

**SIXTY-SECOND ORDINARY SESSION**

***In re* AYOUB, LUCAL, MONAT,  
PERRET-NGUYEN and SAMSON**

**Judgment 832**

THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL,

Considering the complaints filed against the International Labour Organisation (ILO) by Mr. El-Sayed Salah El-Din Ayoub on 5 February 1986, Mr. John Alanson Lucal and Mr. Jacques Monat on 14 January and Mrs. Hong-Trang Perret-Nguyen on 30 December 1985, as corrected on 10 March 1986, the ILO's replies of 30 April, the complainants' rejoinders of 6 August and the ILO's surrejoinders of 28 November 1986, the telex of 23 April 1987 from those complainants' counsel to the President of the Tribunal about their claim to costs and the ILO's comments thereon of 30 April 1987;

Considering the complaint filed against the ILO by Mr. Klaus Theodor Samson on 4 November 1985, the ILO's reply of 30 April 1986, the complainant's rejoinder of 26 June and the ILO's surrejoinder of 9 September 1986;

Considering Article II, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Tribunal, Articles 3.1.1, 8.2, 13.2 and 14.7 of the Staff Regulations of the International Labour Office, ILO Circulars (Series 6 - Personnel) No. 320 of 14 January 1985 and No. 325 of 27 March 1985, and Articles 3(a), 48, 49(a) and (b), former 54(b) (in force from 1 January 1981 to 31 December 1984) and new 54(b) (in force since 1 January 1985) of the Regulations of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund;

Having examined the written evidence and heard in public on 5 May 1987 submissions from Mr. Jean-Didier Sicault, counsel for Mr. Ayoub, Mr. Lucal, Mr. Monat and Mrs. Perret-Nguyen, and from Mr. Samson, Mr. Dominick Devlin, agent of the World Health Organization, Mr. Francis Maupain, agent of the defendant, and Mr. Alfons Noll, agent of the International Telecommunication Union;

Considering that the facts of the case and the pleadings may be summed up as follows:

A. Staff of the defendant organisation, which belongs to the "common system" of the United Nations, have for some forty years had a pension scheme known as the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund ("the Fund"). A Joint Staff Pension Fund Board ("the Board"), set up by the General Assembly of the United Nations ("the Assembly"), runs the Fund and applies the Fund Regulations.

The amount of the pension depends on three things. One is length of service by the staff member. Another is the percentage of his remuneration that he is to get for each year of service. And the third is "pensionable remuneration", which depends on each staff member's grade and his step within the grade and governs the amount of his pension contributions.

The connection between the rates of pensionable remuneration and of actual pay has changed from time to time. Pensionable remuneration was originally equivalent to net salary; in 1960 it was made equivalent to semi-gross salary and in 1965 to gross salary. Also in 1965, to keep it in line with total pay, which included - and includes - a post adjustment allowance calculated to give staff in the Professional category and above equivalent purchasing power at all duty stations, the Assembly made arrangements for adjusting pensionable remuneration by a percentage known as the "weighted average of post adjustment" at the main duty stations when the average rose or fell by 5 per cent or more.

An actuarial evaluation of the Fund made at 31 December 1980 revealed a serious decline in its finances, the Board made proposals for savings which meant lower benefits, and the Assembly approved the proposals in resolution 37/131 of 17 December 1982.

To make further savings the Assembly decided in resolution 39/246 of 10 December 1984 to adjust pensionable

remuneration. It approved a new scale of pensionable remuneration as from 1 January 1985 and correspondingly amended Article 54(b) of the Fund Regulations to read: "In the case of participants in the Professional and higher categories, the pensionable remuneration effective 1 January 1985 shall be as appears in the appendix to these Regulations". According to the new scale, which determined pensionable remuneration for each grade and step in the Professional and higher categories, pensionable remuneration went up for grades P.1 and P.2 but fell for P.3 and above. The Assembly rejected proposals from the International Civil Service Commission for transitional measures and asked the Board to put to it at its 40th Session proposals for interim or compensatory measures that would apply to staff on duty at 31 December 1984.

