Definitive Report - Report No 362, November 2011

Case No 2785 (Spain) - Complaint date: 03-JUN-10 - Closed

Allegations: Alteration by the authorities of certain clauses of a collective agreement freely concluded between the complainant organization and the employer (AENA)

1. 699. The complaint is contained in a communication from the Trade Union of Air Traffic Controllers (USCA) dated 3 June 2010.
2. 700. The Government sent its observations in communications dated 14 September 2010 and 20 May 2011.
3. 701. Spain has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. The complainant’s allegations

1. 702. In its communication of 3 June 2010, the Trade Union of Air Traffic Controllers (hereafter referred to as “the USCA”) explains that it is the majority union and thus represents the vast majority of Spain’s air traffic controllers, and that the controllers work directly under the public body responsible for Spanish airports and aviation (hereafter referred to as “AENA”) and indirectly under the Ministry of Development, which includes AENA in its administrative structure. The Ministry is responsible for laying down AENA’s performance guidelines, for approving its annual objectives, for following up its activities and, without prejudice to its other areas of competence, for monitoring its effectiveness in accordance with current regulations.
2. 703. The USCA explains that the first collective agreement it concluded with AENA was approved by a decision of 4 March 1999 and was to remain in force until 31 December 2004. However, Agreement 4.3 of the aforementioned text provides that the collective agreement will be automatically extended by 12 calendar months from its date of expiry, provided that it is not renounced by either party. Furthermore, Agreement 4.4 of the same text explicitly provides that: “Despite the agreement having been renounced, all its provisions shall remain in force during the interim period between its expiry date and the publication of its replacement”. The registration of this far-reaching and complex collective agreement was preceded by a favourable report from the Ministry of the Economy and Finance and the Ministry of Territorial Policy and Public Administration.
3. 704. The USCA notes that the text of the collective agreement encompasses all aspects of the professional services provided by the controllers and this fact alone is a testament to the willingness to negotiate and the good faith demonstrated by both parties during the negotiation of such a complex text.
4. 705. The USCA further notes that the parties held several meetings to negotiate a new text to replace the current collective agreement, which were unilaterally interrupted by AENA on 2 February 2010 when its representatives withdrew from the negotiating table (the USCA encloses a copy of the letter from AENA’s Director of Human Resources dated 2 February 2010 communicating the unilateral break in negotiations). The USCA emphasizes that, throughout the process of negotiating a second text, there were no calls for strike action or any other type of collective action or mobilization.
5. 706. The USCA further alleges that three days following AENA’s unilateral break in negotiations, Royal Decree-Law No. 1/2010, which had been approved by the Government at the request of the Ministry of Development, entered into force, laying down certain working conditions for civil air traffic controllers while simultaneously regulating air traffic services and setting out the obligations incumbent on the providers of such services. The aforementioned Decree-Law, which was enacted as a matter of urgency, substantially altered the basic conditions of all contracts of employment which, in this case, had been freely and independently negotiated between AENA and the USCA under the first collective agreement and subsequent agreements, which, in spite of their non-statutory nature, are not any less binding upon the parties. This applies to matters such as shift patterns; working hours (first transitional provision); the altering or substitution of pre-established shifts; alterations to working hours; shift start times; advance publication of rotas; rest periods during working hours; day and night-time breaks; movement outside the workplace; leave and holidays; special leave on the grounds of age; and offences.
6. 707. Once validated by the Congress of Deputies, the aforementioned Decree-Law was treated as a bill, subject to an emergency procedure, and repealed by Act No. 9/2010 (with a single overriding provision), the text of which, in terms similar to those used in the Decree itself, also disregards the agreement reached as a result of collective bargaining. The act makes no mention of the ratification of the fundamental ILO Conventions Nos 87 and 98, which must be considered and complied with unless, given the circumstances, they were to be denounced, which would be unthinkable.
7. 708. The USCA alleges that it was not consulted in any way prior to the adoption of the legislative text.
8. 709. According to press releases dated three days after the entry into force of the aforementioned Decree-Law, the country’s majority trade unions, the General Union of Workers (UGT) and the Confederation of Workers’ Committees (CCOO), expressed their concern that the legal provision could “set a precedent” if it were to be applied to other groups working under the authority of a public body. Furthermore, they described the decree as “a blatant violation of the controllers’ collective agreement”.
