Interim Report - Report No 230, November 1983

Case No 1160 (Suriname) - Complaint date: 28-SEP-82 - Closed

1. 509. The Committee already examined this case at its February 1983 meeting and presented interim conclusions to the Governing Body l The Government subsequently submitted communications dated 7 April and 16 May 1983 which were reflected in a special paragraph to the Committee's 226th Report to the Governing Body.
2. 510. In addition, with the consent of the Government, Mr. W.R. Simpson, Chief of the Freedom of Association Branch, carried out a direct contacts mission to Suriname as the Director-General's representative. He was accompanied by Mrs. Jane Hodges of the Freedom of Association Branch. The mission took place from 18 to 25 August 1983.3
3. 511. At the request of the Government of Suriname, Mr. R.G. Simons, Acting Permanent Secretary of Labour of the Department of Labour of Suriname, made a statement to the Committee on 7 November 1983.
4. 512. Suriname has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87); it has not ratified the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. Previous examination of the case

1. 513. In its previous examination of the case in February 1983, the Committee expressed its deep concern at the gravity of the allegations made which include the death, while in military detention, of the trade union leader Cyrill Daal, the arrests or disappearance of trade unionists and the occupation and destruction of the premises of the trade union "De Moederbond". While noting the Government's explanation of the "accidental" death of the trade union leader during an attempt to escape custody, the Committee emphasised that a climate of violence constitutes a serious impediment to the exercise of trade union rights.
2. 514. In addition, the Governing Body, on the Committee's recommendation, adopted the following recommendations:
   • - The Committee requests the Government to supply detailed and precise information on the allegations made and, in particular, on the circumstances which led to the death and arrest of trade unionists, including the results of any inquiry that may be held.
   • - The Committee notes that the Government accepts the proposal made by the Director-General to send a direct contacts mission to Suriname to elucidate the situation and thereby enable the Committee to reach conclusions in a fuller knowledge of the facts.
   • - The Committee hopes that it will have at its disposal at its next session the report of the representative of the Director-General on the situation.
3. 515. The proposed direct contacts mission was postponed on two occasions by the Government. At its 223rd Session (May-June 1983), the Governing Body noted that in the course of its meeting in May 1983, the Committee had received a communication from the Government, dated 16 May 1983, containing detailed observations on the outstanding allegations, which the Committee had been unable to examine at that meeting. As regards the direct contacts mission request, the Governing Body noted that the Government stated that it would confirm its invitation as soon as possible. The Committee expressed the firm hope that appropriate arrangements would be made by the Government to enable a direct contacts mission to be carried out in the near future so that it would be able, at its November meeting, to examine the case in a fuller knowledge of the facts.

B. Further communications from the Government

1. 516. The Government, in its communication of 7 April 1983, again rejected all the allegations and stated that the following persons were alive: Fred Derby (presently active in trade union negotiations); John Kamperveen (presently residing in the Netherlands); Mangal (still in custody as a result of his involvement in attempting to overthrow the Government in March 1982). According to the Government, the false information spread concerning the December 1982 incidents in Suriname had been deliberately used to mislead the international community.
2. 517. In its communication of 16 May 1983, the Government pointed out that it had always denied the allegations in this case and repeated that Mr. Daal's death had occurred during an attempt to escape custody. It stated that there were no legal provisions or regulations whatsoever in Suriname which restricted freedom of association, including the right to strike, and collective bargaining. It mentioned that the temporary restrictions on the right of assembly introduced after 8 December 1982 by public announcement were repealed in the same manner on 25 February 1983. The Government also emphasised that all labour regulations were drafted in consultation with the workers' organisations concerned. It supplied newspaper clippings in support of its statements.
3. 518. Referring to Suriname's colonial past, the Government stated that the revolutionary process that was started in Suriname on 25 February 1980 was still in danger of being halted by interest groups from abroad or by corrupt local interest groups. As this entailed an increased amount of vigilance with regard to the national security, the Government believed that the country should be governed in close collaboration with the military authorities.
4. 519. According to the Government, the fact that the President of the Moederbond, Mr. Daal, was arrested, was not in any way connected with his trade union activities as such. The arrest was made for his political activities which were clearly subversive, and aimed at overthrowing the Government. The Government stated that these activities were part of a plan of destabilisation which would culminate in a violent coup.
5. 520. According to the Government the trade union federation, the Moederbond, did not participate in this plan as an organisation. Instead, Mr. Daal and Mr. A. Haakmat, the main adviser of the Moederbond, took part in the plot as individuals. It pointed out that Mr. Haakmat left the country before 8 December to recruit mercenaries as part of the plot to overthrow the Government. It alleged that he was still actively involved in recruiting such a mercenary force to invade the country. The Government stressed that other prominent persons in the Moederbond were not informed of the "role" which this trade union had in the plans and consequently the Executive Board of the Moederbond, after consulting the affiliated trade unions, dismissed all advisers and executive members who remained abroad after the events and dissociated itself from the counter-revolutionary activities of these persons.
6. 521. With respect to the strikes by Moederbond affiliates which preceded the events of 8 December 1982, the Government stated that Mr. Daal was abusing this workers' union in order to restore the pre-25 February 1980 situation and stressed that these actions were isolated and apparently lacked the support of the other major trade unions. It pointed out that the President of the Moederbond was the only member of this trade union who belonged to the group of persons arrested for being members of a secret, subversive political group which planned to overthrow the Government by violent means.
7. 522. According to the Government the premises of the Moederbond were one of the places where this secret group held its meetings. It expressed its regret that in the military operations to foil the coup, the Moederbond premises were destroyed and stated that during recent deliberations between the Prime Minister and the Moederbond Executive the Government had committed itself to build a new office for this trade union.
8. 523. With respect to the alleged detention of trade unionists, the Government stated that no trade union leader was being detained at present since the security measures were not directed against any trade union or workers' movement. It appeared that three of the persons arrested on 8 December 1982 were known trade unionists. One of them was released within a day because he evidently had nothing to do with the plot. The other two lost their lives in the attempted escape.
9. 524. The Government fully agreed that a climate of violence seriously impedes trade union rights. Therefore it had endeavoured to implement peacefully a programme of national reconstruction. It was its opinion that the climate of violence was repeatedly, and intentionally, introduced by individuals who were in opposition to the revolution and the Government's measures for a national reconstruction. It pointed out that in the past three years of revolution there had been four serious and violent attempts to overthrow the Government. Despite the security measures which naturally had to be taken by the army in such situations, the Government had constantly tried to create and maintain a climate in which the trade unions could continue to function normally. In this respect it referred to newspaper clippings reporting the position of various trade union federations since 8 December 1982.

