Registry's translation, the French text alone being authoritative.

EIGHTY-SECOND SESSION

In re Abreu de Oliveira Souza (Nos. 1 and 2), Bastos de Miranda, Ribeiro (Nos. 1 and 2), Fonseca Prates (Nos. 1 and 2), Marques Porto e Santos (Nos. 1 and 2), Mendes Fernandes Levi (Nos. 1 and 2), Queiroz Dias (Nos. 1 and 2) and Silva Martins (Nos. 1 and 2)

Judgment 1609

The Administrative Tribunal,

Considering the complaints filed by Mrs. Josélia Abreu de Oliveira Souza, Mrs. Adriana Bastos de Miranda Ribeiro, Mrs. Márcia Maria Fonseca Prates, Mrs. Lilian P. Marques Porto e Santos, Miss Sonia Teixeira Mendes Fernandes Levi, Mrs. Rosana de Queiroz Dias and Mrs. Bernardeth de Fátima Silva Martins against the International Labour Organization (ILO) on 20 October 1994 and corrected on 17 January 1996, their second complaints filed against the Organization on 21 March 1995 and corrected on 17 January 1996, the ILO's replies of 24 May, the complainant's rejoinders of 9 August and the Organization's surrejoinders of 24 October 1996;

Considering Articles II, paragraph 1, VII and VIII of the Statute of the Tribunal and Article 14 of its Rules;

Having examined the written submissions and decided not to order hearings, which none of the parties has applied for;

Considering that the facts of the case and the pleadings may be summed up as follows:

A. The complainants, who are Brazilian, were serving at the material time on the staff of the ILO's office at Brasilia. Mr. Wilson Vieira dos Santos had become director of the office in April 1991.

By a single letter of 10 May 1994 the complainants submitted a collective "complaint" to the Director-General of the International Labour Office through the Director of the Personnel Department. They alleged that Mr. Vieira dos Santos had infringed the rules on proper administration and on behaviour at work: he had been indulging in coarse lewd talk and disrespectful and demeaning behaviour, taking decisions arbitrarily and meddling in his subordinates' private lives. They asked the Director-General to take fitting action and to afford them protection pending a final decision.

By a letter dated 16 June 1994 the Director of Personnel told Mrs. Silva Martins, who was acting *de facto* for the other complainants as well, that their letter of 10 May was not a valid "complaint" under Article 13.2 of the Staff Regulations; each must file her own one under that provision; if they sent off 13.2 complaints within seven working days of receipt of the letter the ILO would take the date of filing as 26 May, when their letter of 10 May had reached headquarters in Geneva; and after determining the material facts and looking into them the Administration would let them have a decision and they might challenge it within six months of seeing the text.

On 28 June 1994 they each submitted 13.2 complaints to the Director-General. They pleaded that Mr. Vieira dos Santos had offended against the rules that govern management and relations at work in his treatment of subordinates -- cruel and violent behaviour and obscene language -- and in his wielding of authority -- refusal of annual or sick leave and intrusion into private life. Some of the complainants further accused him of misusing his authority, discriminating against them on the grounds of creed or bodily handicap, meddling in staff union matters and ignoring proper admini-strative channels. They asked the Director-General to take disciplinary action against him for the harm to their health and affront to their dignity. Three of them demanded his summary dismissal.

Although they had asked the ILO not to let him see their grievances, it did so and invited him to comment. In a letter of 27 June 1994 to the Director of Personnel he rebutted their charges, which he set down to resentment at the firm hand he had had to take in running the Brasilia office.

From a fax message the Director of Personnel sent on 8 July 1994 the complainants learned that headquarters were sending officials out to Brasilia on a fact-finding mission and had had to let Mr. Vieira dos Santos see their grievances so that he might have his say. There followed correspondence between them and the Director about how the ILO would be protecting them.

The fact-finding mission reported on 20 September 1994. They recommended, among other things, that the Administration should impose condign punishment on Mr. Vieira dos Santos for the serious offences they found him guilty of; tell those who reported on his performance how he had been running the Brasilia office; have him make a formal apology to the staff there for wanting in due respect; pay back to the complainants the costs they had incurred for treatment by group therapy and the costs of their 13.2 complaints; and see to it that such things never happened again.

