Informe definitivo - Informe núm. 364, Junio 2012

Caso núm. 2821 (Canadá) - Fecha de presentación de la queja:: 06-OCT-10 - Cerrado

Allegations: The complainant organization alleges the violation of the collective bargaining rights of the 6,500 workers represented by the Union of Canadian Correctional Officers (UCCO–SACC–CSN)

1. 335. The complaint is contained in a communication dated 6 October 2010 by the Confederation of National Trade Unions (CSN). The CSN submitted additional allegations in a communication dated 22 December 2010.
2. 336. The Federal Government sent its reply in a communication dated 30 September 2011.
3. 337. Canada has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87). It has not ratified the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), the Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No. 151), or the Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154).

A. The complainant’s allegations

1. 338. In its communications dated 6 October and 22 December 2010, the CSN presented a complaint relating to sections 16–34 and 56–65 of the Expenditure Restraint Act (Part 10 of the Budget Implementation Act, 2009, S.C. 2009, Chapter 2, section 393, “the ERA”) and section 113 of the Public Service Labour Relations Act (S.C. 2003, Chapter 22, “the PSLRA”).
2. 339. The complainant organization alleges that, in promulgating these acts, the Government violated its freedom of association obligations to the 6,500 employees represented by the Union of Canadian Correctional Officers (UCCO–SACC–CSN), as enshrined in the ILO Constitution, the Declaration of Philadelphia and Conventions Nos 87, 98, 151 and 154. In addition, the provisions of these acts violate Canada’s freedom of association obligations under customary international law, of which the right to bargain freely with employers with respect to conditions of work is an essential element. The main provisions of these acts referred to by the complainant organization and the Government are attached to this document.
3. 340. The CSN is a trade union organization that was established in 1921, grouping together over 2,500 trade unions and representing over 300,000 workers throughout Quebec and Canada. These trade unions, including the UCCO–SACC–CSN, are affiliated to nine trade union federations based on their sector of activity. The UCCO–SACC–CSN is certified to represent over 6,500 workers covered by the PSLRA; and these are the workers concerned by this complaint. These 6,500 workers are employed in the institutions of the Correctional Service of Canada and fulfil an important role in the protection of Canadians. The UCCO–SACC–CSN is the bargaining agent for these workers, who are employed in 58 different institutions throughout Canada and whose employer for collective bargaining purposes is the Treasury Board of Canada.
4. 341. The complainant organization indicates that, on 6 October 2010, it lodged a complaint before the Quebec Superior Court to declare unconstitutional with regard to freedom of association the contentious provisions contained in this complaint. According to the complainant organization, it is entirely appropriate that the Committee examine this complaint, as it is entitled to do on the basis of its procedures and its case law, and given that the examination of the case by the Committee will be of assistance in the national consideration of the issues in question. The complainant organization emphasizes that, over the years, international law, and in particular international labour law, has become of considerable importance to Canadian courts.
5. 342. The complainant organization indicates that, following negotiations, on 26 June 2006, the Treasury Board of Canada and the UCCO–SACC–CSN signed a collective agreement covering the period 2006–10. The agreement expired on 31 May 2010. Annual increases to rates of pay were provided for in Annex A of the collective agreement, in particular increases starting from 1 June 2006, 1 June 2007, 1 June 2008 and 1 June 2009. This constitutes an important element in the working conditions agreed upon by the parties.
6. 343. However, the ERA, which entered into force on 12 March 2009, has the effect of amending the collective agreement by imposing limits on the salaries and additional remuneration payable for any 12-month period starting between the beginning of the 2006–07 fiscal year and the end of the 2010–11 fiscal year (ERA, sections 16 and 19 on collective agreements signed before 8 December 2008). The ERA retroactively invalidates any of the provisions of existing collective agreements that are incompatible with its provisions (ERA, sections 56–65). Furthermore, section 64 of the ERA requires that any employee who has received a salary or additional remuneration under a collective agreement that is in excess of the limit established by the law must repay such amounts to the Government; the Government may recover such amounts through salary deductions. Moreover, during the restraint period, the negotiation of increases to pay or additional remuneration in excess of the limits established by the ERA, as well as any restructuring of rates of pay or increases to additional remuneration, are prohibited (ERA, sections 23–29). The “restraint period” is from 1 April 2006 to 31 March 2011 (ERA, section 2). The collective agreement expired on 31 May 2010 and UCCO–SACC–CSN will have to negotiate a new collective agreement with the Treasury Board from that time.
7. 344. The PSLRA applies to collective agreements that are entered into between the UCCO–SACC–CSN and the Treasury Board of Canada. According to the complainant organization, section 113 of the PSLRA drastically limits the UCCO–SACC–CSN’s capacity to carry out and conclude negotiations concerning whole areas of working conditions of concern to its members. First and foremost, the effect of this provision is to make it so that any condition of employment or work which may, even indirectly, require the amendment or enactment of a federal law is non-negotiable. Furthermore, under section 113 of the PSLRA, any condition of employment that has been or may be established in the future within the framework of the Public Service Employment Act (PSEA), the Public Service Superannuation Act (PSSA) or the Government Employees Compensation Act (GECA) is non-negotiable, even if such a condition of employment does not currently concern any of these acts. Therefore, any condition of employment which currently falls or in the future may fall with the remit of these acts is exempted from any form of negotiation; yet these three acts regard the fundamental working conditions of government workers.
8. 345. The PSEA outlines the principles and conditions for recruiting and appointing public service employees. It sets out the selection criteria, assessment methods, hiring priorities and the appointing process for the public service. It also contains provisions on the employer’s right to deploy employees, the effective date of appointment, the duration of employment, the rate of pay upon appointment, the duration of the probationary period and the employer’s right to terminate employment during this period. It sets out the rules governing the laying off of employees and the right to appeal appointments. It also establishes the extent to which public service employees may be involved in political activities. Many rules and regulations have been adopted under the PSEA, demonstrating its extensive scope of application, in particular with regard to: political activities; the definition of the word “promotion”; public service employment; periods of probation and periods of notice of termination of employment during probation; the student employment programme; equal access employment programmes; and part-time work in the public service. The PSSA establishes the pension scheme for federal public service employees, including correctional officers represented by the UCCO–SACC–CSN. Section 24 of the PSSA sets out certain specific rules concerning the Correctional Service of Canada. The PSSA contains provisions on all issues relating to the pension scheme, in particular with regard to who is required to contribute; pensionable service; elections; benefits; payments to survivors, children and other beneficiaries; minimum benefits; disability payments; medical examinations; transfer agreements; divestiture of service; and so on. The GECA establishes the compensation regime for workplace accidents involving federal government employees.
9. 346. Finally, the complainant organization underlines the fact that the ERA and section 113 of the PSLRA were enacted without any consultation whatsoever and without taking into account the fundamental freedom of association. With regard to the ERA, the UCCO–SACC–CSN adds that the legislator did not take any steps to discuss alternative measures with it. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the situation violates in particular Article 8 of Convention No. 151, which stipulates that disputes between parties must be settled through negotiation or through a procedure established to ensure the confidence of the parties involved. This was clearly not the case here; Canada adopted retroactive legal provisions to amend collective agreements it had negotiated freely and to demand repayment from targeted employees of amounts that they had already received and which were in excess of the limits established by the abovementioned laws. By the combined effect of the ERA and section 113 of the PSLRA, the Government of Canada has violated both the spirit and the letter of Convention No. 154. Specifically, Canada has violated Article 7 of the Convention, which concerns prior consultation, as well as Article 5, paragraph 2(a), which states that all groups of workers should be able to bargain collectively over their working conditions.
10. 347. According to the complainant, the situation described above infringes freedom of association protected by the Constitution of Canada and enshrined in the decision Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Association v. British Columbia, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391. In this decision, the Supreme Court of Canada entirely redefines the scope of freedom of association in Canada and initiated a process of harmonization of Canadian law with international law.
11. 348. According to the complainant, the situation described above in no way constitutes an acceptable restriction which can be temporarily imposed on freely conducted collective bargaining. In the complainant’s view, this conclusion is supported by many precedents concerning Canada set by the Committee on Freedom of Association.
12. 349. The complainant organization draws attention in particular to Case No. 1859, in which the Committee examined a case with aspects similar to the case in question. In that case, the complainants criticized the Government of Canada for adopting the Finance Act of 1995 (Bill C-76), which suspended the right of bargaining agents to negotiate provisions regarding job security for a period of three years. Yet this is precisely one of the effects of the Expenditure Restraint Act of 2009 with regard to the workers represented by the UCCO–SACC–CSN. This situation was condemned by the Committee, which stated: “The Committee first notes the Government’s indication that, in order to achieve the reductions necessary in the public service workforce to respond to the budget deficit concerns, it was necessary to have more flexible job security provisions concerning employees declared ‘surplus’ during the three-year period from 1995–98. In this regard, the Government has recalled its dual role as employer on the one hand, and as Government responsible for the welfare of the population as a whole, on the other. Indeed, the Committee has always taken full account of the serious financial and budgetary difficulties facing the governments, particularly during periods of prolonged and widespread economic stagnation. It considers, however, that the authorities should give preference as far as possible to collective bargaining in determining the conditions of employment of public servants. In other words, a fair and reasonable compromise should be sought between the need to preserve as far as possible the autonomy of the parties to bargaining, on the one hand, and measures which must be taken by governments to overcome their budgetary difficulties, on the other” [see 306th Report, para. 238]. In this regard, the complainant organization indicates that, in the present case, there was never any question of “prolonged and widespread economic stagnation” in Canada and that the Government simply did not undertake consultations before adopting these contentious legislative measures.
13. 350. To sum up, the complainant organization cannot but observe that the Committee’s expressed wishes with regard to collective bargaining in the public service were not respected in the least by Canada in the present case.

