Rapport où le comité demande à être informé de l’évolution de la situation - Rapport No. 384, Mars 2018

Cas no 3078 (Argentine) - Date de la plainte: 04-JUIN -14 - En suivi

Allegations: The complainants allege that: (i) the public authorities are preventing employees of the national judiciary from exercising the right to bargain collectively; (ii) the UEJN has been unlawfully and arbitrarily excluded from collective bargaining in the judiciary of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires; and (iii) the UEJN is a victim of interference by the public authorities, both at the national level and in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires

1. 64. The complaints are contained in a communication dated 5 June 2014 from the Union of Employees of the National Judiciary (UEJN), supported by the General Confederation of Labour of the Argentine Republic (CGT RA), and in subsequent communications from the UEJN dated 10 June 2015, 20 April 2016 and 15 June 2017.
2. 65. The Government sent its replies in communications dated 23 July and 11 September 2014, 10 March 2015, May 2017 and 27 June 2017, as well as two communications dated October 2017.
3. 66. Since similar issues are raised in the two complaints, Cases Nos 3078 and 3220 will be examined together by the Committee.
4. 67. Argentina has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), the Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No. 151), and the Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154).

A. The complainants’ allegations

Case No. 3078

1. 68. In a communication dated 5 June 2014, the UEJN and the CGT RA allege, at the outset, that the Argentine Government is using internal regulatory instruments to restrict judicial workers’ exercise of the right to bargain collectively regarding their working conditions. The organizations report that in order to remedy this situation, draft legislation was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies with a view to the establishment of a uniform collective bargaining regime for the judiciary in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and the 23 Argentine provinces. They state that it was approved by the Chamber of Deputies and that although the relevant Senate committees issued a favourable opinion on it and it was placed on the Senate’s agenda on three occasions, it was never considered and, as a consequence, the draft legislation expired pursuant to Act No. 13640.
2. 69. The complainants add that judicial workers do not fall within the scope of Act No. 24185, which regulates the right to bargain collectively in the public sector. They consider that not only does the absence of national legislation guaranteeing the right of employees of the national judiciary to bargain collectively and regulating the exercise of that right affect the interests and working conditions of those employees; it also has an impact on and serves as a deterrent to collective bargaining by judicial workers in all of the provincial jurisdictions since, notwithstanding the country’s federal system, the provinces adopt laws and mechanisms through which they agree to be bound by domestic law. The complainants also allege that the Argentine Government cannot invoke the separation of powers under the national Constitution as grounds for not adopting legislation that would grant judicial workers the right to bargain collectively since, in 2013, the Government introduced and Congress adopted Act No. 26861 regulating the hiring of all public servants and other employees of the judiciary and the national public prosecution services.
3. 70. In a communication sent in 2015, drawing attention to Case No. 2881, in which the Committee on Freedom of Association recommended that the Argentine Government should “take measures adapted to national conditions, including legislative measures if necessary, to promote collective bargaining between judiciary authorities and the trade union organizations concerned”, and the similar observations of the Committee of Expert on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations with regard to the Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154), the complainants add that by failing to adopt legislation on the right of judicial workers to bargain collectively, the Argentine Government has not followed any of the observations and recommendations of the International Labour Organization (ILO) supervisory bodies and that, despite the supervisory bodies’ urging, there has been no progress whatsoever on the issue.
4. 71. The complainants further allege that the Argentine Government and the judicial authorities are interfering with the UEJN both at the national level and in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires. They maintain that: (i) the emergence of the Union of Judicial Workers of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (SITRAJU–CABA), a pseudo-union, has led to the unlawful diversion of 2,000 members of the UEJN; (ii) Ms Vanesa Raquel Siley, General Secretary of SITRAJU–CABA, has links with the political party in power at the time of the events in question; (iii) both at the national level and in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, the UEJN has been subjected to threats and persecution by the Attorney-General, Ms Alejandra Gil Carbón, and the President of the Council of the Judiciary of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, Mr Juan Manuel Olmos; (iv) this persecution worsened after 18 February 2016, when the UEJN held a demonstration in front of the law courts and demanded additional information on the death of a prosecutor, Mr Alberto Nisman, who had been murdered a month earlier; (v) with the collusion of the President of the Council of the Judiciary, the pseudo-union misappropriated information on the UEJN’s members and erased the hard drives of the computers in the latter’s offices; and (vi) the aforementioned events occurred at a time when the country’s then Minister of Labour, Employment and Social Security, Mr Carlos A. Tomada, who had links with the political party, Frente para la Victoria (Onward to Victory), was encouraging the emergence of “yellow trade unions”, having subjected the unions that did not share the official ideology to years of procedural delays while facilitating the registration process for other unions; in that regard, the complainants state that the Union of Judicial Workers (SITRAJU) and SITRAJU–CABA were registered on 14 April 2015 (Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security decisions Nos 281/15 and 282/15), just four days after the registration process began. Lastly, the complainants accuse the Government and the judicial authorities of providing direct and indirect support to SITRAJU and SITRAJU–CABA.