C. The direct contacts mission

1. 525. Following his mission to Suriname (18 to 25 August 1983), the Director-General's representative, Mr. W.R. Simpson, submitted to him a report on the various meetings he had during his stay in the country. In his report, the representative of the Director-General points out that every facility was granted during the mission to enable him to meet all the persons who, he considered, might assist him in the accomplishment of his mission.
   • I. The attack on the premises of the Moederbond on 17 September 1982
2. 526. The mission, during its meeting with the Executive Board of the Moederbond, was able to receive a firsthand account of the events of 17 September 1982 from one of the members who had been in the building at that time. He stated that schoolchildren, who were on holiday during that month, occupied the building with verbal support from members of the Department of People's Mobilisation who were outside. The inciters were allegedly telling the students that the Moederbond was responsible for the recent strike in the Academic Hospital. Following a telephone call by this member of the Moederbond Executive, the police arrived to take two or three of the leaders of the occupation to police headquarters. The incident was over, but when the Moederbond later called the police station in this connection, they were told that an official of the Department of People's Mobilisation had demanded the release of the leaders and that the police had accordingly let them leave without charges being brought against them. The occupation was never mentioned again, and no further action was taken by the Moederbond as subsequent events overshadowed its importance.
3. 527. The Minister of Labour indicated to the representative of the Director-General that this incident - as well as the other allegations - must be viewed in the context of the changes in the country between 25 February 1980 (when the military seized power) and 8 December 1982. He stated that the Moederbond premises were used by a group of suspected persons to meet to discuss activities aimed at overthrowing the Government. He further indicated that the events of 8 December had, in any event, superseded this allegation.
   • II. Events leading up to 8 December 1982
4. 528. The Minister of Labour, trade unionists and employers with whom the representative of the Director-General spoke gave clear, coinciding descriptions of these events. The following is a synthesis of their comments. When the military took power on 25 February 1980 they had little political expertise and turned to as many groups as possible (progressive trade unions, mass organisations and even members of the ousted government) to assist in the establishment of a government. The Moederbond had, in fact, nominated two persons for ministerial posts in this first cabinet (one being chosen), and a CLO member, in his personal capacity, had also been appointed to ministerial office. Despite its official stand that politics and trade unionism cannot be separated, the C-47, although invited to do so, did not present any candidates for office since, according to it, the future political line the military would take was not certain. The President of the C-47 nevertheless emphasised his federation's support and that of the population as a whole for the military at that time in view of the frustrating unfulfilled promises of the previous government. It should be noted that the federations were represented on the newly formed Government Advisory and Planning Boards.
5. 529. However, the representative of the Director-General was told that by mid-1982 the incidence of strike action, especially by the Moederbond and its affiliates, was more pronounced and there was increased government interference in community life. The C-47 was also involved in strike action and its representatives described the April 1982 strike by one of its nursing affiliates which the Minister of Health had condemned during a press conference. The Government had prevented a return press conference by the C-47 and confiscated 15,000 copies of its newspaper which contained the federation's reply to the Minister. In July 1982 there was a strike at the Academic Hospital by a Moederbond affiliate concerning the terms of the 1977/82 agreements within the Ministry of Health. In September there was a partial strike by the Moederbond-affiliated postal workers concerning conditions of work and in particular the installation of air-conditioning. Events culminated in the Moederbond-affiliated air traffic controllers calling a strike in October 1982 ostensibly over wages and working conditions, which was finally settled on 2 November 1982. The strike and its attendant mass demonstrations coincided with the arrival in Suriname of the Prime Minister of Grenada. This strike was led personally by Cyrill Daal, President of the Moederbond.
6. 530. The employers with whom the representative of the Director-General spoke considered that the events leading up to 8 December 1982 were political in nature, and that the Moederbond's actions, and in particular the strikes, placed the Government under great pressure. Some saw no change in the Moederbond's attitude to collective bargaining in the July-December period. Others, however, stated that the attitude of the unions was caused by a vacuum created by the Government itself because the official mediation procedures did not operate as a proper link between the unions and the employers. The occupation by the army of the premises after the strike at the Academic Hospital may also, they said, have antagonised the unions. Some others stated that the problems between the unions and the military began as early as 1981 when the Revolutionary Front was established since the unions were unsure as to what their position would actually be in that structure; in any event, they said it was at that time that the Moederbond started advocating a return to democracy.
   • III. The arrests and deaths on 7 and 8 December 1982