By a circular of 14 January 1985 the Director-General of the International Labour Office made known his decision to apply the new scale to those who had joined or would join the staff on or after 1 January 1985 and to continue to apply to other staff the scale in force at 31 December 1984. By another circular, No. 325, Series 6, of 27 March 1985 he announced his decision to apply the new scale as from 1 April 1985 to staff whose pensionable remuneration had been blocked as at 31 December 1984. For staff whose pensionable remuneration at that date had been higher than it was under the new scale the amounts corresponding to the difference between the rates of contribution under the two scales would be levied and put in a suspense account until the Assembly, at its 40th Session, decided whether to approve interim or compensatory measures. The staff would be paid back with interest any contributions not made over to the Fund on the Assembly's approving such measures. The Director-General accordingly amended Article 3.1.1 of the Staff Regulations, which defines pensionable remuneration.

The complainants are Professional category staff of the International Labour Office. Their pay slips for April 1985 took account of the two circulars and they found that the new scale meant a reduction in their pension contributions and so also in the amount of their future pensions. They lodged internal "complaints" with the Director-General under Article 13.2 of the Staff Regulations: Mr. Samson on 13 June 1985, Mrs. Perret-Nguyen on 22 July, Mr. Lucal on 29 July, Mr. Monat on 4 September and Mr. Ayoub on 26 September. They challenged the decisions to apply to them as from 1 April 1985 the new scale in Article 3.1.1 of the Staff Regulations amended as stated in circular 325. Mr. Ayoub and Mr. Samson also objected to the discounting of steps they had had since 1 January 1985, but these claims are not before the Tribunal.

The Director-General rejected the appeals: Mr. Samson's on 16 August 1985, Mrs. Perret-Nguyen's on 3 October, Mr. Lucal's on 17 October, Mr. Monat's on 7 November and Mr. Ayoub's on 11 November. The letters, which were signed by the Chief of the Department of Personnel, are the final decisions now impugned.

B. The complainants other than Mr. Samson submit identical pleas. Mr. Samson's, though stated differently and sometimes more fully, are similar in substance.

The complainants are alleging breach of the Staff Regulations and of other texts and principles that govern the terms of their appointment. In their submission the decisions they challenge cause them injury, and the Tribunal is competent to hear their complaints under Article II(1) of its Statute.

They allege breach of their acquired rights. Two provisions of the Staff Regulations are material: 8.2 and 3.1.1. The former says that "Except as otherwise provided in his terms of appointment an official shall be subject to the Regulations of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund". Article 3.1.1 defines pensionable remuneration. Matters might have changed with the inclusion of a definition in the Fund Regulations as from 1 January 1981 and the ILO might have waived its competence in the matter, as have indeed other organisations. Instead it kept its own definition in 3.1.1 and so the reference to the Fund Regulations in 8.2 may not be read without regard to 3.1.1. Even supposing the ILO did not mean to give independent force to the definition in 3.1.1, 8.2 makes the provisions of the Fund Regulations on pensionable remuneration part and parcel of its own Staff Regulations, which may not be amended, insofar as they affect relations between the ILO and its staff, unless the staff's acquired rights are safeguarded.

By the lights of the Tribunal's case law and that of the World Bank Administrative Tribunal the pension scheme and the scale of pensionable remuneration are essential terms of an official's appointment, and he has an acquired right in the matter. What must be safeguarded is terms of appointment not just as at the time of recruitment but also as revised from time to time. It is wrong to say that officials not on the brink of retirement have no interest in having the old and more favourable scale still apply to them. At the least they should be given an option.

The complainants invite the Tribunal to quash the decisions to apply the new scale to them and order the

application of the old scale or else award compensation for the injury they have sustained. All but Mr. Samson claim costs. Mr. Samson seeks compensation which he puts at \$43,210, or the grant of such other relief as the Tribunal deems fit.

C. In its replies the ILO points out that, though Article II of the Tribunal's Statute allows review of the observance of provisions of the Staff Regulations on pension rights, and Article 8.2 does provide for membership of the Fund in accordance with the Fund Regulations, that is not what the complaints are really about. Moreover, Article 48 of the Fund Regulations says that it is for the United Nations Administrative Tribunal to hear complaints alleging non-observance of the Regulations.

As to the merits, the Organisation contends that the only material rules are in the Fund Regulations, whatever other provisions the ILO's own Staff Regulations may include on the subject. Article 3.1.1 merely reproduces the definition of pensionable remuneration in Article 54 of the Fund Regulations and does not give it independent force.

