

K.
A. and others
A. M. and others
v.
WHO

128th Session

Judgment No. 4135

THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL,

Considering the complaint filed by Mr K. A. K. against the World Health Organization (WHO) on 19 September 2018 and corrected on 27 October, WHO's reply of 17 December 2018, the complainant's rejoinder of 13 February 2019 and WHO's surrejoinder of 18 March 2019;

Considering the complaints filed by Ms C. A. and 36 other complainants (listed in Annex 1) on 20 September 2018 and corrected on 26 October, WHO's reply of 17 December 2018, the complainants' rejoinder of 13 February 2019 and WHO's surrejoinder of 18 March 2019;

Considering the complaints filed by Ms C. A. M. and 286 other complainants (listed in Annex 2) on 19 September 2018 and corrected on 19 October, WHO's reply of 17 December 2018, the complainants' rejoinder of 6 February 2019 and WHO's surrejoinder of 11 March 2019;

Considering the applications to intervene in those last complaints filed by 90 officials (listed in Annex 2) on 20 February 2019 and WHO's comments thereon dated 25 March 2019;

Considering Articles II, paragraph 5, and VII of the Statute of the Tribunal;

Having examined the written submissions and decided not to hold oral proceedings, for which none of the parties has applied;

Considering that the facts of the case may be summed up as follows:

The complainants are officials of WHO or of the United Nations Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) in the Professional category and above. They challenge the decision of the Director-General of WHO to apply to their salaries as of February 2018 the post adjustment multiplier (PAM) determined by the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) on the basis of its 2016 cost-of-living survey, with the result that their salaries were reduced.

Following its 2016 cost-of-living survey undertaken in relation to seven duty stations, the ICSC decided in March 2017 to approve the results of the survey in Geneva and determined that the new post adjustment index (PAI) applicable to Geneva should be implemented on 1 May 2017. It subsequently decided that the date of implementation should be deferred until 1 August 2017.

After several discussions between executive heads of Geneva-based organizations and the ICSC, the Director-General decided on 12 February 2018 to implement the ICSC's decision to reduce the PAI and corresponding PAM for staff in the Professional category and above. This was implemented in two stages: on 12 February 2018, the officials concerned received an e-mail informing them of an initial reduction of the PAM reflected in their February payslip, and in June 2018, a similar e-mail was received with regard to the further reduction reflected in their June payslip.

The complainants submitted individual requests for review to WHO and UNAIDS, respectively, contesting their February and June 2018 payslips to the extent that they applied the revised PAM. These requests for review were rejected by WHO and by UNAIDS on 21 and 22 June 2018, respectively. These are the impugned decisions.

In these decisions, both WHO and UNAIDS exempted the officials who requested review from the obligation to follow further steps of the internal conflict resolution procedures. Consequently, the officials were authorized to impugn the decisions directly before the Tribunal.

Mr K. requests that the impugned decision be rescinded and that from February 2018 onwards the PAMs used to calculate the post adjustment be calculated or recalculated without taking into account the results of the ICSC's 2016 cost-of-living survey for Geneva. He also requests that his salary plus post adjustment continue to be increased by a 6 per cent supplement for as long as he has at least one dependent child and that this measure be applied with retroactive effect, and that his entitlement to education grant for school years 2017-2018 and thereafter continue to be calculated in accordance with the rules applicable to school year 2016-2017. Further, the complainant claims interest at the rate of 5 per cent per annum on all amounts due, from the date of the January 2018 payslip until the date on which all amounts due are paid in full. Finally, he claims moral damages in the amount of 5,000 Swiss francs and costs in the amount of 2,000 Swiss francs.

The complainants listed in Annex 1 request that the impugned decision be rescinded and that from February 2018 onwards the PAMs used to calculate the post adjustment be calculated or recalculated without taking into account the results of the ICSC's 2016 cost-of-living survey for Geneva. They also claim interest at the rate of 5 per cent per annum on all amounts due. Finally, they each claim costs in the amount of 2,000 Swiss francs and moral damages in the amount of 5,000 Swiss francs.

The complainants listed in Annex 2 ask the Tribunal to set aside the impugned decision with all legal consequences and, in particular, to order WHO to pay them with effect from February 2018 a remuneration not affected by a decrease of the PAM resulting directly or indirectly from the ICSC's 2016 cost-of-living survey, with interest at the rate of 5 per cent per annum on all remuneration due. They also claim moral damages and costs.

WHO requests that all the complaints be dismissed by the Tribunal.

CONSIDERATIONS

1. This judgment concerns complaints filed by several staff members of WHO and an associated entity, UNAIDS, based in Geneva, challenging a downward adjustment in their salaries as part of a general downward adjustment of salaries of staff in Professional category and above. Similar challenges have been made by Geneva-based staff of four other organizations, namely the World Intellectual Property Organization, the International Labour Organization, the International Organization for Migration and the International Telecommunication Union.

2. Separate judgments will be given in relation to each of these organizations. However, in virtually all respects, the events leading to the downward adjustment are the same and very many of the legal arguments are the same though, in some ways, differently expressed. Accordingly much of the analysis and the language used in this judgment will be repetitive of what is said in those other judgments. The fact that the language used does not adopt or repeat the language in the specific pleas of the parties in any given case does not, in the Tribunal's view, compromise the analysis or the conclusions.

3. In addition, the suite of documents or extracts from documents relied on by the parties in their pleas were not universally the same. In aggregate, the documents (excluding documents peculiar to a particular organization) were either public documents or documents (such as letters) which were semi-public in the sense that their contents were not confidential and were shared with others beyond the direct recipients. In these circumstances, the Tribunal is satisfied that no prejudice is occasioned to any party by referring to or relying on any document in the aggregate of documents, even if it was not specifically referred to or relied upon by the parties in any particular proceedings.