7. 531. The Minister of Labour told the mission that many people were arrested for questioning on 7 December because there were serious indications that action might be taken against the regime in late December. He claimed that Daal had been arrested as an individual and that many members of the Moederbond Executive did not know what was going on. The Minister indicated that there was no evidence of a definite link between Daal and the 14 other persons killed on 8 December, but stated that there had been "some meetings" between them prior to that date.
8. 532. The representative of the Director-General received from Mr. Derby, President of the C-47 federation and one of the 14 people rounded up that evening to be held in Fort Zeelandia (the military headquarters), a description of the circumstances of his own arrest. He was the only one amongst a final group of 16 who were questioned by the Military Commander, Lt. Col. Bouterse during that 24-hour period to be allowed to leave the Fort alive. According to Mr. Derby, he and Mr. Daal were not the only trade unionists arrested. The others were Mr. E.A. Hoost, Mr. L.P. Rahman and Mr. Bram Behr. Mr. Derby still did not know why he had been arrested or why he had finally been released. He had been told that Lt. Col. Bouterse let him leave the Fort because he considered Derby to be honest. He stressed, that during his own 18-hour detention - when he shared a cell with several others rounded up on 7 December - he did not suffer any ill-treatment. While detained he had two interviews with Lt. Col. Bouterse. He stated that he had asked Lt. Col. Bouterse for the release of Mr. Hoost and two others who had been sharing his cell and was told that they would be released. It was discovered on 9 December that they, too, had in fact been killed along with Daal and the others.
9. 533. Opinions varied as to the reasons why Daal had continued with the strike until 2 November 1982 when, by all accounts the consequences of doing so were obviously dangerous. The Executive of the Moederbond itself was divided on this question. One member stressed that he personally had warned Daal on 29 October about the dangers of continuing the strike action alone without the support of the other federations. Another member, however, maintained that everyone encouraged Daal in his course of action and that the Moederbond as a whole supported him in the strike. The representatives of the C-47 with whom the mission spoke thought that Daal had been "victimised" by some groups or interests which they could not precisely identify but that these groups existed within and outside the country. Mr. Derby mentioned that, on 30 October, he himself had been contacted by persons who were anxious to ascertain whether the C-47 would support Daal's proposed mass meeting planned for the next day. The representatives of the PWO with whom the representative of the Director-General spoke considered that Daal may also have been encouraged by the mass demonstrations that took place to protest his arrest. The representatives of the CLO with whom the mission spoke took the view that Daal, whose strength of personality enabled him to call people out into the streets, easily saw himself as the champion, and even a martyr if necessary in the cause of democracy.
10. 534. The employer representatives with whom the representative of the Director-General spoke stressed that no one, not even Daal, suspected that the military was capable of perpetrating the action it took on 8 December. One of these representatives had, in fact, met Daal on 7 December and reported him as saying that he was aware that his actions involved a risk but that he "did not care whether he died now or in a year's time". According to the employer representatives, Daal had throat cancer. The representatives of another employers' association with whom the mission spoke did not think that Daal realised the impact of his actions. They reported that Daal told them - at a meeting on 2 November between the Moederbond and representatives of employers' and church organisations - that a member of the military had warned him "to consider his future" if he continued to flout the military. They stated that Daal's speeches in favour of free enterprise and his criticism of the Government's socialisation process were naturally described by his opponents as subversive.
11. 535. From the mission's meetings with government members and officials it was clear that the Government has no plan to carry out an independent inquiry into the deaths. The Attorney-General could not say whether the Minister of Justice was considering the matter. The Minister of Labour, on the other hand, stressed that the events took place against a background of an expected invasion of Suriname and anti-government pressure from both external and internal forces. The Moederbond Executive stated that it had had three meetings with the Government shortly after the events of 8 December but on none of these occasions was the question of an inquiry into the deaths raised. The other trade union centrals considered that an inquiry would be difficult because of the military leadership and useless because, in their view, the true facts would never be brought to light.
    • IV. The destruction of the Moederbond premises on 8 December 1982
12. 536. During discussions with the Minister of Labour, when he confirmed the destruction of the Moederbond headquarters, he assured the representative of the Director-General that talks had been held between the Moederbond Executive and the Ministry of Public Works and agreement reached on the rebuilding of the premises at Government expense. Work was due to begin late 1983 or early 1984 at the latest. The Minister explained that the Government was expected to reimburse the Moederbond for rental paid for its present offices. The Government was undertaking these actions because it did not wish the destruction of the premises to be interpreted as an act against the Moederbond or against the workers. The Moederbond confirmed that the Government had agreed to begin reconstruction in the near future.