The complaints disclose no cause of action. The two scales were adopted in accordance with the provisions of the Fund Regulations, and the provision in Article 8.2 of the Staff Regulations that staff members shall be subject to the Fund Regulations is an essential term of their appointment. By virtue of 8.2 the Fund Regulations form part of ILO Staff Regulations: on that score the parties seemingly agree. But though they acknowledge that it is the Fund Regulations that govern pensionable remuneration the complainants do not address the material provisions. Such remuneration is defined in 54(b), which the Assembly may amend under the procedure prescribed in 49(a) but without prejudice to rights to benefits acquired before the date of amendment (49(b)). What is more, the ILO's function is mainly limited to the levying of contributions, whereas the complainants' future benefits will depend on the amount of pensionable remuneration. The quashing of the decisions impugned would have no effect on the amount of pensionable remuneration: the only consequence for the Organisation would be to require it to levy higher contributions.

As to their allegations of breach of acquired rights, the complainants fail to explain what are the acquired rights they believe to have been denied and what is the text that was amended. The only acquired right conceivably at issue is the right to a pension, that is, to the Fund membership prescribed in 8.2. But since the impugned decisions correctly applied 8.2 the material issue is whether bringing in the new scale was contrary to 49(b) of the Fund Regulations. It would be in breach of 49(b) to do away with the right to a pension but not to change the scale of pensionable remuneration, whether the effect is to raise or to lower the amount of future pension benefits.

From the Tribunal's recent case law, and particularly Judgment 726, the ILO infers that the application of the new scale to the complainants does not amount to breach of their acquired rights.

It invites the Tribunal to dismiss the complaints.

D. In their rejoinders the complainants develop their case and seek to refute the defendant's.

Their purpose is, they submit, both substantive and straightforward: to keep in force a particular pension scheme, including the rules that determine the amount of pensionable remuneration.

The duty the Organisation owes its staff in the matter of pensions is not confined to the levying of contributions. The acquired right the complainants are relying on is the right to have a set of rules apply that provide for a scale of pensionable remuneration by grade and step. There is no question of breach of Article 49(b) of the Fund Regulations: what they allege is that the ILO failed to abide by the terms of their appointment, not that the Fund was in breach of its own Regulations. What the defendant is saying is that it would be unlawful to do away with the right to a pension altogether but that it is lawful to change the method of reckoning contributions. To carry that plea to its logical conclusion would be to strip the right of all safeguards by allowing drastic cuts in future pensions.

E. In its surrejoinders the Organisation enlarges on its main pleas.

In its submission the complainants' rejoinders add no weight to their allegations of breach of acquired rights. By its very nature pensionable remuneration is a variable, because it is governed by outside factors, and cannot form part of the essential terms of appointment. Although constant cuts in pensionable remuneration might put the right to a pension under threat, that does not preclude reduction altogether in a constantly shifting economic context. What the Tribunal's case law requires in the matter of acquired rights is that the essential features and objectives of the

pension system be safeguarded. Though the rejoinders seek to show that the introduction of the new scale of pensionable remuneration is just part of a downward drift, the complainants have failed to show any breach of acquired rights as so defined.

## CONSIDERATIONS:

### Pensionable remuneration

1. The United Nations General Assembly set up the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund to provide benefits for staff members of the United Nations and its specialised agencies in the event of their retirement, death or disability. The Regulations of the Fund came into force on 23 January 1949 and according to Article 3(a) the ILO joined the Fund on that date, though it kept its own pension scheme for officials recruited before 26 May 1946.

2. Although retirement pensions do bear a relation to the pay of staff members, it is "pensionable remuneration" (in French it was known until 1981 as "traitement soumis à retenue pour pension" and then as "rémunération considérée aux fins de la pension") that serves in reckoning the amount of the pension. It has been adapted many times to changes in circumstances. It was originally equivalent to net salary, then to semi-gross salary, and from 1965 to gross salary, though account was also taken of the weighted average of post adjustment allowances paid at the main duty stations. A system was introduced that was based on two amounts, one reckoned in the United States dollar and the other in local currency, and the Assembly took a series of measures. In 1980 it decided to apply different methods of reckoning to contributions and to benefits. In 1982 it approved proposals for savings that brought about a reduction in benefits. In 1983 it raised the contribution rate and suspended adjustments of pensionable remuneration. On 10 December 1984 it adopted a new scale of pensionable remuneration to take effect on 1 January 1985 and an amendment to Article 54(b) of the Fund Regulations. On 18 December 1985 it approved transitional arrangements. Under the new scale pensionable remuneration was raised for staff in grades P.1 and P.2 but lowered for staff in higher grades.