Case No. 3220

1. 72. In its communication of 20 April 2016, the UEJN alleges, first, that the Council of the Judiciary in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (CMCABA), hereinafter “the local judicial body”, arbitrarily excluded it from collective bargaining in the judiciary of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires even though it had signed a compromise agreement, agreeing to bargain collectively with the UEJN, on 4 December 2014. The complainant maintains that the judicial body excluded it from the collective bargaining process in violation of its trade union rights and, on 6 November 2015, signed a collective labour agreement with the Association of Employees of the Judiciary of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (AEJBA), a trade association that is registered only at the local level, and SITRAJU–CABA, against which the complainant states that it has filed several criminal complaints and whose trade union status has been challenged in the courts. The complainant also recalls its allegation that there is no regulation of collective bargaining in any of the geographical areas over which the judiciary has jurisdiction and adds that, to date, there has been no collective bargaining in the sector as required by national legislation. The complainant also reports that the judicial body has conducted “de facto” collective bargaining with trade union entities that, under Argentine law, were not authorized to bargain because they did not have the required trade union status (personería gremial).
2. 73. In a subsequent communication, the complainant mentions a meeting between CMCABA, AEJBA and SINTRAJO–CABA, which was held on 17 April 2017 in order to negotiate the wages and working conditions of judicial workers and to make any necessary changes in the current collective agreement. The complainant states that on the date in question, it arrived prepared to negotiate and was denied entry to the premises on the sole pretext that it was not empowered to bargain collectively. Lastly, the complainant maintains that it has exhausted domestic remedies in so far as it has made unsuccessful requests for cancellation of the registration of SITRAJU–CABA and of the collective agreement.
3. 74. The UEJN further alleges that the local judicial body has committed acts of trade union interference, giving preferential treatment to SITRAJU–CABA and AEJBA. It states that: (i) pursuant to the collective agreement, these two unions were subsidized through contributions from the employer amounting to 0.2 per cent of the total wages paid to employees of the judiciary in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires in order to defray the costs of their trade union activities; (ii) the President of the Council of the Judiciary, in decision No. 1338/2015, ordered the employer to pay a supplement amounting to 58, 37 and 21 per cent, respectively, of the wages of Mr José Alberto Olmos and Mr Adrián Javier Pafunto, (representing SINTRAJU) and Mr Carlos Daniel Díaz (representing AEJBA) in order to establish the Standing Committee on the Interpretation of Labour Policy and Labour Relations under the collective labour agreement; (iii) the associations that signed the collective labour agreement, but not the complainant, were granted private offices in buildings belonging to the judiciary of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires; and (iv) each of the signatory entities’ trade union representatives were granted ten hours of paid trade union leave per month; in an act of discrimination, the UEJN was not granted such leave.