D. Statement of the Acting Permanent Secretary of Labour to the Committee

1. 537. Mr. Simons, Acting Permanent Secretary of Labour, stated that the events of 8 December 1982 took place in the context of an imminent invasion of the country by foreign powers. According to Mr. Simons, the principle of tripartism and freedom of association have always been respected in Suriname, but the air traffic controllers' strike which preceded the events of 8 December was not of a trade union nature but was political. In reply to the question whether the Government would order a judicial inquiry into the deaths of trade union leaders on 8 December 1982, he stated that, since the risk of an invasion was still present, this question lay within the competence of the military authorities. He, however, assured the Committee that he would transmit to his Government the Committee's request concerning such an inquiry.

E. The Committee's conclusions

1. 538. The Committee has examined the Government's written responses to the allegations and the information obtained by the representative of the Director-General during his direct contacts mission to Suriname.
2. 539. In expressing its thanks to the representative of the Director-General for his detailed report the Committee would also like to express its appreciation to the Government of Suriname for its co-operation in accepting the Committee's requests that such a mission be carried out and for providing the facilities that were necessary to enable the representative of the Director-General to carry out his mission.
   • (i) The September attack on the Moederbond premises
3. 540. The Committee notes that neither in the Government's most recent written reply nor during the discussions held in Suriname with the authorities was any new light shed on this allegation, apart from the assertion that the premises had been used for meetings by a secret group aimed at the violent overthrow of the Government. In view of the fact that the Moederbond Executive itself did not approach the relevant authorities for an explanation, investigation or apology and of the fact that the premises were subsequently destroyed thus making any inquiry into their occupation hypothetical, the Committee considers that no purpose would be served in pursuing its examination of this aspect of the case.
   • (ii) The arrests and deaths of 7/8 December 1982
4. 541. It is clear to the Committee from the Government's written and oral statements that the Government arrested Mr. Daal, President of the Moederbond, for what it considered to be political activities unconnected with his trade union functions. It is equally clear that, despite the assertions of certain members of the present Moederbond Executive, the other social partners saw the strikes and mass demonstrations called by Daal in the second half of 1982 as going beyond normal trade union activities and designed to promote the return to a democratic form of government.
5. 542. Although the arrest and deaths of three other trade unionists at the same time were not the specific subject of the ICFTU's or WCL's allegations in this case, it appears to the Committee that their situation parallels that of Mr. Daal.
6. 543. As regards the alleged political activity of Cyrill Daal, the Committee notes that the Government has produced no specific evidence in support of its assertions and copies of Mr. Daal's speeches disappeared with the destruction of the Moederbond premises. On the other hand the Committee observes that a substantial amount of evidence has been obtained from various sources to indicate that his actions were more closely related to the movement for a return to a system of democracy. In the view of the Committee, such a system is fundamental for the free exercise of trade union rights. The Committee has always stressed, however - and it would particularly draw this to the Government's attention in this case - that even in cases in which trade unionists are charged with political or criminal offences which the Government considers have no relation to their trade union functions, the authorities should instigate a prompt and fair trial of the individuals concerned before an independent and impartial judiciary.)
7. 544. The Committee deplores that the Government of Suriname, feeling, as it alleges, threatened by anti-government movements both inside and outside the country, proceeded to round up certain individuals including trade unionists, at night and hold them without charges and without access to legal representation in the military Fort instead of using the normal judicial procedures. This is all the more deplorable since the detainees were killed while in military custody.
8. 545. The deaths of 8 December 1982 are condemned by the Committee in the strongest terms. The Government has supplied no proof of an attempted escape by those arrested and, in view of the circumstances of their arrest and detention in the military fort the Committee has the greatest difficulty in accepting this explanation. Again, the Committee would stress, as it has done in the past, that in situations involving the loss of life, an independent judicial inquiry should be' held immediately into the circumstances surrounding the killings in order to ascertain the facts and determine responsibilities. 2 Only in a climate where the rule of law is respected can human rights, including trade union rights, be exercised normally.
9. 546. The Committee, accordingly, deplores the fact that the: Government has not instituted any investigation into the deaths, and that it informed the representative of the Director-General that none was envisaged. In its view, such an investigation would indicate a certain willingness on the part of the Government to ensure that there would be no recurrence of the tragic events that took place on 8 December 1982. The Committee notes the undertaking given to it by, the Government representative that he will transmit to his Government the Committee's request for an inquiry. The Committee urges the Government to reconsider its position and it requests the Government to inform it of the results of any inquiry that is so undertaken. "
   • - (iii) The destruction of the Moederbond premises
10. 547. The Committee notes from the Government's written communication that the premises of the Moederbond trade union federation were destroyed by the military on 8 December 1982. It also notes from the report of the representative of the Director-General that the authorities regret this destruction and have now agreed to rebuild new premises for the union. The Committee also notes that the Government is expected to pay the rentals of the Moederbond's present offices. The Moederbond confirmed that construction of its new premises should begin by the end of 1983.
11. 548. While noting the Government's efforts to restore to the union the premises it lost through military action, the Committee would draw the Government's attention to the Resolution on trade union rights and civil liberties, adopted by the International Labour Conference at its 54th Session (1970) in which protection of trade union property is listed as one of those civil liberties which are essential for the normal exercise of trade union rights. The Committee trusts that the construction at government expense of the new trade union premises will proceed smoothly and rapidly and that protection of union premises and property will in future be fully respected.
    • (iv) The alleged detention of trade unionists
12. 549. The Committee notes from the Government's written and oral communications that no trade unionists are at present held in Suriname prisons and that no warrants for arrest or charges remain outstanding against trade unionists. It therefore considers that this aspect of the case does not call for further examination.