9. 710. As to the health and safety of air traffic controllers, the USCA states that the measures adopted (which entail substantial changes to their working conditions) have given rise to new occupational risks for that group of workers, without compulsory updates to the risk assessment procedure having been carried out.
10. 711. Lastly, the USCA draws attention to the principles of the supervisory bodies of the ILO, on the compulsory nature of collective agreements and the principles according to which “State bodies should refrain from intervening to alter the content of freely concluded collective agreements, as this runs counter to the principle of collective bargaining.
11. B. The Government’s reply
12. 712. In its communication of 14 September 2010, the Government states that the enactment of Royal Decree-Law No. 1/2010 and Act No. 9/2010 has in no way affected the freedom of association of air traffic controllers or their right to engage in timely negotiations with the body for which they provide services to establish their labour rights and obligations. The enactment of the aforementioned legal provisions has provided a framework for the delivery of these services, as required in view of two basic circumstances:
13. (a) First, the nature of the activity for which the services are provided (air traffic), which affects a number of basic individual and collective rights (including the right to free movement of persons and goods), aside from the question of air traffic safety, which in Spain is governed by the provisions of EU Regulation No. 2096/2005/CE of 20 December, which lays down common requirements for providing aviation services, as well as by other EU provisions that regulate the Single European Sky initiative.
14. (b) Second, the parties failed to reach an agreement, as demonstrated by the fact that, while the collective agreement expired on 31 December 2004, a new agreement had still not been reached five years later, in spite of the numerous and frequent offers made by the employer, which has held 65 meetings around the negotiating table in order to conclude the second collective agreement, during which it submitted up to ten proposals based on the regulations of the Single European Sky initiative (compliance with the initiative is compulsory in Spain), whereas the workers’ representatives submitted only one proposal, which failed to take into account any of the aspects that had to be altered, in order to be aligned with EU law.
15. (c) Given the situation, the aforementioned legal provisions only temporarily alter the working conditions of the AENA controllers. While these alterations are minimal, they remain nonetheless essential in order to achieve the desired objectives.
16. 713. The above does not constitute a violation of the Spanish air traffic controllers’ freedom of association (which has not been affected in any way), or of their right to collective bargaining, which, similarly, has not been affected in any way. However, there are certain conditions governing this right:
17. - This right may be subject to internal legal restrictions in accordance with the provisions of Spanish employment regulations (Workers’ Statute Act), without these restrictions constituting a violation of the right to collective bargaining enshrined in international instruments, such as ILO Conventions Nos 87 and 98.
18. - Second, the special status enjoyed by certain workers, as set out in ILO Convention No. 98, article 6, concerning public servants must be taken into account. It should be noted that, in Spain, air traffic controllers who work for AENA are public employees who provide an essential public service. Similarly, this category of public employees necessitates a special adherence to the principles and rules laid down by the State to regulate the provision of these services.
19. 714. Lastly, the fact that the entry into force of the legal provisions approved by the Spanish State (Royal Decree-Law No. 1/2010 and Act No. 9/2010) has not affected the collective bargaining framework but has led to the setting up of a new committee to negotiate the future collective agreement within the framework provided by these legal provisions is a testament to the right to collective bargaining. To date, the negotiating committee has held more than 18 meetings, including two information sessions.
20. 715. The Government further notes that the USCA brought a case of collective dispute before the National High Court on the grounds that the alterations to the working conditions of air traffic controllers, stemming from the implementation of the Royal Decree-Law No. 1/2010 of 5 February and subsequently by Act No. 9/2010 of 14 April, were illegal, thereby requesting the restoration of the working conditions laid down in the first collective agreement concluded between AENA and the USCA. In its ruling of 10 May 2010 (a transcription of which has been enclosed), the Social Chamber of the National High Court categorically rejected the case of collective dispute brought by the USCA, deeming the authorities’ intervention to be not only justified but essential, opportune and proportionate owing to its minimal and temporary impact on the first collective agreement in the interests of guaranteeing the safety and continuity of air traffic services.
21. 716. The Government explains that official reports underscored the need to safeguard the economic viability of AENA, which had run up a substantial deficit, to urgently bring air traffic services into line with EU regulations and for an overhaul of the current air traffic system in the interests of guaranteeing the safety and continuity of the service, all of which pointed to the urgent need to adopt measures in order to regulate issues such as working hours, rest periods and training. According to these reports, it is a question of confronting a serious threat to both the national and European air traffic system.