B. The Government’s reply

Case No. 3078

1. 75. In a communication received on 11 August 2014, the Government indicates that by virtue of the separation of powers in the republican system enshrined in the Constitution, it has forwarded the complainant’s allegations regarding barriers to collective bargaining in the national judiciary to the Supreme Court. In a second communication dated 3 March 2015, the Government forwards the Supreme Court’s statement that it will not rule on this case. In a communication of May 2017, the Government reiterates that, owing to the country’s republican and federal regime and pursuant to the Constitution, “each provincial government may regulate the separation of powers and the competencies of each of those powers in accordance with its own constitution”. The Government also mentions sections 1, 121 and 122 of the federal Constitution, which states that the provinces “shall retain all powers not delegated to the Federal Government by this Constitution or expressly reserved by special agreement at the time of their incorporation” and that the provinces are governed by their own local institutions; they elect governors, legislators and other provincial officials without interference from the Federal Government. The Government further states that the country has 23 provincial states and the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and that each of them has been adopting its own legislation for years in light of its specific characteristics and conditions. On this point, the Government refers to the Committee on Freedom of Association’s Case No. 3141, in which the Association of Judicial Officers of Mendoza (AFJM) alleged that the Government of Mendoza province had failed to comply with the relevant Convention and the complainant dropped the complaint after signing a sectoral collective agreement with the provincial government. Lastly, the Government maintains that active wage negotiations have resulted in progress in the judiciaries of the various provinces. In its most recent communication (of October 2017), the Government states that Autarchic Act No. 23853, which regulates the functioning of the judiciary, strengthens the latter’s independence; it reiterates that wage negotiations with the judiciary are ongoing in many provinces. In that connection, the Government mentions that: (i) there is already collective bargaining with the judiciary in Río Negro and Santa Cruz provinces and the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, all three of which have adopted legislation regulating it; (ii) Santiago del Estero province reports that bargaining with the judiciary is being conducted at a round table with the relevant social stakeholders; and (iii) Neuquén and Córdoba provinces report that they have procedures for voluntary bargaining in the judiciary and that all relevant social stakeholders are notified in such cases.

