benefit from demobilization and reintegration assistance because of the obligation to look after children and family is the principal issue that separates women ex-combatants from their male colleagues.

The Zimbabwean female ex-combatants who responded in the ILO study emphasized that some reintegration assistance services should be exclusively for them. Their needs differ from those of other war-affected women and they cannot be expected to become economically and socially integrated into civilian society through general post-conflict reconstruction and economic development efforts. Many women veterans continue to fear being mocked and ostracized by their families or their colleagues at work.

General negative attitudes appear to be prevalent against women ex-combatants in many countries. For those who have to support

98. Ex-combatants were not questioned about the legal status of their marriages; 84 per cent of the women interviewed had lived with or still lived with the partner with whom they had children.

themselves and their children and extended families, civilian life has proved particularly difficult. Programmes to assist them are urgently needed in Zimbabwe as well as in other countries that have recently emerged from war. The urgency to consider the specific needs of female war veterans was acknowledged in studies undertaken in other African countries as well. A study by the Ugandan Veterans' Assistance Board confirmed that:

The situation of wives of veterans and female war veterans and their children calls for special attention since they represent a group of people in abnormally severe circumstances. Unlike other types of improvident persons, the wives of veterans and female veterans have limited options for survival. The social support systems that are community based, which normally extend food and other services in times of need, are mainly forthcoming to people who know each other and are dependent on long-term community relationships; hence [these] tend to exclude veteran families that are regarded as "strangers" or "newcomers". This kind of circumstance leaves female war veterans and wives of veterans in vulnerable positions.[99]

2. *Current institutional arrangements for demobilization and reintegration*

The national liberation struggle of Zimbabwe ended with the cease-fire of 1979. Negotiations were held between the two leading national liberation movements, the Zimbabwe Association of National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe Association of Peoples' Union (ZAPU) on the one side and the international community led by the British Government on the other side. These talks had begun in the early 1970s and culminated in 1979 with the constitutional talks at Lancaster House in Britain. There, a peace agreement was formulated which is commonly known as the Lancaster House Agreement.

This Agreement governed the conditions of the cease-fire and hence that of the demobilization and reintegration of combatants. However, the Agreement said very little about ex-combatants in general and nothing about female ex-combatants. Once bound by the Lancaster Agreement, the new Government of Zimbabwe could not modify policies in favour of ex-combatants. Consequently, they were grouped together with all war-affected populations and not referred to as a target group needing special assistance. In light of this, the working documents which detailed Zimbabwean post-conflict development plans mentioned female war veterans only as part of the general

99. Ugandan Veterans\'92 Assistance Board (UVAB): }{\plain \i\f1 A situation analysis of wives of veterans and female veterans}{\plain \f1 , Kampala, Uganda, K2 (U) Consult, 1995, p 36.

population of war-affected women (refugees, widows, wives of male veterans, etc.).

The Lancaster House Agreement provided that the Zimbabwean army should pay demobilization funds to those ex-combatants, both male and female, who could not be absorbed into the army either because they did not want to pursue a career in the military or because they could not qualify. Demobilization payments were set for two years on the assumption that at the end of the two-year period most ex-combatants would be totally reintegrated into civilian and economic life and would thus be able to look after themselves and their families. To support education and training, the Agreement provided for a scholarship fund administered under the Zimbabwean Ministry of Education and Culture for war-affected people. Those who qualified could enrol in formal education, while others could attend pilot schools for practical training.

3. *On-going assistance packages*

Two types of benefits were made available to demobilized female war veterans at independence, and these did not differ from those given to male war veterans. These included a demobilization package for all ex-combatants and a compensation for war victims. The compensation was administered following the War Victims' Compensation Act passed by the then Rhodesian Government and given to all war-affected victims, including disabled veterans. The demobilization package aimed to provide the ex-combatants with financial support and assistance to return to civilian life. This consisted of further education, technical training, business advice and an allowance of Z$4,400 payable over a period of two years at Z$185 per month.

As there was no official programme to reintegrate war veterans in Zimbabwe, there was no structure through which the ex-combatants could be informed about the assistance and benefits available to them once they were demobilized. At the time of demobilization, ex-combatants were advised to use their money to further their education or to obtain skills which could provide them with a source of income. However, as many female combatants did not go through the assembly points for demobilization, many got to know of the demobilization money only months, or even years, after the war (and the programme) ended.

Female war veterans who had been wounded or permanently disabled could claim compensation through the War Victims' Compensation Act. However, many complained that the amounts which they could receive depended on a doctor's medical assessment and on the rank which they held in the army. They were often under-assessed, not

recognized by high-ranking military officers and at times spurned or ignored by male officers.

Different organizations came up with their own rehabilitation initiatives. However, women ex-combatants knew little or nothing of the programmes which these organizations put in place to assist women's socio-economic development, because this assistance for women was irregular and uneven in different parts of the country. Further, as none of the programmes took gender differences into consideration, many women missed opportunities to obtain assistance. Eventually, the Zimbabwe Foundation for Education and Production (ZIMFEP) opened a women's desk in 1993 to address the particular needs of female war veterans.

A female ex-combatant summarizes the sentiments of her colleagues on the demobilization benefit allowance as follows:

The war ended abruptly and there had been no preparation on how ex-combatants would be handled after the war. The only hope the war veterans had in a new Zimbabwe was that the new government would give them land, houses, education, job opportunities and a good life. We did not expect a demobilization package so we did not look out for it.[100]

During the war, veterans were registered by their liberation names and therefore could not prove their identity and thus their rank. Furthermore, to be eligible for benefits they depended on their administering officers for identification of their rank in the military and the time which they spent as combatants. Often they could not find their high-ranking officials or were unable to receive from them adequate confirmation of their identification and former positions in the military. A further complication was the fact that the Zimbabwean national liberation armies were not considered regular armies, and therefore the internal ranking of their combatants was not always taken into account at official demobilization. Finally, many female combatants were often discriminated against by their male superiors as not being "true soldiers".

Both male and female war veterans in Zimbabwe complained about the administration and distribution of demobilization benefits and war victims' funds. They pointed out that to get an application or medical form for assessment, bribes often had to be paid. The veterans' funds have thus benefited many who least needed the money – that is, those who could afford to pay the bribes. "The poor, who cannot pay a bribe, are left and either never get any forms at all or their completed forms suddenly disappear without trace."[101]

Comparatively speaking, men were more likely to be able to invest their money in an informal sector business. Male war veterans, particularly those in the communal and resettlement areas, stated that

100. P. Maramba, op. cit..
101. P. Maramba, opt. cit.

they used their allowances to purchase agricultural implements. However, it must also be pointed out that, because of the generally high levels of poverty amongst war veterans, even male ex-combatants frequently found that they had to use their money to look after their families.

Women war veterans used their money differently. Most unmarried women war veterans who had children or parents to look after used their benefits to procure food and other household items. Those who were married, particularly to civilians, also found they often had to use their money for household needs (Zimbabwean women, as in many of the world's societies, are responsible for the subsistence needs of the family such as food procurement and school fees for the children.). This money was considered as the women's contribution to the household income. Those female war veterans who married fellow ex-combatants found their husbands more understanding and were often encouraged to use the benefit money to obtain further training.

4. Health concerns of female ex-combatants

During the transition phase when ex-combatants travel to their home communities or settle in new places of residence, the first signs of distress become evident. This is the period in which combatants must deal with their initial economic needs (often of a critical emergency nature) and come to terms with their families and the communities of their pre-war lives.

The most common causes of illness and stress among female war veterans arise during their initial reintegration into civilian communities. In Zimbabwe, they complained of discrimination because of their history in the army and of the lack of medical services available to them. Health problems were frequently gynaecological in nature, due to harmful experiences in the military. These have sometimes had devastating effects on the women's family life, their chances of having children and of remaining married. Some have had to divorce their husband because he or the parents-in-law could not accept their predicament.

Other common problems due to life in the military were, for example, back pains and swollen feet due to repeated labourious work such as carrying heavy ammunition, or digestive troubles, often of a stress-related nature. Respiratory problems, circulatory system diseases, digestive diseases, lower limb injuries, migraine headaches, internal chest injuries, as well as stress-related mental disorders, ulcers, depression, loss of sight due to exposure and high blood pressure are other reported health problems.

5. Obstacles and opportunities for education and vocational training

More than half of the Zimbabwean female ex-combatants (56 per cent) did not go beyond primary school education, while only 29 per cent have some secondary school education. Of these, only 1.5 per cent have a primary school diploma and 0.3 per cent have a secondary school diploma. Only 0.08 per cent of the female ex-combatants have graduate or post-graduate training. In comparison, the majority (68 per cent) of the Zimbabwean male ex-combatants had some years of primary school education (i.e. they were recruited at an older age than girls) and 34 per cent attended secondary school before or after their discharge from the army. Slightly more male ex-combatants have been able to obtain higher education and diplomas; yet, their educational competencies are generally low and also require improvement.

Group discussions revealed that most women ex-combatants would only like to further their education if they cannot obtain capital to start their own businesses. Unfortunately, female war veterans lack training in business aspects and knowledge of how to start a micro enterprise or a cooperative. Nevertheless, some women ex-combatants did manage to obtain professional or vocational training in clerical and secretarial services and in the life sciences. Of those in employment, many complained that they have few chances of promotion because their educational qualifications are not competitive.

Men's training preferences differ from those of female war veterans in that they have mostly chosen training for agriculture and related rural self-employment and wage employment (i.e. construction, mining, mechanics, etc). In contrast, women rarely take up training for self-employment in agriculture. While they also live mostly in rural areas and are already active on farms (commercial and subsistence) like most rural women in Zimbabwe, they never regard agriculture as a potential source of income for themselves.

The small percentage of women who want training in agricultural self-employment reflects also that, after the post-colonial land redistribution by the Government, they had few possibilities to receive land set aside for ex-combatants. Such land was usually made available only to the male members of households. Women ex-combatants have been looking at other activities through which to generate income. Many single and widowed former women soldiers or those unmarried with children find it very difficult to integrate into a rural community or family and many have preferred to migrate to cities and live in the anonymity of urban life.

The participation of trained ex-combatants in education and training for their colleagues often goes a long way to building self-confidence and promoting rehabilitation. Because of the division between former

combatants and civilian society, ex-combatants (women and men) generally prefer to receive professional assistance from fellow ex-combatants. Towards their colleagues, veterans feel they can confide their psycho-social and economic needs and receive sympathy and solidarity. In this regard, education and vocational training should and can contribute towards comprehensive capacity building; this is perhaps the most important element for reintegration.

It is obvious that any war will interrupt or disrupt the education of the combatants. However, it is difficult for female ex-combatants to understand why they have little opportunity of improving their education and preparing themselves to enter the labour market now that the war is over. Their difficulties persist, despite the existence of educational facilities such as scholarship funds and pilot schools. Furthermore, arrangements were made in the first years following the war for training and educational institutes, such as polytechnic, primary and secondary schools and also the university, to accept war veterans. However, according to the women war veterans, the Government had promised to fund these courses, but at times was not able to pay and students found themselves burdened with bills for school fees.

Even the educational programme run by ZIMFEP for war veterans was not administered with women war veterans in mind. Female ex-combatants pointed out that the college (called Mupfure) which was set up under this programme is too far away for many. Most women ex-combatants could hardly attend two- to three-year courses and at the same time perform their other household duties and perhaps rear children. Another complication is that in the intervening years education has become very competitive, and schools insist that entry should be granted according to performance rather than on historical war-related conditions. The result is that about 90 per cent of the female ex-combatants stated that they had not received any help, either in the form of training or financial assistance for education.

6. The employability prospects

Through the ILO study, it is clear that female ex-combatants without secondary school education could not compete equally in employment opportunities at Zimbabwe's independence. For example, the majority of female ex-combatants who had worked as nurses during the war could not qualify to join the nursing profession, as they did not have secondary school education and could thus not match the professional qualifications required for nurses in Zimbabwe. For other ex-combatants, the lack of schooling was to their disadvantage even after vocational training in, for example, fashion design or dressmaking. They were often turned down by manufacturing

companies in both the formal and informal sectors on the grounds of inadequate education.

ZIMFEP ran a job placement programme for ex-combatants with some education, and some women were placed in management, secretarial and manual work positions within the Government. Many with secondary school education were also able to attend additional courses to upgrade their training. The Government did encourage the employment of all ex-combatants (women and men), particularly those with little education, within municipal offices. Many obtained employment, but – as is so often the case with insufficient labour market information – separate data on the number of women in such employment could not be obtained. The figures available indicate only that at the end of the rehabilitation programme in 1984 some 36,000 war veterans had been demobilized and that out of these less than half had obtained employment.

Employment in the formal sector is still a problem for all ex-combatants. They continue to be viewed with suspicion. For those who managed to obtain posts within this sector, many did not reveal that they were war veterans for fear of discrimination. Public prejudice towards ex-combatants was at times based on fears that they were agents of the Government and not to be trusted by the private sector which, at the time, was heavily controlled by the (former colonial) business community.

In all, very few female war veterans have found paid employment after their demobilization. Of those female veterans in formal employment, most are in the public sector, given that the private sector has a history of discrimination and prejudice against war veterans. The result is that many female war veterans are unemployed and generally poor. Of the total number of ex-combatants in formal-sector paid employment, only 12 per cent are women and the majority of them have secondary school education.

Very few ex-combatants, male or female, were able to establish their own businesses using the money they received at demobilization. In fact, according to the male war veterans who were able to establish their enterprises, many complained that the demobilization money was too little to constitute a sufficient capital base. Some lost this money as their businesses collapsed, while others found they had to sell off their enterprises and use the money to meet their subsistence needs. Of the 40 ex-combatants which the study found to have begun their own businesses, only three are women. The absence of large numbers of women war veterans who earn an income from their own account activities may point to the fact that most are destitute and do not have access to capital to start an enterprise. Many thus remain dependent on the income of families.

Women and men tend to work in different activities in the informal sector. Operating an informal enterprise to manufacture textile-related products, for example, was most popular among the kind of work in

which women had become self-employed. Generally, female war veterans desired training for this branch of activities. It includes garment making, textile processing and related activities which may include “illegal” import and export of textile products. This latter activity involves travelling to neighbouring countries such as South Africa and Mozambique to buy goods for resale in Zimbabwe; this has become a very common income-earning activity. Additional sources of income cited by women war veterans during discussions are beer brewing and gold panning, which are illegal activities as well.

War veterans were also encouraged by various NGOs and international agencies to form cooperatives and to use their demobilization benefit money as start-up capital for their business ventures. Many men formed cooperatives in welding, machine operating, etc., but few women used their demobilization money to form cooperatives. The women who did work in a cooperative did so with the assistance from non-governmental organizations. Their efforts included, among others, beer selling projects, textile manufacturing and agricultural works. However, many women ex-combatants lack confidence when engaged in work cooperatives with civilians.

Those who desired to form cooperatives were registered with the then Ministry of Cooperatives. On registration, the Ministry undertook to provide their members with training in business management, marketing techniques and also in financial management. However, few war veterans, men or women, stated that they had received this back-up training from the Ministry. One reason was that these assistance programmes were targeted to the general population and did not have special provisions for the ex-combatants. The consequence was that former combatants suffered from their activities in the military long after other population groups had acquired education, training and employment.

7. *Property ownership, loans and extension services*

In almost all post-conflict situations in Africa, women war veterans have great trouble obtaining loan schemes and credit guarantees to start a small enterprise, to join a cooperative or otherwise to provide for their own self-employment. Reasons for this range from social prejudice to a lack of vocational training.

Women’s access to property and ownership of land or housing is difficult because of the patriarchal nature of traditional society in Zimbabwe. In communal areas, for example, men have direct access to landed property, while women can obtain such rights only through

men – their husbands or fathers. When loans are considered, men can put up their land as collateral without regard for the community or family. Women can legally own their own property, but usually lack the resources and are subject to patriarchal attitudes within rural and city administrative councils. Further, the men usually control income and investment; the women have little say over the produce or income.