22. 717. The Government has prepared comments on the aforementioned court ruling, in which it indicates that jurisprudence attaches great importance to the principle of the law of the land prevailing over the agreement, specifying that, with regard to the division of labour between the legislature and the collective bargaining process, the legislature is entitled by law to enter reservations on certain matters, which would normally be regulated by means of collective bargaining, should exceptional circumstances or special cases arise. Given that the law prevails over the agreement without prejudice to the right to collective bargaining, the National High Court refers to constitutional doctrine when laying down the guidelines for identifying the essential content of fundamental rights. In this regard, the National High Court stipulates that “... no fundamental right is absolute, in other words, all rights are restricted in the way that all fundamental rights are restricted by the need to ensure their compatibility with the other rights and legal provisions enshrined in the Constitution, which leads to the belief that legislative intervention is required to seek out solutions in the case of conflict between rights and legal provisions of constitutional standing, which would need to be the subject of deliberations in the light of the general consensus that the restriction of fundamental rights must be supported in the Constitution, given the inadequate nature of the support that can be offered by the simple interests of the respective parliamentary majority. The European Convention on Human Rights has maintained the same criterion and makes reference throughout the text to measures necessary in a democratic society whereby restrictions may only be placed on such rights in the interests of safeguarding values such as public safety, health and the impartiality of the judiciary. Therefore, restrictions may be placed on fundamental rights only when concurrent with a vital community interest. However, should restrictions prove necessary, it is not enough to merely state the existence of such an interest without also acknowledging the need to protect it within the framework of fundamental rights to the extent that the restriction of fundamental rights is justified. The deliberations between the stakeholders must respect the principle of proportionality, which is the tool used to ascertain whether the actions leading to the restriction of fundamental rights have respected the limits established in the Constitution. In such cases, three requirements must be met:
23. (1) The intervention must possess the means to achieve its end.
24. (2) The intervention must be necessary and used as a last resort.
25. (3) It must be proportional in the strict sense of the term. In other words, it must not excessively curtail the right or interest on which the restriction was placed. This requirement is the most important since the principle of proportionality and essential content are not synonymous, given that, according to scientific doctrine, respect for essential content, for all intents and purposes, overlaps with the third requirement set out above in such a way that it is not enough for the legislature’s intervention to be adequate and necessary, rather it must score reasonably well in terms of proportionality. These three requirements having been met, the court ruling of 10 May 2010 on the case of the air traffic controllers concluded that the fundamental right to the freedom of association, of which collective bargaining forms an integral part, had not been violated. The ruling stated that “it has been proven beyond all doubt that AENA was not in a position to guarantee the safety and continuity of its air traffic services or to honour the country’s international obligations, in particular EU Regulations Nos 2096/2005 /CE and 1070/2009/CE, proving that, in 2011, AENA was still not in a position to fulfil the community requirements laid down by the European Commission for the air traffic network, given Spain’s central role in air traffic both in Europe and worldwide, owing to the high frequency of its air traffic. The ruling also noted that AENA’s economic viability has been gravely compromised, making it one the most inefficient air traffic service providers in Europe, as is evident from the report of the Directorate-General of Civil Aviation, which is the regulatory body and executive office for aeronautical policy, which was based on the reports of EUROCONTROL.
26. 718. Among other things, the ruling notes the USCA’s insistence that there were no exceptional circumstances or any urgent need for the Government, and subsequently for the legislature, to intervene, as the situation had been ongoing for 20 years. However, it does not accept the USCA’s assessment, as the continuation for over 20 years of a situation such as the one in question, whereby collective bargaining was used in fraud of law to reach a formal agreement on insufficient working hours, only for collective bargaining to be used later in order to extend working hours, which resulted in controllers undertaking hundreds of hours of overtime, in violation of the overtime limits laid down in article 35, 2ET, does not constitute a state of normality but rather a permanent state of exception that no responsible administration can tolerate, as it is subject to the principle of legality in accordance with the provisions of article 103, 1CE.
27. 719. It should be acknowledged that the intervention of the legislature was not only necessary but vital to ensure a return to “normality”, in other words, a return to legality. To this end, the legislature was obliged to impose temporary measures relating to the current service provider, which created the conditions necessary for an ordered transition to a new organizational structure of civil air traffic service providers by legislative means. These measures affected the essential aspects of collective bargaining, which have given rise to the situation in question. It is inconceivable that collective bargaining could be used to resolve the situation, as demonstrated by the failure to negotiate the terms of the agreement following 75 fruitless meetings.