B. The Government’s reply

1. 351. In its communication of 30 September 2011, the Government rejects the CSN’s allegations. First of all, the Government denies that the provisions of the ERA and section 113 of the PSLRA are in violation of Canadian domestic law, and in particular section 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which protects freedom of association. The Government indicates that the matter will be decided by the Quebec Superior Court in the case Union of Canadian Correctional Officers – CSN and Pierre Mallette v. Attorney General of Canada. Accordingly, the Government requests the Committee to wait for the conclusion of the domestic proceedings prior to examining this complaint. The issues in this matter are novel and highly complex, and are expected to involve testimony by numerous lay witnesses and seven expert witnesses (four expert witnesses presented by Canada and three expert witnesses expected to be called by the complainant). A hearing could realistically take place at the end of 2012 or in early 2013.
2. 352. Furthermore, the Government emphasizes that allegations are receivable by the Committee only if the complainant organization is directly interested in the matter, and refers in this regard to paragraph 31 of Annex I of the Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee, fifth (revised) edition, 2006. Therefore, according to the Government, some of the allegations should not be received, as they relate to provisions of the ERA that have no direct effect on the situation of the complainant organization and the members of the bargaining unit that it represents. This applies to the allegations relating to the following sections of the ERA: 23; 26 and 29; 30–34 and 62; 64; 18, 20, 22, 25 and 28; 59–61; and 63 and 65.

Expenditure Restraint Act (ERA)