On 27 September the complainants each sent the Director-General letters asking him to treat their 13.2 complaints of 28 June as individual requests for the writing of letters of apology, to be given the widest circulation inside the Organization, for breach of its duty to respect their dignity. They each sought awards equivalent to five years' pay in material and moral damages and awards against the medical and legal costs that the behaviour of Mr. Vieira dos Santos had caused them to incur. Mrs. Abreu de Oliveira Souza further sought the quashing of a report that he had written on 12 July 1993 about her performance and of a decision of 9 November 1992 and another of 17 December 1993, each to extend her appointment by only one year.

On 20 October 1994 they lodged complaints with the Tribunal challenging the implied rejection of their 13.2 complaints dated 28 June 1994 but deemed to have been filed on 26 May 1994.

On 19 December 1994 Mr. Vieira dos Santos wrote them identical letters: he said, among other things, that he had resigned and had intended merely to do his job, not to offend them.

By letters of 21 December 1994 the Director of Personnel told them that the Director-General would pay their legal costs against written evidence of payment; they were free under Annex II of the Staff Regulations to claim the refund of their medical expenses; the Director-General had ordered Mr. Vieira dos Santos to make them "appropriate" apologies; and disciplinary action had been taken against him "independently" of their claims. The Director's letter to Mrs. Abreu de Oliveira Souza said that the sole reason for the one-year extensions of her appointment had been financial straits, and that the deputy director of the Brasilia office would see her about rewriting the report on her performance.

On 21 March 1995 the seven lodged second complaints with the Tribunal against the Director-General's decisions of 21 December 1994.

In like-worded letters of 10 April 1995 the Director-General told them that Mr. Vieira dos Santos' treatment of them was "not tolerated in the Organization and would not have subsisted for so long if it had promptly been brought to [his] attention".

B. The complainants object to the approach that the mission took: their report discounted any factual evidence that Mr. Vieira dos Santos might challenge and, time and again, took his tale at face value instead of setting the different versions against each other so as to get to the bottom of things. Yet even the findings of fact and the recommendations in that report ought to have induced the Organization to award in full the relief the complainants were claiming.

The ILO was in breach of its duty to care for their dignity. So much was plain from Mr. Vieira dos Santos' treatment of them and the torpor of the Director-General, who cared more about giving him his say than about taking the steps urgently called for and who refused to offer them apologies on the ILO's behalf. As was said in Judgment 1376 (*in re* Mussnig), an international organisation has a special duty to act in cases of sexual harassment. This was one. Yet the ILO dilly-dallied: it took two-and-a-half years just to put out a circular, No. 543 of 2 November 1995, headed "Sexual harassment policy and procedures", which promised: "In view of the sensitive nature of sexual harassment, special procedures are being developed".

Mrs. Abreu de Oliveira Souza further alleges that the Director-General's decision of 21 December 1994 was flawed in that it came to wrong conclusions on the evidence and disclosed bias by refusing to overturn Mr. Vieira dos Santos' decisions of 9 November 1992 and 17 December 1993 to grant her one-year extensions of appointment. She sees personal prejudice too in the poor report that Mr. Vieira dos Santos signed on 12 July 1993 about her performance from 1 November 1990 to 31 October 1992.

The first complaints seek the quashing of the Director-General's implied rejection of the 13.2 complaints and awards of costs; the second complaints claim the quashing of the Director-General's decisions of 21 December 1994 and again costs.

C. The ILO replies that the first complaints are irreceivable *ratione temporis* because not until 27 September 1994 did the complainants explain the thrust of their 13.2 complaints. If what they said in their letters of that date is discounted, the first complaints are irreceivable *ratione materiae* too.

The ILO puts forward three reasons why the second complaints are irreceivable. First, some of the evidence the complainants have produced did not come into being until long after the date of filing of the complaint forms and they are relying on what happened after that date. So the complaints are not just "corrected" versions of the ones originally filed but new ones. Secondly, the complainants changed their claims in the course of the internal proceedings: the claims in their letters of 27 September are quite different from the ones they made in their 13.2 complaints. And thirdly, they have failed to exhaust their internal remedies: they challenged neither the final refusal on procedural grounds to entertain their 13.2 complaints "as clarified" nor the decision which the Director-General took of his own accord on the fact-finding mission's report on the merits, and which was not final.