28. 720. The Government also notes the decision taken by the Ombudsman in relation to the calls for entering a plea of unconstitutionality against Royal Decree-Law No. 1/2010 of 5 February, to the effect that no such plea was entered.
29. 721. In accordance with the above, the Government concludes that the exercise of the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining has not been violated.
30. 722. In a report sent by the Government, AENA refers to the statement of the complainant organization, in which the organization affirms that throughout the process of negotiating a new collective agreement to replace the first (which was extended as of 31 December 2004), there were no calls for strike action or any other type of collective action or mobilization. AENA confirms that this indeed is the case, which corresponds with the proven facts recorded in ruling No. 047/2010 of the Social Chamber of the National High Court, which also appear in procedure No. 41/10, initiated at the request of the USCA against AENA, the Ministry of Development and the Ministry of the Economy and Finance on the grounds of collective dispute, which considers the following facts as established:
31. The industrial relations between air traffic controllers as a collective and their employers have been greatly strained; the main points of contention, which have been reported in the media, include the following:
32. [...]
33. 6. The delays experienced at Madrid Barajas airport on 2 and 3 January 2009 owing to seven air traffic controllers being off on sick leave.
34. 7. The closure of two runways at Madrid Barajas airport on 23 July 2009 owing to a lack of air traffic controllers due to illness and the remaining controllers’ refusal to work overtime.
35. 8. The delays to flights from Madrid Barajas airport to the Canary Islands on 27 December 2009 owing to several controllers being off on sick leave and the remaining controllers’ refusal to work overtime.
36. 9. The closure of two runways at Madrid Barajas airport on 1 January 2010 owing to a lack of air traffic controllers due to illness and the remaining controllers’ refusal to work overtime.
37. 10. The controllers’ announcement that from 1 April 2010 they would work only their statutory, basic day of 12 hours.
38. 723. Furthermore, AENA notes that, in addition, the complainant organization seems to have deviated from the content of the following paragraph of the statement of proven facts contained in the ruling:
39. As of 31 December 2004, the expiry date of the first collective agreement, a total of 65 meetings have been held between AENA and the USCA without any satisfactory outcome.
40. On 2 February 2010, when reaching an agreement proved impossible, AENA broke negotiations with the USCA, notifying the air traffic controllers to this effect through a communication dated 5 February 2010, which has been placed on record and is incorporated herein by reference.
41. 724. Furthermore, AENA notes that following the entry into force of the aforementioned legal provisions, a new negotiating committee has been set up to negotiate the terms of the future collective agreement within the framework provided for in these legal provisions, which is a testament to the right to collective bargaining. To date, the negotiating committee has held numerous meetings.
42. 725. In its communication of 20 May 2011, the Government announced that Spain was submitting its comments on the case, which would appear in the reports prepared by the relevant authorities of the Ministry of Development – the Civil Aviation Directorate and the AENA, as well as the Directorate-General for Labour of the Ministry of Labour and Immigration.
43. 726. The Directorate-General of Civil Aviation of the Ministry of Development notes that the adoption and entry into force of Act No. 9/2010 of 14 April did not affect the framework of collective bargaining as, following the entry into force of this act, a negotiating committee was set up to negotiate the terms of the second collective agreement of these workers, which is a testament to the right to collective bargaining. The activities of the negotiating committee have already yielded preliminary results as, in August 2010, the AENA and the USCA signed a basic agreement with 12 points. On 29 December 2010, the negotiating committee ratified the agreement on the negotiation procedure, which had been provisionally adopted by a number of the members of the negotiating committee and in which the parties had set 1 January 2011 as the deadline for negotiating the terms of the second collective agreement, explicitly stating that, “should discrepancies regarding any of the matters that are the subject of the negotiation persist and thereby prevent a consensus from being reached that would otherwise lead to the signing of the agreement, in the present document both parties undertake to bring any such discrepancies before a binding arbitral procedure with which they must comply in full”.
44. 727. The deadline set by both parties for negotiating the terms of the collective agreement having passed, the parties jointly informed the appointed arbitrator that no consensus had been reached over the course of the negotiations. The arbitral procedure began on 1 February 2011 and resulted in an arbitral award that concluded the second collective agreement for air traffic controllers employed by the AENA. The agreement will remain in force until 31 December 2011.