4. The complaints filed in the Tribunal concerning WHO directly have resulted in two proceedings which are being considered by the Tribunal in this session. One proceeding involves a complaint by one complainant. The second proceeding involves complaints by

287 complainants. These complaints raise substantially the same facts and questions of law and they are therefore joined to form the subject of a single judgment. No issues are raised by WHO about the standing of any of these complainants or the receivability of their complaints, save in one respect discussed shortly. On 21 June 2018, WHO agreed to the complainants filing a complaint with the Tribunal without pursuing internal appeals to finality.

5. There are 90 applications to intervene in the second proceeding. WHO argues that a number of the interveners are not in the same position of fact and law as the complainants and they should not be permitted to intervene. The identified differences appear to be that some of these interveners did not seek a review of the impugned decisions or, alternatively, did but then failed to lodge a complaint with the Tribunal. These arguments should be rejected. The threshold for intervention created by Article 13, paragraph 1, of the Rules of the Tribunal is that the intervener “is in a situation in fact and in law **similar** to that of the complainant” (emphasis added). That is undoubtedly true in the present case. Moreover the failure to exhaust internal remedies (either in whole or part) is not a disentitling factor (see Judgment 2236, consideration 13) nor is the failure to pursue a complaint in the Tribunal. Indeed, had that happened, intervention would not have been possible. The interventions are allowed.

6. The complaints filed by staff of UNAIDS have resulted in one proceeding, in which there are 37 complainants. The status of UNAIDS staff is explained in the reply prepared by WHO and expressed to be made on behalf of both WHO and UNAIDS in the proceeding involving UNAIDS. UNAIDS derives its legal status from WHO as the administering organization in accordance with WHO’s Staff Regulations and Staff Rules. UNAIDS staff members are thus subject to the conditions of service as determined by WHO. On 22 June 2018, UNAIDS agreed to the complainants filing a complaint with the Tribunal without pursuing internal appeals to finality. It is appropriate that these complaints be

joined with the other complaints concerning WHO directly. This has consequences referred to later in this judgment.

7. WHO argues that some of the complaints more generally are irreceivable insofar as they seek to challenge the introduction of a new unified base floor salary scale removing the distinction between single and dependency base salary rates as well as changes to the education grant. The Organization argues that the complainants have not exhausted internal means of redress in relation to this matter. WHO says that the consent of the Director-General allowing the complainants to come directly to the Tribunal without fully exhausting internal means of redress was confined to the challenge to the alteration of pay scales arising from the 2016 survey in Geneva. The Tribunal is satisfied this is correct. Moreover the Tribunal rejects the contention of the affected complainants that the position taken by the administration involved laying down a procedural trap or that the alteration of the pay scales arising from the 2016 survey was inextricably linked to the decision concerning the matters presently being discussed. Accordingly, the complaints are, in this respect, irreceivable.

8. The legal foundation for the complaints is the individual decision, reflected in a payslip, to reduce the salary of each complainant and likewise affecting each intervener. In such circumstances the complainant can challenge the general decision on which the individual decision is based (see, for example, Judgment 1798, consideration 6). In the present case there is potentially a succession of several general decisions of the ICSC following a survey conducted in, amongst other places, Geneva in 2016 culminating in the Geneva-based officials in the Professional category and above being paid at a reduced amount. In addition there was the general decision of the administration of WHO to give effect to these ICSC decisions. The last mentioned decision flowed from WHO's membership of and adherence to the United Nations common system.

9. The following are potentially at least some of the relevant general decisions of the ICSC. One was a decision in March 2017 to

approve the 2016 survey results. The next was that the implementation date be 1 August 2017 not 1 May 2017, as originally contemplated, and the next was a decision in July 2017 to augment by 3 per cent the PAI derived from the survey. The next was a decision to pay to existing staff members a personal transitional allowance (being the difference between the revised and prevailing PAMs) in full for the first six months after the implementation date though to be adjusted downwards every four months until it was phased out. The last decisions were Consolidated Post Adjustment Circulars. One was ICSC/CIRC/PAC/518 dated 1 February 2018 and the other was ICSC/CIRC/PAC/522 dated 1 June 2018. Both specified the amount of the PAM for, relevantly, Switzerland and declared from when the amount took effect (1 February 2018 and 1 June 2018 respectively).

10. Some principles in the case law of the Tribunal should be noted immediately. The first is, as observed in Judgment 1266, consideration 24, that:

“[...] by incorporating the standards of the common system in its own rules the [organization] has assumed responsibility towards its staff for any unlawful elements that those standards may contain or entail. Insofar as such standards are found to be flawed they may not be imposed on the staff and [the organization] must if need be replace them with provisions that comply with the law of the international civil service. That is an essential feature of the principles governing the international legal system the Tribunal is called upon to safeguard.”

11. The second is, as noted in Judgment 1160, consideration 11, that if the ICSC adopts a methodology, although not binding on an organization merely by virtue of the ICSC’s approval of it, the organization’s decision to apply it is one that it is not free afterwards to disclaim. Moreover, as the Tribunal observed in Judgment 1000, consideration 12:

“Some principles there is ample precedent for will bear restating. One is that when impugning an individual decision that touches him directly the employee of an international organisation may challenge the lawfulness of any general or prior decision, even by someone outside the organisation, that affords the basis for the individual one (cf. Judgments 382 [...], 622 [...] and 825 [...]). The present complainants may accordingly challenge the lawfulness

of the general methodology and of the 1987 survey of Vienna, which, taken together, constitute the basis in law of the decisions under challenge.”