In any event, should the Tribunal reject those pleas, their claims -- which the ILO has met anyway -- to disciplinary action against Mr. Vieira dos Santos and to the writing and circulation of letters of apology are irreceivable *ratione materiae*. Their claims to medical and legal expenses are misconceived inasmuch as they have failed to act on the ILO's offers of payment.

Since the complainants do not take the point, the ILO reserves the right to comment on another issue: can it be held liable for injury attributable, not to any particular decision or act of mismanagement, but to a staff member's wayward behaviour outside the context of his duties? The answer is, it submits, that it would be liable only for failure to "afford proper safeguards" against such behaviour or to "apply them with due diligence".

The complainants offer scant evidence in support of their allegations of injury: they exaggerate what happened and portray Mr. Vieira dos Santos as the embodiment of evil. They allege sexual harassment, for example; yet the facts scarcely bear out the charge and certainly do not suggest that there was any such harassment as the law construes the term. There was never any question of witting tolerance of what the complainants had reported to headquarters. The ILO took the matter in earnest from the outset, but before deciding what to do it had to get to the truth of the charges without detriment to the rights of either side. It nevertheless decided at once to keep Mr. Vieira dos Santos away from the office at Brasilia by relieving him of his duties there as from 19 July 1994. It also treated the offences he was found guilty of as grave enough to warrant proceedings for dismissal. But he forestalled them by tendering his resignation and the Director-General accepted it as from 31 December 1994, one condition being that he write the complainants letters of apology.

The ILO says that it has granted the relief they seek. They have already had apologies in the letters of 10 April 1995 from the Director-General. Their claims to damages are time-barred and go well beyond what they asked for "while the iron was still hot".

Mrs. Abreu de Oliveira Souza's more particular grievances are devoid of merit: she is still on the staff and the decisions she objects to have harmed her career not a whit. The deputy director of the Brasilia office has rewritten the report on her performance at the material time.

D. The complainants rejoin that the one and only purpose of their first complaints is to safeguard their rights. Though the ILO warned them that their collective 13.2 complaint of 10 May 1994 was irreceivable it said nothing at the time of treating their claims therein as irreceivable *ratione materiae*.

They corrected their second complaints within the time limit set for correction in keeping with the Tribunal's own Rules: what held up correction was negotiation with the ILO. Their counsel having advised that the claims in their

original 13.2 complaint were irreceivable, they duly worked out a new wording, still on the strength of the same facts, before the ILO came up with its answer. In any case, even if their letter of 27 September amounted to a new 13.2 complaint their second complaints would be receivable, having been filed with the Tribunal within the prescribed ninety days of the date of receipt of the Director-General's decisions in the Director of Personnel's letters of 21 December 1994. The complainants see as "artificial" the distinction the ILO tries to draw between a final decision on procedure and the interim one on the merits which it says was in those letters. Appeal lies to the Tribunal against the ILO's reply, whatever form it may take, to a 13.2 complaint.

The complainants again accuse the Organization of bias: instead of "seeking to protect them" it made Mr. Vieira dos Santos out to be the victim of the whole business.

They point out that circular 543 defines sexual harassment to include "verbal or non-verbal conduct which creates a sexually offensive working environment".

Citing the case law, they submit that the ILO is wrong to construe so narrowly its own liability for the behaviour of its staff. A firm line of precedent has it -- they contend -- that an organisation may be liable for the consequences of the way in which an official performs his duties, even when the injury is not attributable to an *intra vires* administrative decision. At all events the ILO fails to show that -- to quote its own language -- it "afforded proper safeguards" or applied them "with due diligence". It imposed no disciplinary sanction on Mr. Vieira dos Santos and even ruled it out by accepting his resignation. Though the Director-General's letters of 10 April 1995 purport to amount to an "apology" they do nothing of the kind: they offer no excuse, either from the ILO or from himself, for the treatment of them by Mr. Vieira dos Santos and by the Organization.

The complainants contend that the Tribunal is competent under Article VIII of its Statute to order specific performance of a duty. That may, for example, include the writing of a letter of apology to be circulated among all the staff.

E. In its surrejoinder the ILO presses its objections to receivability. The Director of Personnel's letters of 16 June 1994 to the complainants were plain enough: the Director-General would himself be taking a decision, whether or not they each lodged 13.2 complaints. His decision was notified in the letters of 21 December 1994 from the Director of Personnel, and it was subject to internal appeal.

The defendant again denies ignoring the complainants' interests and cites the correspondence with the Director of Personnel as evidence of its good faith.