1. 353. The Government reports that the global financial crisis of 2008–09 had a sudden and significant impact on the Canadian economy and on the fiscal position of the Government of Canada. In this regard, the Government describes at length the economic situation that it had to face. In autumn 2008, the situation was rapidly declining and urgent measures were needed to support the economy while helping to restore budgetary balance and fiscal sustainability in the medium and long term. Limiting wage growth was one of the numerous measures adopted to ensure that Canada managed its way out of the crisis in a fiscally responsible manner.
2. 354. The Government notes that it acted in conformity with freedom of association by giving priority to collective bargaining as a means to address the impact of the crisis and achieve these objectives within a short time frame for action. In October 2008, Canada considered several means of controlling growth in compensation costs, namely: (i) reducing or limiting growth in the number of employees: imposing a freeze on new hiring, not replacing retiring workers, laying off employees and offering departure incentives; (ii) suspending or limiting wage growth: suspending any movement within pay ranges and suspending promotions and reclassification of positions; (iii) reducing wages, or freezing or limiting pay increases. After consideration, it was decided that imposing a temporary ceiling on wage increases for the public sector would make it possible to achieve the objectives in the least intrusive way possible, in view of the urgency of the situation. Furthermore, unlike a wage reduction or freeze, it was assessed that a limited wage increase could be achieved through collective bargaining process. Therefore, in October and November 2008, the Treasury Board secretariat contacted each of the 17 bargaining agents representing the 27 bargaining units in the core public administration, whether those units were in negotiations, awaiting arbitration or, like the UCCO–SACC–CSN unit, already had a collective agreement in place at that time. The Treasury Board also met secretariat representatives of other federal public sector employers, such as heads of Crown corporations and separate agencies, to encourage them to contact their respective bargaining agents and attempt to reach agreements within the parameters set by the Government. Collective agreements covering close to 70 per cent of the unionized employees in the core public administration were concluded by December 2008. Although discussions took place between the Government and the complainant organization, in particular with regard to potential concessions such as overtime in exchange for a reduced pay increase in view of Canada’s difficult economic situation, no agreement could be reached with the complainant organization.
3. 355. The temporary limits were later implemented through legislation, as part of the federal budget legislation passed by the Parliament of Canada on 12 March 2009. The ERA was subsequently enacted as an exceptional, temporary measure designed to achieve the urgent objectives of the Government while protecting the living standards of the workers. In order to come out of the crisis in a fiscally responsible manner, the policy objectives at the time were threefold: (1) to help reduce upward pressure on private sector wages; (2) to provide leadership by showing restraint and respect for public money; and (3) to manage public sector wage costs in an appropriate and predictable manner that would help ensure the ongoing soundness of the Government’s fiscal position.
4. 356. The ERA safeguarded the living standards of workers by imposing a ceiling on wage increases rather than freezing wages or cutting jobs. The members of the UCCO–SACC–CSN benefited from a wage increase that was above the rate of inflation for the period June 2009–May 2010 (the Government points out that, according to the Canadian Consumer Price Index, the rate of inflation stood at 1.4 per cent for that same period). The ERA nevertheless reduced the wage increases of the members of the UCCO–SACC–CSN from 2 per cent to 1.5 per cent, and the ceilings imposed remained in place for part of the next round of bargaining.
5. 357. Furthermore, the Government points out that, by applying to both unionized and non unionized workers, the ERA did not specifically target the unionized sector. In addition, the restraint measures were applied equitably across the public sector, therefore avoiding putting any particular group of employees, including those who negotiated wage increases in line with Canada’s new fiscal situation in the autumn of 2008 and the winter of 2009, at a disadvantage vis-à-vis others.
6. 358. The complainant was able to pursue its activities, including collective bargaining. In fact, the right to bargain collectively provided for under the PSLRA is specifically maintained under the ERA (section 6). The Government reports that negotiations took place concerning fundamental working conditions (leave, hours of work, professional development and the performance evaluation process). It also reports that the act did not: undermine the right to strike (section 7); prevent amendments that are agreed in writing to the provisions of a collective agreement or a decision (section 8); prevent bargaining agents and employers from co-developing workplace improvements under the auspices of the National Joint Council (section 9); or undermine the entitlement of any employee to incremental increases, merit or performance increases, in-range increases, performance bonuses or similar forms of compensation (although without increases to the amounts or rates of any applicable additional remuneration) (section 10). Moreover, the Government indicates that, at the time of sending its reply, the complainant organization was negotiating a new agreement, following the expiry of the previous one in May 2010. Numerous matters were negotiated, such as leave, assignment of overtime, inmate escorts, discipline, hours of work, paid holidays, the grievance procedure and the duration of the agreement. The ERA did not affect the ability of the complainant organization to consult with the management of the Correctional Service of Canada on matters of mutual interest. For example, several national meetings between employers and unions were held during the period covered by the ERA, at which the complainant and the team from the Correctional Service of Canada discussed various issues, such as transfers, searches and a pass system. These meetings notably occurred in June, September, October, November and December 2010, as well as in February 2011.
7. 359. The Government categorically denies the complainant’s allegations that it was not consulted with regard to the adoption of the ERA. First of all, as mentioned above, the Government tried to negotiate an agreement with the complainant organization, but no agreement was reached. Second, the Budget Implementation Act, 2009, including the ERA, was the subject of a review by a parliamentary committee (the Standing Committee on Finance of the House of Commons) in February 2009. Many federal public sector bargaining agents, including the complainant, had the opportunity to freely express and promote their views directly to the legislator.

Public Service Labour Relations Act (PSLRA)