Given that most ex-combatants are from rural areas, the ownership of land is a major issue of concern for economic and social security. War veterans feel that they deserve to obtain land more than anyone else because they fought for it during the war. In addition, land is perhaps the principal demand of the veterans in rural communities, as they have few other sources of livelihood. In Zimbabwe, this has led the War Veterans' Association to negotiate with the Government that at least 20 per cent of all land distributed every year under the land distribution scheme must go to ex-combatants. While many male ex-combatants have benefited, a missing gender consideration has left women veterans in a disadvantaged position.

An analysis of loan schemes offered to Zimbabwean women showed that few could take advantage and, among those who could, few ex-combatants have benefited.[102] Data on the number of Zimbabwean women and also female war veterans who have benefited from the commercial bank loans is not readily available. In the study, it was noted that one woman had taken advantage of the availability of loans to set up her own business. She is a well-educated woman who had a profession of her own before joining the struggle. During the war, she managed to improve her qualifications and obtain a degree and diplomas in various fields. After independence, she embarked on a number of training programmes with the ILO and with SEDCO in entrepreneurship development. Through her business, she is now able to offer free training facilities and assistance to other women ex-combatants who want to set up their own businesses.

This example is cited to illustrate the type of woman war veteran who is likely to benefit from the available credit schemes. She must be confident, educated and informed and have the ability to identify and take advantage of existing opportunities. Unfortunately, many women ex-combatants were unaware of the existence of loan facilities offered by commercial banks or by non-governmental and governmental organizations.

According to a study presented through the Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC) in 1995, the Ministry of National Affairs, Employment Creation and Cooperatives (1994) observed that the loan systems available are not very "user friendly" to women. There is less confidence in women investors, so that loan

102. P. Maramba: op. cit. For a discussion on methods to support collateral-free loans programmes for women through investment banking, see N.M. Abu Wahid: }{\plain \i\f1 The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh}{\plain \f1 , ed. Boulder, Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 1993. Similar banking efforts exist today in Africa as well.

eligibility criteria are more vigorously applied in assessing their credit worthiness for proposed investment projects. Women are not auto-matically turned away by banks, but in most cases the rigorous scrutiny of their project proposals as well as the need for financial security and collateral have discouraged women from applying for loans.

Besides the obstacles to obtaining loans, extension support structures do not exist to help women ex-soldiers in their self-employment attempts. The lack of access to information was one of the most commonly cited needs during the Zimbabwe study discussions with female veterans. These women pointed out that one of their biggest problems is to obtain permission to rent a house or to rent a plot of land from the municipality in rural or urban resettlement areas in order to grow a commercial crop. Not being independently employed, female ex-combatants have difficulty in receiving the required application forms to ask for housing under municipal schemes. The result is that many are forced to remain dependent on their parents or in-laws or live as squatters in urban areas.

8. *Ex-Combatants' Associations and women's support groups*

The Zimbabwean war veterans have set up an association of their own and are creating programmes to reintegrate their members into economic and social community life. It is only once the war veterans organized themselves into an official body which could represent their needs to governmental and non-governmental organizations that they began to benefit from the existing assistance programmes. Through their association, ex-combatants have become a visible political voice in Zimbabwe. And to the benefit of women ex-combatants, the Association does distinguish between the needs of its male and female members.

In the past, "voicing for war veterans" had been left to organizations and individuals who themselves were not war veterans and who did not fully appreciate the problems of ex-combatants. Thus, while the War Victims' Compensation Act had existed since the end of the war, it benefited veterans only after 1991 when the Veterans' Association was established. Now, it is important that the Association become more gender sensitive in the implementation of its programmes. Many women war veterans need land – especially those ex-combatants who are single, widowed or divorced – and many also are still without secure accommodation.

Furthermore, in organizations that represent the needs of combatants to the Government, the lack of women representatives is still evident in Zimbabwe. This implies that women ex-combatants must still rely on male sympathizers to articulate and represent their interests. Given that women ex-combatants displayed a general lack of knowledge of the reintegration assistance programmes and government policies regarding them, a women's section within the Veterans' Association could resolve this information lacuna.

9. *On-going macro-economic developments and assistance services*

Since the introduction of economic structural adjustment programmes in Zimbabwe, the Government has set up the Social Dimensions Fund (SDF) for self-employment and employment creation. This Fund was set up in 1992 under the Ministry of Public Service in order to help workers and civil servants who suffered due to structural adjustment.

The SDF has two components, the Employment and Training Programme and the Social Welfare Programme. Under these programmes, the Government provides counselling, training, loans and grants to retrenchees from both the public and private sectors to help them set up their own small businesses. Under the Social Welfare Programme, the SDF provides compensation directly to households who apply for assistance under its three schemes: school and examination fees, health fees and food money.

However, the SDF has had only a small impact because of its poorly designed targeting strategy. The SDF is not designed to seek out potential beneficiaries and invite them to participate. Rather, it is a passive mechanism that awaits for potential beneficiaries to apply on their own. The consequence was that many of the women ex-combatants never got to know of the programme. Those who lived in urban centres were more likely to know of the existence of government benefits than those who resided in small towns or in the rural areas.

Another obstacle to obtaining benefits is the lengthy and costly application process. Extensive documentation requirements automatically excluded many of the most vulnerable who may not have proof of residence, income or (un)employment; many of the most needy members of the target population (the rural poor) live far away from the SDF offices, and the amount of benefits is often so low compared to the cost of application that the process to many seems hardly worthwhile.

Conclusion

The examples presented here of the Zimbabwean case study have illustrated that special assistance for women ex-combatants is probably necessary in all conflict-affected societies and that these must also be adapted to the local cultural and social characteristics. In most African countries, culture and community traditions render social and economic reintegration for these women very difficult. Without reintegration assistance that addresses these specific difficulties, they remain either discriminated against for their past combat activities or spurned for having missed family obligations and contributions to the household while they were in the military. Programmes need to be properly planned before demobilization and to cover an adequate period of time.

The planning of reintegration should be such that information on benefits and assistance can be brought to the ex-combatants in a short period of time and at little cost. It is vital that information reaches all former combatants, whether they live in rural or urban areas. Otherwise, there is a real danger of an uneven, spatial socio-economic development among female war veterans. For example, in Zimbabwe it became evident that, in comparison with women war veterans in rural villages, those in urban centres were far more knowledgeable about the benefits provided by government agencies as well as by NGOs and by the Veterans' Association.

Programmes to improve the socio-economic integration of women ex-combatants should provide not only specific skills, but also include guidance for proposal writing, fund raising, simple book-keeping, marketing, product development and business management. Assistance facilities, training course content, scheduling and duration of training must be offered in such a manner that women's needs are taken into account, as for example the need for child-care support, travel costs in rural or rural-to-urban areas, and their present levels of literacy and income.

A marked aversion amongst civilians against female veterans is common in almost all sub-Saharan African countries. They must survive in an environment in which they suffer, not only because they missed years of education or employment training, but also because of the social stigma placed on them. Additionally, women war veterans have a variety of health problems that need attention if reintegration is to be successful. Single mothers in particular need help in coping.

Including the families of female ex-combatants in assistance programmes can facilitate capacity building and also spread the benefits to more people, particularly training and extension services. Programmes should also be run for communities to help them understand the needs of female war veterans so that they can facilitate reintegration.

Efforts must be made in reintegration programmes to identify institutions and NGOs which can assist entrepreneurship and, for example, offer low-interest loans specifically designed for women war veterans. A veterans' association or an ex-combatant support agency may be able to act as financial guarantor for the women war veterans who have difficulties obtaining commercial loans for their own businesses or for joining a cooperative.

VIII. REINTEGRATION OF CHILD AND YOUNG EX-COMBATANTS

Introduction

The International Catholic Child Bureau was asked by the ILO to coordinate case studies in African countries on the special training/ vocational needs of young soldiers following demobilization. The purpose was to present experiences and problems and suggest appropriate strategies. Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea were selected, and numerous local and international NGOs contributed to these studies to better help the future planning of reintegration programmes.[100]

This study describes the issues and problems that concern the well-being of child/young soldiers following demobilization. The social, political and cultural reality which gives rise to internal armed conflicts in Africa characterizes the experience of tens of millions of people who have been involved in fighting. Often included are thousands of children engaged in military activities. With the violence and psychological stress to which most military personnel are exposed, a mistaken impression may be obtained that child/young soldiers are mature beyond their years. Yet their war-time experiences necessitate special attention because these children's experiences in war influence their capacity to benefit from reintegration programmes and develop into "healthy" adults.

For various reasons that are often difficult to define, few data are available on demobilized young and child combatants to inform us of their particular situation. The reintegration and rehabilitation of former child/young and adolescent combatants are sometimes regarded as problematic because of the embarrassing image which recruitment of children into the armed forces may imply for political and military authorities. Reintegration programmes are thus often avoided and the children/teenagers simply sent "home". Furthermore, the social reintegration of demobilized child and young soldiers is inherently more complicated than that for adult ex-combatants because it must address not only the usual programmes of general education, vocational training and employment, but also consider the mental scars from horrifying experiences which mark the character and personality of many child soldiers. Special psychological and educational activities must be offered that encourage trust, healthy social values and acceptable behaviour which promote self-confidence within a civil social setting.

100. This report was completed by Margaret McCallin and published by the ILO Vocational Training Systems Management Branch under the title: }{\plain \i\f1 The reintegration of young ex-combatants into civilian life}{\plain \f1 , ILO, Geneva, 1995.

1. The Convention on the Rights of the Child

Articles 1 and 38 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) define a child as: "every human being below the age of 18 years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier".[101] Article 38 forms the exception to this, requesting states to take all feasible measures to prevent the recruitment into the armed forces of children under 15 years and, for those over 15 years, to limit recruitment to the oldest children.[102] Following this definition, the term "young soldiers" can be understood as implying two categories:

- former child combatants who participated in military activity and are still under the age of 15 years;
- young soldiers who, although over the age limit set by article 38 of the UNCRC for participation in military activity, are still "children" within the overall provisions of the Convention (article 1).

Throughout the text below, the term child/young soldier is used to refer to these age distinctions. The two age limits set for the study help to organize or delimit information, but are essentially arbitrary. The point of reference is the experience undergone by the child/young soldier. The age of the children at the time of recruitment, the length of time they were associated with the military, and the roles they were assigned will be important factors in determining how they have been affected and how reintegration programmes must be conceived to facilitate a return to normal civil society.

In the case studies on which this part is based, both categories were put together to avoid confusion and provide equal consideration. The age of the former child/young combatants at the time of demobilization can direct the form of response to their needs. If the focus of concern of the case studies was only child soldiers within the terms of article 38 of the UNCRC, the risk would be that young people over 15 would be ignored with respect to appropriate strategies for rehabilitation and reintegration. It is within this age group that one can very likely find individuals who commenced their involvement in military activity whilst under 15 years, may have been involved for some years and, as a result, are in particular need of attention for their educational and vocational requirements.

The ILO standards concerning child labour complement the provisions of article 32 of the UNCRC and make an explicit reference to "the relevant provisions of other international instruments". ILO

101. Article 1, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. See Appendix 1 for the complete text of these articles.
102. An optional protocol to the UNCRC, limiting recruitment of persons under 18 years, is presently under consideration.

Convention (No.138) "Minimum age for admission to employment" does not apply to work done by children and young persons in schools or in other training institutions (article 6). Training can be provided to young ex-combatants of whatever age in a school or a training institution. But the placement in employment or work should be done only for those who have attained the minimum age.[103]

Child soldiers under 15 or between the ages of 15 and 18 are not generally included in demobilization documents; nor do they receive the benefits awarded to older soldiers. Being neither "child" nor "adult", these youngsters are more easily marginalized and their needs ignored as they fall through the gap in reintegration programme development. For the purposes of the ILO study summarized in this section, the definition of "young" soldier is expanded to include all persons from 15 to 20 years of age in order to include young people who may have commenced their military activities when they were under 18.

2. Children and armed conflicts

Today, children are involved to an ever-increasing degree in armed conflict. The manner of their recruitment and the reasons for their participation are varied, but what is common to them all is poverty and the breakdown of their family and of their community.

Some children are forcibly recruited by both government and opposition forces. As with the children associated with Renamo in Mozambique, this can involve actual or threatened harm to the child or to persons close to him/her. Such recruiting is often justified by a shortage of support personnel in the armed forces or to swell the ranks and satisfy quotas. In Ethiopia, the shortage of manpower is considered to have influenced the recruitment of children and young people by guerillas and faction groups throughout the war.

Children also join the military for "voluntary" reasons to satisfy immediate needs (such as food and security) or because they lost their homes, families, friends, etc. In the case of Uganda, for instance, their association with the military is described as a consequence of their loss of or separation from their families and community due to armed incursions in villages and towns. Other reasons for joining the military are persuasion by military personnel or other child soldiers, but many also willingly offer themselves to fight for their country or are fascinated by the "sensation of adventure". Furthermore, the prestige accorded to military personnel and their control of everyday life is

103. This can be 14 years in developing countries (article 2 of Convention 138), but if the country has engaged itself in a higher minimum age the latter should be respected. Light work which would not hinder school attendance may be permitted from 12 years old (article 7), while dangerous work should not be allowed under 18 (article 3).

also pervasive and has done much to make life in the army appear attractive.

Children have most often become involved in lighter duties such as escort, guard, reconnaissance and patrol. But at times, they have also carried out ambushes and violent fighting. Given the often cruel circumstances in which children have lost their families, it is not surprising that they naturally attach themselves to the substitute family which the army may provide or which individual officers may represent. In such circumstances, children become loyal and highly motivated little soldiers.[104] The majority of children in the military do not report that they were forced to participate, but rather that circumstances gave them no choice – the need for food, protection, to avenge their families, etc. The extent to which the military position of power provides a model for young people is also significant in terms of rehabilitation and reintegration into civilian life.

3. *Current status of demobilized child / young combatants*

Whatever the method of recruitment, participation in armed conflict is harmful to the future well-being of the child. Participation in military activities is synonymous with separation from parents, school and professional opportunities. Military life is also detrimental to social and cultural life and the values which these engender during the crucial stage of a child's development. During their time in the miliary, children continue to develop physically, socially and emotionally, but it is the quality of their development that determines their character in later adult life.[105]

The type of activities in which the child soldiers engaged, what duties they performed, their age at the time of recruitment, the length of time they were associated with the military, and the quality of their living conditions prior to recruitment all influence the formation of their character. Developmental outcomes following involvement in armed conflict differ greatly. In Sierra Leone, for example, the children who were actively involved in combat were generally more traumatized, more violent and very difficult to handle compared to children who merely wore uniforms and served in other capacities in the army.

104. C.P. Dodge and J. Raundalen: }{\plain \i\f1 Reaching children in war: Sudan, Uganda and Mozambique}{\plain \f1 , 1991.
105. E. Jareg and M. McCallin: }{\plain \i\f1 The rehabilitation of former child soldiers}{\plain \f1 , report of a training workshop for care givers of demobilized child soldiers, Freetown, Sierra Leone, Geneva, International Catholic Child Bureau, 1993.

Children who have been forcibly recruited, coerced and brainwashed into killing and maiming their victims inevitably acquire a distorted perspective of social development and civic responsibility. In the military, child soldiers undergo a form of "asocialization" where behaviour and values are based on the possession of weapons and the ability to overpower others.[106] Repeated trauma and violence results in a destruction of trust in others.[107] Where efforts have been made to address the children's needs, the rebuilding of trusting relationships is seen as the foundation of rehabilitation and social reintegration. To participate in civilian life, former child soldiers need to "to regain a sense of self-esteem which is not based on the power they commanded as child soldiers".[108]

The economic and social impoverishment of demobilized child/young combatants is often similar if not worse than what they experienced prior to recruitment. Due to the loss of schooling in the military, they may also be prone to remaining poor and marginalized in their communities. For example, a UNICEF survey of some 500 unaccompanied street children in Monrovia in 1991 revealed that over 90 per cent of them were homeless since the war and that they lived off begging and petty theft in order to survive.[109] The impoverished circumstances of former child soldiers, their families and community, particularly in the rural areas, and the difficulties associated with access to services in the phase of post-conflict reconstruction must be emphasized as factors that determine a reintegration programme.

4. *The fate of child soldiers in peace agreements*

In the difficult conditions immediately following a cease-fire or peace agreement, political and economic normalization demands so much attention that decisions regarding the fate of child soldiers are easily postponed or even neglected. Without specific mention in peace agreements that child/young combatants have special needs upon demobilization, it is very unlikely that a comprehensive rehabilitation and reintegration programme can be initiated.