12. It is desirable to summarise some of the factual background. In September and October 2016, cost-of-living surveys were undertaken by the ICSC in relation to seven duty stations, including Geneva. They were undertaken for the purpose of gathering price and expenditure data at each location to be used for determining the PAI at each of those locations. The PAI for any given duty station measures the cost of living of staff in that duty station compared to that of the base city, presently New York.

13. The PAI affects the salaries actually paid, in the present case, to Professional category and above staff of WHO and UNAIDS in the following way. The salaries are essentially composed of two parts. One amount is the net salary, or base or floor salary as it is described in the United Nations common system, embodied in a prescribed salary scale. The other amount is the post adjustment established for each duty station arising from the application of Rule 335 of WHO’s Staff Regulations and Staff Rules. That provision operates to adjust the salaries for cost-of-living variations at different duty stations. The post adjustment is determined by multiplying 1 per cent of the net salary by a multiplier, the PAM. The PAI informs the amount of the PAM together with other elements including exchange rates. This process underpins a significant element of the Noblemaire principle applicable to the salaries of international civil servants, namely that “the pay of international civil servants [should be] equivalent by making its real value, or purchasing power, as uniform as possible from one duty station to another” (see Judgment 825, consideration 4).

14. The Advisory Committee on Post Adjustment Questions (ACPAQ) met at its 39th session in New York from 20 to 27 February 2017. A summary of the deliberations was set out in an ICSC note (ICSC/84/R.7) dated 3 March 2017 (the March 2017 note). The ACPAQ is an expert body providing the ICSC with technical advice on the operation of the post-adjustment system and it is comprised of six

members and chaired by the ICSC's Vice-Chairman. The March 2017 note recorded recommendations of the ACPAQ. Those recommendations, as the ICSC later noted, would lead to a salary reduction of about 7.5 per cent (in United States dollar terms) or about 6.7 per cent (in Swiss franc terms), though the precise magnitude of the salary reduction could not then be determined until further steps were undertaken. The ICSC met at its 84th session later in March 2017 and considered the March 2017 note. It accepted the results of the 2016 survey in Geneva with the ultimate consequence that the salaries of Geneva-based officials in the Professional category and above would be reduced.

15. Affected organizations had not been formally notified by the ICSC of its decision in March 2017, but information on its decision and implementation measures was published on the ICSC website and this “resulted in a swift reaction from the executive heads of Geneva-based organizations, as well as from the staff and staff associations” (this is a description in the 10 July 2017 paper referred to shortly). By letter dated 13 April 2017, the executive heads of ten Geneva-based organizations affiliated to the United Nations common system wrote to the Chairman of the ICSC requesting that they be provided with specified information. They proposed deferral of implementation until such information was available and validated. A meeting took place on 24 and 25 April 2017 between the Vice-Chairman of the ICSC and the executive heads, who wrote again on 28 April 2017 reaffirming their request for deferral and thanking the ICSC for its commitment to provide the requested and related information.

16. On 9 May 2017 the Chairman of the ICSC provided information specifically on the Geneva survey results and additional explanations of the results of the 2016 baseline cost-of-living surveys at headquarters duty stations. The Geneva-based organizations considered that the information provided was not sufficient and “mandated an informal team of three senior statisticians to review the application of the methodology and data processing work” (ICSC/85/CRP.9, paragraph 8). The review commenced with a desk review of available documentation during a mission by members of the team between 31 May and 2 June 2017.

Later in June 2017, they produced a report of 60 pages including three appendices. The results, in summary, of the review were that there had been material errors in the survey methodology. In the opinion of the statisticians:

“Correcting these errors has the combined impact of [...] increasing the PAI by approximately 4%. Incorporating these corrections alone in to the published PAI for May, decreases the reduction in the pay index for Geneva from 7.7% to less than 4%, well below the 5% threshold for any reduction in the pay index to be implemented.”

The practical import of this conclusion, put simply, is that there would be no decrease in salaries arising directly from that survey. Of some significance is that this conclusion depended on the existence of the 5 per cent threshold, as discussed later.

17. On 10 July 2017 the ICSC published a note (ICSC/85/CRP.9) from the Geneva-based organizations, setting out their position for the purpose of consideration at the 85th session of the ICSC in Vienna between 10 and 21 July 2017 (the 10 July 2017 note). This note summarized many of the events between March and July 2017 referred to in the preceding considerations. After recounting this history and discussing a number of matters potentially relevant to what should occur thereafter, the 10 July 2017 note concluded with five steps the Geneva-based organizations believed should be taken by the ICSC. They were:

- “(a) Consider seriously the conclusions reached by the informal review team as developed in Annex I of the present document and take immediate appropriate actions to correct the identified errors;
- (b) Suspend its decision to implement the survey result for Geneva as of 1 May 2017 with a staggered approach over several months;
- (c) Review the survey methodology in the light of the conclusions and recommendations presented in this paper in close consultation with the organizations of the UN common system;
- (d) Rescind its decision to modify the gap closure measure in determining the post adjustment multiplier applicable to a duty station by abolishing the 5 per cent augmentation of the post adjustment index derived from negative place-to-place survey results when the difference between the existing pay index and the new post adjustment index resulting from the survey is more than 5 per cent; and

- (e) Notwithstanding (d) above, review in consultation with the organizations the issue of transitional measures and other operational rules of the post adjustment system, as may be required.”