1. 360. The Government explains that the Treasury Board of Canada is a committee of federal ministers. It is the employer for the federal core public administration. The core public administration consists of the departments and the other parts of the federal public administration named in Schedules I and IV to the Financial Administration Act, and includes the Correctional Service of Canada. The Correctional Service of Canada reports to the Minister of Public Safety. According to the Government, the members of the UCCO–SACC–CSN are persons employed by public authorities within the meaning of Convention No. 151. They are also public servants engaged in the administration of the State. As such, they are excluded from the application of Convention No. 98.
2. 361. The Government explains first of all that section 113 recognizes a fundamental Canadian constitutional principle that only the Parliament of Canada can make legislation in the federal jurisdiction, and that an amendment to legislation must be made by the Parliament. Thus, the parties to collective bargaining cannot “contract out” of the legislative provisions in force, and neither can they bind the Parliament of Canada, which is answerable to the Canadian electorate, to amend or enact new legislation. The Government recalls that both the mandate of the Committee on Freedom of Association and the ILO Conventions contemplate that collective bargaining operates within a legislative framework. The Committee is competent to determine whether legislation or draft legislation complies with the principles of freedom of association and collective bargaining laid down in the Conventions. Article 8 of Convention No. 87 provides that: “In exercising the rights provided for in this Convention workers and employers and their respective organisations, like other persons or organised collectivities, shall respect the law of the land.” Similarly, Canadian domestic law recognizes that labour relations operate within legislated boundaries, which often serve to protect and uphold the bargaining process or human rights protections for workers. This principle was recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Airlines International Ltd. Therefore, according to the Government, the recognition in section 113 of the PSLRA that parties to collective bargaining may not “contract out” of the legislative provisions in force relating to terms or conditions of employment if doing so would require the adoption or amendment of legislation does not in itself breach freedom of association.
3. 362. Section 113 of the PSLRA specifically excludes from the ambit of collective bargaining any term or condition of employment that has or may be established under the three following statutes of Parliament: the PSEA, which deals with staffing in the federal public service and the political activities of employees; the PSSA, which provides for the pension regime for public servants; and the GECA, which is the basis for the system governing workplace accidents and compensation in the event of workplace injuries for state employees.
4. 363. Collective bargaining in its current statutory form was introduced in the federal public service in 1967, with the enactment of the Public Service Staff Relations Act. The enactment of this act was preceded by extensive consultations and a report (the “Heeney Report”) written by the Preparatory Committee on Collective Bargaining in the Public Service, which had been mandated in September 1963. The Heeney Report, which was completed in 1965, specifically recommended that staffing, superannuation, death benefit and accident compensation should continue to be governed under the existing regimes set up by the law. Consequently, from the inception of collective bargaining under the Public Service Staff Relations Act, deliberate limitations on bargaining in relation to the PSEA, the PSSA and the GECA have been a part of the structure of collective bargaining in the federal public service. The reform of this law, in 2003, was preceded by in-depth consultations that took place over several years, notably with several associations representing the interests of public servants, including in particular the association that at the time represented the UCCO–SACC–CSN. On that occasion, the complainant organization was able to participate in the discussions and to submit a paper to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates concerning section 113 of the PSLRA.
5. 364. The Government emphasizes that the Committee on Freedom of Association has identified a number of terms and conditions of employment that might be the subject of collective bargaining, such as: wages, benefits and allowances, working time, annual leave, selection criteria in case of redundancy, the coverage of the collective agreement, the granting of trade union facilities, including access to the workplace beyond what is provided for in legislation, and the collection of union dues [see Digest, op. cit., paras 913, 914 and 916]. The Government indicates that these matters are the subject of collective bargaining in the Canadian federal public service.
6. 365. The Government also emphasizes that the scope of collective bargaining is not unlimited. Collective bargaining in the public service may be subject to special modalities of application fixed by national laws or national practice, as provided for in Article 1 of Convention No. 154. The Government recalls that the Committee has opined that matters concerning the operation and management of government business are properly excluded from collective bargaining. The Government also observes that the Committee has declined jurisdiction to look into questions concerning legislated social security programmes.
7. 366. In application of the above principles, the PSEA, the PSSA and the GECA do not lend themselves to collective bargaining under the PSLRA, for reasons of public interest specific to each statute and described at length by the Government.
8. 367. With regard to the PSSA, the Government explains that: (i) despite the fact that the plan is legislated, it is managed with significant involvement of public service bargaining agents, including the complainant; (ii) if the pension plan was negotiated and if negotiations or an arbitration award led to changes to the plan, this could have an unexpected impact on Canada’s financial stability. In view of the need for a long-term approach, it would be difficult for a legislated plan to meet the demands of the round of collective bargaining; (iii) the Pension Advisory Committee provides a forum for the Government to seek input from the plan’s participants and from pensioners regarding their pension plan. It is composed of 13 members: six members represent the management side of the public service, six members represent the labour side and one member is nominated to represent pensioners. The Pension Advisory Committee has considered many issues over the years, including: survivor benefits, administration costs, communication to plan members, recourse mechanisms, contribution rates, unreduced early retirement for those with 35 years of service before the age of 55, retirement and re-employment, administration, governance, pension portability, pension policies, disability, part-time service and phased retirement. The committee has formed subcommittees to examine specific issues, such as policy and research, communications, review mechanisms, governance and disability; and (iv) the complainant organization and other bargaining agents are consulted with regard to legislative amendments to the pension plan.
9. 368. With regard to the PSEA, the Government explains that: (i) this act creates an independent agency, the Public Service Commission (“the Commission”) to oversee staffing and the political activities of the employees. The Commission is not the employer of public servants and does not report to a minister. It is independent from the Government, employers and bargaining agents. This ensures that it delivers its mandate in a non-partisan manner; (ii) the bargaining of appointments and the political activities of public servants could threaten the public interest in a merit-based non-partisan public service, as well as put at risk the guiding values; (iii) the Public Service Commission Advisory Council, which was established in 1998 and consists of members representing bargaining agents, government departments, the Commission and the Chair of the Human Resources Council, provides a forum where bargaining agents and human resources personnel can meet to discuss and consult on matters of common concern related to the PSEA; (iv) section 14 of the PSEA provides that the Commission shall, on request or if it considers necessary or desirable, consult with the employer or any employee organization certified as a bargaining agent under the PSLRA, about policies respecting the manner of making and revoking appointments or with respect to the principles governing lay-offs or priorities for appointment. The general policy of the Public Service Commission Advisory Council strongly encourages departments to include union representatives and unrepresented employees in the development of their departmental policy on the appointment process; and (v) reviews of the PSEA are provided for in the law and bargaining agents are always consulted.
10. 369. With regard to the GECA, the Government explains that: (i) the act is the basis for the programme providing compensation for workplace injuries to workers in the federal public service; (ii) as it is a system of statutory and administrative recourses that is “borrowed” from the provinces, any changes to the programme would affect millions of workers. For example, federal public service workers employed in the province of Ontario see their claims being processed by the Ontario Workplace Safety and Insurance Board; (iii) this is not a term or condition of employment that is negotiable in the context of a relationship between one employer and one bargaining agent; rather, it is a social security programme that is provided for the benefit of all employees; and (iv) even though it is not a term or condition of employment, the complainant has nonetheless the full autonomy to formulate its views and advance the interests of the members of the bargaining unit in existing forums.
11. 370. The Government underlines that it attaches great importance to consultation and cooperation with bargaining agents on these matters of mutual interest, in accordance with Article 7 of Convention No. 151 and Convention No. 154 and the general principles outlined by the Committee on consultation with workers’ organizations. The Government refers in this regard to the Digest, op. cit., para. 1067, and to Case No. 2434 (Colombia) [see 344th Report, paras 794 and 798].
12. 371. To sum up, the Government indicates that section 113(b) of the PSLRA does not violate freedom of association. First of all, bargaining agents, including the complainant, have numerous avenues open to them to discuss matters relating to the PSSA and the PSEA. These avenues have been used successfully to promote and advance the interests of the members of the UCCO–SACC–CSN and for bargaining agents to have direct input in the crafting of these laws. Therefore, section 113 of the PSLRA is in full compliance with freedom of association. According to the Government, freedom of association contemplates that collective bargaining should occur within legislated boundaries; it does not require that every subject matter be bargained and allows for flexibility in the vehicles for consultation in the public service. Furthermore, the matters covered by the PSEA, the PSSA and the GECA are properly excluded from bargaining for reasons of public interest and are best established by the Parliament of Canada, which is answerable to the electorate. Finally, freedom of association recognizes that it is inappropriate to bargain social security programmes such as the regime set up by the GECA (the Government refers in this regard to Annex I, paragraph 21, and paragraph 516 of the Digest). The scope of bargaining these laws has been the subject of extensive consultations and discussions with workers’ organizations, including with the complainant.
13. 372. The members of the UCCO–SACC–CSN have at their disposal numerous avenues and lawful means to exercise their right to freedom of association, in addition to traditional collective bargaining. For example, the complainant is a member of the National Joint Council (“the Council”). Created in 1944, the Council today includes 18 bargaining agents, the Treasury Board and a number of other federal public sector employers as official members. The Council is a forum in which participating employers and bargaining agents can share information, consult on workplace issues and develop directives which provide social benefits for public service employees. The directives are incorporated into the collective agreements of the participating members. They cover such terms and conditions of employment as travel, bilingualism bonuses, commuter assistance, isolated posts and government housing, workforce adjustments and occupational health and safety. The Council is also used to discuss public service health, dental and disability benefit plans.