To incorporate the needs of child/young soldiers in post-conflict agreements is not always a simple matter. Only two of the five

106. E. Jareg: }{\plain \i\f1 Rehabilitation of child soldiers in Mozambique}{\plain \f1 , note prepared for the Secretary General of Redd Barna, 1993.
107. E. Jareg, ibid.
108. See \'93Case Study 1 for Mozambique\'94 prepared by H. Charnley and T. Silva for Save the Children (UK) and the Ministry for the Coordination of Social Action, in Appendix 5 of M. McCallin: }{\plain \i\f1 The reintegration of young ex-combatants into civilian life}{\plain \f1 , op. cit.
109. M. McCallin: \'93Child Soldiers in Liberia\'94, case study for Liberia in }{\plain \i\f1 The reintegration of young ex-combatants into civilian life}{\plain \f1 , op. cit.

countries studied – Uganda and Sierra Leone – explicitly recognized the role of children during the war. This facilitated attention to their needs. While these two countries gave different reasons for the participation of children in the conflict, the recognition both of their involvement and of their welfare needs led to official action on their behalf.

Advocacy on behalf of child/young combatants is still unheard of in many conflicts and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. A lack of awareness and information may explain why international organizations do not often implement a response in this area. This may indicate that there is a need for access to information relating to demobilization procedures in order that child/young combatants can be identified and strategies for their rehabilitation and reintegration developed.

In Mozambique, for example, the peace accord made no mention of the existence of child/young combatants, although both government and Renamo forces acknowledged that children and young people had been recruited. Considerable information was available on the extent to which children were forcibly recruited and the subsequent abuses which they experienced, as well as the approximate numbers of child/young combatants who were still in the armed forces at the end of the war. Still, the peace accord dismissed their participation. Protocol IV, which deals with the economic and social reintegration of demobilized soldiers, makes no reference to age, while the Reintegration Commission (CORE) does not include persons under the age of 18 for demobilization benefits or other compensation.

The case studies for Mozambique explain the treatment of child/young soldiers at demobilization as a matter of political expediency. Public recognition that children had been actively involved in the conflict was considered a political liability, and their official demobilization was inconvenient. Renamo denied the existence of children in its armed forces, and when the general demobilization commenced in November 1993 children were forbidden to join. Public pressure and concern for their welfare did eventually force attention to the children's situation.

An assessment was conducted on behalf of UNICEF which followed Renamo's request for assistance to unaccompanied children in February 1994.[110] The result of this assessment was an agreement that the ICRC and the Save the Children Fund (USA) would undertake their evacuation and family reunification as part of the programme for the demobilization of civilian vulnerable groups. It was assumed that those aged 16 and over would "pass through the demobilization process" and would be "eligible for benefits".[111]

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110. }{\plain \i\f1 An assessment of children and youth in Renamo zones: Strategies and recommendations}{\plain \f1 , prepared for UNICEF, Mozambique by Creative Associates International, Inc., May 1994.

A similar concern should be noted in the case of Liberia. Here UNICEF estimates[112] that there are more than 6,000 combatants (at least 10 per cent of the total) who are children under 15 and some 30 per cent of combatants are under 18 years of age. However, no policy has been outlined to enable these young people to cope with and adjust to civilian life. "At present, small soldiers get next to nothing at demobilization. They are told to go to town and make it on their own, which they do through robbery".[113]

5. *Planning the reintegration and rehabilitation of child/young combatants*

Studies immediately following conflicts in Africa reveal the difficult political and economic situation in which government departments and ministries, as well as local and international NGOs, are obliged to work. Some governments or local NGOs respond to needed reintegration programmes for former child/young combatants, while others are not able to assist this group of demobilized combatants. Because each situation is unique, programmes will require their own process of needs assessment and methods of rehabilitation. Reintegration measures must be designed which are appropriate to the situation in which the children are in and which their families and communities are presently experiencing.

Mozambique, as an example, has been the scene of significant population movements as people have repatriated, resettled in their homes and begun the process of post-conflict reconstruction. The extent to which the general population was affected during the conflict and the enormity of the task of reconstruction requires that the needs of child/young combatants be addressed within the context of general community rehabilitation. Within general post-conflict reconstruction, they require speedy reintegration that allows them to integrate into civil society in an anonymous manner so as to acquire a new civilian identity without the stigma of war-time activities.

Although Mozambique, like Ethiopia, did not develop specific policies and programmes to address the needs of child/young combatants, studies reveal that the Mozambican authorities are well aware of the situation. And while no programmes for child soldiers had been created in advance, the high profile of the conflict drew many international humanitarian agencies and NGOs to the country. Their concern for the child soldiers was matched by the Mozambique

111. }{\plain \i\f1 An assessment of children and youth in Renamo zones}{\plain \f1 , op. cit.
112. }{\plain \i\f1 Easy prey: Child soldiers in Liberia}{\plain \f1 , Human Rights Watch/Africa and Human Rights Watch, Children\'92s Rights Project, 1994.
113. J. Haapiseva:}{\plain \i\f1 Report of a field trip to Liberia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe}{\plain \f1 , on behalf of the Lutheran World Federation, 1994.

Ministry for the Coordination for Social Action and developed inadvertently into a large reintegration programme for children affected by armed conflict, including child soldiers.

Other African countries managed to plan their reintegration programmes for their child/young combatants without acknowledging their active recruitment. In Uganda, for example, the National Resistance Army (NRA) admitted to having many children in its midst, but saw itself as a substitute family. It considered that most of its child soldiers were orphans or children who came from impoverished families. For many of these children, this was indeed true. And after the war, the Ugandan military did continue to care for some of the children. These were often reluctant to relinquish their role as military heroes of the war and return to the oblivion of village life. Many demobilized child soldiers were sent to a special primary school where counselling was provided for those with behavioural problems and where classes and practical skills (horticulture, dairy farming, carpentry, etc.) were given. The army assumed much of the responsibility of funding and implementing the reintegration programme for its child/adolescent members.

In Rwanda, in early 1995 there were some 1,500 boys under 15 years of age and approximately 500 aged from 15 to 18 awaiting reintegration. It was explained that while there was no policy of child recruitment, children attached themselves to the army for security and protection during the war and the genocide of 1994. In many instances, the army has continued to care for them. There is an obvious attachment to the children on the part of the army, which considers itself a substitute family. Unlike Uganda, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) does not intend to organize the civilian reintegration of the children; this responsibility is to be passed on to civil authorities.

The programmes in Sierra Leone and Liberia, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of outreach to the child soldiers' families and communities. The approach to rehabilitation, based upon experience working with the children, was characterized by a flexible determination of individual needs rather than "managing" a group of "difficult" children. This perspective creates a foundation for successful reintegration; in both cases, it is synonymous with family reunification and with a productive involvement in community life. The rehabilitation gave the children an opportunity to regain their self-confidence in programmes that ranged from six months in Sierra Leone to three months in Liberia. Some programmes have followed with an additional three months of vocational instruction.

The extent to which the children have been affected by their experiences, particularly at the psychological level, means that "for many of them aggression and the fighting spirit become their way of life. Giving up the will to fight is correlated with drop-out behaviour, depression, and drug abuse. This indeed has created the urgent need for intensive intervention through appropriate rehabilitation

programmes".[114] During the period of rehabilitation, educational, recreational and skills training programmes are available. Counselling is also provided, with an opportunity for the children to establish trusting relationships with adults and with each other.

Financial constraints have hampered and always slow down the development of reintegration programmes. In most cases, it is extremely difficult for rehabilitation programmes to maintain a level of intensive support for demobilized child/young combatants. The official reintegration programmes in Sierra Leone and Liberia proclaim a high level of commitment to the welfare of the children, and as such they provide an invaluable basis of knowledge to inform future initiatives. However, international and domestic sources of funding are restricted, as in most similar situations, and require careful planning to incorporate flexibility and durability.

6. *Managing the reintegration of child/young combatants: The main issues*

Throughout the case studies, regardless of the form of response to the reintegration of child/young soldiers, certain issues were described which are considered to influence successful reintegration. These are:

- the reintegration environment:
  - family reunification
  - community involvement in reintegration
  - economic opportunities

- the child/young ex-combatants:
  - physical effects and disabilities
  - psycho-social effects
  - girl ex-combatants

- rehabilitation and economic reintegration:
  - coping with behavioural problems
  - education
  - vocational training.

114. M. McCallin: \'93Child soldiers in Liberia\'94, a case study for Liberia in }{\plain \i\f1 The reintegration of young ex-combatants into civilian life}{\plain \f1 , op. cit.

(i) The reintegration environment

Family reunification

The children's reintegration with their families and communities is the ultimate goal of most reintegration efforts. The case studies indicate that the needs of child/young soldiers upon demobilization can be adequately addressed only with reference to and within the context of their family and community. As such, assessments should be made by rehabilitation counsellors of the family's capacity to accommodate the child and assume services that may be required to enable his/her social and community reintegration. For this, communities must also be sensitized to the needs of the children so as to encourage their reintegration as well as to alternative kinds of assistance which the community can learn to give.

Where family reunification has been accomplished, programmes should aim to develop sustainable projects to secure their well-being. This involves the participation of the community in defining and implementing solutions and in monitoring and evaluating programme development to ensure continued appropriateness to the child's needs and circumstances.

However, there are instances where local conditions do not favour family reunification or where the child may not wish to return. In some instances, the child soldiers cannot return to their original community because they were forced to commit atrocities there by the military men who recruited them. Institutionalized responses for the reintegration of orphaned or severely traumatized former child soldiers is often conducted in special schools or orphanages. Such institutional methods present advantages, but many NGOs believe that they prolong aggressive behaviour and risk further marginalizing the children from their ultimate civilian communities. In this context, finding foster families to take care of orphaned child soldiers is often a better alternative.

Following a conflict, situations exist also where the children's families cannot be found, as these may also have been displaced. The majority of children who were involved in military activities have indeed lost their families and as a result suffer from severe deprivation. During the wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the families of many child soldiers were victims of attacks and often had to flee from their homes. In cases of large population displacements, family reunification and reintegration are only possible once a minimum of social stability can be re-established. It is difficult, if not impossible, to return children to families and communities which themselves have no stable home or are perhaps broken up.

Community involvement in reintegration

As seen above, for successful reintegration and rehabilitation of former child/young soldiers the involvement of the children's families and communities is most important. However, civilian communities and the families which accommodate former child combatants must also be aided. In most post-conflict societies in Africa, community

support in reintegration programmes has been lacking, especially due to the unawareness of the needs of child soldiers. Efforts must be made to raise awareness among civilians about the situation of former child soldiers and to initiate meetings with community members or village leaders/ elders to clarify how the community can support rehabilitation and social integration.

Admittedly, this requires resources, both human and material, which should mostly come from local sources to be effective and locally understood. However, community involvement in reintegration work is burdensome and inconvenient for people who already live in difficult social and economic conditions. Community acceptance and active input in the rehabilitation and reintegration of young ex-combatants is more likely to be successful if such programmes bring rewards for the families and communities who accommodate former child/young combatants. Rewards can come in the form of food and material assistance, vocational training interventions or employment opportunities that can benefit the larger civilian community as well.

While many people may be available for employment or participation in reintegration programmes, it is important to plan the training of rehabilitation personnel and volunteers so that local capacities can be enhanced. Without local/community participation (as paid workers or volunteers), reintegration and rehabilitation are almost impossible. The most effective means of addressing the children's needs is to capitalize on existing social and economic community-level linkages or to establish such networks of support which help to encourage trust and self-confidence for these children in a civilian environment. Involvement in general education and vocational training will help in this effort.

Economic opportunities

Reintegration is dependent on the distribution of economic activity and opportunities. Many former child/young soldiers return to areas (often rural villages) where there is inadequate provision of basic services. All too often, no social and economic market and capacity exists in which former young combatants can learn about marketing and begin some small-scale trade or business, let alone find employment even at very low wages. Families which accommodate war-displaced and former child soldiers have few resources and little to offer in terms of assistance for reintegration and rehabilitation.[115] Programmes for reintegration should consider the problem of poverty and the lack of economic opportunity and assess the potential for implementing flexible initiatives that can respond to the needs of rural communities.

115. In planning the demobilization and reintegration of former child combatants in Angola, it has been suggested that, to avoid disappointment with regard to the benefits awarded to other soldiers, they be provided with \'91kits\'92 of clothing and school supplies and professional and domestic kits for day-to-day use following their return home (personal communication from Christian Children\'92s Fund, Geneva Office).

(ii) The child/young ex-combatant

Physical effects and disabilities

The rehabilitation and long-term care of former child/young soldiers with disabilities are particularly difficult to address. Soldier children have "grown up" to learn the methods and values of war and violence and need more intensive psycho-social care. They need a stable family or a home in which to become healthy adults, and they may need ongoing professional rehabilitation. Furthermore, in case of permanent war-related physical disabilities, repair and renewal services of prostheses and other medical aids must be provided as the children grow or develop certain vocational skills. The extended needs for medical rehabilitation services may present severe travel, communication or financial difficulties for host communities or families living in rural areas.

Because the nature of war is to cause physical harm, it is no wonder that physical abuse among children engaged in military activities is common. Violence may be witnessed daily and death is never far away for those who are frequently on the front lines of combat.[116] In combat and non-combat activities, children can be subjected to physical deprivation, food shortages and poor health, physical and sexual abuse at the hands of older soldiers, various forms of physical and mental torture to extract compliance, sexually transmitted diseases and/or substance abuse. These all have consequences ranging from severe social disfunctionality and learning disabilities to nerve and brain damage.[117]

Psycho-social effects

However, the impact on children's participation in military activities is not only a physical one. The marginalization and social rejection from which former soldiers often suffer must be addressed with more determination in the case of child soldiers (especially girls and the war-disabled) and their self-esteem must be encouraged. Some good efforts have been made, such as in Mozambique where an emphasis on holistic reintegration is made by recognizing a need to change attitudes towards disabled ex-child soldiers. In most countries, however, efforts to assist disabled child/young soldiers are desperately needed to secure their recovery and reintegration, to support their families so that they are not burdened and to ensure that their special needs are not forgotten in already economically demanding and socially disorienting post-conflict conditions.

Girl ex-combatants

The situation for girl/young ex-combatants is especially serious because of the mental and physical abuse to which girls (like women)

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116. See, for example: \'93The use of children as \'91cannon fodder,\'94 by the NPFL during Operation Octopus in October 1992, p. 20, in Human Rights Watch/Africa Rights Watch, Children\'92s Rights Project: }{\plain \i\f1 Easy prey: Child soldiers in Liberia}{\plain \f1 , p. 20, op. cit.
117. ibid.

can be subjected in times of war. It is difficult for their families to confront the sexual nature of many girls' experiences and humiliations in war and the fact that girls, like most women, avoid talking about such experiences. Girls are frequently used as "sex objects" in addition to experiencing the same situation of war-related violence as the boys.[118] The consequence of this is that they are vulnerable to continued abuse within their communities or that they turn to prostitution as a last resort if they are without a family.

Often, a "conspiracy of silence" surrounds the girls' participation or victimization in conflict. It reflects a deep embarrassment or a means of self-preservation in societies where girls and women are socially condemned unless they fulfil traditional roles. Female ex-combatants are often required to conceal their involvement in a conflict for fear of total social and family rejection. In most communities, it is difficult to accept and usually impossible to acknowledge that a daughter, sister or wife was a soldier or that she supported military activities in other ways. Often, the only recourse is to pretend never to have participated in combat or to have experienced war first-hand and instead to show themselves as "acceptable" submissive women.[119]

Any concern for child welfare must incorporate the special needs of girl soldiers and children with disabilities. They are at particular risk of being marginalized and rejected by their communities. Special attention will be required to ensure that programmes will provide them with a secure economic base and facilitate their reintegration.