18. On 12 July 2017 the ICSC published another document (ICSC/85/CRP.10) entitled “Response to the report of the review of the cost-of-living survey in Geneva by a team of statisticians appointed by Geneva-based organizations” (the 12 July 2017 paper). Again, this paper was created for the purpose of its consideration at the 85th session of the ICSC in Vienna between 10 and 21 July 2017. It was highly critical of the methodology and conclusions of the team of statisticians retained by the Geneva-based organizations. In relation to the opinion referred to at the conclusion of consideration 16, the 12 July 2017 paper said in paragraph 41:

“As discussed above, the secretariat disagrees with such an assessment, which is not based on an application of the approved methodology, but on an alternative scenario designed to increase the PAI for Geneva. It is regrettable that the review team’s conclusions are based on selective data sources and a weight structure not approved by the [ICSC]; an erroneous calculation of the ‘New Fisher Index’, leading to an exaggeration of the results for Geneva. It is evident that this calculation is an *ad hoc* attempt to increase the PAI for Geneva, to within what the review team knew was required to achieve a *status quo* post adjustment classification for Geneva. It was done with no regard to the approved methodology, the need to use valid data, or its implications for the rest of the system.”

19. The ICSC met in its 85th session in Vienna between 10 and 21 July 2017. It published a report of the work at that session on 22 September 2017 (ICSC/85/R.13) (the 22 September 2017 report). That report addressed a number of matters including a discussion of the survey results at the session by representatives of a number of Geneva-based organizations and representatives of staff. Without descending into detail at this point, it is clear from the report that there was considerable concern expressed by the Geneva-based organizations about the survey methodology, the results of the survey and the implementation of those results. The discussion also reflected a significant division of opinion between the ICSC secretariat and an

independent expert in price statistics who was a member of the ACPAQ on the one hand and, on the other hand, the statisticians referred to in consideration 16 about the legitimacy of the survey results. It was clear that, in substance, neither the Geneva-based organizations nor the ICSC were resiling from their critiques and criticisms of the methodologies and conclusions of the other. However, as discussed in more detail shortly, the ICSC indicated it was prepared to reintroduce an aspect of the gap closure measure it had abandoned in 2015, with a threshold percentage of 3 per cent. This and related measures would result in the attenuation of the effect of the salary reduction both in terms of the immediacy of the reduction and the period over which the reduction would incrementally impact on staff members.

20. At its 85th session, the ICSC decided that a review should be undertaken of the methodology for cost-of-living surveys and, to that end, engaged in due course an independent expert to carry out this task, though the terms of reference for the expert did not involve a consideration of the 2016 survey or the analysis of its results. The expert reported in February 2018 about survey methodology more generally, but in terms that cast real doubt on the ICSC's position maintained at its 85th session in relation to the 2016 survey results, and suggested, impliedly, that this position was not as irrefutably correct as contended by the ICSC at its session in July 2017.

21. In early 2018 each of the five Geneva-based organizations referred to in consideration 1, including WHO, responded to the circumstances in which it found itself, leading, ultimately, to a decision reflected in payslips to reduce the salaries of officials in the Professional category and above as determined by the ICSC.

22. It is convenient to record, at this point, that at a meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations on 24 December 2017 the implementation of the ICSC's decisions was addressed and the following resolution (A/RES/72/255, distributed on 12 January 2018) adopted (relevant extracts):

“The General Assembly,

[...]

6. Notes with serious concern that some organizations have decided not to implement the decisions of the [ICSC] regarding the results of the cost-of-living surveys for 2016 and the mandatory age of separation;

7. Calls upon the United Nations common system organizations and staff to fully cooperate with the [ICSC] in the application of the post adjustment system and implement its decisions regarding the results of the cost-of-living surveys and the mandatory age of separation without undue delay;

8. Reminds executive heads and governing bodies of the United Nations common system that failure to fully respect the decisions taken by the General Assembly on the [ICSC]’s recommendations could prejudice claims to enjoy the benefits of participation in the common system, including organizations’ participation in the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund, as stated in article 3 (b) of the Fund’s regulations;

[...]”

23. On 26 January 2018, the WHO Executive Board approved the Programme, Budget and Administration Committee (PBAC)’s report 142/25, which “reminded the Secretariat of its obligation to implement fully the decision of the [ICSC] regarding the 2016 cost-of-living survey for Geneva with effect from 1 February 2018” (Document EB 142/25).

24. On 12 February 2018, the WHO Administration informed its staff of its decision to approve the PBAC’s report, thus retroactively implementing the pay cuts as of 1 February 2018. The Administration explained that it had spoken with the ICSC “to seek clarification as to the nature of the independent review commissioned by the ICSC to assess the 2016 surveys and the underlying methodology and its application”. However, according to the same communication:

“The ICSC was clear that the report will not have any impact on the decisions already made. Its focus is on whether to make future changes to the methodology. The ICSC insisted that the changes to the Geneva adjustment must be made from 1 February 2018 in line with its decision. As a result, and as a member of the UN common system, WHO will implement the decrease in Geneva post adjustment as of 1 February 2018.”

Staff experiencing immediate financial hardship as a result of the changes were invited to request a salary advance. The Administration also made a commitment to “ensure that the post adjustment methodology is transparent and sound and avoids, to the extent possible, sudden and significant adverse changes for staff” and, to that effect, to “closely review the report of the independent assessment commissioned by the ICSC, which will be submitted to the ACPAQ [...] at its meeting in February and reviewed by the ICSC in its March session”. At the same time, UNAIDS “shar[ed] an email from WHO Director Human Resources Department, informing staff of the implementation”, inviting its staff to “note that the decision of WHO to implement the decrease in the Geneva post adjustment as of 1 February applies to UNAIDS staff in HQ” and pledging its commitment to “continue to share information, as it becomes available”. On 23 June 2018, the complainants’ payslips for June 2018 were issued, showing an additional reduction of the PAM by 5.31 per cent compared to January 2018.

