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Report of the Director-General

Second Supplementary Report: Report on developments in the application of the resolution concerning the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine from the perspective of the mandate of the International Labour Organization

▶ Introduction

1. At its 344th Session (March 2022), the Governing Body adopted a resolution concerning the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine from the perspective of the mandate of the International Labour Organization (ILO).¹ In the resolution, the Governing Body requested the Office to provide all possible assistance to the tripartite constituents in Ukraine. Furthermore, it decided to temporarily suspend technical cooperation or assistance from the ILO to the Russian Federation, except for humanitarian assistance, and to suspend invitations to the Russian Federation to attend all discretionary meetings, such as technical meetings and meetings of experts, conferences and seminars whose composition is set by the Governing Body, while safeguarding the ILO's technical cooperation or assistance to all other countries within the purview of the ILO Decent Work Technical Support Team and Country Office for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (DWT/CO–Moscow).
2. At its 347th Session (March 2023), after considering the last report to it on developments relating to the resolution, the Governing Body requested the Director-General to continue to

¹ [GB.344/Resolution](#).

respond to constituents' needs in Ukraine and to expand the ILO's resource mobilization efforts for Ukraine, to expand the ILO's resource mobilization efforts for other affected countries across Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and to continue to monitor the impact on the world of work of the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine.² The present document responds to the Governing Body's request for a report on developments in that regard.³

► General developments

3. The Russian military aggression has now persisted for over 15 months and is continuing to cause devastation both in the territories occupied by the Russian Federation and in the rest of the country, with continued aerial strikes causing loss of life and substantive damage, particularly to energy infrastructure and to housing and enterprises. While refugee flows have slowed down and there have been some returns, displacement remains widespread, with 8.2 million refugees from Ukraine across Europe and an estimated 5.35 million internally displaced persons.⁴ Effects on host labour markets are not well documented, but emerging evidence suggests that the large inflows of refugees have not had a negative impact on host populations. Meanwhile, data from multiple rounds of a survey by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) suggest that labour market integration is slowly improving. The latest survey round found that 40 per cent of the refugees from Ukraine who were interviewed in host countries are employed or self-employed and 11 per cent are engaged in professional training. It also found that 19 per cent are unemployed and 17 per cent are fully occupied in a caregiving role.⁵ These figures hide substantial heterogeneity between countries, with the Baltic countries and countries bordering Ukraine showing much higher employment levels among refugees from Ukraine than other European Union (EU) Member States.⁶ The fact that much of the employment uptake has been concentrated in low-skilled jobs suggests that skills mismatches are high.⁷
4. March 2023 saw the release of the second Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, prepared by the Government of Ukraine, the World Bank Group, the European Commission and the United Nations, with the participation of the ILO.⁸ It estimates that the cost of reconstruction and recovery had risen to US\$411 billion by the end of the first year of the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine; that, for 2023, Ukraine will need US\$14 billion for critical and priority reconstruction and recovery investments; and that the current funding shortfall is US\$11 billion. Furthermore, the assessment estimates that 7.1 million Ukrainians are facing poverty and another 3.7 million are vulnerable to poverty. The number of persons with disability status increased by at least 130,000 in 2022 alone.

² GB.347/INS/16/Decision.

³ Data in this report reflect the situation up to 23 May 2023. If necessary, the Office will provide the Governing Body with an oral report on developments since that date.

⁴ See UNHCR, "Operational data portal – Ukraine refugee situation" and IOM, "Global Data Institute Displacement Tracking Matrix", accessed 26 April 2023.

⁵ UNHCR, *Lives on Hold: Intentions and Perspectives of Refugees from Ukraine: Regional Intentions Report #3*, 22 February 2023.

⁶ ECB, "Integrating Ukrainian refugees into the euro area labour market", *ECB Blog* (blog), 1 March 2023.

⁷ OECD, "What we know about the skills and early labour market outcomes of refugees from Ukraine", 6 January 2023.

⁸ World Bank et al., *Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: February 2022–February 2023*, 20 March 2023.