The Committee's recommendations

1. 550. In these circumstances the Committee recommends the' Governing Body to approve this interim report and in particular the following conclusions;
   • (a) The Committee appreciates the fact that the Government of Suriname co-operated in accepting a direct contacts mission by the representative of the Director-General and provided the necessary facilities to enable the representative to carry out his mission.
   • (b) The Committee considers that no purpose would be served in pursuing the aspect of the case concerning the September 1982 attack by students on the Moederbond trade union's premises.
   • (c) The Committee deplores that the Government, feeling, as it alleges, threatened by anti-government movements both inside and outside the country, proceeded to round up certain individuals, including trade unionists at night and hold them without charges and without access to legal representation in the military Fort instead of using the normal judicial procedures.
   • (d) The Committee would draw the Government's attention in this connection to the principle of freedom of association according to which the authorities should instigate a prompt and fair trial of individuals before an independent and impartial judiciary even in cases in which trade unionists are charged with political or criminal offences which the Government considers have no relation to their trade union functions.
   • (e) As regards the deaths of trade unionists which took place on 8 December 1982 while in military custody, the Committee condemns these acts in the strongest terms; it deplores the fact that the Government has not instituted any investigation into the deaths, nor does it envisage any such inquiry. The Committee considers that such an investigation would indicate a certain willingness on the part of the Government to ensure that there would be no recurrence of the tragic events that took place on 8 December 1982. The Committee notes the assurance given by the 10 representative of the Government that he will transmit to his Government this request for an inquiry. The Committee urges the Government to reconsider its position and it requests the Government to inform it of the results of any inquiry that is so undertaken.
   • (f) The Committee would draw the Government's attention in this connection to the principle of freedom of association according to which in situations involving the loss of life, an independent judicial inquiry should be held immediately into the circumstances surrounding the killings in order to ascertain the facts and determine responsibilities.