Contrary to what they make out, the case law they cite suggests rather that an organisation is not liable for any injury caused by the irrational behaviour of one of its employees outside the line of duty.

They misread Article VIII of the Tribunal's Statute: the Tribunal may do no more than order an organisation to perform an obligation arising under a contract of employment. All that the complainants have asked for is the quashing of decisions. They cite no duty the ILO may have to offer them apologies; so their claims to letters of apology are irreceivable. Besides, the Organization has already granted them whatever satisfaction they may "reasonably" seek on that score.

CONSIDERATIONS

1. All seven complainants were at the material time serving on the staff of the International Labour Office and stationed at the ILO's office at Brasilia. They were answerable to Mr. Wilson Vieira dos Santos, who had been made director of that office in 1991. In 1993 they twice protested at their working conditions in the office and at the director's behaviour. On 10 May 1994 they sent the Director of the Personnel Department a collective letter objecting to their supervisor's treatment of them, citing as examples insulting and offensive remarks, various forms of abasement and intrusion into private life and breach of the rules of proper conduct. They concluded by appealing to the Director-General for protection and for the sort of formal action that they believed to be urgently needed, and they cited Article 13.2 of the Staff Regulations, which reads:

"Any complaint by an official that he has been treated inconsistently with the provisions of these Regulations, or with the terms of his contract of employment, or that he has been subjected to unjustifiable or unfair treatment by a superior official shall, except as may be otherwise provided in these Regulations, be addressed to the Director-General through the official's responsible chief and through the Personnel Department, within six months of the treatment complained of."

2. In a letter of 16 June 1994 the Director of Personnel answered that the ILO was taking their grievances seriously and would do whatever it had to. But -- she went on -- their letter of 10 May 1994 was not to be treated as a 13.2 complaint; instead they might each file such complaints, duly substantiated, which if despatched within seven days of receipt of the letter of 16 June the ILO would treat as filed on 26 May 1994, when it had got their letter of 10 May. At all events -- said the Director -- it would take a decision once it had ascertained the facts and they would be free to lodge new 13.2 complaints within six months of having notice of that decision.

3. On 28 June 1994 each of the seven lodged her own 13.2 complaint. Each of them set out in detail her grievances against a supervisor who, she said, had harassed and demeaned her and in general behaved without proper respect and in breach of the standards of labour law. Each of them asked the ILO to punish him and, pleading injury to dignity and health, reserved the right to go to the Tribunal.

4. Headquarters officials were sent out to the Brasilia office and from 12 to 20 July 1994 carried out an inquiry there. The mood was strained. On 19 July the ILO told Mr. Vieira dos Santos not to report for duty until 8 August, when he was transferred to Geneva. The officials reported to the ILO on 20 September on their mission. After sifting the evidence they had heard they upheld many of the charges. They held that the conduct of Mr. Vieira dos Santos warranted disciplinary action commensurate with the gravity of what he had done, that he owed the staff at Brasilia formal apologies, and that the Organization should pay any medical and other expenses his behaviour had caused them. There were also findings about some complainants' more particular grievances.

5. There followed a great deal of correspondence between Personnel and the complainants, whom the staff union were backing. Worth mentioning are letters of 27 September 1994 whereby the complainants sought to "circumscribe" their 13.2 complaints of 28 June 1994 by expressly demanding letters of apology, the equivalent of five years' pay each in damages and the refund of medical expenses. Mrs. Abreu de Oliveira Souza asked also for the quashing of a performance report and of decisions of 9 November 1992 and 17 December 1993 to grant her only one-year extensions of appointment.

6. On 21 December 1994 the Director of Personnel wrote to each of the complainants to explain what action the Director-General would be taking on their 13.2 complaints. Her letters acknowledged that the evidence obtained by the fact-finding mission sufficed to bear out their charges: by his behaviour, attitude and language Mr. Vieira dos Santos had indeed harmed their personal and professional dignity. Though the ILO was rejecting some of their claims as irreceivable or devoid of merit, it had brought disciplinary proceedings against him on the grounds that his "authoritarian and arrogant attitude", to which it ascribed the "stressful and unhealthy working environment", was "incompatible with his status as an international civil servant"; the disciplinary proceedings were not, however, being brought because of the 13.2 complaints. The Director's letters went on to describe just what action the ILO was taking on those complaints: it would pay them back the cost of their paperwork and would, against evidence of payment, meet claims to the costs of any medical treatment they had had to undergo because of what they had been through. The Director-General -- said the letter -- much regretted the way that Mr. Vieira dos Santos had treated his staff; was ordering him to make them proper apologies; and impressed on them that "such treatment is not tolerated in the Organization and would not have subsisted for so long if it had been promptly brought to his attention". Lastly, the Director told Mrs. Abreu de Oliveira Souza that her performance report would be rewritten.