5. Also in March 2023, the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund approved a new 48-month extended arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility with an amount of 11.6 billion special drawing rights (about US\$15.6 billion) as part of a US\$115 billion total support package for Ukraine.⁹ This arrangement aims to support the Ukrainian authorities in anchoring policies that sustain fiscal, external, price and financial stability, and to support the ongoing gradual economic recovery, while promoting long-term growth in the context of post-aggression reconstruction and Ukraine's path to EU accession.
6. In April 2023, at the 70th Session of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), Member States expressed concern about the impact that the Russian aggression against Ukraine was having on the whole region, through a surge in refugee flows, trade disruptions and high food and energy prices, fuelling a cost-of-living crisis that is hindering the achievement of the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.¹⁰
7. On 15 May 2023, the World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Committee for Europe decided to close the WHO European Office for the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases in Moscow and to request the WHO Secretariat to relocate its functions and management of activities to the WHO Regional Office for Europe in Copenhagen as soon as possible and no later than 1 January 2024.¹¹ Meanwhile, the WHO Country Office for the Russian Federation remains operational in Moscow.
8. Aid pledges to Ukraine have slowed down in recent months, although there are differences among donors.¹² Scandinavian countries in particular increased their contributions, although most new contributions are focused on military aid. Japan also pledged an additional US\$5.1 billion in loans. A positive change from a planning perspective is that an increasing number of bilateral donors are promising to equal their contributions of 2022 in 2023, expanding the planning horizon of Ukrainian authorities.
9. The Office continues to actively engage with the donor community to support labour market recovery in Ukraine. For example, the Director-General is going to participate in the Ukraine Recovery Conference in London on 21 and 22 June 2023. Participants in a recent study visit to ILO headquarters organized for a tripartite Ukrainian delegation (25–27 April 2023) reaffirmed the importance of engaging with the ILO and other development partners to facilitate recovery and reconstruction in parallel to securing humanitarian assistance.

► Impact of the aggression on jobs, livelihoods and enterprises

10. Beyond the humanitarian costs of the aggression against Ukraine, its impact on economic and labour market conditions has been severe. Due to the scarcity of data, the effects on the world

⁹ IMF, "IMF Executive Board Approves US\$15.6 Billion under a New Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Arrangement for Ukraine as part of a US\$115 Billion Overall Support Package", 31 March 2023.

¹⁰ United Nations Economic and Social Council, *Economic and Social Effects of Russia's Aggression Against Ukraine*, 19 April 2023.

¹¹ WHO, *Closure of the WHO European Office for the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases (NCD Office) in Moscow, Russian Federation, and relocation of its functions and management of activities to Copenhagen, Denmark: Decision*, EUR/RCSS3(2), 15 May 2023.

¹² Data derived from Arianna Antezza et al., "The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?" Kiel Working Paper, No. 2218, 1–65 (4 April 2023 update).

of work can only be estimated imprecisely and are subject to high uncertainty. Nonetheless, ILO estimates continue to indicate that employment losses in Ukraine have been dire.

11. The tenth edition of the *ILO Monitor on the world of work* estimated that employment in Ukraine declined by 15.5 per cent in 2022, equivalent to 2.4 million jobs lost.¹³ As the macroeconomic forecasts for 2023 in Ukraine have not changed, ILO employment projections from the last report to the Governing Body on developments relating to the resolution remain the same.¹⁴ Forecasts assume stagnant activity in 2023, as the hostilities continue to severely constrain the potential of the Ukrainian economy and its labour market. Based on the assumption that the security situation will remain close to its current state for the entire year, the ILO estimates an employment growth rate of just 0.5 per cent, corresponding to an increase of only 70,000 jobs. It is, however, important to highlight the uncertainty underlying this estimate, which is reflected in the wide prediction interval for employment growth in 2023, ranging from a 5.8 per cent decrease (corresponding to another major downturn) to a 6.8 per cent increase (corresponding to a substantial labour market rebound). Sustained recovery and strong job growth are unlikely to materialize unless the security situation materially improves, but a cessation of hostilities would almost certainly be associated with extraordinary rates of economic recovery.¹⁵
12. The broader economy suffered a severe decline, with a drop in gross domestic product of 29.1 per cent in 2022.¹⁶ While measures by the National Bank of Ukraine and budget support by donors have helped to stabilize core inflation, it nevertheless ran to 22.6 per cent in 2022 and is expected to drop to 14.8 per cent in 2023.¹⁷
13. With respect to workers in nuclear power plants, particularly in the Zaporizhzhia plant, the ILO continues to liaise with relevant United Nations (UN) agencies (the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights) and with the relevant trade unions to gain a better understanding of the situation on the ground. In a report to the 81st Meeting of the Committee on Radiological Protection and Public Health of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (4–6 April 2023), the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine states that military action around the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant has severely affected plant staff, citing murder, imprisonment and aggressive pressuring of staff; destruction of safety-related equipment and radiation monitoring systems; disruptions to maintenance and security supplies; and other grievances endangering the lives and workplaces of plant workers. Recent reports from the IAEA suggest that, contrary to the broader population, plant staff are not being evacuated from Enerhodar – the town housing most plant staff.¹⁸
14. The future of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, an important effort to stave off famine in countries in the global South that has facilitated more than half of Ukraine's grain exports since its