Case No. 3220

1. 76. In a communication dated 27 June 2017, the Government forwards the local judicial body’s response to the UEJN’s allegations regarding the negotiation of a collective agreement within the Buenos Aires judiciary and interference in favour of other trade unions. With regard to these allegations, the local judicial body categorically denies having discriminated against the UEJN by excluding it from collective bargaining, failing to follow the recommendations of ILO supervisory bodies, interfering with the exercise of trade union rights, showing favouritism to other trade unions and conducting “de facto” collective bargaining with trade union entities that did not have the required trade union status (personería gremial). It states that it is only competent to comment on the situation of the local judiciary since section 129 of the federal Constitution establishes that the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires shall have a system of autonomous government with its own legislative and judicial powers. It maintains that for this reason, the complainant’s complaint that judicial workers are unable to bargain collectively at the national level is irrelevant because a collective labour agreement was recently signed at the local level.
2. 77. Concerning the exclusion of the UEJN from collective bargaining, the local judicial body points out that the collective labour agreement was the outcome of joint efforts by itself and the trade unions and that the scope of the agreement includes all workers, regardless of whether they belong to a specific trade union. With respect to the agreement signed on 4 December 2014, the local judicial body explains that it was envisaged that, in addition to the employer, the signatories would be the two most representative trade union entities – which were, at that time, the UEJN and the AEJBA – since the statistics provided by the legal secretary in the Department of Human Resources showed that they had 791 and 914 members, respectively. However, by the time the collective labour agreement was signed on 6 November 2015, the UEJN had become less representative than SITRAJU–CABA, which had been entered in the Registry of Trade Unions of Workers in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires on 14 April 2015. Thus, when the collective labour agreement was signed in 2015, the signatories were the AEJBA and SITRAJU, which, again according to data provided by the Department of Human Resources, had 1,439 and 1,021 members, respectively. The UEJN was excluded from the bargaining because it had 195 members (7.345 per cent of all trade union members). The local judicial entity also indicates that, according to information contained in Department of Human Resources memorandum No. 80 of 7 February 2017, the delegates who had represented the UEJN at the signing of the compromise agreement on 4 December 2014 had changed unions and were members of SINTRAJU when the collective agreement was signed.
3. 78. The local judicial body states that in calling the AEJBA “a trade association that is registered only at the local level” and SITRAJU–CABA a “pseudo-union”, the UEJN is attempting to limit the participation of other labour groups, the coexistence of trade unions and the formation of new ones even though the complainant has always functioned locally as a sectional trade union and has not even been registered at the local level. It also states that it was the Committee on Freedom of Association that drew the Government’s attention to the elimination of distinctions between trade unions and that, by making such a distinction, the complainant violated the principles established by the Committee. It adds that it has always maintained an ongoing dialogue with all trade union groups, regardless of their registration status.
4. 79. The local judicial body states that the ILO supervisory bodies have always considered that recognition of the most representative trade union does not violate the principles of freedom of association, provided that certain objective requirements are met and that the advantages are limited to the granting of certain preferential rights. It also explains that the fact that the AEJBA, SITRAJU–CABA and the UEJN participate at the local level demonstrates respect for the principles of freedom of association and the promotion of trade union pluralism in the judiciary of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires. It explains that, given that two of the local judiciary’s trade unions are registered only at the local level and that only the complainant has trade union status at the national – though not the local – level, priority was given to the most representative unions during the bargaining in question. It states that although section 38 of the Trade Unions Act (Act No. 23551) authorizes the withholding of dues from wages only in the case of unions with trade union status, not those that are registered only at the local level, it withholds dues for all three of the trade unions that operate at the local level. Furthermore, although sections 48 and 52 of the Act provide that only individuals with trade union status shall enjoy trade union immunity, the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires has decided to accord favourable treatment at the local level to all trade union representatives in order to avoid discriminating against any of them.