C. The Committee’s conclusions

1. 373. The Committee notes that this complaint concerns allegations of legislative intervention in the collective bargaining process in the federal public sector with regard to: (i) the adoption of the Expenditure Restraint Act (Part 10 of the Budget Implementation Act, 2009) (the “ERA”). This law allegedly had the effect of amending the collective agreement in force for the UCCO–SACC–CSN by imposing a ceiling, on a retroactive basis, on the salaries and additional remuneration payable for any 12-month period starting between the beginning of the 2006–07 fiscal year and the end of the 2011–12 fiscal year; and (ii) the exclusion from the ambit of collective bargaining of certain working conditions under section 113 of the PSLRA (the relevant legislative provisions of the ERA and the PSLRA are contained in the appendix to this document).
2. 374. The Committee notes that, on 6 October 2010, the complainant organization lodged a complaint before the Quebec Superior Court to declare the provisions referred to in this complaint, which it considers to be contentious, unconstitutional with regard to freedom of association, and that a hearing could realistically take place at the end of 2012 or in early 2013. With regard to the Federal Government’s request that the full examination of the case be postponed pending the outcome of the appeal on grounds of unconstitutionality lodged by the complainant organization, the Committee wishes to recall that, although the use of internal legal procedures, whatever the outcome, is undoubtedly a factor to be taken into consideration, it has always considered that, in view of its responsibilities, its competence to examine allegations is not subject to the exhaustion of national procedures [see Digest, op. cit., Annex I, para. 30]. As in the examination of Case No. 2704 (Canada) [see 358th Report, para. 354], the Committee considers that its examination of the present case on the basis of long-established principles may be of assistance in the national consideration of the issues in question. It is in this spirit that the Committee will proceed with its examination of the substantive points raised in this case.

Expenditure Restraint Act (ERA)

1. 375. The Committee notes that the Government points out that certain allegations relating to this act should not be received by the Committee, as they concern provisions of the ERA that do not have a direct impact on the situation of the complainant organization or on the members of the bargaining unit that it represents. The Government refers in this regard to paragraph 31 of Annex I of the Digest, which provides that: “Allegations are receivable only if they are submitted by a national organization directly interested in the matter ...”. The Committee recalls that, according to paragraph 14 of Annex I, “The mandate of the Committee consists in determining whether any given legislation or practice complies with the principles of freedom of association and collective bargaining laid down in the relevant Conventions”. The Committee considers that, in this case, the complainant organization, having communicated more general allegations affecting its freedom of association and being directly covered by the ERA, even if not all its provisions, meets the criteria of paragraph 31 of Annex I. In order to carry out its mandate, the Committee must be able to examine in full any legislation that is referred to it by a complainant organization which has a direct interest in the matter in order to determine whether a practice should be considered to be in breach of the principles of freedom of association and collective bargaining, when the challenge to the legislation is an aspect of the complaint.
2. 376. Before examining the merits of this complaint, the Committee considers it necessary to describe the general context in which the complaint was filed. Since October 1991, the Committee has received on more than 20 occasions complaints against the Federal and Provincial Governments [see Cases Nos 1616, 1758, 1800 and 1859 against the Federal Government]. All these complaints share common ground in that they relate to reports of public service wage increases, reductions or freezes and restrictions on the right of public servants to bargain collectively in the different jurisdictions, measures that are sometimes accompanied by a ban on holding a strike.
3. 377. In the present case, the Committee notes that the Government, once again, has intervened through legislation to amend the provisions of negotiated collective agreements. In the present case, in order to justify its action, the Government basically uses the same argument that it used in previous cases, namely that the ERA was necessary in view of the difficult economic situation and that the measures taken are compatible with the principles established by the ILO.
4. 378. The Committee examined in detail the observations and arguments presented by the two parties. In particular, it carefully examined the explanations provided by the Government with regard to the country’s difficult economic and budgetary situation. There is no doubt that the Government was convinced of the need to remedy the situation by adopting legislation to restrain wage increases. The complainant, however, is convinced that the method used by the Government was not the best way to overcome the country’s economic problems. As has been mentioned in previous cases concerning the various restrictive laws of Canada, it is not the Committee’s role to express its views on the soundness of the economic arguments used by the Government to justify its position or the measures it has adopted. However, it is for the Committee to express its views on whether, in taking such action, the Government has gone beyond what the Committee has considered to be acceptable restrictions that might be placed temporarily on free collective bargaining [see Digest, op. cit., para. 998]. The Committee however emphasizes that adequate mechanisms for dealing with exceptional economic situations can be developed within the framework of the public sector collective bargaining system.
5. 379. The Committee notes that the Government clearly wanted to give priority to collective bargaining by consulting the complainant organization, but without success. The evidence provided in the present case clearly shows that the March 2009 budget and the legislation that embodied the Government’s policy put an end to all real wage bargaining for employees of the federal public service. In similar cases concerning restrictions placed on the right to collective bargaining as a result of economic stabilization measures, the Committee has recognized that if, for compelling reasons of national economic interest and as part of its stabilization policy, a government considers that wage rates cannot be settled freely through collective bargaining, such a restriction should be imposed as an exceptional measure and only to the extent that is necessary, without exceeding a reasonable period, and it should be accompanied by adequate safeguards to protect the living standards of workers, especially those who are likely to be the most affected [see Digest, op. cit., para. 1024]. The Committee notes in this case that the act imposes a ceiling on wage increases. The Committee also notes that the ERA reduced the wage increases of the workers in question from 2 per cent to 1.5 per cent, and that the ceilings imposed remained in place for part of the next round of bargaining. The Committee also notes that the act had a limited duration, allowed the complainant organization to carry out its activities, including bargaining over the normative clauses – albeit in a limited way in some respects – and that certain provisions had been taken to protect workers’ living standards (according to the Government, the members of the UCCO–SACC–CSN benefited from a wage increase that was above the rate of inflation for the period from June 2009 to May 2010). In view of all these circumstances and the Committee’s previous conclusions with regard to cases concerning legislative restrictions adopted by the Federal Government, the Committee considers that collective bargaining in the federal public sector has been seriously restricted for a period extending over five years (2006–11) and more specifically three years in the case of the complainant (since 2008, in line with legislation).
6. 380. The Committee furthermore notes that the measures taken were applied retroactively, rendering null and void any provisions in existing collective agreements which were incompatible with the new legislation, and requires any employee who has received for services already rendered a salary or additional remuneration under a collective agreement in excess of the limit established by the law to repay such amounts to the Government (the Government may recover such amounts through salary deductions). In this regard, the Committee notes that, according to the Government, none of the members of the complainant organization had been required to repay such an amount. The Committee recalls, however, that respect for the rule of law implies avoiding retroactive intervention in collective agreements through legislation. State bodies should refrain from intervening to alter the content of freely concluded collective agreements [see Digest, op. cit., para. 1001].
7. 381. The Committee regrets that the Government felt compelled to resort to such retroactive measures and trusts that it will refrain in the future from having recourse to retroactive intervention in the collective bargaining process. The Committee firmly expects that the Government will allow normal collective bargaining to be fully restored in the public service. Furthermore, given that, under the legislation, these restrictions to collective bargaining on wage increases expired at the end of 2011, the Committee expects that, in the future, full, frank and meaningful consultations will be held with the UCCO–SACC–CSN in all instances where workers’ rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining are at stake.