¹³ ILO, *ILO Monitor on the world of work: Tenth edition*, 31 October 2022. The prediction interval at the 95 per cent confidence level corresponds to a decline in employment of between 8.2 and 22.7 per cent.

¹⁴ GB.347/INS/16.

¹⁵ For details on these estimates, see GB.347/INS/16.

¹⁶ National Bank of Ukraine, "NBU Comment on Change in Real GDP in 2022", 14 April 2023.

¹⁷ National Bank of Ukraine, "Speech by NBU Governor Andriy Pyshnyy at Press Briefing on Monetary Policy Decisions", 27 April 2023.

¹⁸ IAEA, *IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine* (Update 156), 5 May 2023.

introduction in July 2022,¹⁹ has recently been assured for a further two months.²⁰ The Russian Federation had requested the Joint Coordination Centre of the initiative to inform inbound vessels that the initiative might be suspended after 18 May 2023, but all parties have since agreed to an extension. The Office has continued to organize regular meetings with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and representatives of the Government of Ukraine, the Marine Transport Workers' Trade Union of Ukraine (MTWTU), the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF), the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and a number of seafarers' welfare organizations on the impact on seafarers of the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine. Such meetings have offered opportunities to share information and for collaboration with relevant international bodies focusing on protective measures. In addition, on 22 May 2023, the ILO Director-General met with the Secretary-General of the IMO in London to discuss the situation of seafarers stranded in Ukraine and the need to ensure the full respect of the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006, as amended (MLC, 2006), in relation to all seafarers affected by the conflict. The meeting was also attended by representatives of the ICS, the ITF and a number of governments. According to the latest information provided by the Government of Ukraine, the large majority of seafarers on board ships stranded in Ukrainian ports are now Ukrainian nationals. The ILO and the IMO will continue to work together to ensure the safe repatriation of the remaining foreign seafarers.

► Impact of the aggression on the ILO's constituents and on the implementation of Decent Work Country Programmes and technical cooperation or assistance

Government of Ukraine

15. The situation of the ILO's main interlocutors within the Government of Ukraine – the Ministry of the Economy and the Ministry of Social Policy – has not changed. These interlocutors remain fully operational and are now laying the ground for early recovery and reconstruction. The aforementioned discussions between the tripartite Ukrainian delegation and the ILO during the recent study visit to ILO headquarters in Geneva (25–27 April 2023) confirmed that Ukraine needs international support that includes humanitarian, budgetary and development assistance in parallel, in order to lay the ground for recovery after the Russian aggression ends. The Government of Ukraine confirmed that, in relation to the ILO's mandate, priorities remain: the fight against poverty; the training and return to employment of veterans, internally displaced persons and persons with a disability; and the creation of a second pillar for the pension system. It also confirmed that reservations by donors and foreign enterprises with regard to investing in opportunities in territories of Ukraine fully under government control are seen as an impediment to labour market recovery. The delegation highlighted the fear that, if the groundwork for recovery is not laid now, there will be an increased risk of further emigration flows even after the fighting has ended.
16. The Government is continuing its work to modernize labour, employment and social protection policies, as described in more detail in the report to the Governing Body at its 347th Session.²¹

¹⁹ UNCTAD, *A Trade Hope: The impact of the Black Sea Grain Initiative*, March 2023.