(iii) Rehabilitation and economic reintegration

Coping with behavioural problems

A major difficulty in working with former child/young combatants is that their behaviour can be construed as difficult. It is important to note this consequence of their participation as children in conflict. Their behaviour and characters are the result not only of the events in which they participated, but also of the context in which these events occurred. In civilian society, emphasis is placed on participation and communal well-being, and acceptance is gained through adhering to codes of moral and social behaviour.[120] However, during military service, the children are separated from the supportive and nurturing environment of the family and are dependent on rigid and authoritarian structures which control and impose behaviour. This is the way of life they know and the one on which they model their own behaviour towards others. Also, after longer periods of time in the army, children become used to obeying without making decisions for themselves; they may exhibit a continued dependency on authoritarian control to limit their behaviour. Once such control is removed and no alternative support structure is in place, former child soldiers may be

118. E. Jareg and M. McCallin: op. cit.
119. P. Maramba: }{\plain \i\f1 Reintegration of demobilized combatants into social and economic life: The Zimbabwean experience}{\plain \f1 , consultancy for the ILO, 1995.
120. See E. Jareg. op. cit.

unable to control their behaviour and may resort to aggressive methods to obtain what they want.

Despite the often-voiced public concerns of the children's predicament, many feel abandoned and rejected following demobilization. In many cases, such as in Uganda, the army had become a protector and provider for child soldiers and they in turn had identified with it. The need for intensive civilian reintegration support is indispensable in order that the child/young ex-combatants can re-establish attachments to their families and their communities, as well as to social norms and values of civil behaviour.

This process of reattachment through the establishment of trusting relationships is considered to be crucial to successful reintegration. Where special programmes of rehabilitation are implemented, as in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the emphasis is placed less on "managing" the children's difficult behaviour than on overcoming their mistrust and suspicion. It is always difficult for families to accept the behaviour of returning child soldiers that does not conform to social norms and expectations – hence, recognition of the causes of militarization, of the change in social values in child soldiers, and of the need for psycho-social rehabilitation and education.

Education

Time spent in the military is synonymous with lost educational opportunities. None of the case studies in Africa indicated that skills developed in the military could contribute to the ex-combatants' social or economic reintegration. Upon demobilization, the child/young soldiers' level of schooling is almost always well behind that of their peers. Embarrassment and frustration often result when former soldier children attend school with children of a much younger age. Many such youngsters drop out of school because they feel humiliated or marginalized. This was one determining factor in the decision of the NRA to provide special schools for child soldiers.

While education may be considered a necessity for former soldier children, controversy can result in reintegration programmes concerning the selection of those children who are considered to be unfit for continued formal education. Attention to educational needs must often take account of the children's situation, the geographical location of their families' homes, and the availability of remedial education or alternative forms of offering basic literacy and numeracy skills to those with no formal education. Decisions about whether schooling can be offered will of necessity depend on local conditions and resources and the willingness of families and soldier children to be separated again if special schools are distant from home communities.

One model that could be considered is that of education combined with work. This model was implemented in Zimbabwe following the war of liberation. Considering that economically productive lives would bring the greatest satisfaction and benefits to individual ex-combatants and their communities, education ought not to be

purely theoretical, but linked to apprenticeship and internship-type work. Students were offered opportunities to gain work experience and general intellectual education that created a foundation for adult life and proved less costly than establishing and maintaining special schools.[121] Such an educational and work setting offers a better environment for former young combatants to integrate with other children, to work towards the country's reconstruction, and to (re)learn the norms and practices of civil society in a manner that relates to their daily activities.

The role of the teachers in this regard is most important and must be recognized and supported. Civilian teachers are sometimes reluctant to accept former child/young soldiers, as these are thought to be disruptive and difficult. Teachers may need additional training themselves so as to enable them to respond appropriately to the needs of former combatants. In some cases, however, the teachers recognize and address the children's special needs in the absence of any teacher training facilities. The knowledge and commitment of these people constitute a significant resource which must not be neglected when planning appropriate educational strategies.

Funding of educational programmes may be a major constraint, particularly for countries which, whilst struggling with post-conflict reconstruction, are confronted with the demands of structural economic adjustment policies. In Liberia, for example, children wishing to continue their education are obliged to pay. Some funding is available, but in no way does it match the demand. The result is predictable: individual frustration and disillusionment and, worst of all, missed opportunities to enrich the human and professional capacities which the often large numbers of ex-combatants represent.

Appropriate reintegration programming for former child/young combatants must strike a balance between their need for vocational training and/or employment with the more specific concern for child welfare issues. Programmes for these children should be integrated into post-conflict reconstruction efforts in order to complement these activities and strengthen local capacities to respond to the children's needs.

Vocational training

It is important for former child/young soldiers to have the opportunity to develop a sense of identity which is not linked to their previous roles in the military but which incorporates the values, practices, and norms that regulate and give reason to family and community life. Vocational training can contribute significantly to this process, as the capacity and willingness to work and the possession of a skill are of immediate and appreciable value to the community. The opportunity to work is also the opportunity to "deconstruct" the past and to build for the future.

121. J. Haapiseva: }{\plain \i\f1 Report of a field trip to Liberia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe}{\plain \f1 on behalf of the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), Geneva, 1994.

Vocational training is seen as a crucial aspect of the successful reintegration of former child/young soldiers. It implicitly recognizes the children's need to compensate for lost time in the military, not only with education but also with an upgrading of professional skills. The three countries in the case studies which addressed the issue directly (Liberia, Mozambique and Sierra Leone) described different approaches to vocational training and outlined various constraints associated with them. These emphasized not only the children's need for skills training, but also for basic education and learning about civilian life so as to render their reintegration more comprehensive.

The approaches to training and education most common in Africa can be described as the formal model of training in isolation. Study curricula and schooling/training are distinct and separate from the daily activities of the children within their families. More integrated training is, for example, the apprenticeship model where children and young people are trained by crafts-people and local entrepreneurs. In some apprenticeship cases, the young trainee becomes a members of the mastercraft family for the duration of the training period. The formal training model may require previous education (primary school, for example) and thereby limit access to all child ex-combatants.

A non-formal model of skills training is at times carried out within and by the family to enable the children to learn skills traditionally associated with providing for the family's economic security. While the formal education methods are easier to monitor and evaluate in terms of specific course objectives and skills acquired, they present a problem with ensuring their economic relevance, particularly since such courses are not usually linked to the provision of appropriate tools, equipment or actual work experience. Help in seeking appropriate market opportunities requires different skills and places demands on labour market analyses and training feasibility studies, which may be more difficult to obtain.

The most cost-effective means of training may therefore be the apprenticeship system. While (traditional) apprenticeship schemes are more difficult to monitor and evaluate as to their quality of education and training, the fact that such systems have no structured curriculum nor entry requirements or performance evaluations makes them accessible to all former child/young soldiers. And like the non-formal training schemes, they are directly relevant to the children and to the economic situation of their families. The apprenticeship system also provides an opportunity to support existing income-generating skills and strengthen the family's capacity to care for the child. To render such training systems more formal and officially acceptable, they could be combined with government-approved exams or work projects so that the trainees would obtain a nationally recognized standardized certificate.

As children become engaged in activities that are considered meaningful within the community, their chances for successful

reintegration are further enhanced. While this is the case in Sierra Leone and Liberia, it is not always so in other countries. In some countries, there may be social or cultural barriers that prevent the establishment of an apprenticeship system or that render it impossible for certain children to benefit from such initiatives.

In addition to the inherent value of providing skills, vocational training and apprenticeship schemes offer the ex-child/young combatants to recover from their war-time experiences and find a new identity through meaningful and productive activities. This is the objective of the Liberian reintegration programme, and it also characterizes the work done in Sierra Leone where "empowerment" of former child combatants is accomplished through training/education programmes that emphasize building self-confidence.

The experiences in Sierra Leone and Liberia highlight the influence of psychological factors on the effectiveness of vocational training schemes. Psychological and post-traumatic problems such as aggression, fear, uncontrolled emotion, alcoholism and narcotic drug abuse must be addressed. This implies that those agencies and instructors responsible for reintegration need to be assisted to deal with the effect of participation in conflict on the children's behaviour.

To ensure a positive outcome from vocational training, education and training methods must fulfil two principal criteria: correspond to the needs and interests of the young/child ex-combatants and their families, and reflect the existing facilities and future opportunities in which newly-learned skills can be applied (craftsmanship, agriculture and food processing, employment credentials, establishing micro and small enterprises, etc.).

Conclusion

This section pointed to some crucial issues concerning the reintegration of child/young ex-combatants. Principal among these is the urgency after a conflict to find the families and communities of these young soldiers so that they may return to a civilian life as soon as possible. It has also become clear that reintegration programmes for child soldiers must take into consideration that the time spent in the military has usually become part of the personal development and character of these young ex-combatants. Their war-time experiences cannot be separated from the child's personality; hence, reintegration must incorporate appropriate rehabilitation and education.

Such reintegration must facilitate, as much as possible, a process of reattachment through the establishment of trusting relationships between the civilian community and the young ex-soldiers. This is crucial to successful reintegration. These former child combatants should be given the opportunity to develop a new sense of identity which is not linked to their previous roles in the military. They ought to be able to assimilate the values and social norms that regulate and give reason to family and community life.

A reintegration programme should emphasize child welfare concerns and address in particular the needs of those who have spent their entire youth in the military and have in the process missed out on normal family life and social learning. Girl soldiers and the physically disabled must be given particular attention, for they risk being marginalized and rejected by their communities more than any other group of ex-combatants.

However, while recognizing the need for special concerns, it will be necessary to maintain a balance between these young ex-combatants' needs for rehabilitation, education and vocational training and the concern that programmes should not be too specialized and thus isolate these former soldiers rather than integrate them into civilian society. In this regard, community support and active participation in the reintegration programme are indispensable.

IX. REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION OF EX-COMBATANTS WITH DISABILITIES

Introduction

The purpose of this section is to offer an overview of the issues and problems to be considered when planning, implementing and financing rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for disabled ex-combatants. It argues in favour of the inclusion, whenever possible, of disabled former combatants in the same reintegration programmes in which able-bodied ex-combatants are enrolled. The reason for this is three-fold: the exclusion of combatants from general reintegration programmes on the basis of their disabilities has frequently proven detrimental to their well-being; effective long-term recovery from a conflict must include provision for the needs of the most visible victims of a war; and, where governments ignore the legitimate claims of disabled ex-combatants, the seeds of new conflict are sown, as post-conflict demonstrations and incidents in several countries involving disabled former soldiers have demonstrated.

The following is based for the most part on an ILO report which discusses training and employment of ex-combatants with disabilities on the bases of two case studies in Namibia and Zimbabwe.[100] Information from other ILO experiences in Afghanistan, Angola, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Cambodia, Iran, Namibia, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe is also included as well as information from related external publications.[101]

From the documentation available, four principal conclusions can be drawn:

- medical care to individuals disabled during conflict is a necessary, but not the only, prerequisite to the successful reintegration of disabled ex-combatants;
- disabled ex-combatants should not be categorized as continuing medical or social welfare cases;
- physically disabled former combatants should, whenever possible, be included in and benefit from the same reintegration programmes in which non-disabled ex-combatants are enrolled; and
- like all other demobilized combatants, many war-disabled ex-soldiers often are able and want to obtain education and vocational training so as to engage in productive work. Given appropriate training opportunities and counselling, they can contribute to post-conflict reconstruction and social development. However, necessary services are often unplanned or unavailable.

100. Susan Mutambirwa \'93The Zimbabwean experience\'94; Raymond Haynes \'93The Namibian experience\'94. Case studies in }{\plain \i\f1 Rehabilitation and reintegration of disabled ex-combatants}{\plain \f1 , ed. by Bob Ransom; Vocational Rehabilitation Branch (Geneva, 1995).

101. See for example, Centro de Estudios Internacionales, }{\plain \i\f1 Demobilized soldiers speak}{\plain \f1 : op. cit. and German Development Institute, }{\plain \i\f1 Promoting the reintegration of former female and male combatants in Eritrea}{\plain \f1 , 1995.

After conflict injury or trauma, most disabled individuals obtain some minimal medical rehabilitation services and, in some cases, compensation payments. However, they are often soon forgotten and left out of larger resettlement, training and employment schemes. The result is that many disabled ex-combatants are marginalized in society. Unable to participate in the social and economic life of their communities, they are all too often regarded as a "burden" because of their dependence on assistance from families, communities or perhaps the government. This is the experience of the vast majority of disabled ex-combatants in most African post-conflict situations.

The needs and abilities of disabled ex-combatants should be taken into account in reintegration strategies that are targeted to ex-combatants in general. Governments and agencies responsible for reintegration must take these needs seriously and provide assistance in empowering disabled individuals to return to productive life, rather than creating life-long dependency.

1. *Understanding disabled ex-combatants*

Whatever the kind of injury sustained in conflict, ex-combatants with permanent physical disabilities do not want to be subjects of charity for the rest of their lives, nor do they want to depend on families and communities to sustain them. Most disabled ex-combatants wish to become economically and socially active in their civilian communities and avoid being a burden on society. Furthermore, disabled ex-combatants can and want to be included in general demobilization and resettlement programmes that are organized for all ex-combatants. While some will require special services or ongoing medical care, the majority of them are capable of directly participating in vocational skills training and employment creation programmes.

All wars, by their nature, produce victims – civilians and soldiers. Weapons have become more destructive, more pervasive, and easier to purchase for armies as well as for civilians. In the countries affected recently by armed internal or international conflict, the number of disabled combatants has increased dramatically. In Ethiopia an estimate of 45,000 disabled combatants was used for planning purposes after the conflict ended, and in Angola 50,000 and in Eritrea 18,000 were estimated to have been injured in the latest fighting.[102] In the case of Eritrea, where the general demobilization of combatants has now been well under way for some years, it is estimated that some 25 per cent of the ex-combatants have physical impairments (including loss of limbs, hearing, and eyesight, mental problems).

102. ILO: }{\plain \i\f1 Reintegrating demobilized combatants: A report exploring options and strategies for training-related interventions}{\plain \f1 , op. cit., p.41.

However, accurate estimates of the number of soldiers with war-related disabilities who are to be demobilized are often unavailable. When the war came to an end in Zimbabwe, for example, it was not known how many disabled ex-combatants required rehabilitation. Injured soldiers had often been brought to hospitals by fellow combatants during battle and the central military administration was not informed. One reason was that many soldiers acted on their own behalf in emergency situations or because medical personnel had little or no contact with the warring parties. Furthermore, inadequate accounting of soldiers by the military and a lack of cross-information among medical institutions and government reintegration agencies led to inappropriately planned programmes.

2. *Initial planning for rehabilitation and reintegration*

Advance planning and programming should not only provide for medical care, maintenance support and the supply of technical aids and devices (i.e. wheelchairs, etc.) for disabled ex-combatants, but should also include vocational training and employment schemes. Data on the number of disabled ex-combatants must be collected, providing information on the nature of their impairment as well on their abilities and willingness to engage in vocational training and economic activities. This is best gathered as part of any data collection on ex-combatants in general during the encampment and/or the demobilization phases.

However, special efforts are required to identify all disabled ex-combatants, as many will be found in special camps, in hospitals, or already back in their home communities. In almost all post-conflict countries, disabled ex-combatants are entitled to obtain some form of assistance; however, the benefits may not be the same as those for able-bodied demobilized combatants. A reason for this is that most reintegration assistance and financial benefits are allocated and partially distributed at the time of demobilization. The disabled combatants, however, are usually “demobilized” without formalities while the conflict or war is continuing.

3. Institutional arrangements for reintegration assistance

Given that demobilization and reintegration programmes are usually centrally conceived and planned, it is the government's responsibility to implement a framework for inter-agency coordination and provide a decentralized mechanism for assistance programmes. Ministries of Defence sometimes operate their own rehabilitation facilities to provide assistance to disabled combatants (or for child soldiers – see VIII). However, with the large increase in numbers of both disabled ex-combatants and disabled war victims, neither the civilian nor the defence-related facilities are usually adequate. In response to this, war-affected countries are frequently inundated with offers from external humanitarian organizations which wish to support their post-conflict reconstruction efforts. A problem often encountered is that with diverse small and large agencies all delivering assistance to war-affected populations, the country's population is unevenly assisted.

In respect to assistance for disabled ex-combatants, it is important that benefits and compensation payments be made in an even and equitable manner across the country. This means that the principal government reintegration agency must define the respective roles and responsibilities of all organizations (including local and external NGOs or multilateral agencies). The lack of coherent coordination in the past has all too often led to ad hoc belated reactions to and concern for the needs of disabled ex-combatants.