5. 80. The local judicial body explains that between December 2014 and the date on which the collective labour agreement was signed, for reasons totally unrelated to the agreement, a new trade union entity – which, in many workers’ view, better represented them – was established. Thus, the local judicial body acted correctly by taking note of the number of members reported by the trade unions in a timely manner and ensuring that workers and their associations enjoyed freedom of association; the fact that it bargained collectively with entities that were registered only at the local level or did not have trade union status does not constitute a violation of the right to freedom of association.
6. 81. As for the contribution made pursuant to an agreement, the local judicial body indicates that this contribution is not a subsidy, but rather an input pursuant to section 9 of the Trade Unions Act; its purpose is not to defray the costs of trade union activity but, as provided in section 109 of the collective labour agreement, to fund cultural and social activities and support planned new vocational training that will be available to the entire judicial community, regardless of trade union membership or lack thereof.
7. 82. With regard to the supplements paid to members of the Standing Committee on the Interpretation of Labour Policy and Labour Relations under the collective labour agreement, the local judicial body indicates that the Committee’s establishment is envisaged in section 22(i) of the Basic Legal Regime Governing Judges, Public Servants and other Employees of the Judiciary, adopted through Council of Ministers decision No. 170/2014, which empowers the Council of the Judiciary to grant specific wage supplements on duly substantiated grounds at a percentage rate specified in the documents establishing the Standing Committee. In that connection, Presidential decision No. 1338/2015 authorized the establishment of a supplement for the Standing Committee’s coordinators in light of their additional responsibilities and the novelty of implementation of the first collective agreement. The local judicial body also mentions section 116 of that agreement, which calls for the establishment of the Standing Committee and sets out its functions.
8. 83. The local judicial body further states that, contrary to the complainant’s claims, the trade unions’ noticeboards and offices are not for the exclusive use of SITRAJU–CABA and the AEJBA; section 113 of the collective labour agreement does not specify their physical location, merely stating that they will be provided if the employer is able to do so. It adds that to date, there are no specific offices devoted to trade union activities, nor has the complainant requested such an office. Concerning the ten hours’ leave per month that is granted to each of the signatory trade unions’ officials, the local judicial body states that the time granted is proportionate to the representativeness of each union.
9. 84. With respect to the complainants’ allegations of interference, the local judicial body states that it had nothing to do with the formation, operations or administration of any trade union; it adds that allowing the most representative unions to participate in no way implies State interference. It goes on to say that in order for an action to constitute interference with the exercise of trade union rights, there must be a clear intention to place these unions under the control of an employer or an employers’ organization and that there is no evidence whatsoever of such an intention or of favouritism towards a given trade union, particularly as the complainant has supplied no evidence in that regard. In light of the foregoing, the local judicial body maintains that the complaint is factually and legally groundless; that the collective labour agreement is the outcome of a difficult effort by the employer and the signatory trade unions and benefits all employees of the local judiciary, including UEJN members; that the reported actions do not constitute violations of trade union rights; and that the complaint should therefore be dismissed.
10. 85. In its communication of 5 October 2017, the Government forwards an additional response from the local judicial body. At the outset, the latter reiterates its previous observations and, in particular, its denial that the UEJN is registered in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and that there has been any attempt to eliminate it. It goes on to deny that it denied the UEJN entry to the meeting held by the CMCABA, the AEJBA and SITRAJU–CABA on 17 April 2017.