45. 728. The Government maintains that the intervention of the Spanish legislature in the matter concerning collective bargaining was necessary, opportune and proportionate in the interests of restoring legality and guaranteeing citizens the right to free movement, as well as the safety and continuity of air traffic.
46. 729. The intervention was temporary and had minimal impact, as demonstrated by the adoption of the second collective agreement for air traffic controllers employed by the AENA.
47. 730. The public body AENA draws attention to the laborious negotiating process that took place within the negotiating committee (which began following the entry into force of Royal Decree-Law No. 1/2010 of 5 February, and of Act No. 14/2010 of 14 April, which supersedes and repeals it), a process which was brought to an end following numerous meetings by the signing of the second collective agreement, the fruit of an “arbitral compromise”, reached by the parties on 23 December 2010, ratified at the negotiating table on 29 December 2010 and published together with name of the arbitrator in the Official Bulletin of the State on 26 January 2011. Agreement 13 of those contained in the arbitral compromise provides that: “The temporal and effective scope of the arbitral award rules out the possibility of any further proceedings, cases on the grounds of collective dispute or strikes resulting from the resolved matter” while Agreement 15 provides that: “This arbitral compromise is similar in both nature and effectiveness to a statutory collective agreement, and as such will be registered, deposited and published in the Official Bulletin, with the management of AENA being responsible for taking the necessary formalities.
48. 731. The Directorate-General for Labour of the Ministry of Labour and Immigration provides detailed information on the different aspects of the arbitral compromise and of the arbitration process and draws attention to the fact that the temporal and effective scope of the arbitral award rules out the possibility of further proceedings, cases on the grounds of collective dispute or strikes resulting from the resolved matter, and to the fact that it deals with “all points of negotiation that have yet to be agreed upon. Therefore, the arbitral award shall only overlook aspects on which an explicit agreement has been reached or issues that the parties have not explicitly agreed to bring before the arbitration procedure. Furthermore, the unanimous decision to submit any discrepancies to an impartial third party who will resolve them does not constitute, to quote from the arbitral award itself, an abnormal outcome or a failure of the collective bargaining process. Nonetheless, it does not signal the conclusion or the explicit withdrawal of the complaint lodged by the USCA, despite the fact that the arbitral award successfully replaced the first collective agreement between the air traffic controllers and AENA. It is undoubtedly the failure to negotiate the terms of the agreement that belied the USCA’s complaint”.
49. 732. The Directorate-General for Labour provides a detailed account of the interpretation of the jurisprudence relating to the principle of good faith in negotiation and draws attention to the fact that the deadlock reached during the negotiations of the second collective agreement was overcome firstly by AENA’s acceptance of an arbitral compromise on 11 January 2011, involving representatives from both AENA and the USCA, in accordance with the provisions of articles 90, paragraphs 2 and 3, and 91 of the Workers’ Statute Act and Royal Decree No. 713/2010 of 28 May on the registration and submission of collective employment agreements, and secondly by the adoption, registration and official publication of the arbitral award, which includes the full text of the second collective agreement for air traffic controllers employed by AENA, which entered into force on 10 March 2011.

C. The Committee’s conclusions

1. 733. The Committee notes that in this complaint, the complainant organization alleges that the negotiations between the USCA and the public body AENA aimed at replacing the collective agreement, which expired on 31 December 2004, were interrupted on 2 February 2010 when AENA’s representatives withdrew from the negotiating table. According to the USCA, three days following this unilateral break in negotiations, Royal Decree-Law No. 1/2010 entered into force (the contents of which were subsequently enshrined in Act No. 9/2010 adopted by the Chamber of Deputies, which used terms similar to those used in the Royal Decree-Law), which, responding to an urgent need, altered the working conditions set out in the collective agreement, with reference to shifts, working hours, rest periods, movement outside the workplace, leave, holidays and offences. The USCA alleges in particular the interference of the authorities in the collective bargaining process, which constitutes a violation of ILO Convention No. 98, and the lack of consultation and notes that the new regulations have given rise to new occupational risks for air traffic controllers. Lastly, the USCA claims that the alleged acts occurred in the context of a negotiation process during which there were no calls for strike action or any other type of collective action or mobilization.