Z. ANNEX

• Report on the direct contacts mission to Suriname carried out by Mr. W.R. Simpson
• Chief of the Freedom of Association Branch, International Labour Standards Department
• Introduction
  1. 1 The mission took place within the framework of the procedures applicable to the examination of complaints concerning alleged violations of trade union rights, such complaints having been made against the Government of Suriname by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the World Confederation of Labour (WCL) (Case No. 1160).
  2. 2 The Governing Body Committee on Freedom of Association examined Case No. 1160 at its February 1983 meeting and presented an interim report to the Governing Body' in which it noted the Government's acceptance of the proposal made by the Director-General to send a direct contacts mission to the country to elucidate the situation. In communications dated 14 March and 15 April 1983 the Government postponed proposed dates for the carrying out of a mission. At its May 1983 meeting, the Committee on Freedom of Association took note of a communication from the Government containing detailed observations on the outstanding allegations and indicating that it would confirm its invitation to the Director-General to send a mission to Suriname as soon as possible.
  3. 3 Arrangements to enable a direct contacts mission to visit Suriname were made during the 69th Session of the International Labour Conference (June 1983) following discussions with the Suriname Government delegation headed by the Minister of Labour and Public Health. In communications dated 22 and 25 July 1983 the Government confirmed that the direct contacts mission could take place in the second half of August. On 29 July the Office communicated with the Government confirming that the mission could visit Suriname from 18 to 25 August inclusive and that it would be carried out by the representative appointed by the Director-General, Mr. W.R. Simpson, Chief of the Freedom of Association Branch of the International Labour Standards Department.
  4. 4 It was indicated to the Government that the mission would like to meet the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Labour and Public Health, Internal Affairs and Justice, the representatives of the four trade union federations and the two employers' federations as well as any other persons who might assist the mission in establishing the facts in the case, in particular regarding the September 1982 occupation of the premises of a leading trade union and its destruction in December 1982 and the arrests and death of trade union leaders on the night of 7/8 December 1982.
  5. 5 The necessary arrangements having been thus finalised I carried out the mission to Suriname from 18 to 25 August 1983. I was accompanied throughout by Mrs. Jane Hodges of the Freedom of Association Branch of the International Labour Standards Department.
  6. 6 Throughout the mission the Government, in addition to demonstrating a genuine willingness to ensure that I could accomplish my task, provided every facility to enable me to do so. Immediately following our arrival in the capital, Paramaribo, a meeting was arranged with three members of the five-person National Commission, a body established by decree and entrusted with responsibility for receiving missions by international organisations or bodies. During this initial meeting a comprehensive programme was drawn up to include meetings with the following persons: the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. E. Alibux; the Minister of Labour and Public Health, Mr. L.W. Boksteen; the Attorney-General Dr. R.M. Reeder, representing the Minister of the Interior and Justice; the Executive Board of the C-47 trade union federation; the Executive Board of the Progressive Workers' Organisation (PWO); the Executive Board of the Civil Servants' Organisation known as the CLO; the Executive Board of the AVVS De Moederbond; the Association of Surinamese Manufacturers (ASFA); and the Suriname Trade and Industry Association (VSB). It was also arranged that, following all these meetings, a final meeting with the Minister of Labour would take place. In addition to these meetings, arrangements were made for the mission to visit the Government-sponsored Surname Labour College known as SIVIS.
  7. 7 Contrary to the practice followed by the Government during previous investigatory visits to Suriname by certain other international organisations, the mission was at all times able to, arrange its meetings without military or government personnel being present. On more than one occasion our interlocutors referred to this absence of interference and indicated that, had the situation been otherwise, they would not have been able to speak as freely as they did.
  8. 8 At the outset of the mission I had the opportunity to meet briefly with the Prime Minister, Dr. E. Alibux, who is also the minister of Foreign Affairs, when I took the opportunity to point out that the impartiality and objectivity of the mission's report would depend entirely on the co-operation that I would receive and on the openness and frankness of the discussions that I would have with the various Ministries and the social partners. I explained that this direct contacts mission to Suriname concerned trade union rights and was in no way designed to concern itself with the internal politics of the country. I also pointed out that the International Labour Organisation was not an international tribunal but that its supervisory machinery was there to ensure, through objective examination of all the facts, that trade union rights are fully respected and that human rights, which are essential for the free exercise of trade union rights, are guaranteed. I also pointed out that, by the very fact of membership of the ILO and by the act of ratification of ILO Conventions, States, including Suriname, accepted a measure of international supervision of their actions and thereby relinquished a part of their sovereignty. The Prime Minister assured me that the mission would have every freedom to speak with whomever it considered useful and he expressed the firm hope that the mission would prove successful.
• Background
  9. 9 Suriname, which became an independent republic on 25 November 1975 after almost 300 years of Dutch colonisation, is situated on the north coast of the South American continent and shares borders with Guyana, Brazil and French Guyana. The land area totals some 163,000 km2. On 25 February 1980 a small band of military sergeants - who, together with other members of the army trade union, had been on strike for two months over wage claims - seized power. The civilian Cabinet is responsible to the Policy Centre (Lt. Col. Bouterse, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance and the second in command of the military) and is guided by the Advisory Board (Mr. Cruden and Mr. Sylvester, two trade unionists and Mr. Udenhout of the Ministry of Education). The population of around 360,000 is of diverse origin, and consists of Amerindians, Hindustani, Creole, Javanese and Chinese. About two-thirds of the population is concentrated in Paramaribo, with most of the remainder living along the coastal strip, which is 3 per cent of the total land area. The interior consists mainly of dense tropical forest.