²⁰ United Nations, "Secretary-General's press encounter on the Black Sea Initiative", 17 May 2023.

²¹ GB.347/INS/16.

These initiatives range from strengthening the State Employment Service, modernizing the State Labour Inspectorate, developing a new labour code and expanding e-learning solutions, to implementing pension reforms.

17. In the first quarter of 2023, the ILO supported the reform of the State Employment Service through a study visit of officials from the Ukrainian agency to their counterpart agencies in Estonia and Finland, exposing the Ukrainian agency to the service delivery models of EU Member States. Good practices such as these are of key importance, as the Government of Ukraine has increased the funding for active labour market programmes more than fivefold (from 800 million to 4.5 billion Ukrainian hryvnia). The State Employment Service must deliver for some 2.8 million unemployed persons, almost half of whom belong to vulnerable groups, such as internally displaced people or veterans and their spouses.
18. The main support provided to the State Labour Inspectorate in the first quarter of 2023 was a functional audit of the agency and the facilitation of a tripartite consensus on the new draft law on safety and health at work (which has been with the parliament since March 2023) and a revised statute of the State Employment Service.
19. Regarding the planned adoption of a new labour code, the ILO provided technical comments on the latest draft text in March 2023 and offered further assistance in order to align the provisions of the new labour code with other relevant legislation (for example, on digital workers).

Trade unions and employers' organizations in Ukraine

20. Trade unions and employers' organizations remain operational but are severely affected by the Russian aggression. As described in previous reports to the Governing Body, a key concern for the social partners remains the loss of membership dues and the resulting negative impact on their financial situation. Unlike the Government, the social partners do not receive budgetary aid from the international community, except for some donations from sister organizations and support from the ILO. Additional resources are needed to support the social partners in their ongoing efforts to maintain their operations and adapt the services they offer.
21. The three national employer and business membership organizations in Ukraine report that member companies in several industries are gradually expanding their operations. Nevertheless, the utilization of capacities is still far below the levels before the Russian aggression. One challenge has been to attract foreign direct investment.
22. In the first quarter of 2023, the ILO supported the participation of about 100 members of the Federation of Employers of Ukraine (FEU) in the UN Procurement and Vendor Fair, promoting the idea that large UN agencies in Ukraine should increase their local sourcing. The Association of Employers' Organizations of Ukraine (AEOU) launched a training and consultancy service on business continuity and resilience. More than 1,200 companies have been trained so far, on topics such as the trade regulations of new export markets, new production technologies and the use of renewable energies. The Confederation of Employers of Ukraine (CEU) continues to support companies in order to integrate the increased number of people with disabilities into the workplace – a rise driven by the Russian aggression.
23. The two main national trade unions, the Federation of Trade Unions of Ukraine (FPU) and the Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Ukraine (KVPU), are continuing to allocate significant

resources to assist internally displaced persons, particularly through the provision of shelter.²² The ILO has contributed to these efforts.