### The application of the new scale and the complainants' response

3. On the adoption of the new scale the Director-General of the ILO amended Article 3.1.1 of the Staff Regulations, the provision on pensionable remuneration.

Circular 320 (Series 6 - Personnel) of 14 January 1985 informed the staff of the amendment. The new text provided for applying the new scale to Professional and higher category staff recruited on or after 1 January 1985 but it safeguarded the amount of pensionable remuneration as at 31 December 1984 for members of the same categories in service at that date.

Circular 325 (Series 6 - Personnel) of 27 March 1985 reported a decision by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office to authorise the Director-General (1) to apply the new scale from 1 April 1985 to "officials whose pensionable remuneration had been frozen at the level reached on 31 December 1984"; and (2) to deposit the difference between the contributions due under the old and the new scales in a "suspense account" to be used "for the purpose of interim or compensatory measures" or else paid back with interest.

4. The complainants appealed to the Director-General challenging, among other things, the application of the new scale from 1 April 1985. Having failed to get satisfaction, they ask the Tribunal to quash the decisions rejecting those appeals and order that the old scale apply to them or else make an award of damages.

In their internal appeals to the Director-General some of the complainants made claims of their own. Mr. Ayoub and Mr. Samson, for example, submitted that the ILO ought to have taken account of increments they had had since 1 January 1985. But the Tribunal does not have those claims before it and may deem them to be waived.

### Joinder

5. Complaints against a single organisation may be taken together provided the substance of the claims and the facts they rest on are the same.

The present complaints meet both requirements. Although the wording may differ, in substance they all seek the quashing of the decision to apply the new scale from 1 April 1985. And although not all the complainants are in the same position they do rely on the same fact, namely the injury allegedly attributable to the change in scale.

## Receivability

6. Under Article II(1) of its Statute the Tribunal may hear complaints alleging the non-observance of the terms of appointment of officials and of provisions of the Staff Regulations. Its competence thus covers any allegation of breach of service conditions.

7. The complainants' case does not rest on breach of any term of their contracts or of any provision of the Staff Regulations. What they are saying is that as applied to them Article 3.1.1 of the Regulations impairs their acquired rights. Their complaints will therefore be receivable if the application of 3.1.1 does cause them injury.

It does. Article 3.1.1.2 reads: "The scales of pensionable remuneration of the Professional category and above shall be those specified on page 10". Those scales set out in detail the amounts of pensionable remuneration as from 1 April 1985. It is the application of 3.1.1 that, having brought the new scale into effect, causes the complainants injury.

8. The Organisation contends that 3.1.1 is just a corollary of Article 54(b) of the Fund Regulations, that the Tribunal may therefore not review any decision taken under 3.1.1, and that the United Nations Administrative Tribunal is the body competent to rule on the lawfulness of any such decision under the Fund Regulations. But the argument will not square with the purpose or the wording of 3.1.1 or with the construction that has been put on it.

The ILO put a definition of pensionable remuneration in 3.1.1 in 1961 and amended it in 1965 and 1981. There was no definition in the Fund Regulations until 1981, when one was put in Article 54(b). That the ILO kept 3.1.1 notwithstanding the adoption of 54(b) suggests that it gave the provision a force of its own.

That is borne out by the Organisation's own statements. In a report to the Governing Body in February/March 1985 the Office said:

"Pensionable remuneration from the commencement of the Fund has been regarded as an essential condition of service, as it is the basis of pension entitlements and the liability to pay contributions. This is the reason why its definition and the scales of pensionable remuneration have formed part of the ILO Staff Regulations."

Thus the ILO deliberately introduced and kept in its Staff Regulations a definition of pensionable remuneration and so intended to apply the definition to its own staff.

What is more 3.1.1 does not reproduce 54(b) word for word. As it appears in the April 1986 edition of the Regulations 3.1.1 suspends several provisions of 54(b).

