Observation (CEACR) - adoptée 1991, publiée 78ème session CIT (1991)

Convention (n° 98) sur le droit d'organisation et de négociation collective, 1949 - Jamaïque (Ratification: 1962)

The Committee notes that the Government's report has not been received. It must therefore repeat its previous observation which related to the following points:

- the broad powers of the Minister to cause a ballot to be taken to choose the bargaining agent (section 5 (1) of the Labour Relations and Industrial Disputes Act, 1975 (No. 14) and sections 3 (1) and 3 (2) of the regulations issued thereunder), without the right of appeal; - the denial of the right to negotiate collectively in the case of the workers in a bargaining unit when these workers do not amount to more than 40 per cent of the unit or when, if the former condition is satisfied, a single union that is engaged in the procedure of obtaining recognition does not obtain 50 per cent of the votes of the workers in a ballot that the Minister has caused to be taken (section 5 (5) of Act No. 14 of 1975, and section 3 (1)(d) of the regulations issued thereunder).

TEXT

For several years, the Committee has been requesting the Government to take measures to amend the provisions concerning the procedure for designating a union as bargaining agent so as to eliminate the discretionary powers of the Minister and to enable the workers of a bargaining unit to bargain collectively, even where the conditions relating to the numbers in a trade union and the votes cast in a ballot are not satisfied.

In its previous observations, the Committee noted no change in the situation. In its last report, the Government indicates that an advisory tripartite committee is currently examining labour legislation and that the Government representative to the Conference Committee will be in a position to provide information at the 1990 Conference on the progress achieved in the context of the envisaged reforms.

While noting this statement, the Committee recalls that, where the legislation provides for the most representative trade union to have preferential rights, it is important that the determination of the trade union in question should be based on objective and pre-established criteria, so as to avoid any opportunity for partiality or abuse. Furthermore, where conditions concerning the number of members of a trade union or the balloting of workers in a bargaining unit, in the event of a vote, are such that the workers of the unit concerned may be deprived of the right to collective bargaining, when there exist one or more legally constituted unions, the legislation should recognise the right of this or these unions to bargain at least on behalf of their own members.

The Committee hopes that the amendment to the labour legislation will be along the lines of its comments and once again, like the Committee on Freedom of Association, which examined the matter in Case No. 1158, approved by the Governing Body in May, June and November 1983, urges the Government to indicate the measures that have been taken or are envisaged to guarantee the objectivity of the recognition procedure and to ensure that the union representing the largest number of workers, even if these do not amount to 40 per cent of the workers in the bargaining unit or the majority of votes in a ballot, is granted collective bargaining rights concerning terms and conditions of employment, at least on behalf of its own members.