In many reactions to post-conflict needs, assistance is usually organized and offered by external donors (the Red Cross, for example) and international NGOs. While such external assistance is often desperately needed in conflict-affected and poverty-stricken regions, it tends to put all war-disabled people (including disabled ex-combatants) into the same aid programmes. This often leaves the ex-combatants with disabilities marginalized because of their disabilities. Although this is at times inevitable in countries that have a large population of war-affected people, it often means that ex-combatants with disabilities tend to become separated from their able-bodied colleagues and thus fail to be integrated into employment creation and reintegration programmes established specifically for ex-combatants.

The establishment of separate rehabilitation and reintegration projects for disabled combatants is common in many post-conflict countries. This was the case, for example, in Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe. In some of these countries, special rehabilitation centres were set up for disabled ex-combatants (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mozambique, Zimbabwe). Conceived of as transitional centres, where disabled individuals are

prepared for reintegration into the community, some became residential centres of disabled ex-combatants, due to their refusal to leave (Ethiopia, Zimbabwe).

Because of the absence of assistance to disabled ex-combatants, some have, out of necessity, organized their own associations. In various African and Central American countries, formally instituted disabled ex-combatants' or veterans' associations have organized themselves to demand assistance.[103] In Mozambique, for example, disabled ex-combatants organized their own association (the Mozambican Association of Disabled Veterans, ADEMIMA). In Angola, a national association for the disabled (Associacao de Deficientes Angolanos) was established and supported the creation of a corresponding agency for disabled ex-combatants. In Zimbabwe, the establishment of "Vukuzenzele" (Wake Up and Do It Yourself) agricultural enterprises of war-disabled veterans was the result of NGO and community efforts.[104]

The main objective of ex-combatant associations is to obtain better treatment and facilities, especially equal opportunity for employment, training and reintegration in productive activities. While this is perhaps politically unattractive to some post-conflict governments, official support for an ex-combatants' association may prove useful. The active involvement of disabled ex-combatants in their own rehabilitation and reintegration should be encouraged, as it can contribute significantly to the ultimate success of such programmes. It may be beneficial and even cost-effective for post-conflict governments to facilitate the establishment of a representative association of disabled ex-combatants. Such an association can take responsibilities which the government may not be able to shoulder. It may be able to distribute information more effectively and provide for an equitable distribution of rehabilitation assistance, training and reintegration benefits throughout a country.

With or without the assistance of an ex-combatants' association, a reintegration programme must ensure the following principles: (1) even-handed dissemination of information on assistance, benefits and pension schemes offered by both official government agencies and NGOs, and (2) an equitable offer of education, vocational training, employment assistance and business support services for all those affected by war, including disabled-ex-combatants. These aspects of assistance should be centrally planned and offered to disabled ex-combatants in the same manner and through the same channels as the reintegration support which is offered to other demobilized combatants.

103. See, for example: Centro de Estudios Internacionales, }{\plain \i\f1 Demobilized soldiers speak: }{\plain \f1 op. cit..
104. ILO: }{\plain \i\f1 Reintegrating demobilized combatants ...}{\plain \f1 , op. cit, p.42.

Many problems concerning access by disabled ex-combatants to post-conflict programmes have been documented. For example, in Zimbabwe a number of disabled war veterans, both men and women, did not receive compensation. The most commonly cited reason was because they did not know that it existed. The War Veterans' Association of Zimbabwe claims that at least 37 per cent of their disabled members did not receive demobilization allowances; they had simply gone to their rural homes after they were discharged from hospitals or once the war was over. Since no information on benefits and reintegration assistance was passed on to them, they stayed in their home communities without any knowledge of what they were entitled to. Many of these disabled ex-combatants were reported to be living in poverty.[105]

In Zimbabwe, as in so many other post-conflict countries, the lack of knowledge on the part of former combatants regarding the existence and types of rehabilitation assistance and employment training programmes had devastating effects on the lives of many disabled war veterans. Women ex-combatants often suffer more than their male colleagues when wounded in combat and becoming permanently disabled. These women usually become socially isolated and suffer a double form of discrimination: as women who participated in culturally "unacceptable" combat activities and as women with disabilities, being perhaps unable to perform daily household responsibilities or bear and raise children.

4. Identifying disabled ex-combatants

Disabled ex-combatants can roughly be divided into three categories: (1) those whose injuries are less severe and who, after medical treatment and rehabilitation, can resume a more or less normal life; (2) those whose injuries are more severe and who face limitations in one or more primary function and may thus require specialized vocational rehabilitation services and/or flexible work situations; and (3) those who require ongoing medical care and whose prospects of working are marginal.

Approximately half of all disabled ex-combatants in most post-conflict situations are of the first group. They are able to work and usually wish to do so. They include women and men who may have worked before entering military activities or who were drafted during their childhood and need some general schooling to catch up on their education. This group of disabled ex-combatants has more in common with other combatants than with civilian disabled people; and they

105. S. Mutambirwa, op. cit., p.7.

rarely want to be considered as members of a civilian disabled persons' group.

Disabled ex-combatants of the second and third groups who have suffered more serious injuries and require some form of long-term medical care, rehabilitation services or physical support have, in the countries studied, been treated unsatisfactorily during their reintegration period and thereafter. Special medical care is frequently insufficient; for example, disabled ex-combatants are often confronted with long delays in obtaining specialized medical treatment and equipment such as wheelchairs and artificial limbs. Those suffering psychiatric problems due to combat trauma have rarely been able to obtain long-term psycho-social care.

5. *Psycho-social rehabilitation*

The disabled ex-combatants for whom no satisfactory care has as yet been provided in any post-conflict country are those suffering from mental trauma. There are two categories of mental stress which need emphasis: the traumatic stress which is caused by injuries during the war, and post-conflict stress which is the result of destitution, segregation from society and economic dependence.

In Namibia, for example, the psycho-social needs of disabled ex-combatants and also of non-disabled former military personnel have not been met. The fact that many former freedom fighters were at first heralded as heroes and later abandoned by the army and the Government to find their own way back into civil society has caused much hardship. As a result, there has been a rise in psychological disabilities and ailments that have led to impairment and inability to function in society as a parent, spouse, student, worker, etc.[106] The social and cultural stigma of having been soldiers who engaged in or witnessed violence in combination with the limited social, psychiatric and medical care provided during demobilization has worsened their status and self-respect.

In Zimbabwe, the situation is similar. Existing mental health and psychiatric services have been unable to cope with the needs of ex-combatants suffering from mental illnesses.[107] The problem is acute and needs to be recognized as one requiring the establishment of special services offered by trained personnel. In some instances, such personnel are themselves rehabilitated and trained disabled ex-combatants who have been given the opportunity to work for their colleagues and who have acquired some basic counselling skills.

106. R. Haynes, op. cit., p.9.
107. S. Mutambirwa, op. cit., p. 22.

6. Organization of rehabilitation programmes

Disabled ex-combatants consider themselves to be first and foremost veteran combatants and do not like to be associated with disabled civilians. Their recommended inclusion in reintegration programmes for all demobilized combatants, however, does not ignore the fact that they may have special needs and often face special difficulties when re-entering civilian life. While disabled ex-combatants may need special considerations, their ultimate needs and desires are no different than those of non-disabled ex-combatants – to work, earn a livelihood and live independent lives. For these reasons, rehabilitation services for them often need to be provided separately from those catering to civilians with disabilities. This does not mean that civilian rehabilitation agencies cannot exchange information and services with those for ex-combatants; they can, as long as service provision is organized and carried out separately.

Because the principal consideration for the successful reintegration of demobilized ex-combatants is not their disability but their ability and vocational interest, there is no need to separate skills training programmes for disabled ex-combatants from those for other former combatants. The problem is often one of conception: a lack of awareness on the part of planners that many individuals with visual, hearing and mobility impairments are able to work and want to learn a skill to become productive. Furthermore, not only does a separation of programmes lead to unnecessary segregation of disabled ex-combatants from their able-bodied comrades, but it often results in a costly duplication of facilities and training courses.

The inclusion of disabled ex-combatant trainees in mainstream vocational skills training programmes and courses, however, does not happen automatically in response to policy measures. It also requires an orientation for vocational instructors on how to assess the vocational interests and capabilities of disabled trainees. The only "special" input that instructors may need to facilitate the mainstream training of disabled ex-combatants is information on how to train individuals with certain types of impairment.

7. Planning for employment creation and training

Besides the needs for medical – and, for some, vocational – rehabilitation, there are three options available for employment of demobilized combatants (as well as for other war-displaced persons). These are: (a) agriculture, (b) paid employment in

employment-intensive infrastructure reconstruction, and (c) self-employment in micro enterprises and small business.

In all post-conflict countries, efforts are made by the government and by external agencies to promote economic development through employment creation. In some instances, government legislation has provided for the reservation of positions in public employment, although the employment created is limited. In other instances, international and local NGOs have tried to support training and employment though their own programmes in specific economic sectors or regions of the country. Such efforts are usually targeted to selected war-affected groups and rarely benefit all ex-combatants equally.

International assistance provide important support to work and training projects. The design of past programmes has, however, often failed to address the needs of disabled ex-combatants in a comprehensive and nationally balanced manner. Most often, rehabilitation care has been provided by volunteers, churches, the Red Cross or other domestic and international NGOs outside the framework of reintegration programmes. While these sometimes offer excellent services, they cannot reach all disabled ex-combatants in an entire country. So far, only a few projects have been exclusively targeted to disabled ex-combatants (Ethiopia, Eritrea), while other projects have included them (Afghanistan, Angola, Namibia, Sudan, Zimbabwe).[108]

The conceptual framework and methods for vocational rehabilitation of persons with disabilities and their socio-economic integration are well developed and have been tested and validated in various country settings. The overarching framework is provided by the ILO Convention (No.159) concerning the Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons) and Recommendation (No.168) and the UN World Programme of Action concerning Disabled Persons. These instruments emphasize the importance of integration, rather than segregation, of disabled persons in all aspects of community life including those services and opportunities available to non-disabled persons. Thus, disabled ex-combatants should, as a matter of policy, benefit from all programmes designed for demobilized combatants in general.[109]

8. Education and vocational training

In order to prepare ex-combatants for civilian work, vocational skills training programmes are often proposed. These include the training of agricultural skills, rural non-farm activities, and skills for urban,

108. ILO: }{\plain \i\f1 Reintegrating demobilized combatants...}{\plain \f1 , op. cit., p.42.
109. ILO: }{\plain \i\f1 Reintegrating demobilized combatants...}{\plain \f1 , op. cit., pp.42-43.

informal sector self-employment. When such programmes are planned, the targeted trainees are invariably assumed to be non-disabled. Rarely have disabled ex-combatants been among the trainees in training courses established for ex-combatants.

The recommended inclusion of all disabled trainees in mainstream training courses requires that the training facilities be made physically accessible to trainees using wheelchairs and that the content of the training be accessible to those with seeing or hearing impairments. This requires that information be provided to training administrators and instructors on ways to make buildings accessible and to make the presentation of training curricula orally for the blind and using sign language for the deaf. It may also require, in special cases, information on the adaptation of tools and equipment.

In many post-conflict countries, the training needs of disabled ex-combatants were met by separate programmes. However, these rarely prepared the trainees adequately for the world of work. One reason has been the failure to include such training in the government's overall policy for all demobilized ex-combatants. Another is the failure to link the training to available job opportunities. But perhaps most importantly, the training was not geared for self-employment which is the most realistic option for most demobilized combatants. For example, the Zimbabwean military personnel who were demobilized had very little or no formal education at all, let alone any vocational training that could have helped them to create their own income-earning work. Most attempts at setting up small enterprises or cooperatives failed because of inappropriate and inadequate training as well as insufficient raw materials, transport problems for goods and a lack of financial support.[110]

Some disabled ex-combatants in Zimbabwe managed to get jobs in the public and private sector where employment opportunities existed. The major problem, however, was that much of the training offered at rehabilitation centres was not linked to labour market needs and existing economic opportunities. For example, when the study in Zimbabwe was conducted (1995), there was no placement officer at the principal Ruwa National Rehabilitation Centre.[111] One result is that some graduates in Zimbabwe found themselves entering non-viable jobs which they eventually had to abandon. The services of training guidance and job placement are needed at many rehabilitation and training centres for disabled as well as non-disabled ex-combatants.

110. S. Mutambirwa, op. cit., pp.18-19.
111. ibid., p.18.

9. Employment

Training does not create employment. For the successful reintegration of ex-combatants, it is necessary to correlate labour market information on existing opportunities for employment and entrepreneurship with the trainees' capacities and the training offered. It follows that training and employment programmes for disabled ex-combatants must be provided parallel to, and in conjunction with, larger post-conflict employment creation programmes (such as training interventions and labour-intensive public works) for other war-affected people. But, as mentioned above, the disabled ex-combatants must be able to benefit from assistance that is specifically designed for the reintegration of demobilized combatants.

To facilitate the employment of disabled former combatants, some countries have adopted special policy measures, such as quotas. Such measures, although welcomed particularly by disabled veterans, require that these individuals have the necessary skills and qualifications for the jobs. They have, however, often resulted in dissatisfied workers and employers and in the subsequent loss of the jobs offered.

In the case of Zimbabwe, disabled ex-combatants preferred to use their demobilization money and war victim compensation whenever they could as start-up capital for their own small enterprises. Those who underwent training and self-employment courses had acquired some basic knowledge of the responsibilities involved in self-employment and managing a small business. Land was also given to disabled ex-combatants who formed farming cooperatives, and for these lucky few resources and equipment were provided by NGOs. The majority of the cooperatives, however, failed to survive their initial years in business. The reasons for this were failure of technical support and market information, lack of knowledge of business management and problems with keeping to budgets. Adequate financial capital was not provided, and the training packages were not designed to accommodate the working capacities of disabled ex-soldiers.[112]

In Namibia, the private sector of the economy was found to discriminate against disabled combatants in many ways.[113] Employers and institutions are reluctant to hire or train ex-combatants because of the social stigma which their former activities represent to civilians. The employers are often unwilling to recognize the training which ex-combatants obtained in their reintegration programmes and hence are disinclined to support reintegration and rehabilitation programmes. For many Namibian disabled ex-soldiers, the consequence of their life in the military and the resultant disability has been that they suffer not

112. ibid., pp.18-19.
113. R. Haynes, op. cit., pp.6-7.

only from the social stress of non-acceptance but also from the lack of employment opportunities.

10. Some practical issues in rehabilitation and integration

In most post-conflict countries, rehabilitation and vocational training for disabled ex-combatants lacks financial and human resources. One consequence is that disabled ex-soldiers are among the most impoverished, discriminated against and marginalized – both socially and economically – members of society. They remain dependent upon the government, families and the general public for support.

The design of most special rehabilitation programmes and centres for disabled ex-combatants assumes that essentially their needs will be met and that the civilian disabled population can then be served. This has implications concerning the designation of the responsible authority for the programmes and centres such as a demobilization commission, a veterans' association, a government rehabilitation agency or the Ministry of Health. A lack of linkages and coordination with government rehabilitation agencies often results in the closing down of rehabilitation projects and centres once external funds run out.

While special rehabilitation centres and programmes could cater for the needs of disabled civilians once ex-combatants have been taken care of, in practice the transfer of authority from those responsible for disabled ex-combatants to local agencies which care for other disabled people is very difficult. Donor funding has rarely been available for the transfer of disabled ex-combatant-related programmes and facilities to disabled civilian use. Authorities must prepare in advance for the transfer and funding of such rehabilitation programmes and centres.

The problem of maintaining rehabilitation centres for disabled ex-combatants after post-conflict assistance has ended might be resolved if these facilities were already part of the general reintegration programmes for all demobilized soldiers.

However, as mentioned earlier, most disabled ex-combatants do not wish to be associated with civilian disabled people. Rather, they most often want to be assisted and rehabilitated in the same centres as their non-disabled comrades. Ex-combatant rehabilitation centres can be made available for civilian disabled people, but these should first assist former combatants until all of them have been helped to reintegrate into civilian and economically sustainable lives.