7. On 20 October 1994 the seven of them had lodged first complaints with the Tribunal, impugning what they took to be implied rejection of their 13.2 complaints of 28 June 1994, treated by the ILO as filed on 26 May. On 21 March 1995 they lodged with the Tribunal in summary form second complaints, which they corrected on 17 January 1996, impugning the decisions of 21 December 1994 outlined in 6 above.

8. The fourteen complaints raise like issues, even though the facts of some may call for specific rulings, and are therefore joined to form the subject of a single judgment.

9. The defendant pleads that the complaints are irreceivable on several counts. It submits that the first complaints, purporting as they do to impugn implied decisions, are irreceivable on the grounds that the only specific relief sought in the original 13.2 complaints was disciplinary action against Mr. Vieira dos Santos. Their second complaints, challenging the decisions of 21 December 1994, must be deemed to have been filed only on 17 January 1996, the date of correction, long past expiry of the time limit of ninety days in the Tribunal's Statute. What is more, their claims shifted in the course of the internal proceedings, not being the same in their letters of 28 June 1994 as in their purportedly "explanatory" letters of 27 September 1994. Lastly, they failed to challenge the Director-General's decisions of 21 December 1994 as required by Article 13.2 and within the time limit it sets; so

their complaints impugning those decisions are again irreceivable on account of their failure to exhaust their internal remedies.

10. Those pleas fail. The complainants' many claims were intricately linked, and the position kept changing. The defendant needed time in which to investigate their charges and, quite properly, the Director of Personnel sent them provisional replies in the meantime. So it is wrong to accuse the complainants of acting prematurely by filing suit on 20 October 1994: their purpose in doing so was to avoid the risk of being declared out of time. It is also wrong to take them to task for treating the letters of 21 December 1994 as final decisions rejecting their 13.2 complaints. After all, those letters purport to answer theirs of 10 May, 28 June and 27 September 1994. Though the Director of Personnel warns that their letters do not "offer an adequate basis for a decision" and explains that the Director-General has taken his decision "independently" of the 13.2 complaints, the letters constantly cite them and indeed in so many words reject several claims as irreceivable or devoid of merit. In the circumstances the complainants were free to treat the Director's letters as final decisions rejecting their 13.2 complaints, and appeal then lay to the Tribunal. And though they corrected their second complaints more than ninety days after getting notice of the decisions, they did not act out of time on that account. They filed in time with the Tribunal complaint forms identifying the decisions they were impugning; their counsel duly applied for extensions of the time limit for correction; and those extensions were duly granted under Article 14 of the Tribunal's Rules. The conclusion is that, even though their claims may have altered from the filing of their first to the filing of their second complaints, what is before the Tribunal is a single and duly delimited dispute and they may seek the quashing of the Director-General's final decisions as notified in the letters of 21 December 1994.

11. The Tribunal comes now to the merits. The case strikingly illustrates how deeply a supervisor may disrupt the lives of subordinates by dictatorial behaviour and indulgence in coarse language. The defendant is of course quite right in pleading that some claims of the complainants are of a kind that the Tribunal will not entertain. One is to the imposition of a disciplinary penalty on Mr. Vieira dos Santos: the reason why it cannot succeed is that, though the ILO did bring proceedings against him for dismissal, it was unfortunately unable to carry them through because he resigned. Unsuccessful too are the claims to the refund of legal costs of internal proceedings and medical expenses. The Director-General has actually granted those claims in the impugned decisions, albeit *ex gratia*. The claims to the writing of letters of apology likewise fail. Though the letters, supposedly of "apology", that Mr. Vieira dos Santos sent them at the ILO's bidding were quite inadequate, the closing passages of the letters of 21 December 1994 may be deemed to give them satisfaction on that score.