  10. 10 Suriname has an uneven developed economy, with a few capital intensive modern enterprises producing most of the country's output and exports dominated by foreign capital and a stagnant traditional sector. Besides the two bauxite-producing companies, Suralco (which the mission was able to visit) and Billiton, there are also large agricultural enterprises, including state-owned enterprises engaged in rice research, cultivation and production, and wood processing. The per capita GNP was estimated at about US$2,860 in 1982. As a consequence of the duality in the economic structure, the capital-intensive sector employs relatively few people and pay higher wages, in contrast with the national controlled and trade sectors, characterised by lower productivity. Despite the large-scale emigration in recent years and the rapid growth of the public sector, unemployment is still around 18 per cent of the labour force.
  11. 11 Of the four trade union federations the C-47 has 12,000 to 15,000 members in the bauxite, metalworkers, agricultural, water supply, airline, hotel and private teaching and nursing sectors; the Moederbond has 15,000 members in the public, industrial and services sectors; the PWO has 4,500 members in the agricultural, cement and trade and commerce sectors; and the CLO represents 40,000 civil servants. There are two employers' organisations, the ASFA comprising 132 manufacturing undertakings and the VSB with 170 private enterprise and state-owned member companies. The Moederbond is affiliated to the ICFTU, the PWO to the WCL and the CLAT, and the CLO to the IFFTU and INFEDOP. The C-47 has made a conscious decision against international affiliation for the time being. Neither of the employers' organisations have international affiliation.
  12. 12 From the standpoint of international principles on freedom of association the labour legislation of Suriname has not given rise to serious comment by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. In particular, collective bargaining has always been freely and widely practised in Suriname and, even in the public service, the CLO negotiates a common collective agreement for its members (who comprise about half of the total labour force of 84,000) every two years with a special board appointed by the Government for this purpose. A Mediation Board, at present comprised of two Government representatives and a retired trade unionist from the bauxite sector who is also a civil servant, has disputes settlement responsibilities primarily for the private sector. The employers' representative on the Board who, for personal reasons, resigned four years ago has not been replaced. There is also a Public Service Board procedure for disputes in the civil service, and the Policy Centre appears to have an ad hoc power to settle disputes if requested so to do. The right to strike is recognised in all sectors.
• The allegations
  • (a) The attack on the premises of the Moederbond on 17 September 1982
    13. 13 The ICFTU alleged that the premises of its affiliate were occupied by a group of young persons, some of whom were armed, and who were members of the "popular mobilisation section" of the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport. According to the ICFTU, the youths proceeded to pillage the premises for several hours and prevented a trade union meeting which had been arranged from taking place there.
    14. 14 The Government replied that the illegal occupation of the office of the Moederbond was carried out by individuals apparently incited by indignation at the involvement of that trade union in a recent strike by hospital staff. The Government emphasised that its authorities did not interfere and were not involved in any way in this occupation. The Government expressed its regret that the Moederbond trade union did not correct the information supplied to the ILO in spite of the fact that an exchange of telegrams between the union and the Government had taken place.
    15. 15 During my meeting with the Executive Board of the Moederbond, I was able to receive a first-hand account of the events of 17 September 1982 from one of the members who had been in the building at that time. He stated that schoolchildren, who were on holiday during that month, occupied the building with verbal support from members of the Department of People's Mobilisation who were outside. According to my interlocutor the inciters were telling the students that the Moederbond was responsible for the recent strike in the Academic Hospital. Following a telephone call by this member of the Moederbond Executive, the police arrived and took two or three of the leaders of the occupation to police headquarters. The incident was over, but when the Moederbond later called the police station in this connection, they were told that an official of the Department of People's Mobilisation had demanded the release of the leaders and that the police had accordingly let them leave without charges being brought against them. The occupation was never mentioned again, and no further action was taken by the Moederbond as subsequent events overshadowed its importance. According to the Moederbond Executive, the Department of People's Mobilisation is a co-ordinating body for the recently formed people's committees and regional and district councils; it is involved in socio-political activities such as the reconstruction of roads and the political education of youth.
    16. 16 My meeting with the Attorney-General, representing the Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs, threw no light on this incident. In answer to several detailed questions, he merely stated that no complaint had been lodged with his Office and that all he knew of the incident was what he had read in the newspapers. The Minister of Labour indicated that this incident - as well as the other allegations - had to be viewed in the context of the changes in the country between 25 February 1980 (when the military seized power) and 8 December 1982. He stated that the Moederbond premises were used by a group of suspected persons to meet to discuss activities aimed at overthrowing the Government. He further indicated that the events of 8 December had, in any event, superseded this allegation.
  • (b) Events leading up to 8 December 1982