So it is an independent provision.

Several departures by the ILO from the Fund Regulations show it did not believe it was absolutely bound by the Regulations but gave 3.1.1 independent effect. First, the ILO did not comply with the Assembly's decision at its 39th Session to suspend adjustment of pensionable remuneration. Secondly, whereas the new scale was supposed to apply as from 1 January 1985, not until 1 April 1985 did the ILO apply it to its own staff. And thirdly, the ILO takes account of several salary steps - increments for seniority or merit - which the Regulations do not refer to.

Article 8.2 of the Staff Regulations does say that "Except as otherwise provided in his terms of appointment an official shall be subject to the Regulations of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund". But instead of just citing the Regulations the article declares the terms of appointment to apply, and they include those embodied in 3.1.1.

The ILO's argument is therefore mistaken: 3.1.1 is an independent provision, and the Tribunal may hear complaints impugning decisions that are founded on it.

## The substance of the claims

9. The ILO submits that the complaints are misdirected: they challenge the reckoning of pensionable remuneration whereas what is really at issue is the reckoning of the remuneration that serves in calculating pension contributions.

For two reasons this plea fails as well.

One is that the complaints are impugning decisions to apply 3.1.1, and that is a provision that determines pensionable remuneration. The Tribunal is therefore required to rule on the actual amount of such remuneration.

Secondly, there is a close connection between pensionable remuneration and the remuneration that serves in reckoning pension contributions. As the ILO acknowledges, the remuneration on which contributions are based may not be lower than the remuneration that gives right to a pension: when the former falls, so does the latter. Contrary to what the ILO maintains, even if the complaints had a direct bearing only on the reckoning of contributions they would indirectly raise the question of the reckoning of the pension.

Acquired rights as defined in the Fund Regulations

10. The ILO submits that, if the complaints are not misdirected, the issue of acquired rights arises in the context of Article 49(b) of the Fund Regulations. The clause authorises the Assembly to amend the Regulations without prejudice to the rights acquired during an earlier period of affiliation. The ILO infers that staff may rely on their acquired rights only up to the date of adoption of the new scale, which applies without restriction thereafter.

11. There are fatal objections to the plea. First, it is not this Tribunal that construes 49(b), but - so says Article 48 of the Regulations - the United Nations Tribunal. Secondly, what the complaints challenge is the application, not of the Fund Regulations, but of Article 3.1.1 of the Staff Regulations, and so there is no call to construe the former.

Thirdly, since the doctrine of acquired rights is a general principle it does not matter whether 49(b) construes them widely or narrowly.

The Tribunal will rule on the issue by its own lights.

Acquired rights as construed by the Tribunal

12. Article 14.7 of the ILO Staff Regulations reads:

"Subject to the approval of the Governing Body, the Regulations may be amended, without prejudice to the acquired rights of officials, by the Director-General after consulting the Administrative Committee. The Director-General shall also amend the Regulations, without prejudice to the acquired rights of officials, and after consulting the Administrative Committee, in order to give effect to decisions of the International Civil Service Commission ..."

Thus ILO staff have their acquired rights protected by the Organisation's own Staff Regulations. Actually the doctrine would afford them protection anyway even if there were no such provision in the Regulations.

As the Tribunal defines it, an acquired right is one the staff member may expect to survive any amendment of the rules. The meaning may be debatable, but the term is worth keeping. It appears in the Staff Regulations and it is a convenient enough way of describing a staff member's right to have some term of his appointment protected.

13. In Judgment 61 (in re Lindsey) the Tribunal held that the amendment of a rule to an official's detriment and without his consent amounts to breach of an acquired right when the structure of the contract of appointment is disturbed or there is impairment of any fundamental term of appointment in consideration of which the official accepted appointment.

That calls for some explanation.

Although there will be breach of an acquired right only if one of two conditions is fulfilled, the two are in fact but one. Disturbance of the structure of the contract posits impairment of a fundamental term, and the latter the former.

A somewhat broader framing of the doctrine is wanted so that it will cover not just terms of appointment that were in effect at recruitment but also terms that were brought in later and were calculated to induce the staff member to stay on.

The reference to a "term of appointment in consideration of which the official accepted appointment" was never

meant to import a subjective test: did this term or that actually make the staff member sign on or decide to stay? What the Tribunal had in mind was a term of the sort that might sway his decision.