Public Service Labour Relations Act (PSLRA)

1. 382. The Committee observes that the PSLRA is the law that is applicable to collective bargaining between the UCCO–SACC–CSN and the Treasury Board of Canada. According to the complainant organization, section 113 of the PSLRA drastically limits the capacity of its members to carry out and conclude negotiations concerning whole areas of working conditions of concern to them. First and foremost, the effect of this provision is to make it so that any condition of employment or work which may, even indirectly, require the amendment or enactment of a federal law is non-negotiable. Furthermore, under section 113(b) of the PSLRA, any condition of employment that has been or may be established in the future within the framework of the PSEA, the PSSA or the GECA is non negotiable, even if such a condition of employment does not currently concern any of these acts. Therefore, any condition of employment which currently falls or in the future may fall with the remit of these acts is exempted from any form of negotiation; yet, according to the complainant organization, these three acts regard the fundamental working conditions of government workers.
2. 383. The Committee takes note of the Government’s explanation that that section 113(a) of the PSLRA recognizes a fundamental Canadian constitutional principle that only the Parliament of Canada can make legislation in the federal jurisdiction, and that an amendment to legislation must be made by the Parliament. Thus, parties to collective bargaining cannot “contract out” of all legislative requirements, and neither can they bind the Parliament of Canada, which is answerable to the Canadian electorate, to amend or enact new legislation. The Committee notes that Canadian domestic law recognizes that labour relations operate within legislated boundaries, which often serve to protect and uphold the bargaining process or human rights protections for workers, and that this principle was recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Airlines International Ltd. Therefore, according to the Government, the recognition in section 113 of the PSLRA that parties to collective bargaining may not “contract out” of the legislative provisions in force relating to terms or conditions of employment if doing so would require the adoption or amendment of legislation does not in itself breach freedom of association. In view of the above, the Committee considers that this allegation does not call for further examination.
3. 384. The Committee notes that section 113(b) of the PSLRA specifically excludes from the ambit of collective bargaining any term or condition of employment that has been or may be established under the three following statutes of Parliament: the PSEA, which deals with staffing in the federal public service and the political activities of employees; the PSSA, which provides for the pension regime for public servants; and the GECA, which is the basis for the system governing workplace accidents and compensation in the event of workplace injuries for state employees.
4. 385. The Committee notes that, from the inception of collective bargaining under the PSLRA, deliberate limitations on bargaining in relation to the PSEA, the PSSA and the GECA have been a part of the structure of collective bargaining in the federal public service. The Committee notes that it is for reasons of public interest specific to each of the acts that the Government decided to exclude the PSEA, the PSSA and the GECA from bargaining. The Committee notes that, according to the Government, the members of the UCCO–SACC–CSN are persons employed by public authorities within the meaning of Convention No. 151. They are also public servants engaged in the administration of the State. As such, they are excluded from the application of Convention No. 98.
5. 386. The Committee notes that, according to the Government, the scope of collective bargaining is not unlimited and that collective bargaining in the public service may be subject to special modalities of application fixed by national laws or practice, as established in Article 1 of Convention No. 154. The Government considers that this provision leaves States free to limit the scope of collective bargaining when it concerns compulsory schemes such as pensions, and to allow exceptions which have a major impact on the national budget and equality of workers, in a field as important as retirement pensions. In this respect, the Committee considers that, in accordance with the provisions of Convention No. 154, collective bargaining in the public service may be subject to special modalities of application. The Committee is aware that collective bargaining in the public sector calls for verification of the available resources in the various public bodies or undertakings and that such resources are dependent on state budgets, which does not preclude the competent budgetary authority from establishing an overall “budgetary package” within which the parties may negotiate pension clauses. It is essential, however, that workers and their organizations be able to participate fully and meaningfully in designing this overall bargaining framework, which implies in particular that they must have access to all the financial, budgetary and other data enabling them to assess the situation on the basis of the facts [see Digest, op. cit., para. 1038].
6. 387. Furthermore, with regard to allegations concerning the refusal to bargain collectively on certain matters in the public sector, the Committee recalls the view of the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association that “there are certain matters which clearly appertain primarily or essentially to the management and operation of government business; these can reasonably be regarded as outside the scope of negotiation”. It is equally clear that certain other matters are primarily or essentially questions relating to conditions of employment and that such matters should not be regarded as falling outside the scope of collective bargaining conducted in an atmosphere of mutual good faith and trust [see Digest, op. cit., para. 920].
7. 388. In view of the detailed information provided by the Government with regard to the mechanisms, commissions and vehicles established to enable bargaining agents to negotiate with regard to their working conditions and their involvement in the management of the plans that are established, in view of the Government’s explanations concerning the nature of the GECA, and recalling that questions concerning social security legislation fall outside its competence [see Digest, op. cit., Annex I, para. 21], the Committee considers that these allegations do not call for further examination.
8. 389. As regards the alleged failure by the Government to hold consultations on the adoption of this legislation, in view of the consultations described in detail by the Government in this regard, the Committee considers that these allegations do not call for further examination.