C. The Committee’s conclusions

1. 86. The Committee observes that both Case No. 3078 and Case No. 3220 concern, on the one hand, allegations of violation of the right to bargain collectively in the judicial sector and, on the other, allegations of favouritism and interference to the detriment of the UEJN. The Committee notes that some of these allegations concern the status of the administration of justice at the national level while others are limited to the administration of justice in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires.
2. 87. First, with regard to the allegation that the persistent absence of legislation recognizing and regulating the right of judicial workers throughout the country to bargain collectively prevents the workers in question from exercising that right, the Committee takes note of the complainants’ statement that: (i) the Chamber of Deputies adopted draft legislation regulating collective bargaining uniformly for all of the country’s judicial workers; (ii) however, although all of its relevant committees had issued a favourable opinion on it, the Senate decided not to consider this draft; and (iii) not only does the absence of national legislation guaranteeing the right of employees of the national judiciary to bargain collectively and regulating the exercise of that right affect the interests and working conditions of those employees, it also has an impact on and serves as a deterrent to collective bargaining by judicial workers in all of the provincial jurisdictions since, notwithstanding the country’s federal system, the provinces adopt laws and mechanisms through which they agree to be bound by domestic law. The Committee also takes note of the Government’s statement that: (i) under the Argentine institutional model, the provinces retain all powers not delegated to the Federal Government under the Constitution; (ii) the 23 provincial states and the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires have been adopting their own legislation for years in light of their specific characteristics and conditions; and (iii) active wage negotiations with the judiciary are taking place in a growing number of provinces as evidenced by the collective agreements signed in Mendoza, Río Negro and Santa Cruz provinces and the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and the negotiations conducted in Santiago del Estero, Neuquén and Córdoba provinces.
3. 88. The Committee takes note of this information and emphasizes that although it is not for it to comment on the division of legislative powers among the various levels of government, it is competent to ascertain whether the current regulatory framework or lack thereof is hindering access to or exercise of the right to bargain collectively. In that regard, in a previous case concerning Argentina, the Committee recalled that while in the preparatory work for Convention No. 151, it was established that judges of the judiciary do not fall within the scope of implementation of the Convention; nevertheless, the said Convention does not exclude the auxiliary staff of judges. Also, according to Article 1 of Convention No. 154, ratified by Argentina, only armed forces and the police may be excluded from its scope. The Committee further recalled that while the same Article provides that while special modalities of the application of this Convention may be fixed, it deemed that auxiliary staff of the judiciary must have the right to collective bargaining. It therefore requested the Government to take measures adapted to national conditions, including legislative measures if necessary, to promote collective bargaining between the judiciary and the trade union organizations concerned [see Case No. 2881, 364th Report, para. 228]. While taking due note of the significant progress in collective bargaining in the judiciaries of a growing number of provinces and the fact that in several cases, this progress has followed the adoption of provincial legislation in that regard, the Committee notes that there is still no collective bargaining either in the majority of the country’s provincial judiciaries or in the national judiciary. It also notes that this absence of collective bargaining is still accompanied by the absence of a regulatory framework for collective bargaining in the sector in the various geographical regions. In that connection, the Committee reaffirms that its recommendations in Case No. 2881 remain fully valid.
4. 89. Second, with regard to the alleged exclusion of the complainant from the first instance of collective bargaining in the judiciary of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, the Committee takes note of the complainant’s statement that: (i) on 4 December 2014, the local judicial body signed an agreement in which it undertook to bargain collectively with the complainant and the AEJBA; (ii) on 6 November 2015, in violation of that agreement, the local judicial body signed a general collective labour agreement with the AEJBA and SITRAJU–CABA, two trade union entities without trade union status (personería gremial); and (iii) on 17 April 2017, a meeting between the local judicial body, the AEJBA and SITRAJU–CABA was held in order to negotiate the wages and working conditions of the workers in question – and that the complainant was denied entry on the grounds that it was not empowered to bargain collectively.
5. 90. The Committee also takes note of the local judicial body’s reply, which the Government forwarded, in which it denies that it discriminated against the complainant by excluding it and states that: (i) in the agreement of 4 December 2014, it was envisaged that the signatories on the workers’ behalf would be the two most representative trade unions in the judiciary of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires; (ii) when the agreement of 4 December 2014 was signed, the two most representative entities were the complainant and the AEJBA but by 6 November 2015, when the collective labour agreement was signed, the complainant had lost that position and, as a consequence, the agreement was signed by the two trade unions that were the most representative at that time, the AEJBA and SINTRAJU–CABA; (iii) the complainant is seeking to limit the participation of other trade union groups even though it functions locally as a sectional trade union; it is not and never has been registered at the local level; (iv) the local judicial body has always promoted trade union pluralism and since the AEJBA and SITRAJU–CABA are registered only at the local level and the complainant has trade union status only at the national level, it gave priority to the two trade union organizations that were most representative in the judiciary of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires; and (v) it did not deny the UEJN entry to the meeting held by the CMCABA, the AEJBA and SITRAJU–CABA on 17 April 2017.
6. 91. In light of the foregoing, the Committee observes that the second allegation concerns the local judicial body’s decision to exclude the complainant from the negotiation and signing of its first collective agreement in favour of two other trade unions that the employer considered more representative at the time even though, the previous year, it had signed with the complainant an agreement stipulating that it would negotiate the collective agreement with “the two most representative trade unions, namely the UEJN and the AEJBA”.