25. It is desirable to refer to some of the principles that govern the Tribunal’s consideration of cases such as the present. First, an international organization is free to choose a methodology, system or standard of reference for determining salary adjustments for its staff provided that it meets all the principles of international civil service law (see, for example, Judgments 1821, consideration 7, and 3324, consideration 16). Further, the Tribunal has noted that cases such as the present can raise issues of a highly specialised nature being “based on the technical judgment to be made by those whose training and experience equip them for that task” and that it will not substitute its own assessment for that of the organization (see, for example, Judgment 3360, considerations 4 and 5). While an international organization is free to choose a methodology, system or standard of reference for determining salary adjustments it must be a methodology which ensures that the results are stable, foreseeable and clearly understood or transparent (see, for example, Judgments 1821, consideration 7, and 2095, consideration 13). The requirement that the results must be stable, foreseeable and clearly understood or transparent does not mean a salary regime is fixed once and for all and is incapable of change (see Judgment 1912,

consideration 14), or that this requirement excludes reasonable variations in the results yielded (see Judgment 3676, consideration 6). Moreover “a methodology cannot be applied without a degree of flexibility and without leaving some room for interpretation by the competent authority, which [is] entitled to take into account the imbalances generated by past applications of the adopted methodology in order to try to attenuate the effects thereof and properly to implement the Noblemaire principle” (Judgment 2420, consideration 15).

26. The Tribunal has recognised that “[t]he whole subject of post adjustment is of great complexity and [...] the constant changes in the factors that are considered relevant, mean that the methodology will probably never attain perfection” (see Judgment 1459, consideration 10; see also Judgment 1603, consideration 6).

27. However, if the organization is relying on an external body for advice and assistance, it nonetheless needs to ensure these principles have been applied (see, for example, Judgment 1765, consideration 8, where the Tribunal said in relation to erroneous calculation by the ICSC):

“[The organization] has the duty of checking the lawfulness of any decision by another body on which it bases its own decision. So too must it check the adequacy of action by that other body to correct any mistake it may have made, and make sure that such corrective action respects the rights of staff. Authority for that is in Judgment 826 [...] under 18. If the [ICSC]’s original reckoning was unlawful, so is a second one that fails to redress fully the wrong.”

To the same effect was Judgment 1713, consideration 3, and later, Judgment 2303, consideration 7. In Judgment 1713 the Tribunal observed that a decision on local pay cannot “stand if, say, it overlooks or misconstrues some particular factor, or if some method is applied for the wilful contrivance of lower figures of local pay, or if corners are cut for the sake of saving time, but to the detriment of staff interests” (consideration 8).

28. The Tribunal’s mandate deriving from its Statute is, fundamentally, to resolve individual disputes between an organization

and one or a number of members or former members of its staff. Over the life of the Tribunal a matrix of legal principles has been developed and applied by the Tribunal to ensure just and principled outcomes both from the perspective of members of staff and also the perspective of organizations as employers. In its judgments the Tribunal has recognised and accepted the existence of the United Nations common system and respected its objectives. However, the existence of the United Nations common system and a desire to maintain its integrity should not, in itself, compromise the Tribunal's adjudication of individual disputes in any particular case or series of cases involving the application of its principles. Indeed, in Judgment 2303, consideration 7, the Tribunal acknowledged the argument of the organization that considerable inconvenience arose from an earlier judgment (Judgment 1713) and it was virtually impossible for the organization to depart from the scale recommended by the ICSC. The Tribunal has to recognise that an organization's legal obligations arising from the operation of the common system could have legal ramifications for an organization that inform or even determine the resolution of any particular dispute. However notwithstanding these matters, the Tribunal must uphold a plea from a staff member or members if it is established that the organization has acted unlawfully.

29. One issue of fundamental importance raised by some of the complainants is whether the ICSC had the power to determine, by decision, the outcome of its conclusions about the PAI and its effect on the salaries of Geneva-based Professional and higher grade staff, or whether it only had a power to make a recommendation on this matter to the General Assembly.

30. Because all these complaints concerning, either directly or indirectly, WHO have been joined, the pleas in each proceeding can be treated as pleas in all the joined proceedings. That is relevant because it is in only one of the WHO proceedings before joinder that the issue about to be discussed was raised. However what is important is whether WHO, on its own behalf directly, or indirectly on behalf of UNAIDS,

has had the opportunity to answer the issue in a reply and surrejoinder. It has had that opportunity.

31. It can be seen in Resolution 72/255 of the General Assembly set out in consideration 22 above that the General Assembly proceeded on the assumption that there had been a decision concerning the PAI and its effect on salaries by the ICSC. Moreover, much of the correspondence and other documentation generated by the ICSC concerning the implementation of the 2016 cost-of-living survey in Geneva speaks in terms of that body having made a decision. Indeed, four of the Geneva-based organizations, including WHO, which had challenged the methodology applied in the survey and the conclusions drawn by the ICSC at its 85th session, sought the ICSC's opinion (in a letter dated 15 November 2018) on, amongst other things, its powers. The ICSC provided a legal analysis in a letter dated 23 November 2018, supporting a conclusion that under Article 11(c) of its Statute it had power to determine, by decision, the applicable PAM for the relevant Geneva-based staff with its consequential application and effect on salaries.

32. Articles 10 and 11 of the ICSC's Statute provide:

“Article 10

The Commission shall make recommendations to the General Assembly on:

- (a) The broad principles for the determination of the conditions of service of the staff;
- (b) The scales of salaries and post adjustments for staff in the Professional and higher categories;
- (c) Allowances and benefits of staff which are determined by the General Assembly;
- (d) Staff assessment.

Article 11

The Commission shall establish:

- (a) The methods by which the principles for determining conditions of service should be applied;
- (b) Rates of allowances and benefits, other than pensions and those referred to in article 10 (c), the conditions of entitlement thereto and standards of travel;

- (c) The classification of duty stations for the purpose of applying post adjustments.”