The principal benefits which can be gained from opting for an integrated approach to the reintegration of disabled ex-combatants among all demobilized combatants include:

- saving of funds by avoiding duplication (for example, separate vocational raining centres for disabled and non-disabled);
- greater variety of information available for the disabled to find employment or create self-employment opportunities alongside non-disabled veterans;
- greater motivation for disabled ex-combatants to live economically productive lives when surrounded by non-disabled demobilized combatants; and
- increased possibility to learn about other post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation opportunities through linkages and exchanges of information.

11. Special measures, compensation and benefits

Special programmes and facilities for disabled ex-combatants should be planned only when their needs cannot be met within the framework of mainstream programmes. This will be the case for those ex-combatants whose injuries are severe and who, due to the nature of their impairments, require specialized rehabilitation services or long-term medical care. However, being disabled is not a characteristic that should automatically segregate or exclude the individual from the programmes and benefits designed for ex-combatants in general.

Disabled ex-combatants, due to their injury and resultant impairment, often assume that they are entitled to special compensation in the form of payments, subsidies and pensions. The planning of demobilization and reintegration programmes should make provision for the payment of appropriate compensation but, as most post-conflict reintegration programmes suffer from budgetary restrictions, it is most important that benefits be provided in conjunction with training and employment schemes, such as work-for-food projects.

The following example of problems encountered in Zimbabwe concerning entitlement and provision of benefits indicates that the planning of assistance must take into consideration practical problems: the Government of Zimbabwe created a compensation package through its War Victims' Compensation Act of 1980. The payments were made on a monthly basis or as a lump sum, depending on the degree of disability and rank of the victim. Because the process was long, it cost the Government more money than if needs assessments

and benefits had been closely coordinated. For the disabled ex-combatants, the process involved travelling to the administrative centres, often more than once, to be assessed by a government medical doctor and then at army headquarters for verification and identification of rank. The process caused considerable hardship among the disabled ex-combatants who had to travel to Harare to be assessed by military personnel and doctors whom they often did not trust.

A study carried out on women ex-combatants in Zimbabwe reveals further that the amounts of veterans' allowances paid to victims depended on his or her rank in the army and also on the number of years of service. The ex-combatants spoke of problems with the administration of this fund which prevented many of them (men and women) from benefitting. For example, the medical assessment of disabilities for compensation was done primarily by doctors of the pre-war "old regime", i.e. doctors who were not trusted by the combatants.[114] Hence, dissatisfaction was expressed by the disabled ex-combatants about the amounts of benefits allocated to them after inspection of the extent of their disabilities and injuries.[115]

12. Follow-up of disabled ex-combatants in reintegration programmes

Follow-up of disabled individuals is necessary in order to find out whether the reintegration programmes have helped them to establish themselves in their communities and provide for their own economic security. In Zimbabwe, the Ruwa National Rehabilitation Centre managed to organize some follow-up services which proved very helpful. It undertook to monitor trainees in their workplace environment and to assist them in their adjustments to overcoming work-related problems.[116] Placement officers were responsible to follow-up on the graduates from the training and rehabilitation centre and ensure that the ex-combatants obtained what they needed while providing the reintegration programme with valuable feedback on the effectiveness of its rehabilitation services and training courses.

114. P. Maramba, op. cit.
115. S. Mutambirwa, op. cit., p. 13.
116. ibid., p. 21.

Conclusion

As revealed in studies on the reintegration of demobilized combatants, the resettlement of ex-soldiers in their communities of origin has proven to be extremely difficult in many countries. This is principally due to problems of adjustment on the part of the individuals and reluctance on the part of the civilian community to accept the returning former military men, women and sometimes children. These problems are particularly acute for disabled ex-combatants. Their difficulties in reintegrating into their communities of origin are often compounded by their lack of mobility and transport, the lack of appropriate work opportunities, and negative attitudes towards them on the part of community members.

Efforts to support and assist the reintegration of disabled ex-combatants are more likely to be successful if plans for such efforts are made in advance as part of general demobilization and reintegration plans and programmes. The early involvement of local authorities and community organizations is also important for their successful reintegration.

Support structures for disabled ex-combatants at community level have frequently been facilitated by informal grass-roots organizations and NGOs. Often local NGOs, which are concerned with social development issues, have acted as vehicles for reintegration assistance to disabled ex-combatants. While usually helpful when no other support structures exist, these non-governmental and mostly ad hoc efforts cannot supply assistance in an equitable manner to any large number of disabled ex-combatants. Nor are most NGOs able to inform ex-combatants of government policy changes, of new veterans' benefits or of training and employment opportunities in other parts of the country.

Associations created by the disabled ex-combatants or war veterans themselves have proven to be effective intermediaries and advocates for equitable assistance.[117] The establishment of such associations (local or national) is encouraged and should be officially supported as a means for effective representation and involvement of former combatants in the implementation of their own reintegration. In addition, such associations can be given responsibilities for the dissemination of information, provision of services and the implementation of programmes to address the needs of disabled ex-combatants. For example, some disabled veterans' associations have become engaged in counselling or providing vocational training, credit for income-generating activities, and employment referral services. Some even operate businesses creating employment opportunities for their members.

117. See: Centro de Estudios Internacionales, op. cit.

Another function which some ex-combatant associations carry out is the provision of training in various kinds of basic life-skills. These are skills which enable former soldiers to deal with and manage personal and community conflicts through socially suitable methods of conflict mediation, reconciliation, stress management, and social organization. Furthermore, as training does not guarantee that they will find a job or enter into self-employment, the former soldiers need to learn skills for further learning; i.e. they must become retrainable as their economic possibilities require.[118]

In sum, the principal messages which have been voiced by disabled former combatants are that (1) their reintegration does not end merely with medical care, (2) they should not be categorized as needing only charity, and (3) they should be included in and benefit from the same reintegration programmes in which their able-bodied colleagues are enrolled. Their chief desire is ultimately to find real employment or work opportunities through training so that they can be productive and economically independent.

The social and economic needs of disabled former combatants are not so different from those of able-bodied ex-combatants. Yet, they are too often segregated and treated as if they are no longer ex-combatants. While medical and psycho-social rehabilitation is needed by many disabled people, they want to benefit from reintegration programmes in the same manner as all their other colleagues.

In planning and operating rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for disabled-ex-combatants, the goal should be an even-handed dissemination of information on the assistance, benefits and pension schemes that are made available by official and non-official (NGO) agencies and access to opportunities for education, vocational training, employment assistance and entrepreneurship support in the same manner and through the same channels as those available to non-disabled veterans.

118. See the presentations of the veterans\'92 associations in Central America and especially of the work of the Mozambican Association of War Demobilized (AMODEG) in: Centro de Estudios Internacionales, op. cit.

X. PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING REINTEGRATION PROGRAMMES

The following list presents a suggested programme of activities to provide for a more complete demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. It is not a blue-print for action, but is intended to be a summarized guide of possible considerations to address when preparing a reintegration programme. Nor are the activities listed chronologically – many will take place simultaneously. More detailed guidelines for the reintegration of demobilized combatants may be obtained from the ILO, Geneva.[100]

1. Peace/cease-fire agreement

Following peace negotiations (often chaired by external mediators), a peace/cease-fire agreement is signed. It must include provisions for the establishment of a principal coordinating agency which will oversee the demobilization and reintegration programme. The peace agreement should include initial agreements on the orderly demobilization of all combatants in all (formerly) conflicting parties. Also, the agreement must provide for an approximate timeframe for reintegration and rehabilitation assistance for all personnel and combatants who have been active in the military or in informal militia during the conflict.

2. Coordinating arrangements

The principal coordinating agency is usually instituted as part of the post-war government, but may operate independently once the reintegration process is to begin. This agency can either be centrally planned and financed by one or more government ministries (military, health, economic development, employment and labour, welfare, etc.) or it can be established as an independent body financed by government and external agencies and managed by a body of war veterans. The latter may, if not included in the planning and management of their own reintegration process, decide to form their own ex-combatants' association so as to have an organization through which to voice their views and make demands to the government.

The principal coordinating agency should not only be fully established by the time the demobilization process is under way, but it must also

100. }{\plain \i\f1 Framework of guidelines for the reintegration of demobilized combatants through training and employment}{\plain \f1 , ILO, Vocational Training Systems Management Branch, Geneva, 1996.

have begun establishing linkages with all local and national agencies and NGOs which concern themselves with economic and social development. The purpose of this is to permit, at a later date, the take-over of reintegration assistance agencies and personnel by long-term development agencies.

To begin the demobilization and reintegration process, the principal coordinating agency must observe the following

- estimate the timeframe of a reintegration programme, which includes one initial year for pilot reintegration programmes targeted to the first groups of combatants who are demobilized;
- estimate the costs and funding needs for each element of the programme, i.e. reintegration options and special needs for the different categories of combatants (women, disabled and child soldiers), employment promotion options that will have sufficient funding for direct wage employment provisions in the public sector and training facilities to teach self-employment;
- estimate the cost of demobilization, which will include travel from military barracks to the demobilization camp, housing, food, water and sanitation provisions at the demobilization camp, educational and information activities at the camp, questionnaires for data gathering on the combatants, recreational activities, initial benefit payments or material benefits in exchange for military hardware, etc.;
- plan the organizational arrangements and administration of the reintegration programme. This will require, besides the principal coordination agency, technical committees, field structures and implementation partners (such as external and local NGOs, schools, medical clinics, etc.).

It is also important to assure that funding is secured for the long term and that appropriate experts and professionals (medical staff, teachers, trainers, administrators, accountants, psychologists, etc.) can be attracted to contribute their skills and help initiate human resource capacity building.

The principal agency should begin to establish a coordinating office in conjunction with all concerned government ministries as well as local and international NGOs and the external multilateral and bilateral organizations. For this task, a special office must be established with the responsibility of engaging all domestic and external humanitarian and development organizations to register and make provisions for eventual participation in reintegration, vocational training and employment promotion.

3. Information gathering

Information gathering must be planned and initiated within the first months after the end of hostilities. This will include:

- labour market analysis (see III);
- key informants' surveys (KISs) (see III and IV);
- feasibility studies (see IV).

Labour market analysis

The labour market analysis is composed of four principal elements: collecting information/data on the existing labour and policy environment; discovering labour needs and trends through targeted studies such as KISs; indicating training and skill needs in the civilian community where combatants are to settle; and carrying out feasibility studies for training options.

The labour market analysis must identify the economic activities which show growth, market demand and employment/ entrepreneurship potential. The information on the existing labour and policy environment must include the following:

- analysis of the labour market trends by sector of economic activities (by looking at existing official statistics and data supplied by local organizations and chambers of commerce);
- sectoral business analysis (suppliers, competitors, customers and partners) to be carried out in conjunction with key informants (KIs);
- preliminary forecast of market growth potential based on information from official sources and KIs;
- information on new employment opportunities that will act as a guide for training and public works programmes;

Key Informants' Surveys (KISs)

The KISs must identify economic and human resource needs and inform on what kind of wage-employment and self-employment opportunities exist or could be developed within a given community (see IV for detailed recommendations).

Feasibility studies

The objectives of a feasibility study are to study and report on the opportunities for providing training that will directly contribute to wage employment and self-employment. This implies identifying the demands for vocational skills in specific economic sectors and geographic regions and finding out how training can best be provided.

The feasibility study can aim to fulfil the following objectives:

- make a thorough assessment of existing training institutions and other training providers;

- examine the usefulness of vocational training centres, i.e. whether they are responsive to clearly identified needs of ex-combatants, especially with respect to self-employment promotion;
- introduce new training facilities which meet the needs of ex-combatants;
- set up a close link between the LMI system and appropriate vocational training systems;
- explore the most cost-effective and realistic ways to offer training to target groups in the rural areas which are far away from urban centres or educational institutions.

It is also necessary to complement the information on labour markets and training opportunities through surveys of combatants to be demobilized. This includes, for example, social characteristics of ex-combatants, age and educational background, marital status and types of family structures among ex-combatants, health status of war veterans, etc. (see sample in Annex 1).

4. Option-specific guidelines

For economic reintegration, the option-specific guidelines must be elaborated through the initial planning and on the basis of labour market analyses. These options will all concern the promotion of employment through the following means:

- vocational training interventions (IV);
- employment-intensive works programmes (V);
- small business/micro-enterprise development (IV and VI).

Vocational training interventions

Vocational training interventions must be provided for skills and business training in both the formal and informal economic sectors of the following income-earning activities:

- wage employment in the rural formal sector (agriculture, related food processing and marketing, private and public enterprises and the civil service);
- wage employment in the urban formal sector (government/civil service sector, military, police, mine clearance, etc.), infrastructure public works, private enterprise, small private business, etc.;
- private self-employment in the formal small and medium enterprise urban and rural sectors;
- private self-employment in formal community cooperatives;
- private self-employment in informal micro enterprises and cooperatives.

Employment-intensive works programmes

Employment-intensive works programmes provide for short-term wage employment to large numbers of war-displaced and unemployed men and women. These may boost local economic activities, as the wage earners need goods and services (food, water, housing, etc.).

Small business/ micro-enterprise development

Small business/micro-enterprise development is principally facilitated through governmental macro-economic policy reforms.

5. *The demobilization process*

In the demobilization process, it is necessary to estimate the number of combatants to be demobilized and the time it will take, considering age, rank, years of service, disabilities, proportion of women and children to adult men, etc. Assembly areas for encampment should be identified and verified. Separate camps for (former) rival armies or for different factions and region-specific (ethnic/linguistic) military formations should be organized.

Questionnaires and identification cards/papers for the demobilization information survey should be designed and the rank, identity and position in the military of each combatant confirmed. Questionnaires are the principal means of data collection and therefore their design is crucial (see Annex 1). The questionnaire should be simple, self-explanatory, easy to fill out, and impartial as to where the combatant comes from, what ethnic group he/she belongs to and from which army or guerrilla faction he/she is from.

It is very important that a neutral format for all documentation is used concerning all combatants, whether they are from formerly antagonistic and warring groups (military or guerrilla groups) or from diverse regional, linguistic or ethnic groups. Subsequent discrimination must be prevented by taking appropriate measures beforehand because antagonistic groups of ex-combatants can easily become a security threat if one of them regards itself as less favoured by official government benefits and reintegration assistance.

The demobilization process begins when combatants are brought to predetermined assembly points or transit centres for military debriefing procedures, processing and documentation. Combatants from different armies or factions should be keep at different assembly points, but it is important to ensure that the demobilization of (former) rival armies takes place at the same rate, in accordance with an agreed timetable and following nationally standardized methods for the distribution of benefits and assistance.

A minimum period of two to three months is usually required at the assembly points to complete the demobilization process. The decision on the minimum period should be taken after due consideration of the specific circumstance of each country. Too long a period is likely to promote dependency and delay the reintegration programme, while too short a period may not prepare combatants well enough for adaptation to civilian life.

At demobilization, identity cards are usually given to all combatants. Their main purpose is to enable the individual demobilized military men and women to draw upon the assistance offered for their reintegration into civilian society.

A medical check-up by qualified doctors/nurses who are unprejudiced towards military personnel or ex-combatants should be performed.

The categories of veterans and their special needs, such as disability periods for war victims/disabled, and benefits for widows and children of deceased combatants, should be defined.

The assistance needs, based upon questionnaire data according to expressed wishes by combatants before or during their demobilization, should be assessed, as well as the psycho-social service/counselling needs (post-trauma shock, stress, grievances, social problem solving, etc.) in conjunction with the services offered by medical facilities and the veterans' or ex-combatants' association (see also IX).

Special demobilization assistance should be offered to demobilized women ex-combatants, child/young ex-combatants, disabled combatants who can join economic reintegration programmes while obtaining rehabilitation, and severely disabled combatants who can only participate in social reintegration and rehabilitation.

Information on benefits and assistance should be provided at the time of the demobilization period, as it is the last time that the combatants are in groups and can be given vital information and training for their subsequent travel and integration into civilian communities and socio-economic lives. This period may be used for intensive psychological counselling, for assessments of likely post-trauma symptoms (particularly in children or young combatants), etc.