7. 92. On this point, the Committee draws attention to the following background information: (i) at the time of the events, none of the trade unions had trade union status in the judiciary of the Autonomous City of Bueno Aires, which, under Argentine general law and provincial Act No. 471/2000 – which is applicable to this specific case – is a condition for the entitlement to bargain collectively; (ii) according to the local judicial body, during the year that elapsed between the signing of the initial agreement with the complainant and the signing of the collective agreement with other organizations, a new trade union (SITRAJU–CABA) was formed and rapidly achieved a membership far higher than that of the complainant; and (iii) the judicial body’s reply shows that the number of members of each of its three trade unions was calculated by its own Department of Human Resources.
8. 93. With regard to determination of the trade unions that are entitled to bargain collectively, the Committee recalls that where, under the system in force, the most representative union enjoys preferential or exclusive bargaining rights, decisions concerning the most representative organization should be made by virtue of objective and pre-established criteria so as to avoid any opportunities for partiality or abuse [see Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee, fifth (revised) edition, 2006, para. 962]. In this case, the Committee observes that in the absence of trade unions with trade union status, the local judicial body had no pre-established rules for identifying the most representative trade unions with which to negotiate collectively the collective agreement for the sector. The Committee also recalls that the determination to ascertain or verify the representative character of trade unions can best be ensured when strong guarantees of secrecy and impartiality are offered. Thus, verification of the representative character of a union should a priori be carried out by an independent and impartial body [see Digest, op. cit., para. 351]. While the Committee welcomes the signing of the first collective agreement in the judiciary of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, it requests the Government to take the necessary measures to ensure that in future, identification of the representative trade unions with a view to negotiation of the collective agreement in the judiciary of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires is based on objective and pre-established criteria. The Committee requests the Government to keep it informed in that regard.
9. 94. The Committee takes note of the complainants’ third allegation regarding several acts of interference in which the local judicial body is said to have given preference to the signatories of the collective agreement. In that connection, the complainant maintains that: (i) the two signatories were subsidized through contributions from the employer amounting to 0.2 per cent of the total wages paid to employees of the judiciary in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires; (ii) by a decision of the President of the Council of the Judiciary, the employer was ordered to pay a supplement amounting to a percentage of the wages of the members of the Standing Committee on the Interpretation of Labour Policy and Labour Relations, which is composed entirely of members of the signatory organizations; (iii) these organizations were granted private offices in buildings belonging to the judiciary; and (iv) each of the signatory entities’ trade union representatives were granted ten hours of paid trade union leave per month.
10. 95. The Committee also takes note of the local judicial body’s reply, which the Government forwarded, in which the judicial body indicates that: (i) the so-called contribution pursuant to an agreement that the complainant mentions is an input pursuant to section 9 of the Trade Unions Act and its purpose is to fund cultural and social activities and support training plans that will benefit all staff members; (ii) the supplement paid to members of the Standing Committee on the Interpretation of Labour Policy and Labour Relations is envisaged in section 22 of the Basic Legal Regime Governing Judges, Public Servants and other Employees of the Judiciary, adopted through Council of Ministers decision No. 170/2014, in Presidential decision No. 1338/2015, and in section 116 of the collective labour agreement; (iii) the trade unions’ offices and noticeboards are not for the exclusive use of the signatories since section 113 of the collective labour agreement does not specify their physical location, merely stating that they will be provided if the employer is able to do so, and the complainant has not requested them; and (iv) concerning the ten hours of paid leave, the time granted is proportionate to the representativeness of each group.
11. 96. With regard to the complaint regarding the advantages granted to two trade unions, the AEJBA and SITRAJU–CABA, the Committee observes that these advantages arose from implementation of the collective agreement and from the fact that the signatory organizations are the most representative. The Committee refers to its previous conclusions regarding the need to ensure that in future, the verification of “most representative trade union” status with a view to negotiation of the collective agreement in the judiciary is carried out by a body independent of the parties involved.
12. 97. The Committee takes note of the complainants’ final allegation: that the formation of the trade union, SINTRAJU, and its subsidiary, SITRAJU–CABA, in 2015 was accompanied by favouritism by the then Minister of Labour and the then judiciary and by interference and persecution directed against the UEJN, including, among other things: (i) registration of SITRAJU by the Ministry of Labour in just four days; (ii) seizure of the data on the UEJN’s hard drives; and (iii) unlawful diversion of 2,000 members of the UEJN by SITRAJU. While noting that the Government has sent no observations concerning these allegations, the Committee notes that they were presented quite briefly by the complainants, which did not provide details or evidence that would facilitate both the Government’s response and the Committee’s examination. Under the circumstances, unless it receives additional details from the complainants, the Committee will not pursue its examination of these allegations.

The Committee’s recommendations

1. 98. In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations:
   • (a) The Committee requests the Government to take measures adapted to national conditions, including legislative measures if necessary, to promote collective bargaining between judiciary authorities and the trade union organizations concerned and, in particular, to facilitate the adoption, in consultation with the various trade unions concerned, of the rules applicable to collective bargaining in this sector. The Committee requests the Government to keep it informed in that regard.
   • (b) The Committee requests the Government to take the necessary measures to ensure that in future, identification of the representative trade unions with a view to negotiation of the collective agreement in the judiciary of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires is based on objective and pre-established criteria. The Committee requests the Government to keep it informed in that regard.