The Committee’s recommendation

1. 390. In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendation:
   • With regard to the ERA, the Committee regrets that the Government felt compelled to resort to such measures and trusts that it will refrain from doing so in the future. The Committee firmly expects that the Government will allow normal collective bargaining to be fully restored with the UCCO–SACC–CSN. Furthermore, given that, under the legislation, these restrictions to collective bargaining on wage increases expired at the end of 2011, the Committee expects that, in the future, full, frank and meaningful consultations will be held with the UCCO–SACC–CSN in all instances where workers’ rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining are at stake.

Z. Appendix

• Excerpts of the Expenditure Restraint Act, S.C. 2009, c. 2, s. 393
• Application
• Employees
• 13. (1) This Act applies to employees who are employed in or by:
• (a) the departments and other portions of the federal public administration named in Schedules I and IV, respectively, to the Financial Administration Act and the separate agencies named in Schedule V to that Act, other than the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada and the Staff of the Non-Public Funds, Canadian Forces;
• (b) the Crown corporations and public bodies named in Schedule 1; and
• (c) the Senate, the House of Commons, the Library of Parliament, the office of the Senate Ethics Officer and the office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner.
• Members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
• (2) For greater certainty, members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police are employees.
• Deemed employees
• (3)This Act applies to the following persons, who are deemed to be employees for the purposes of this Act:
• (a)the staff of members of the Senate and the House of Commons;
• (b)directors of the Crown corporations and public bodies named in Schedule 1;
• (c)officers and non-commissioned members of the Canadian Forces; and
• (d)the Chief Electoral Officer.
• Restraint measures
• Increases to rates of pay
• 16. Despite any collective agreement, arbitral award or terms and conditions of employment to the contrary, but subject to the other provisions of this Act, the rates of pay for employees are to be increased, or are deemed to have been increased, as the case may be, by the following percentages for any 12-month period that begins during any of the following fiscal years:
• (a) the 2006–2007 fiscal year, 2.5 per cent;
• (b) the 2007–2008 fiscal year, 2.3 per cent;
• (c) the 2008–2009 fiscal year, 1.5 per cent;
• (d) the 2009–2010 fiscal year, 1.5 per cent; and
• (e) the 2010–2011 fiscal year, 1.5 per cent.
• Employees represented by a bargaining agent
• Increases to rates of pay – collective agreements or arbitral awards after coming into force
• 17. (1) The provisions of any collective agreement that is entered into, or arbitral award that is made, after the day on which this Act comes into force may not provide for increases to rates of pay that are greater than those set out in section 16, but they may provide for increases that are lower.
• 12-month periods
• (2) For greater certainty, any collective agreement that is entered into, or any arbitral award that is made, after the day on which this Act comes into force and that provides for increases to rates of pay for any period that begins during the restraint period must do so on the basis of a 12-month period.
• Increases to rates of pay – collective agreements and arbitral awards – 8 December 2008 until coming into force
• 18. The provisions of any collective agreement that is entered into, or any arbitral award that is made, during the period that begins on 8 December 2008 and ends on the day on which this Act comes into force that provide, for any particular period, for increases to rates of pay that are greater than those referred to in section 16 for that particular period are of no effect or are deemed never to have had effect, as the case may be, and are deemed to be provisions that provide for the increases referred to in section 16.
• Increases to rates of pay – collective agreements and arbitral awards – before 8 December 2008
• 19. With respect to a collective agreement that is entered into, or an arbitral award that is made, before 8 December 2008,
• (a) section 16 does not apply in respect of any period that began during the 2006–2007 or 2007–2008 fiscal year; and
• (b) for any 12-month period that begins during any of the 2008–2009, 2009–2010 and 2010–2011 fiscal years, section 16 applies only in respect of periods that begin on or after 8 December 2008 and any provisions of those agreements or awards that provide, for any particular period, for increases to rates of pay that are greater than those referred to in section 16 for that particular period are of no effect or are deemed never to have had effect, as the case may be, and are deemed to be provisions that provide for the increases referred to in section 16.
• Other than 12-month periods – section 18
• 20. If a collective agreement or arbitral award to which section 18 applies provides for an increase to rates of pay for a period of other than 12 months that begins during any particular fiscal year in the restraint period, that increase is of no effect or is deemed never to have had effect, as the case may be, and is deemed to be an increase for that period of other than 12 months, determined on an annualized basis to the nearest 1/100 per cent, that provides for the increase referred to in section 16 for a period that begins during that particular fiscal year.
• Other than 12-month periods – section 19
• 21. If a collective agreement or arbitral award to which section 19 applies provides for an increase to rates of pay for a period of other than 12 months that begins during any particular fiscal year that begins during the period that begins on 8 December 2008 and ends on 31 March 2011, that increase is of no effect or is deemed never to have had effect, as the case may be, and is deemed to be an increase for that period of other than 12 months, determined on an annualized basis to the nearest 1/100 per cent, that provides for the increase referred to in section 16 for a period that begins during that particular fiscal year.
• Lower percentages not affected
• 22. If a collective agreement or arbitral award to which section 18 or 19 applies provides for an increase to the rates of pay for any particular period that is lower than the increase referred to in section 16 for that period, section 16 does not apply in respect of that increase.
• Restructuring prohibited
• 23. Subject to sections 31 to 34,
• (a) no provision of a collective agreement that is entered into, or of an arbitral award that is made, after the day on which this Act comes into force may provide for the restructuring of rates of pay during any period that begins during the restraint period;
• (b) any provision of a collective agreement that is entered into, or of an arbitral award that is made, during the period that begins on 8 December 2008 and ends on the day on which this Act comes into force that provides for the restructuring of rates of pay during any period that begins during the restraint period is of no effect or is deemed never to have had effect, as the case may be; and
• (c) any provision of a collective agreement that is entered into, or of an arbitral award that is made, before December 8, 2008 that provides for the restructuring of rates of pay during any period that begins during the period that begins on 8 December 2008 and ends on 31 March 2011 is of no effect or is deemed never to have had effect, as the case may be.
• No increases to additional remuneration – after coming into force
• 24. No collective agreement that is entered into, or arbitral award that is made, after the day on which this Act comes into force may provide, for any period that begins during the restraint period, for any increase to the amount or rate of any additional remuneration that applied to the employees governed by the collective agreement or the arbitral award immediately before the collective agreement, or the arbitral award, as the case may be, becomes effective.
• No increases to additional remuneration – 8 December 2008 until coming into force
• 25. If a collective agreement that is entered into, or arbitral award that is made, at any time during the period that begins on 8 December 2008 and ends on the day on which this Act comes into force contains provisions that provide, for any period that begins during the restraint period, for an increase to the amount or rate of any additional remuneration that applied to the employees governed by the collective agreement or the arbitral award immediately before the collective agreement, or the arbitral award, as the case may be, became effective, those provisions are of no effect or are deemed never to have had effect, as the case may be.