It can be seen that the power of the ICSC in relation to the matters enumerated in Article 10 is a power to recommend only. In contradistinction, the power of the ICSC in relation to the matters enumerated in Article 11 is a power to decide by “establishing”.

33. This question of power does not arise in isolation and the answer has consequences. What was the source of the ICSC’s power to do what it purportedly did may have ramifications in at least three respects. The first is that under Article 25(3) of the ICSC’s Statute an organization is arguably bound to give effect to the ICSC’s decisions, if that is the correct characterisation of the ICSC’s actions. The second is that the answer concerning the source of power and what the ICSC did has a bearing on whether the ICSC was obliged to consult with affected organizations before acting. The third concerns potential limits on the power of the Director-General of WHO to determine the remuneration of staff to whom a PAI applies under WHO’s Staff Regulations and Staff Rules referred to earlier in consideration 13.

34. In ascertaining the ICSC’s powers, the text of the Statute construed purposively is of paramount importance. The text of Articles 10 and 11 is comparatively clear, particularly having regard to the immediate context. The two Articles are clearly intended to demark different functions or powers. If the power to determine post adjustments in a quantitative sense is conferred by Article 10(b), then the power is not conferred by Article 11 and, specifically, by the expression “[establishing] the classification of duty stations for the purpose of applying post adjustments”. Each provision is mutually exclusive of the other in the sense that the power to decide in relation to specified matters is conferred by one Article and the power to recommend only in relation to other specified matters is created by the other Article. It is inconceivable that each provision confers a power to address or deal with the same subject matter.

35. Even if the words “[t]he scales” are intended to qualify not only “salaries” but also “post adjustments”, there is little room to doubt that Article 10(b) is concerned with the quantification of salaries and post adjustments that would be the subject of recommendation. Indeed, Article 12(2) creates an exception to the limitation that the ICSC is only to recommend salary scales. That paragraph confers power to determine salary scales at a particular duty station rather than make a recommendation if requested by the executive head after consultation with staff representatives. The existence of this exception in relation to salary scales and its absence in relation to post adjustments, reinforces the construction of the Statute that the ICSC’s power in relation to the quantification of post adjustments is limited to making recommendations. The Tribunal is satisfied, having regard only to the text of the Statute, that Article 11(c) is not a source of power to make a decision quantifying post adjustments.

36. However it is necessary to address historical matters and commentary concerning those powers relied on by the parties. The Statute of the ICSC was presented, in draft form, to the UN General Assembly in September 1973 as an annexure to a report (A/9147, dated 20 September 1973). That report contained, amongst other things, a commentary on the draft Statute. It included the following observations at paragraphs 14 and 15:

“14. Under article 10, the [ICSC] is to make recommendations to the General Assembly on ‘the broad principles for the determination of the conditions of service of the staff’ **and on three elements of pay** which are of general application: Professional and higher-level salaries, **post adjustments, which are added to or deducted from such salaries in order to compensate for differences in cost-of-living at the various duty stations**, and the staff assessment to which all salaries are subject [...].

15. The functions assigned to the [ICSC] under article 11 differ from those enumerated under article 10 in two respects: (a) they cover methods of application of the broad principles for determining the conditions of service and particular allowances or benefits; and (b) they represent a uniform cession to the [ICSC] of powers now variously distributed between the legislative and executive organs of the organizations in the common system. It is the intent of this provision that the authority of the [ICSC] in regard to

the technical or detailed aspects of the conditions of service should be the same in relation to all the organizations it is to serve.” (Emphasis added.)

37. There is no material before the Tribunal that would suggest any amendments were made to the draft Statute impacting on the accuracy of this commentary, before the adoption of the Statute by the General Assembly on 18 December 1974 by Resolution 3357 (XXIX). This commentary plainly supports a conclusion that the ICSC was only being given a power to provide a recommendation concerning, and not decide, post adjustments “added to or deducted from [...] salaries in order to compensate for differences in cost-of-living at the various duty stations”.

38. WHO says in its reply that the expression “scales” referred to in Article 10(b) refers to an earlier method of calculating post adjustment based on schedules of post adjustments that had been submitted in the past to the General Assembly for approval, together with salary scales, as annexes to the Staff Regulations. This method of calculation was discontinued in 1989 when the General Assembly adopted Resolution 44/198 and decided that a revised PAM and a PAI would be established at each duty station. Moreover, in 1991, the General Assembly by Resolution 45/259 approved the deletion of post adjustment schedules and references to such schedules from the Staff Regulations. WHO says that the current method of calculating post adjustment is based on the determination of a multiplier for each duty station and the establishment of the multiplier for a duty station is understood by the ICSC and the General Assembly as a means of classifying duty stations. This is within the power contemplated by Article 11(c). However, the obvious difficulty with this analysis is that these changes postdate the adoption of the ICSC’s Statute, and whatever may have emerged systemically by actions of the General Assembly cannot, in the absence of an amendment to the Statute, found an interpretation of the Statute, adopted almost one and a half decades earlier, which is at odds with its terms. Article 30 of the Statute provides that amendments to it are to be made by the General Assembly and are subject to the same acceptance procedure “as the present statute”.

Article 1 provides that acceptance involves notification thereof in writing by the executive head of the organization.

39. The ICSC did not have power to decide, itself, the amounts of post adjustments with the ultimate consequence that the salaries of Geneva-based Professional category and above be reduced. The ICSC could only make recommendations and not decide on amounts. That was the preserve of the General Assembly.