24. Trade unions report being particularly affected by the Russian winter offensive in the Donbas and Zaporizhzhia regions. As a result of the intensified attacks, even more enterprises stopped functioning, jobs were lost and many union members have been conscripted in the new wave of mobilization. The situation of frontline workers, such as health, energy and transport workers, has become particularly dangerous because of the constant shelling.
25. Many trade union members staying in the territories occupied by Russian forces have been reporting violence and intimidation, abuse and forced labour. The reported cases include compulsion to sign employment contracts under threat of death, extension of working hours and unpaid overtime work, and discrimination and forced affiliation with Russian trade unions that continue establishing their offices in the territories under occupation. Further cases concern severe deficits of safety and health measures, as well as an absence of the right to voice grievances, or to take industrial action, as Russian laws restrict the free exercise of public meetings and demonstrations and threaten any trade union activist with severe punishments, including imprisonment. Finally, Ukrainian workers in the occupied territories face increasing difficulties in getting complaints to their unions across the front line, as all means of communication are controlled by the occupying forces.
26. In addition to supporting Ukrainian constituents in filing grievances with the ILO supervisory mechanism, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine was twice invited to share information with the Ukrainian affiliates of IndustriALL on ways in which their members can report individual human and labour rights violations if they have witnessed or been victims of these. The Office is producing a series of briefs about such violations in specific sectors, based on reports from trade unions and international organizations.
27. The situation at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant remains dire. Ukrainian trade unions have continued to report the persisting extremely unsafe working conditions. Emergency response and occupational safety and health management systems are no longer functioning effectively. The IAEA reports that the chain of command and decision-making is unclear, with conflicting messages being transmitted to operating staff. The IAEA also reports that the reduction in the operating staff available has resulted in increased workloads, which are unsustainable.²³ Furthermore, workers themselves report that they no longer have access to personal protective equipment, and that the occupying forces are not purchasing new equipment. The most recent electricity outage at the plant due to Russian bombardment on 9 March 2023 again put workers – including some who are being forcibly held at the plant – at risk of increased exposure to radiation and a potential nuclear accident. Recent media reports suggest that military positions are being established at the plant, further increasing risks to workers. Remaining Ukrainian nuclear workers that have tried to leave the city of Zaporizhzhia have been stopped at the first checkpoint and refused the right to leave the occupied territory.
28. The existence of Ukraine's seafarers' union – the MTWTU – is at risk, as the Russian Federation continues to block many Ukrainian ports. According to the union, 80 per cent of Ukrainian seafarers are presently abroad and cannot exercise their freedom to move and to work, or gain access to quality healthcare. Even in these dire circumstances, the union continues to actively support seafarers and their families. Together with the UN Global Compact, the ILO is

²² For details, see GB.347/INS/16.

²³ IAEA, *Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine: February 2022–February 2023*, 2023.

supporting the union in the development of a project proposal on “Seafarers’ Skills for a Sustainable and Green Shipping Programme in Ukraine”. This is aimed at rebuilding and strengthening the Ukrainian system of maritime education and training, which has significantly suffered due to the Russian aggression.

ILO Decent Work Technical Support Team and Country Office for Eastern Europe and Central Asia

29. The DWT/CO–Moscow continues to provide technical cooperation and assistance to all countries in the subregion other than the Russian Federation,²⁴ with no significant impediments to the delivery of its services. The handover of responsibility for Georgia from the DWT/CO–Moscow to the ILO Decent Work Technical Support Team and Country Office for Central and Eastern Europe in Budapest (DWT/CO–Budapest) will be completed by 1 July 2023.
30. Office assistance to constituents has continued along within the technical areas outlined in the previous report to the Governing Body, both in standard technical assistance by the Decent Work Technical Support Team in Moscow and through the implementation of existing technical cooperation projects.²⁵ The team has been on 177 missions since the end of March 2022 within the subregion, including 30 missions since the finalization of the previous report to the Governing Body. In the same time span, 194 events with constituents took place in person and online, including 30 since the finalization of the previous report to the Governing Body. Additional fundraising efforts are bearing fruit, as available funds have increased by nearly US\$0.5 million since the last report to the Governing Body, due to a new regular budget supplementary account project and a project funded by the UN Trust Fund – both in Kyrgyzstan – and a project funded by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to implement the Better Work Programme in Uzbekistan. Conversations with other donors are ongoing, and some project proposals are under review or have been shortlisted for funding consideration. A particular emphasis in recent months has been to increase collaborative fundraising with other UN agencies.

► Situation of ILO staff in Ukraine and in the Russian Federation

31. The ILO currently employs 10 staff members in Ukraine (compared to 14 staff members before the aggression). As the United Nations lifted the relocation status for Kyiv in July 2022, with the final responsibility for staff security remaining with the individual UN agencies, the ILO developed and adopted detailed plans for a staged return of staff to Kyiv in the first half of 2023. The staged return is in the process of being finalized. The ILO staff members will work in new offices rented from the UNHCR in Kyiv. These offices have been assessed by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS).
32. Concerning the DWT/CO–Moscow, the situation remains unchanged since the last report to the Governing Body. The Office continues to have the operational capacity to safeguard the technical cooperation or assistance it provides to all countries in the subregion other than the Russian Federation. The duty of care remains the highest priority of the Office and, in this regard, the Office has been assured by Russian authorities that the immunities of ILO

²⁴ Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

²⁵ For details, see GB.347/INS/16.

international staff in Moscow are also applicable to their family members. The continued operation of the office is in line with the latest UNDSS security assessments for Moscow.