• No increases to additional remuneration – before 8 December 2008
• 26. If a collective agreement that is entered into, or an arbitral award that is made, before 8 December 2008 contains provisions that, for any period that begins in the period that begins on 8 December 2008 and ends on 31 March 2011, provide for an increase to the amount or rate of any additional remuneration that applied to the employees governed by the collective agreement or the arbitral award immediately before the first period that began on or after 8 December 2008, those provisions are of no effect or are deemed never to have had effect, as the case may be.
• No new additional remuneration – after coming into force
• 27. No collective agreement that is entered into, or arbitral award that is made, after the day on which this Act comes into force may provide, for any period that begins during the restraint period, for any additional remuneration that is new in relation to the additional remuneration that applied to the employees governed by the collective agreement or the arbitral award immediately before the collective agreement or the arbitral award, as the case may be, becomes effective.
• No new additional remuneration – 8 December 2008 to coming into force
• 28. If a collective agreement that is entered into, or an arbitral award that is made, at any time during the period that begins on 8 December 2008 and ends on the day on which this Act comes into force contains a provision that provides, for any period that begins during the restraint period, for any additional remuneration to the employees governed by the collective agreement or the arbitral award that is new in relation to the additional remuneration that applied to the employees governed by the collective agreement or the arbitral award, as the case may be, immediately before it became effective, that provision is of no effect or is deemed never to have had effect, as the case may be.
• No new additional remuneration – before 8 December 2008
• 29. If a collective agreement that is entered into, or an arbitral award that is made, before December 8, 2008 contains a provision that provides, for any period that begins in the period that begins on 8 December 2008 and ends on 31 March 2011, for any additional remuneration to the employees governed by the collective agreement or the arbitral award that is new in relation to the additional remuneration that applied to the employees governed by the collective agreement or arbitral award, as the case may be, immediately before the first period that began on or after 8 December 2008, that provision is of no effect or is deemed never to have had effect, as the case may be.
• General
• Inconsistent provisions
• 56. Any provision of any collective agreement that is entered into – or of any arbitral award that is made, or of any terms and conditions of employment that are established – after the day on which this Act comes into force that is inconsistent with this Act is of no effect.
• Compensating for restraint measures prohibited
• 57. No provision of any collective agreement that is entered into – or of any arbitral award that is made, or of any terms and conditions of employment that are established – after the day on which this Act comes into force may provide for compensation for amounts that employees did not receive as a result of the restraint measures in this Act.
• Provisions compensating for restraint measures of no effect
• 58. If a provision of a collective agreement that is entered into – or of an arbitral award that is made, or of terms and conditions of employment that are established – on or before the day on which this Act comes into force provides for compensation for amounts that employees did not receive as a result of the restraint measures in this Act, that provision is of no effect or is deemed never to have had effect, as the case may be.
• No changes to performance pay plans – new collective agreements, etc.
• 59. No provision of any collective agreement that is entered into – or of any arbitral award that is made, or of any terms and conditions of employment that are established – after the day on which this Act comes into force may, for any period that begins during the restraint period, change the performance pay plans, including the amounts or rates, that apply to any employees governed by the agreement, award or terms and conditions of employment.
• No changes to performance pay plans – existing collective agreements, etc.
• 60. If a provision of a collective agreement that is entered into – or of an arbitral award that is made, or of terms and conditions of employment that are established – during the period that begins on 8 December 2008 and ends on the day on which this Act comes into force changes, for any period that begins during the restraint period, the performance pay plans, including the amounts or rates, that apply to any employees governed by the agreement, award or terms and conditions of employment, the change is of no effect or is deemed never to have had effect, as the case may be.
• No changes to performance pay plans – existing collective agreements, etc.
• 61. If a provision of a collective agreement that is entered into – or of an arbitral award that is made, or of terms and conditions of employment that are established – before 8 December 2008 changes, for any period that begins in the period that begins on 8 December 2008 and ends on 31 March 2011, the performance pay plans, including the amounts or rates, that apply to any employees governed by the agreement, award or terms and conditions of employment, the change is of no effect or is deemed never to have had effect, as the case may be.
• Royal Canadian Mounted Police
• 62. Despite sections 44 to 49, the Treasury Board may change the amount or rate of any allowance, or make any new allowance, applicable to members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police if the Treasury Board is of the opinion that the change or the new allowance, as the case may be, is critical to support transformation initiatives relating to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
• Administration
• Powers and duties of Treasury Board
• 63. (1) The Treasury Board may exercise the powers and shall perform the duties in relation to this Act that are necessary to enable it to determine whether an employer of employees, other than employees referred to in paragraph 13(1)(c) or (3)(a), is complying with this Act.
• Information and documentation
• (2) The Treasury Board may require from the employer any information and documentation that it considers necessary to enable it to determine whether the employer is complying with this Act.
• Treasury Board directive
• (3) If the Treasury Board determines under this section that the employer is not complying with this Act, it may issue any directives that it considers appropriate to ensure the compliance.
• Debt due to Her Majesty
• 64. (1) Every amount paid – including amounts paid before the day on which this Act comes into force – to any person in excess of the amount that should have been paid as a result of this Act is a debt due to Her Majesty and may be recovered as such.
• Overpayment
• (2) Any amount that is a debt due to Her Majesty as a result of subsection (1) is deemed to be an overpayment to which subsection 155(3) of the Financial Administration Act applies.
• Application
• (3) For greater certainty, subsection (1) applies to, but is not limited to, the following amounts:
• (a) amounts paid under a provision that by the operation of this Act is of no effect or is deemed never to have had effect; and
• (b)amounts paid as a result of the payment of any amount referred to in paragraph (a).
• Orders
• 65. The Governor in Council may, on the recommendation of the Treasury Board, by order, amend Schedule 1 by adding to or deleting from it the name of any Crown corporation or public body.
• Excerpt of the Public Service Labour Relations Act, S.C. 2003, c. 22, s. 2
• Restriction on content of collective agreement
• 113. A collective agreement may not, directly or indirectly, alter or eliminate any existing term or condition of employment or establish any new term or condition of employment if:
• (a) doing so would require the enactment or amendment of any legislation by Parliament, except for the purpose of appropriating money required for the implementation of the term or condition, or
• (b) the term or condition is one that has been or may be established under the Public Service Employment Act, the Public Service Superannuation Act or the Government Employees Compensation Act.