12. The only claims that do raise difficulty are to awards of damages for the behaviour of Mr. Vieira dos Santos.

13. The complainants observe that the ILO's refusal to pay compensation -- beyond medical expenses actually incurred -- rested on the report of the fact-finding mission and they contend that the report was incomplete and tendentious. On that score they are again mistaken. It is quite plain from the report that the officials sent out by headquarters were at great pains to investigate the many facets of the case and did not by any means, as the complainants make out, take Mr. Vieira dos Santos' account on trust.

14. More telling is their plea that on the strength of the mission's findings the ILO should have granted them full damages and come more promptly to their rescue, and that in any event it was liable for the affront that the behaviour of one of its senior officers had caused to their dignity.

15. On one issue the Organization is right and the complainants are wrong: it was not laggard in dealing with the case. Though they had had talks in May 1993 with the ILO's auditor and in November 1993 with the chief of Administrative Services for its Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean, they stated no specific claim and there was not yet sufficient cause for action by the Organization. But as soon as they had put in their collective complaint the ILO sent off the fact-finding mission and, even before the mission was over, forbade Mr. Vieira dos Santos to report for duty. As for the disciplinary proceedings against him, he had resigned soon after transfer to headquarters and they no longer served any purpose. Nor may the ILO be held liable for his sending quite inadequate letters, supposedly of "apology", to the complainants.

16. Yet one issue remains: an international organisation is liable for the injury a staff member may cause in the performance of duty, and that includes injury to other members of staff. The defendant itself puts the question clearly enough:

"How far may the Tribunal, acting *proprio motu*, hold an organisation liable for the injury that one staff member's misconduct may cause

another when that injury is not attributable to any decision -- be it lawful or not -- or to mismanagement but to irrational behaviour extraneous by its very nature to the performance of duty such as, say, an act of violence, or sexual harassment, or theft?"

An organisation will of course not be liable for private misconduct of an employee that has no link with the performance of duty. But misconduct in the context of employment is another matter. When someone whom the organisation has appointed to act as supervisor or director commits an abuse of authority, the subordinate who suffers injury thereby is entitled to damages. Such is the complainants' case. Without having to go through all the evidence before it -- the salient facts are summed up in A above -- the Tribunal holds that each of the complainants suffered treatment that was an affront to her personal and professional dignity. It was inadmissible for one of its officers, in this case a man, to make a habit of addressing women subordinates in language that was blatantly coarse and lascivious. What is more it offended against ILO circular 543 of 2 November 1995, which seeks to ensure -- to use its own words -- "a safe and healthful working environment free from sexual harassment and intimidation". The whole drift of the evidence before the Tribunal is that someone on whom the ILO had conferred much authority saw rough language and rough behaviour as not incompatible with his exercise of it. They were therefore part and parcel of the performance of his duties, and on that account the Organization is liable.

17. The ILO has already granted or offered the complainants compensation for material injury that strikes the Tribunal as fair. What sums, then, are they to be awarded in moral damages? Their claims under that head are grossly inflated. As subordinates they all suffered injury to dignity, even though it took different forms. In the circumstances the Tribunal awards each of them moral damages in an amount that it sets *ex aequo et bono* at 10,000 United States dollars.

18. Mrs. Abreu de Oliveira Souza has claims of her own to the quashing of decisions of 9 November 1992 and 17 December 1993 granting her only one-year extensions of appointment. The ILO has objections to the receivability of those claims. There being no need to entertain those objections, the Tribunal dismisses the claims on the merits. It is satisfied on the evidence that the decisions were not taken on any grounds extraneous to the Organization's interests and have not proved detrimental to her career. The defendant points out that she is still on the staff and, in keeping with the findings of the enquiry, it has revised her performance report. Her plea of misuse of authority fails.

19. The complainants are entitled to costs, and the amount is set at a total of 50,000 French francs.

DECISION

For the above reasons,

1. The ILO shall pay each of the complainants 10,000 United States dollars in damages.

2. It shall pay them a single award of 50,000 French francs in costs.

3. Their other claims are dismissed.

In witness of this judgment Sir William Douglas, President of the Tribunal, Mr. Michel Gentot, Vice-President, and Miss Mella Carroll, Judge, sign below, as do I, Allan Gardner, Registrar.

Delivered in public in Geneva on 30 January 1997.

(Signed)

William Douglas
Michel Gentot
Mella Carroll
A.B. Gardner

Updated by PFR. Approved by CC. Last update: 7 July 2000.