40. The scheme of the ICSC's Statute is relatively clear. On some matters the ICSC is authorised to make a decision. On some matters it is authorised to make a recommendation to the General Assembly. In the latter situation, the reservation of the power to decide to the General Assembly is intended to ensure that the actual decision is made at the highest level. The role of the General Assembly is not intended to be nominal or symbolic. Otherwise there would be no purpose served by conferring on it the power to decide rather than on the ICSC. The General Assembly, obviously aided by the recommendations of the ICSC and the reasons for those recommendations, must give genuine and realistic consideration to the matter on which a decision must be made. If there is information known to the General Assembly that, in a material way, bears upon whether it should accept and act on the recommendation of the ICSC or reject the recommendation, then it must have regard to the information or material. In the present case that now would include the report of the independent expert retained by the ICSC and the reasons advanced by the Geneva-based organizations, founded in particular on the report of the statisticians they had retained. It also must have regard to the purpose for which the whole scheme of post adjustments was established, namely to give effect to the Noblemaire principle discussed earlier. That purpose is not to create economies by reducing salary costs even if, in relation to any particular duty station, that is a consequence of the operation of the scheme for the purpose for which it was established.

41. The ICSC's decisions on this matter were without legal foundation. On any reasonable view, the General Assembly did not

consider and act on a recommendation in adopting its Resolution 72/255 in December 2017. It is not apparent that the General Assembly exercised any discretionary decision-making power whether to act on a recommendation but assumed, as noted earlier, the decision had already been made. Accordingly, action of WHO to reduce the salaries of the complainants and interveners based on the ICSC's decisions was legally flawed and should be set aside.

42. The outcome involving no decrease in salaries referred to in consideration 16, above, depended on the maintenance of the 5 per cent threshold that was reaffirmed in 2015 and not its reduction to 3 per cent as occurred in July 2017. But that reduction was itself legally flawed. For some time before 2015, the ICSC had adopted a methodology that had, as an element, a gap closure measure. It provided, amongst other things, a 5 per cent buffer when salaries might be adjusted as a result of implementing the results of a new cost-of-living survey.

43. In 2015, this policy was revised by the ICSC. In a note prepared by the secretariat of the ICSC dated 1 June 2015 for its 81st session between 27 July and 7 August 2015, options were canvassed concerning the operation of the gap closure measure. The 1 June 2015 note explained that the 5 per cent augmentation of the updated PAI, part of the gap closure measure, "provides a margin for the error that may result from determining salaries exclusively on the basis of a single cost-of-living survey producing negative results".

44. In July 2017, at its 85th session, the ICSC reverted to the application of the gap closure measure as it had been applied before the changes in 2015. It also then adopted the threshold percentage as 3 per cent rather than 5 per cent. The change in the percentage is discussed shortly. However it is convenient to note a description given by the ICSC in a booklet published in April 2018 entitled "UNITED NATIONS POST ADJUSTMENT SYSTEM". The booklet said at page 40:

"The gap closure measure (GCM) is designed to mitigate the impact of the implementation of negative survey results leading to a post adjustment index that is lower than the prevailing pay index by more than 3 per cent. It is

applicable to all duty stations regardless of type (Group I or Group II). The GCM is applied as follows [...]:

- a. If the PAI resulting from the [cost-of-living] survey is lower than the existing pay index (multiplier +100) by 3 per cent or less, the existing PAM is maintained until the PAI catches up with the pay index;
- b. If the PAI resulting from the [cost-of-living] survey is less than the existing pay index by more than 3 per cent, a revised PAM equal to the survey PAI plus 3 per cent is promulgated;
- c. This revised PAM is applicable for all staff members in the duty station. Existing staff members, already at the duty station before the implementation date of the survey results, receive the revised PAM plus a personal transition allowance (PTA).
- d. The PTA is the difference between the existing PAM and the new PAM. It is paid in full for the first six months, and adjusted downwards every four months until it is phased out.
- e. During an adjustment month, the new PTA is calculated by taking the difference between the prevailing pay index and the pay index applicable to existing staff (that is, the prevailing pay index plus the existing personal transitional allowance), reduced by 3 per cent.”

45. As noted earlier, the ICSC met in its 85th session in Vienna between 10 and 21 July 2017 and published a report of the workings of that session on 22 September 2017. The report addressed, in a summary way, the gap closure measure. The ICSC made, relevantly, several decisions. The first was expressed as follows:

“76 (a) [...] Approve a margin of 3 per cent to be added to the results of all cost-of-living surveys conducted under the round for 2016 that are lower than the prevailing pay index by more than 3 per cent, in view of the recommendation of the Advisory Committee’s at its resumed thirty-ninth session.”

The second decision contained several elements under the general heading “Implementation of the results of the cost-of-living surveys conducted in the round for 2016”. The ICSC decided as follows:

“78. Taking into account the appeals by representatives of organizations and staff federations, the [ICSC] decided to approve the following modification of the gap closure measure, an operational rule designed to mitigate the negative impact on salaries of the results of cost-of-living surveys that are significantly lower than the prevailing pay indices:

- (a) In accordance with the Commission’s decision in 76 (a), the post adjustment index derived from the survey (updated to the month of

- implementation) is augmented by 3 per cent to derive a revised post adjustment multiplier for the duty station;
- (b) The revised post adjustment multiplier is applicable to all Professional staff members in the duty station. Existing staff members already at the duty station before the implementation date of the survey results receive the revised post adjustment multiplier, plus a personal transitional allowance;
 - (c) The personal transitional allowance is the difference between the revised and prevailing post adjustment multipliers. It is paid in full for the first six months after the implementation date; and adjusted downward every four months until it is phased out;
 - (d) During an adjustment month, the new personal transitional allowance is calculated by taking the difference between the prevailing pay index and the pay index applicable to the existing staff (that is, the prevailing pay index plus the existing personal transitional allowance), reduced by 3 per cent.”