► Action areas for the ILO Decent Work Technical Support Team and Country Office for Central and Eastern Europe

33. Building on previous efforts to increase resource mobilization for the ILO's work in Ukraine (which have included the publication of the technical service offer of the ILO to support the early recovery of Ukraine and the organization of round tables with donors),²⁶ the Office focused in the first quarter of 2023 on bilateral discussions with potential development partners.
34. The ILO signed a two-year project with Canada on supporting the labour law reform to improve Ukraine's compliance with international labour standards. Concept notes for new projects were submitted to the Governments of Belgium (on the prevention of labour exploitation of Ukrainians fleeing the war, the relocation of enterprises to safer territories within Ukraine and the provision of support to the social partners) and Sweden (on the improvement of childcare services to increase women's labour market participation). First discussions took place with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (on occupational safety and health in the construction sector and on entrepreneurship development), Denmark (on a partnership with the city of Mykolaiv covering employment creation and working conditions in the construction and maritime sector), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the International Organization for Migration (on forced labour), and the United Nations Development Programme (on active labour market programmes and support to small and medium-sized enterprises).
35. Despite these efforts, the ILO's technical cooperation portfolio in Ukraine continues to be slightly less sizeable than it was before the Russian aggression. The main reason remains the reluctance among donors to decide what approach to take under a very volatile security situation in Ukraine. Many donors that have been working with the ILO in Ukraine have not yet decided whether to support recovery and reconstruction projects in parallel to providing budgetary and humanitarian aid, or whether to wait until the end of the aggression.
36. Regarding the establishment of an ILO Country Office for Ukraine in Kyiv, the Office has engaged in first discussions with the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva on modalities. While the establishment of a country office is contingent on the approval of the Director-General's Programme and Budget proposals for 2024–25 at the 111th Session (2023) of the International Labour Conference, preparations are under way to facilitate the timely signature of a host country agreement and prepare for the recruitment of an ILO Country Director. In the discussions with the Permanent Mission, the Office also reiterated the challenge posed by the possible conscription of ILO project staff, who are protected by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies (1947). It was promised that the situation would soon be addressed.

²⁶ For details, see GB.347/INS/16.

▶ Draft decision

- 37. In the light of the developments in Ukraine outlined in document GB.348/INS/5/2 and the resolution concerning the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine from the perspective of the mandate of the International Labour Organization (ILO), adopted at its 344th Session (March 2022), and taking into account the discussions held and the guidance provided during its 348th Session, the Governing Body:**
- (a) noted the information provided in the document;**
 - (b) reiterated its most profound concern at the continuing aggression by the Russian Federation, aided by the Belarusian Government, against Ukraine and at the impact that this aggression is having on the tripartite constituents – workers, employers and the democratically elected Government – in Ukraine, and on the world of work beyond Ukraine;**
 - (c) urged the Russian Federation again to immediately and unconditionally cease its aggression and withdraw its troops from Ukraine;**
 - (d) urged once again the Russian Federation to meet all the obligations following from its ratification of ILO Conventions, including the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006, as amended (MLC, 2006), in particular in relation to the repatriation of seafarers and access to medical care; the Radiation Protection Convention, 1960 (No. 115), in relation to the exposure of workers to ionizing radiations in the course of their work; and the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), and its accompanying Protocol of 2014;**
 - (e) reiterated its unwavering support for the tripartite constituents in Ukraine, requested the Director-General to continue to respond to constituents' needs in Ukraine and to expand the ILO's resource mobilization efforts, including in forthcoming international donor conferences on recovery and reconstruction, and welcomed the update on the establishment of an ILO Country Office for Ukraine in Kyiv;**
 - (f) requested the Director-General to continue to enhance resource mobilization efforts for other affected countries across the subregion of Eastern Europe and Central Asia;**
 - (g) requested the Director-General to continue to monitor the impact on the world of work of the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine and to report to the Governing Body at its 349th Session (October–November 2023) on developments in the light of the resolution, including the ILO's continued engagement with relevant United Nations bodies involved in monitoring human rights violations and the situation of maritime and nuclear workers.**