2. 734. The Committee notes the Government’s statements, according to which (1) the legal provisions contested by the complainant organization temporarily alter certain working conditions of air traffic controllers, who provide an essential public service; (2) it was necessary to bring this service into line with the provisions of EU Regulation No. 2096/2005, which lays down common requirements for all States providing air travel services, and with other EU provisions regulating the Single European Sky initiative, compliance with which is compulsory in Spain, which affect air traffic safety and the fundamental right to free movement of persons and goods; (3) the legal provisions were contested as a new collective agreement still had not been concluded (the previous one having expired on 31 December 2004) following five years of negotiations and despite the numerous and frequent offers made by the employer over the 65 meetings held at the negotiating table, which resulted in the submission of up to ten proposals based on the regulations of the Single European Sky initiative, whereas the workers’ representatives only submitted one proposal, which failed to take into account any of the aspects that had to be altered; (4) the contested legal provisions (which the Government insists were only temporary in nature) did not affect the collective bargaining framework as, following their entry into force, a new negotiating committee was set up to negotiate the terms of the future collective agreement; (5) on 10 May 2010, the judicial authority (the Social Chamber of National High Court) categorically rejected the case brought by the complainant organization; (6) with regard to the complainant organization’s allegation that the authorities intervened during a negotiation process during which there were no calls for strike action or any other type of collective action or mobilization, the Government and AENA quote the relevant section of the ruling of the judicial authority, where it is stated that the industrial relations between air traffic controllers as a collective and their employers have been greatly strained and that the points of contention, dating from 2009, include delays to flights owing to employees repeatedly being off on sick leave, their refusal to work overtime and the controllers’ announcement that as of April 2010 they would work only their statutory, basic day. The Committee notes that the Government has not responded to the alleged lack of consultation with the USCA when drafting the contested legal provisions but understands that, in addition to the situation of urgency declared by the Government, the numerous meetings and negotiations held with the public body AENA (which is directly answerable to the Ministry of Development) allowed the authorities to gain sufficient insight into the point of view and position adopted by the trade union.
3. 735. The Committee further notes the second reply from the Government, in which it is stated that, following the temporary measures introduced by the authorities, the negotiating committee comprising both USCA and AENA representatives resumed the negotiation of the second collective agreement, which led to the decision, taken on 23 December 2010, to submit any discrepancies to an arbitrator (jointly appointed on 11 January 2011), who subsequently issued an arbitral award that included the full text of the second collective agreement concluded between the air traffic controllers, represented by the USCA, and AENA, which entered into force on 10 March 2011. Furthermore, the arbitral award rules out the possibility of any further proceedings or cases on the grounds of collective dispute resulting from the resolved matter.
4. 736. The Committee wishes to recall the principle of free and voluntary negotiation, and in particular the principle according to which: “State bodies should refrain from intervening to alter the content of freely concluded collective agreements” [see the Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee, fifth (revised) edition, 2006, para. 1001]. However, the Committee considers air traffic control to be an essential service in the strict sense of the term [see the Digest op. cit., para. 585] and that, in such cases, certain types of intervention by the authorities are not incompatible with the principles of collective bargaining. In particular, the Committee considers recourse to compulsory arbitration in cases where the parties do not reach an agreement through collective bargaining is permissible only in the context of essential services in the strict sense of the term (i.e. services the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population) [see Digest, op. cit., para. 994].
5. 737. Furthermore, the Committee has noted the contents of the legal decision on this case, the Government’s arguments for invoking reasons of safety and the urgent need to comply with the EU regulations on air travel services, as well as its statement to the effect that following years of negotiations aimed at concluding the second collective agreement, a deadlock had been reached, which had to be broken in spite of five years and 65 fruitless meetings between the parties. In this regard, the Committee recognizes that there comes a time in bargaining where, after protracted and fruitless negotiations, the authorities may be justified in stepping in when it is obvious that the deadlock in bargaining will not be broken without some initiative on their part [see Digest, op. cit., para. 1003].
6. 738. In the light of this, the Committee, while noting that, following the lodging of the complaint, the parties agreed to appoint an arbitrator to settle their differences and that the award issued by the arbitrator includes the text of the second collective agreement between the USCA and AENA, which entered into force in March 2011, has decided that this case does not call for further examination.

The Committee's recommendations

1. 739. In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee recommends the Governing Body to decide that this case does not call for further examination.