46. Several observations can be made about the way in which ICSC decided, in July 2017, to modify the gap closure measure. The first is that in its report on 22 September 2017 on its 85th session nothing is said which explains in statistical, mathematical, methodological or otherwise scientific terms why the reduction from 5 per cent to 3 per cent was necessary or desirable or justified. It is said that the modifications were based on a recommendation of ACPAQ at its resumed 39th session and involved “taking into account the appeals by representatives of organizations and staff federations”. In the 22 September 2017 report, at paragraph 48, the following is also recorded:

“No member of the [ICSC] questioned the results of the cost-of-living surveys or the faithful application of the approved methodology and the general consensus was that, since the results were expected to have a heavy impact on staff remunerations, not only in Geneva but potentially other duty stations, it was wise to seek a solution that would enhance existing mitigation measures and that there was still time to do so. In concrete terms, several members of the [ICSC] indicated that the parameters of the gap closure measure, including the mitigation provided by the augmentation of severely negative survey results, should be revisited.”

47. The adoption of the threshold percentage at 3 per cent and the reversion to a model of the gap closure measure existing before 2015 attenuated some of the immediate negative effects of the salary reduction

on some of the staff concerned. However the reduction of the percentage had the result that even if the criticisms of the Geneva statisticians were well founded and their conclusions about the quantum of the potential decrease correct, downward adjustments to salaries would nonetheless take place whereas they would not had the prevailing 5 per cent threshold been retained.

48. As discussed earlier, while an international organization (or a body such as the ICSC) is free to choose a methodology, system or standard of reference for determining salary adjustments, it must be a methodology which ensures that the results are stable, foreseeable and clearly understood or transparent (see, for example, Judgments 1821, consideration 7(b), and 2095, consideration 13). The requirement that the results must be stable, foreseeable and clearly understood or transparent does not mean a salary regime is fixed once and for all and is incapable of change (see Judgment 1912, consideration 14). But in the documentary material before the Tribunal, the alteration of the operative percentage in the gap closure measure was without real explanation as to the rationale in statistical, mathematical, methodological or otherwise scientific terms. A change from 5 per cent to 3 per cent is at least in mathematical terms, a two-fifths reduction or, expressed differently, a reduction by 40 per cent. And, as stated by the ICSC itself, this was a measure to create a margin for error that may result from determining salaries exclusively on the basis of a single cost-of-living survey producing negative results. No explanation was proffered as to why 5 per cent was appropriate up to and including 2015 and yet no longer appropriate in 2016 and 2017. The reduction of the threshold percentage to 3 per cent was not substantiated nor transparent.

49. It is necessary to consider what is the appropriate relief. In a number of cases in which the complainants have established that a decision to adjust salaries was unlawful, the order of the Tribunal has been to set aside the impugned decision and to remit the matter to the organization to consider the matter afresh and make a new decision (see, for example, Judgments 1821, consideration 11, and 3324, considerations 22 and 23). However, in the present case, the unlawfulness of the administration's

decision flowed from the unlawfulness of the decision of the ICSC. The decisions to implement ICSC/CIRC/PAC/518 and ICSC/CIRC/PAC/522 are unlawful. WHO cannot, by a new decision, render the ICSC's decisions lawful. Accordingly, WHO should be ordered to reinstate the applicable PAM in place immediately before the decision to reduce salaries was taken and pay the complainants and interveners the salary lost between then and the time the PAM is reinstated, together with interest. The complainants are also entitled to an award of costs. Costs are awarded in the manner identified in the decision. However, the Tribunal considers that this is not a case in which moral damages are warranted.

50. In this judgment, the Tribunal has not addressed a multiplicity of other arguments raised by the complainants in their pleas, though, it should be observed, a number of them raise issues of real substance. It has been unnecessary to address them.

DECISION

For the above reasons,

1. The impugned decisions of 21 and 22 June 2018 are set aside.
2. The complainants' and interveners' February 2018 payslips and all subsequent payslips implementing the ICSC's contested decisions regarding the revised post adjustment for the duty station of Geneva are set aside.
3. WHO shall provide the complainants and interveners with new revised payslips as from the February 2018 payslip with a post adjustment multiplier not based on the revised post adjustment index resulting from the 2016 cost-of-living survey.
4. WHO shall pay each complainant and each intervener an amount equivalent to the difference between the remuneration actually paid to them since February 2018 and the remuneration that would have been paid to them during the same period but for the

implementation of the ICSC decisions, with interest at the rate of 5 per cent per annum from due dates until the date of final payment.

5. WHO shall also pay costs in the amount of 2,000 Swiss francs to the sole complainant of the first proceeding, costs in the aggregate amount of 8,000 Swiss francs to the complainants listed in Annex 1, collectively, and costs in the aggregate amount of 8,000 Swiss francs to the complainants listed in Annex 2, collectively.
6. All other claims are dismissed.

In witness of this judgment, adopted on 13 May 2019, Mr Giuseppe Barbagallo, President of the Tribunal, Ms Dolores M. Hansen, Judge, Mr Michael F. Moore, Judge, Sir Hugh A. Rawlins, Judge, and Mr Yves Kreins, Judge, sign below, as do I, Yusra Suedi, Legal Officer in the Registry.

Delivered in public in Geneva on 3 July 2019.

GIUSEPPE BARBAGALLO

DOLORES M. HANSEN

MICHAEL F. MOORE

HUGH A. RAWLINS

YVES KREINS

YUSRA SUEDI

Annex 1

In re A. and others

Ms C. A. and the following 36 complainants
(in alphabetical order):

(names removed)

Annex 2

In re A. M. and others

Ms C. A. M. and the following 286 complainants
(in alphabetical order):

(names removed)

Ninety interveners (in alphabetical order):

(names removed)