In some instances only the existence of a particular term of appointment may form the subject of an acquired right. But there are other contingencies in which the arrangements for giving effect to the term may also give rise to such a right.

Stated in that way the doctrine is broader than the rule against retroactivity. Whereas the doctrine looks to the future as well as to the past, the rule merely forbids altering what already belongs to the past.

So before ruling on the plea the Tribunal must in each case determine whether the altered term is fundamental and essential.

14. There are three tests it will apply.

The first is the nature of the altered term. It may be in the contract or in the Staff Regulations or Staff Rules or in a decision, and whereas the contract or a decision may give rise to acquired rights the regulations and rules do not necessarily do so.

The second test is the reason for the change. It is material that the terms of appointment may often have to be adapted to circumstances, and there will ordinarily be no acquired right when a rule or a clause depends on variables such as the cost-of-living index or the value of the currency. Nor can the finances of the body that applies the terms of appointment be discounted.

The third test is the consequence of allowing or disallowing an acquired right. What effect will the change have on staff pay and benefits? And how do those who plead an acquired right fare as against others?

15. How do the three tests apply to the present case?

The complainants argue an acquired right to application of the old scale of pensionable remuneration as prescribed in Article 3.1.1 of the Staff Regulations before the recent amendments. So they are relying not on the contract or on any decision but on a rule, their right to the safeguarding of their conditions of service is not an unqualified one, and what matters especially is the reasons for and consequences of the amendments to 3.1.1.

Pensionable remuneration has greatly altered with circumstances. The Assembly made it equivalent to net salary, to semi-gross salary and then to gross salary, with due regard to the weighted average of post adjustment. Contributions and benefits have changed time and again. Indeed the reckoning of the pension depends on such factors as the cost of living, currency rates and rates of tax in the country of the pensioner's residence. Those are variables that may preclude the creation of acquired rights. The financial plight of the Fund has over the years become alarming. To treat pensionable remuneration as a fundamental condition of service, an acquired right, and therefore inviolate, might be to overlook the real difficulties facing the Fund and the agencies.

The cut in pensionable remuneration does of course harm the complainants' interests. International civil servants quite understandably put stock in their retirement benefits and quite rightly want an income that, even if it will not sustain the same standard of living, will at least be comfortable. The decisions impugned do mar the outlook, in some cases seriously. But that is not enough to establish breach of an acquired right. The decisions plainly do not affect everyone to the same extent. Because of promotion or increments some are likely to get at least as much on retirement as they would have got under the old scale on retirement by 1 April 1985. What is more, the reduction in pensionable remuneration affects only senior officials and staff in lower grades fare better under the new scale than they did under the old. Despite the new scale international civil servants still stand to get bigger pensions than the best-paid national civil servants. And on 18 December 1985 the Assembly approved transitional measures that help some staff.

The Tribunal concludes that because the altered term is in the rules and because of the reasons for the amendment, and notwithstanding the financial injury to the complainants, there was no breach of an acquired right. Yet if the injury increased because of decisions that are not now before the Tribunal there might be further review.

16. Although the complainants have no acquired right they do not lack protection. They may ask the ILO to accept restraint in its dealings with staff. An international organisation should refrain from any measure which is not

warranted by its normal functioning or the need for competent staff. It is bound by the general principles of law such as equality, good faith and non-retroactivity. It will act from reasonable motives and avoid causing unnecessary or undue injury.

To sum up, the Organisation did not act in breach of its obligations. One purpose of the impugned decisions was to put the Fund on a sounder financial footing; they do not create any form of discrimination that some difference of fact does not warrant; they break no promise; they do not apply retroactively to the complainants; and although they do cause financial injury the reasons are objective and, all things considered, the degree of it admissible.

#### DECISION:

For the above reasons,

The complaints are dismissed.

In witness of this judgment by Mr. André Grisel, President of the Tribunal, Mr. Jacques Ducoux, Vice-President, and Tun Mohamed Suffian, Judge, the aforementioned have signed hereunder, as have I, Allan Gardner, Registrar.

Delivered in public sitting in Geneva on 5 June 1987.

(Signed)

André Grisel  
Jacques Ducoux  
Mohamed Suffian  
A.B. Gardner