For the programme to be successful, the official government organizational arrangements and administration of the reintegration programme should be explained to the ex-combatants. Information/explanations of the types of benefits, assistance and services that will become available include the demobilization package, advice given on how to utilize demobilization benefits, reintegration assistance, psycho-social services, general education, vocational training etc.

Once the ex-combatants decide where to settle (in the original home community or elsewhere), they must be told to notify both the principal reintegration agency and their own ex-combatants' association. Depending on where ex-combatants settle, the assistance

will need to be adjusted, i.e. training for employment opportunities in the area or community. It is also important that transportation is provided into and out of the demobilization camp.

Emergency assistance should be provided, if required, i.e. immediate shelter and survival needs for those demobilized combatants or their families who cannot survive in their home communities upon arrival there. Access to assistance and benefits must continually be strengthened for all categories of veterans and their families.

Administrative decentralization should be carefully planned to ensure that local settlement, training and employment initiatives can be undertaken without bureaucratic obstacles or disincentives (high taxes, high costs of transportation, problems in obtaining business licences or employing people, etc.). The administrative arrangements should be coordinated among the principal agencies and regional international organizations that concern themselves with the reintegration of war-displaced people.

An official veterans' association or an informal association should be created to support the ex-combatants' reintegration. An ex-combatants' association can serve the government reintegration agency by ensuring that information from the government reaches all ex-combatants in the country. The principal advantage is that an ex-combatants association has a personal interest in ensuring that all its members obtain equitable and fair assistance. It can ensure that all former combatants obtain knowledge of new developments about benefit packages, assistance services or government policies concerning private entrepreneurship and vocational training.

Further, an ex-combatants' association should establish special networks through which to address the specific concerns of women, child/young and disabled ex-combatants, as well as the needs of families of deceased or seriously disabled ex-combatants. It can also offer professional advice on benefit and assistance programmes planned and distributed throughout the country.

The ex-combatants' association or other office should ensure some form of socialization and education. This type of information ("civilianization") would include explanations of assistance and services available after demobilization, such as how to access benefits (bank accounts and procedures), civic education, cooperation and modes of behaviour, where to report for different types of questions or requests, where to go for advice, legal system and health care services, health education/advice, psycho-social counselling, information on reintegration options, the functions of the association, etc.

Financial benefits, including opening bank accounts, obtaining food and material assistance (seeds, tools, training literature, etc.), should be provided to the ex-combatants.

Assistance should also be provided in the form of materials and services, such as community awareness and education meetings to

sensitize civilian families and communities of the needs of demobilized combatants, especially those of women, disabled and child veterans.

One problem which is common in reintegration programmes of a war-affected population is that the immediate families of ex-combatants are often not included in the assistance for demobilized combatants or war veterans. Although wives, husbands, children and parents of deceased or severely disabled war veterans are not generally considered as part of an ex-combatant reintegration programme, they are repeatedly identified as needing assistance. This group of (former) dependants is usually not able to care for its returning disabled ex-combatant or families unless they obtain some form of support. Special category assistance should be offered, such as programmes for women, child/young ex-combatants and disabled ex-combatants. This should also include an assessment of the assistance needs of families of deceased or severely disabled ex-combatants (see VII, VIII and IX). Communities must be sensitized to alternative methods of accommodating ex-combatants.

6. Follow-up on progress / monitoring

Assessment and analysis of reintegration progress that contributes towards a sustainable national development programme are important for the peace process. Monitoring of how all aspects of reintegration assistance perform is crucial for their long-term success. A stringent and well-planned monitoring mechanism must be established that performs two general functions: provides information on how the reintegration programmes has proceeded and guides reforms and amelioration of the existing reintegration assistance.

While each regional programme or component project will develop its own indicators, the following performance indicators may serve as a general suggestion:

- *Time targets* according to which project must be scheduled. Performance objectives and results should be based on the identification of important activities and on how much time each important activity will take and how much flexibility can be incorporated for the inevitable and unexpected modifications of the programme.
- *Physical and technical targets*: Outputs will be specified in the project document, as far as possible in qualitative terms. Physical and technical targets will vary according to the nature of the activity. The following are some examples of physical targets which may be included: the number of teachers and vocational instructors trained, the number of demobilized combatants trained,

the number of training modules finalized, the number of training courses organized, the number of tool kits distributed, etc. Technical targets could include a survey of training institutions completed, a survey of NGO activities completed, needs assessment and feasibility studies completed, etc.

- *Progress indicators*, such as: When were surveys concluded? When did the first group of ex-combatants finish with vocational or business training? How soon could newly-trained ex-combatants begin work in wage employment or self-employment? How long did it take for the self-employed ex-combatants to begin earning an income from their micro enterprises?
- *Effectiveness indicators* will be based on a targeted number of ex-combatants trained and started in income-earning work in the various programmes within specified periods of time.
- *Financial targets* will necessarily include normal expenditures as well as amounts given as grants to target groups or subsidies paid to training institutions for "x" number of demobilized combatants.

7. Phasing out

As the reintegration process gets under way, its conclusion must already be planned. In many cases, post-conflict programmes conclude with the end of funding, and much of the human skill and knowledge that was gained during their operation is lost. It is appropriate that assistance programmes should be maintained until new long-term development agencies or NGOs take over and utilize the human knowledge and material resources which have been accumulated during the post-war reintegration and employment promotion programmes.

For the success of long-term development efforts at local and national levels, a sustainability analysis can provide information on the possibilities of continuing the work that was begun with reintegration training projects and employment schemes. This analysis may be based on two major considerations: the ability of the institutional structure to continue project activities and monitoring after the termination of the national reintegration programme and the degree of qualitative success through training for wage- and self-employment programmes followed by the quantity of stable income-earning work in which former combatants have become active.

Such sustainability analyses need to consider the equitable share of the various categories of ex-combatants (healthy adult men, women, children and disabled, as well as widows of war veterans) as well as the geographical spread and social integration into existing communities.

In the transfer of assistance to related long-term sustainable development projects, planning medium- and long-term programmes for continued reintegration support within the framework of national reconstruction programmes might include the following: strengthening the social cohesion of communities through schemes for local investment; training and employment of the labour force; improvement of social services; activating formal and informal trade and business networks, etc.

General development programmes should contribute to community-wide capacity building, especially if they are geared to promote the development of local crafts, professional skills, and business administration. Development becomes sustainable if it is carried out in such a manner that it meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.

ANNEXES

1. EX-COMBATANT NEEDS ASSESSMENT DOCUMENTS

Survey of ex-combatants
(Generic questionnaire)

(Use a separate sheet for each part)

Part I.
Identification data

Page 1
Serial no.

1. Name: .....

2. Age/date of birth: .....

3. Sex: **r** M **r** F

4. Marital status: **r** (a) Married **r** (b) Divorced
   r (c) Separated **r** (d) Widower/widow

5. No. of dependants: .....

6. (a) Name of father: .....
   (b) Address: .....
   .....
   (c) Occupation/activity: .....

7. (a) Name of mother: .....
   (b) Address: .....
   .....
   (c) Occupation/activity: .....

8. Your home area: village/town, district/province: .....
   .....

9. Where will you live after demobilization?
   (a) Home area/village/town: .....
   (b) Other area/village/town: .....

Part II.
Education, work and experience

10. Name:

11. What did you do before joining the army?

    (a) School **r**

    (b) Work **r**

    (c) Other **r**

12. (a) Name of school attended: .....

    (b) Final grade: .....

13. (a) Training (if any): **r** Yes **r** No

    (b) Skill: .....

    (c) Name of centre: .....

    (d) Address: .....

    .....

14. (a) Years in army: .....

    (b) Rank: .....

    (c) Type of work
    (e.g. soldier, vehicle driver, cook, orderly/messenger, medical/ paramedical, etc.)

    .....

15. What work will you do to earn a living after demobilization?

    .....

16. Do you know about the reintegration programme? **r** Yes **r** No

17. Which activity have you selected? .....

18. Can you indicate a second choice? .....

19. Can you give any reasons in support of your choice of activity?

    .....

    .....

    .....

Part III.
Self-employment/micro-enterprise/small business

20. Name: .....

21 What objective do you want to achieve by following this activity?
Can you described your personal or business objective? .....

.....

.....

22. Can you describe your ideas about this activity?

(a) Which products/services do you propose to produce? .....

(b) Where will you make them? .....

(c) Where will you sell them? .....

(d) Who else is making same/similar products? .....

(e) Why do you think your product will sell? .....

(f) What raw materials will you require? .....

.....

(g) Where and how will you get them? .....

.....

(h) How much time will you take in making the product? .....
How much time in selling it? .....

(i) What resources will you require? .....

.....

(j) What assistance will you require?

More schooling:	r Yes	r No
Skill training:	r Yes	r No
Technical help:	r Yes	r No
Tool kit:	r Yes	r No
Credit:	r Yes	r No
Marketing:	r Yes	r No

Other (please specify): .....

(k) If you take a loan, do you think you can repay it by the sale of the product? r Yes r No

What is the amount of loan you will need? .....

How long do you think you will take to repay it? .....

(l) How long do you think it will take for the activity to become self-financing?

.....

(m) What are the risks?.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

NOTE: This is not an appraisal or feasibility form. The intention is to assess the individual in terms of: aptitude, motivation/determination, ability to understand/interpret the selected activity, and related needs and risks.

Part IV.
Health and medical form

23. Name: .....

24. Sickness: Medication:

....

....

....

....

25. Nature of any disability: Functional limitation:

....

....

....

....

26. Any other remarks: .....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

2 (a) LABOUR MARKET ANALYSIS SUPPORT DOCUMENTS

COMMUNITY NEEDS ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY: A SUMMARY

Community needs assessment methodology: A summary

The purpose of community needs assessment is to identify potential self-employment opportunities within a given community and conduct preliminary feasibility studies to ascertain their economic potential. It uses a participatory focused group interview approach that avoids complicated survey instruments and data analysis that rural communities find difficult to comprehend and use.

The assessment is carried out through seven steps:

1. A general socio-economic description of the community including the composition of its population, training facilities, and NGOs active in the areas.
2. An inventory of existing natural resources, their present use, alternative use and possible implications for self-employment/micro-enterprise/small business activities.
3. An analysis of future development plans in the community and their possible effects on self-employment activities.
4. An inventory of existing businesses, their needs and constraints.
5. Identification of viable income-generating activities through focused group work; inventory of business ideas.
6. Validation of identified income-generating activities and identifying related training needs.
7. Preliminary feasibility study of various business ideas and selection of the most feasible income-generating activities for target groups; identification of specific training needs for each activity and support measures required.

Source: Skill Development for Self-Reliance (SDSR) 1993: A methodology for training for self-employment, Volume II, Guidelines for Implementers, Module One, Step One, Community Needs Assessment Process (International Labour Office/Swedish International Development Authority).

2 (b) LABOUR MARKET ANALYSIS SUPPORT DOCUMENTS

THE KEY INFORMANTS' SURVEY (KIS): PROPOSED STEPS FOR PREPARING A KIS (MODULES 1-9)

The Key Informants' Survey (KIS): Proposed steps for preparing a KIS (Modules 1-9)

The guidelines below (divided into modules) present practical suggestions for conducting a Key Informants' Survey (KIS). These are presented here in the following order:

A. PREPARING A KEY INFORMANTS' SURVEY

Module 1. Consultations with users of Key Informants' data
2. Types of information to be collected
3. Preparing and approving questionnaires
4. Selecting Key Informants

B. IMPLEMENTING A KEY INFORMANTS' SURVEY

Module 5. Preparing practical instructions for field work
6. Carrying out a pilot survey
7. Conducting the full interviews

C. ANALYSING AND DISSEMINATING SURVEY RESULTS

Module 8. Processing and analysis of data
9. Preparing survey reports and evaluation

The planning and operation of these proposed guidelines include three major steps, each containing a number of "modules" which, in practice, are usually linked in various ways.[1] It is important to remember that these guidelines are mere suggestions and that in each country or community where KISs are conducted, modifications might be required to suit local post-conflict circumstances.

A. PREPARING A KEY INFORMANTS' SURVEY

Module 1: Consultations with users of Key Informants' data

The first step under this module relates to the designation of sponsoring organizations, government ministries and the agency responsible for reintegration. In war-affected countries, special bodies are usually set up to formulate and implement demobilization and

1. The modules presented here are a shortened version of those outlined in the ILO (1995) study prepared by J.-B. Celestin.

reintegration programmes as well as to facilitate economic reconstruction and development. However, more cooperation is required between the reintegration agencies at national and local levels and the government ministries which take responsibility for generating employment and monitoring labour markets.

For offices (i.e. steering committees or central data analysis directorates) which organized KISs, they have been useful for the coordination of government ministerial tasks with the reintegration and employment programmes. Experience has shown that such central offices advise on and monitor the various stages of labour market surveys, while ensuring the cooperation of the reintegration agencies and the concerned government ministries.

To begin a process of information gathering through KIs, it is important that an agenda for the surveys and tasks of labour market analyses be determined at the first meeting of the responsible labour market information (LMI) office. An example of key points could be as follows:

- Items of information to be covered
- Potential users and sponsors
- How to get the opinions of users
- Inputs and facilities required from other agencies/services
- Estimates of resource persons needed
- Cost of the key information survey

Initially, the Key Informants' steering committee should set up a small test or pilot survey. The results of such a pilot survey should prepare the ground for a full KIS. It should contain a full presentation of the different views expressed and indicate how the choice of priorities has been made on the basis of several considerations, such as:

- evaluating existing government plans that concern reintegration of war-displaced populations in specific areas, as well as providing information on the prospects for economic development and employment;
- helping develop new policies and programmes that facilitate employment promotion;
- making more efficient use of existing structures and resources (e.g. employment services and training centres) in order to better utilize human potential;
- helping plan the use of resources (e.g. national and external funds, human potential, networks of information and business expertise, etc.) to develop new employment and training projects.

Examples of the type of information needs that the KISs should attempt to meet in the war-affected countries are:

Employment promotion programmes:

- to provide a data base for local programmes (e.g. on local labour markets and labour-intensive public works programmes);
- to create more productive rural jobs (formal and informal, farm and non-farm sectors).

Human resources:

- to assist the target group to locate and select appropriate training courses and to move to new jobs.

Labour market indicators:

- to verify the extent to which the lack of basic skills limits the capacity of the labour market to absorb the target group;
- to develop local projects concerned with literacy, education, and the creation of basic skills.

Vocational training programmes:

- to identify shortages of skilled workers and skilled tasks for which more specialized training is needed;
- to improve rural survival and entrepreneurial skills.

Module 2: Types of information to be collected

Once the survey's objectives have been agreed to by the Key Informants' central committee, the data requirements should be translated into specific items of information to be obtained from the selected KIs. All existing sources of data relevant to the KIS should be examined in order to see if any of them can meet the needs of users.

Depending on the needs which have been identified in the initial pilot survey, there are two main types of KISs: multi-purpose or specific-purpose. The multi-purpose surveys are usually carried out where the population census is organized at long intervals or in cases where the existing data base does not cover certain categories of activity such as community-based programmes and labour-intensive works projects. Questions may include main sources of income and local craft activities. In this type of survey, the socio-economic structure of the areas covered can be as important as the employment aspects.

The specific-purpose surveys are of particular relevance in providing further and more frequently needed information on specific problems. Typical examples relate to:

- monitoring the local impact of programmes;
- assessing the effects of investment and development projects on local employment; and
- identifying gaps in certain skills for some occupations.

With specific-purpose surveys, it is easier to adapt the data to the needs of the users; however, it is necessary to carefully select the KIs.

Multi-purpose surveys are of particular relevance in countries where government and programme managers are interested in making an integrated approach to planning reintegration. "An important strategic choice faced by reintegration programme planners is whether to emphasize tailored programmes for ex-combatants and their families, or whether to support programmes in which ex-combatants participate, but which are not restricted to this target group." [2] Labour-intensive public-works projects, for example, are usually intended to benefit many disadvantaged groups or war-affected people in general (see further in IV).

Mixed surveys involve, by definition, elements of both the multi-purpose surveys and the specific-purpose surveys.

Typical indicators of information:

Employment needs differ not only between countries but also among various military forces in the same country. These variations can have significant implications for the design of tailored programmes. However, there are a number of typical indicators which are commonly included in KI surveys and which should be included in assessing data. Typical key indicators would be, for example:

Village characteristics:
- location,
- infrastructure,
- social facilities, etc.

Population:
- education,
- working age.

Economic activities:
- development projects,
- handicrafts.

Labour force, employment situation and trends:
- labour force structure,
- seasonal employment,
- non-agricultural occupations with labour surpluses,
- programmes and projects to create employment,
- methods of finding work,
- actions or incentives to improve conditions of war-affected people,
- self-employment prospects for the disabled,
- migration trends,
- seasonality,
- individual motivation.

Vocational training programmes:
- traditional skills needing upgrading,
- specific skills or tasks in demand for which training should be improved,
- new training programmes required to maximize local human and resource potentials.

Module 3: Preparing and approving questionnaires

After determining the kind of data to be collected, the KI committee has to find a suitable format for the questions so that they are not culturally or aesthetically counter-productive. All questions should relate to employment- and income-generating

2. World Bank: }{\plain \i\f1 Reintegration of military personnel in Africa: The evidence from seven country case studies}{\plain \f1 (African Regional Series, Report No. IDP-130), Discussion Paper, Oct. 1993, p. xi.

activities and be closely linked to the economic environment of the local community or the relevant economic sector. The issues most frequently included in a KIS questionnaire are:

1. Personal characteristics of the KIs
2. Household characteristics of the interviewed target group:
   number of members
   working/non-working members
   education
   income
   assets (land, livestock, other assets)
3. Labour force:
   employment and unemployment
   under-employment
   non-resident or non-national workers
   emigration, temporary or permanent
   seasonal variations in employment
4. Manpower shortages:
   skills in short supply
   forecasts of future demand for skills
   methods of recruiting skilled workers.
5. Vocational training:
   training needs by occupations or basic skills (e.g. for informal sector, cooperatives, etc.)
   improvements needed in programmes or methods of training
6. Employment situation and prospects:
   small-scale and cottage industries
   factors restricting employment (in agriculture, fishing, industry, construction, etc.)
   forecasts of short-term employment trends
   needs for special employment creation projects.
7. Infrastructure and social facilities:
   mainly housing, health and transportation

The Key Informants who conduct the survey are usually local individuals who occupy positions of authority or enjoy special respect in their community and who are also part of the target survey group. These individuals may be members of a household in which ex-combatants (men, women, children, disabled), migrants or other vulnerable people form part of the family. They are mostly men and women who are involved in a specific economic sector, for example in informal enterprises, the leaders of a village cooperative, owners and managers of a small business, or they may be mastercrafts workers who employ apprenticeship trainees and interns.

Identifying needs and solutions:

The reason for using local survey KI participants is to identify the target groups' needs through their own members' active involvement. By doing so, the local development authorities will stand a better chance of obtaining realistic information as seen from the

"bottom" of economic needs. Planners or assistance programmes can thus find more appropriate solutions which will be more acceptable to individuals and community-level target groups.

It is useful to examine ways by which to link the identification of needs with the discovery of solutions and the development of corrective activities (employment promotion methods and assistance that are effective). Furthermore, an approach must be developed for each survey that involves the target groups themselves in the process of identifying their community's needs and formulating and implementing the solutions. [3]

Checklist of the main objectives in identifying people's needs:

- understand the employment problems as completely as possible,
- define the characteristics of the target groups,
- identify the scale of the problem,
- know how to locate the target groups,
- generate solutions, and
- promote action.

Module 4: Selecting Key Informants

In the context of demobilization and reintegration programmes (DRPs), it might be necessary to design the questionnaires to match the situation in which the ex-combatants or other target groups are presently in: (1) a questionnaire addressed to selected Key Informants among the soldiers who are undergoing demobilization in order to then have them interview their colleagues; (2) a questionnaire addressed to selected Key Informants among the demobilized combatants once they have gone to their places of settlement (traditional or new homes) in order to then survey the ex-combatant population which has also settled following their demobilization; (3) a questionnaire addressed to selected KIs among local leaders of a community and NGOs, small enterprise owner/managers, or other well informed persons (an example of a questionnaire is given in Annex 2). [4]

The process of selecting the KIs should be carried out through collaboration amongst all those concerned at both national and local levels and especially in consultation with the officers in charge of the localities (provinces, districts, villages, etc). The latter would be able to advise on suitable informants for the KISs and to participate in an advisory capacity in the deliberations of the local management committee (if any) or in a mechanism that can continue to conduct similar surveys at a later stage. The number of participating key informants generally should be higher than is likely to be necessary, bearing in mind that some of them may be unable or may not wish to reply. Furthermore, at least two to three informants are needed per selected district or village in order to cover various economic sectors.

It may be necessary to establish a provisional list of participating informants for the KISs with the help of government services, village leaders, NGOs, community-based project

3. EEC: }{\plain \i\f1 Practical manual: Identifying people\'92s needs}{\plain \f1 , \'93Employment action\'94.
4. See also ILO: }{\plain \i\f1 An ILO manual on concepts and methods: Surveys of economically active populations}{\plain \f1 , \'93Questionnaire development and design\'94, Geneva, 1992. See further pp.46-53 of the ILO study by Celestin, upon which II is based.

managers and other well-informed groups of people. This list should be submitted to and approved by the KI central steering committee at an early stage.

The following factors should be retained:

- Length of residence in the area. This factor is very convenient for a continuing survey, i.e. when repeated enumeration spread over a considerable period of time is involved.
- Age: an important characteristic of all types of survey is the person's age, implying the exclusion of individuals below a certain minimum age and possibly of old persons above a certain maximum age.
- Degree of local responsibility.
- Socio-economic group.
- Work experience and specialized knowledge in selecting and evaluating reintegration programmes.

B. IMPLEMENTING A KEY INFORMANTS' SURVEY

Module 5: Preparing practical instructions for the field work

The next step is to draft instructions for field work. This step begins once the questionnaire and area survey and the final list of KIs have been approved.

Key topics regarding instructions to interviewers might be the following:

- operational convenience and practicality;
- questions and answers as precise as possible;
- how to get answers to unusually difficult questions involving, for example, personal and political factors;
- close supervision, control and observation;
- rapid feedback;
- resolving clearly delimited, specific issues and problems.

Operational guidelines for the KIs should give clear orientations and state the confidential character of the survey, as well as contain suggestions for a positive way to conclude the interview. These instructions should be discussed in the sponsoring agency, preferably with a small group of interviewers who will be entrusted with the task of carrying out the pilot survey.

Module 6: Carrying out a pilot survey

The pilot survey is the most crucial step of the overall survey process before full-scale operations are implemented. It is intended to verify whether the decisions taken in Modules 2 to 5 are likely to present any problems which must be solved before commiting resources to the survey proper. It should therefore cover a large and representative sample as well as the type of staff, field organization, supervision and quality control procedures.

Evaluation is an essential part of the pilot survey's successful completion. The key features to measure and evaluate are: the extent to which certain types of questions are correctly or incorrectly answered; the extent to which there are gaps which need to be filled;

and the usefulness and effect of advice given to the interviewers. The results of such an evaluation exercise should be used to improve the quality of the questionnaire for the main survey, for example by identifying any means of action that may be required and by reviewing the effectiveness of the content, structure and timing of the main survey's programme.

Module 7: Conducting the full interviews

The training of the KIs for the interviews which they are to conduct is a principal determinant of the quality of data obtained. The amount of training required depends on the background and experience of the interviewers.

Key topics for training of interviewers are, for example:

- general background information on the survey, including relevant organizational and design aspects;
- detailed explanation of the KIS concepts and questionnaire;
- instructions for dealing with difficult cases;
- techniques and procedures of interviewing;
- procedures for checking the information collected;
- instructions on how to identify and solve specific problems. [5]

C. ANALYSING AND DISSEMINATING SURVEY RESULTS

Module 8: Processing and analysis of data

Following the conduct of the full interviews, the major practical survey operations include: data preparation and processing, coding and clearance of qualitative raw material. It should be emphasized that the latter is of particular importance in respect to the reintegration programmes for ex-combatants and the rehabilitation of disabled combatants and other war victims.

Data processing:

Data processing has often been called the "bottleneck" of a survey. This is because many surveys have suffered from cost excesses, major delays, or even complete failures at the data processing stage.

It is useful to distinguish two phases in this operation: data preparation and data processing proper. Both steps in the process are integrated to some extent. Data preparation relates to the manual editing of the data in the field (survey area) by the sponsoring agency; assigning numeric codes to the information obtained, describing data collected and checking on the completeness of the samples enumerated. Data processing proper refers to data entry into a computer or file, editing and correcting the data, and performing other operations such as tabulation and analysis. This phase could require computer facilities along with the use of a systems' analysis programme.

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5. The following ILO training guide may be useful: }{\plain \i\f1 Employment and manpower information in developing countries: A training guide}{\plain \f1 , second (revised) version, ILO/WEP, 1990.

For the policy-making process, the best way of collecting the data is to prepare a schematic model of the most significant tables and then to use work sheets on which to extract material to be summarized from the questionnaires to prepare the final tables.

Coding:

Coding refers to the process by which numeric values are assigned to questionnaire entries. The process involves the development of a coding frame and the assignment of each response to a particular code (or category). The complexity of the task depends on the nature of the coding frame, the range of responses to be coded, and the relationship between the two. In KISs, especially in the war-affected African countries, the coding should be as simple as possible and made with the help of a well-experienced statistician. A simple numbering of the questionnaires is required, possibly with some subdivisions for each survey, in accordance with either the national classification or international standards. [6] In usual KISs, the most important items to code are the description of employment and the status of employment.

For items based on questions involving qualitative responses, the coding system may be more difficult. Examples are various questions seeking reasons for working less than full time, for not seeking a job, etc. It is possible to simplify coding for qualitative questions by making special notes of the responses. Such notes may refer to:

- summary of opinions, perceptions, attitudes and judgements about major employment and training problems and possible solutions;
- summary of replies making comments and suggestions about specific employment creation programmes;
- summary of views on relatively important points which were not included in the questionnaire.

Module 9: Preparing survey reports and evaluation

The last practical issues involved in carrying out a KIS concern reporting strategy and evaluation. The purpose of this report is to analyse and present the results in a way which satisfies the needs of the consumers, such as:

- policy-makers in the government ministries concerned;
- people engaged in reintegration programmes for ex-combatants;
- disabled ex-combatants and other war victims who will go back to find work;
- NGOs and community-based programme managers;
- agencies and services which collaborate with reintegration and employment creation programmes;
- labour market, employment and training policy specialists;
- employers' and workers' organizations/associations.

6. ILO: }{\plain \i\f1 International Standard Classification of Occupations}{\plain \f1 }{\plain \i\f1 (ISCO}{\plain \f1) and United Nations: }{\plain \i\f1 International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC).}{\plain \f1

The report should encourage early release of the principal findings and might need to contain different sections that highlight the following:

- the main findings, notably about employment and training questions;
- the purpose of the survey as well as an account of the initial effort to identify the needs of users, how the survey was designed to meet these needs and the organization and implementation of the survey;
- the main conclusions drawn from analysis of the data collected. These should contain the most significant points which emerge from a consensus of opinions among the key informants themselves and which are directly relevant to labour market policies;
- the problems encountered by the KI central steering committee in obtaining user's cooperation, interviewing the individual KIs and coping with difficulties in data processing.

The dissemination of the results should be aimed at improving LMI utilization. It is important that the KIS results are made available to prospective consumers of the data. To this end, the sponsoring agency should try to establish user-oriented computer data banks as well as printed material for dissemination to NGOs, reintegration and training personnel and other employer/employee associations.

Finally, to summarize, the quality of survey data depends upon the following three characteristics:

1. Their relevance to the needs of users. Relevance is the most fundamental aspect of data quality. The content and methods of the survey should be designed to measure what is required by the users.
2. Their timeliness. This characteristic concerns current appropriateness and punctuality; i.e, the time taken to complete various stages of the operations followed by a timely delivery of the findings according to a predetermined schedule so that data will not be outdated when they reach the consumer.
3. Their accuracy. The quality of a survey is generally taken to mean its closeness to the targeted population. [7]

7. ILO: }{\plain \i\f1 An ILO manual on concepts and methods}{\plain \f1 , op. cit., p.310.

2 (c) LABOUR MARKET ANALYSIS SUPPORT DOCUMENTS

THE KEY INFORMANTS' SURVEY (KIS): LOCAL RESOURCE PERSONS INTERVIEW SCHEDULE (GENERIC QUESTIONNAIRE)

Key Informants' Survey (KIS): Local resource persons interview schedule (generic questionnaire)

PART I Identification Data

1. Name of the key informant:

2. Position/occupation:

3. Sex: Male **r** Female **r**

4. Age: ☐

5. Name of district/village:

6. Since when living in this district/village?

PART II Population of the district/village

		Male	Female	Total
7.	Population of the village or district:			
8.	How many ex-combatants and disabled:			
9.	Persons in the age group 15-59 years:			
10.	How many ex-combatants or disabled in this group?			
11.	How many households in the village?			
12.	Number of households/ex-combatants:			
13.	Working population of the district or village:			
14.	Working ex-combatants in the village:			

15. Is the district or village likely to attract the resettlement of more demobilized combatants? Yes **r** No **r**

PART III Education and training potential of the district/village

16. Existing educational institutions:

Primary school	**r**
Middle-level school	**r**
Secondary school	**r**
Professional school	**r**
Vocational training school	**r**
University	**r**

Any others (please specify):

17. Educational composition of the population:

	Male	Female	Total
Graduates and above			
Matriculates but below graduate			
Literate			
Illiterate			

18. Educational composition of working force :

	Male	Female	Total
Graduates and above			
Matriculates but below graduate			
Literate			
Illiterate			

19. Training requirements for ex-combatants and disabled (occupations in which skilled workers are not available):

20. Skills needing training upgrading:

21. Existing training centres in the district or village:

22. Training being received by ex-combatants or disabled:

23. New courses in which training is required for ex-combatants:

24. Other comments on training facilities:

PART IV Economic and employment prospects

A. Employment/unemployment

25. Distribution of working population among the following activities

	Male	Female	Total
Public sector personnel:			
Sales/trade/banking:			
Workers in small-scale industries:			
Farmers:			
Agricultural labourers:			
Artisans (please specify):			
Other workers (please specify):			

26. Are there ex-combatants or disabled living in the village who are fully employed? Yes r No r

27. If yes, approximately how many? [ ]

28. How many ex-combatants or disabled are unemployed in the village?

Uneducated [ ]

Educated [ ]

Graduate [ ]

Vocationally trained [ ]

29. How can they obtain jobs?

Employment services r

Advertisements r

Relatives/personal contacts r

B. Employment and migration

30. About how many returned combatants left the village in search of jobs elsewhere?

[ ]

31. Where to?

C. Employment opportunities

32 Are there any manufacturing units in the district or village which provide employment to people? Yes r No r

33. If yes, about how many people from the village are employed in these industries?

34. Are there any job opportunities for ex-combatants/ disabled in these industries? Yes r No r

35. Are there any such industries outside the village but within 15-20 km where demobilized military can find employment? Yes r No r

36. Is the available employment (within or outside the district or village) seasonal or year-round?

	Agriculture	Industry	Others
Mostly seasonal			
Seasonal, some year-round			
Mostly year-round			

37. How did you hear about the reintegration programme for demobilized military?

38. In the context of the reintegration programme, what are the main economic activities which could be of interest to ex-combatants and disabled? (Please specify).

39. Do you think there is a chance to develop the following activities with a view to creating jobs for ex-combatants and disabled?

Microenterprises	Yes	r	No	r
Cooperatives	Yes	r	No	r
Public works programmes	Yes	r	No	r
Local employment initiatives	Yes	r	No	r
Rural development and non-farm activities	Yes	r	No	r
Informal sector activities	Yes	r	No	r
Handicrafts	Yes	r	No	r
Construction activities	Yes	r	No	r

Others (please specify)

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40. What assistance would be needed to develop those activities?

Raw materials/equipment r
Skill training r
Marketing r
Credit r
Technical support r
Others (Please specify) r
.....

41. New occupations coming up (Please specify):

42. Other views and opinions on employment opportunities in your district/village:

Signature of interviewer and/or key informant Date

_____ _____ _____