    17. 17 The Minister of Labour, trade unionists and employers with whom I spoke gave clear, coinciding descriptions of these events. The following is a synthesis of their comments. When the military took power on 25 February 1980 they had little political expertise and turned to as many groups as possible (progressive trade unions, mass organisations and even members of the ousted government) to assist in the establishment of a government. The Moederbond had, in fact, nominated two persons for ministerial posts in the first Cabinet (one being chosen), and a CLO member, in his personal capacity, had also been appointed to ministerial office. Despite its official stand that politics and trade unionism cannot be separated, the C-47, although invited to do so, did not present any candidates for office since, according to it, the future political line the military would take was not certain. The President of the C-47 nevertheless emphasised his federation's support and that of the population as a whole for the military at that time in view of the frustration at the unfulfilled promises of the previous Government. It should be noted that the federations were represented on the newly-formed Government Advisory and Planning Boards. One person mentioned by several of my interlocutors, Mr. André Haakmat, played a particularly important role in the new Government, especially as regards the Moederbond and trade union activity in general. As Minister of Justice Mr. Haakmat prepared a decree to ban strikes on 13 August 1980. The same day there was an attempted coup which resulted in the suspension of the Constitution and the cessation of Parliament and the anti-strike decree was never adopted. Apart from an incident in November 1980 involving the occupation of the premises and confiscation of the books of one of the C-47's affiliates by order of Minister Haakmat, the political and industrial relations scene was calm until the Government, following talks with students, progressive organisations and farmers, established, in December 1981, a "Revolutionary Front" which, in the view of many, virtually removed all possibility of a return to democracy which the military had initially promised. This resulted in Cabinet resignations and a further attempted coup in mid-March 1982 led to the formation of a new government. In January 1982 Minister Haakmat was relieved of his various ministerial posts and he became the official adviser of the Moederbond trade union federation.
    18. 18 From this point onwards the incidence of strike action, especially by the Moederbond and its affiliates, was more pronounced and there was increased government interference in community life. The C-47 was also involved in strike action and its representatives described the April 1982 strike by one of its nursing affiliates which the Minister of Health had condemned during a press conference. The Government had prevented a return press conference by the C-47 and confiscated 15,000 copies of its newspaper which contained the federation's reply to the Minister. In July 1982 there was a strike at the Academic Hospital concerning the terms of the 1977/82 agreements within the Ministry of Health. In August the former Minister Mr. Haakmat was asked by the military to develop a paper on the formation of a new democratic structure involving civilian rule. In September there was a partial strike by the postal workers concerning conditions of work and in particular the installation of air conditioning. Events culminated in the Moederbond affiliated air traffic controllers calling a strike in October 1982 over wages and working conditions. This strike was led personally by Cyrill Daal, President of the Moederbond.
    19. 19 The events surrounding this strike are of particular importance and they were described in detail by those involved in them. On Monday 25 October Lt. Col. Bouterse personally contacted Mr., Daal, President of the Moederbond, and warned him to call off the strike, otherwise he would "be locked up and forgotten about". Mr. Derby, President of the C-47, also described his own warning to Daal that continuation of the strike could have serious consequences. On Tuesday 26 October Mr. Daal called for a meeting of all Moederbond affiliates which received wide press coverage. On Wednesday 27 October Mr. Haakmat, adviser to the Moederbond, announced that Mr. Daal had gone into hiding, but on Thursday 28 October Mr. Daal was arrested in his office only to be released some hours later following an intervention by the C-47 and the CLO which threatened a general strike if his detention continued. In view of the seriousness of the events, Mr. Derby called for a meeting of all C-47 affiliates and was summoned by the Prime Minister to explain this action. On Friday 29 October the Moederbond called for another meeting and a general two-hour strike to protest Mr. Daal's arrest. On Saturday 30 October certain employers contacted the Moederbond Executive and warned them of the dangerous situation that could ensue if the Moederbond continued its strike alone. The same evening the four trade union federations met in a Paramaribo hotel but the other centrals could not reach agreement with Daal about the continuation of the strike. On Sunday 31 October Mr. Daal called for a third mass demonstration which was attended by 15,000 to 17,000 people and which coincided with the visit to Suriname of the Prime Minister of Grenada, Mr. Bishop. The welcoming crowd for Mr. Bishop barely numbered 1,500. Mr. Derby's C-47 did not support this demonstration. I was informed that at all of Mr. Daal's mass meetings his statements were practically confined to calling for the return of the military to barracks, and a return to democracy in the country.
    20. 20 The information supplied to the mission by the Moederbond on these events is of particular relevance. The Executive told me that, after the July and September strikes, Moederbond began to be accused of organising strikes that had a destabilising effect. Although the Minister of Labour had promised the federation that discussions would take place, Daal felt that he had to force a meeting to find a solution. At an earlier point in time the then Executive had warned Daal not to call for a strike of air traffic controllers, but once the strike was called matters escalated. According to the Moederbond members with whom I spoke, the date of the arrival of the Prime Minister of Grenada was not known when the strike was called. Whilst stressing that the strike had initially nothing to do with Mr. Bishop's arrival, my interlocutors admitted that Daal later complained of the visit because it was being made at the Suriname Government's expense which, in his view, was totally unjustified. My interlocutors informed me that the deterioration in relations between the military and Mr. Daal around October 1982 was difficult to explain, especially since Mr. Daal had originally given his support to the military and personally supported Lt. Col. Bouterse. One suggestion was put forward that some persons who did not appreciate the closeness of the relations between Mr. Daal and Lt. Col. Bouterse tried deliberately to disrupt the trust that existed between them. These persons were left-wing elements who did not share Daal's political views. The role of former Minister Mr. A. Haakmat, who was still advising not only the Moederbond, but also the Government was described by some executive members as doubtful. I was informed that, while Mr. Haakmat's advices to the federation had originally been in writing and available to all members of the then executive these were later given orally and only to Daal. Daal himself, they said, who was a close friend of Haakmat, had, on occasion, expressed misgivings about the dual advisory role that Haakmat had assumed and about the advice he gave to the federation. There were, however, differences of opinion amongst the executive members as to whether Mr. Haakmat himself eventually lost favour with the military because of his influence on Daal towards a continuation of the struggle for a, return to a form of democracy or because he let Daal proceed to call a strike "on the issue of a return to democracy" without informing him that discussions on this very issue were already underway in the Government itself. The members of the Executive pointed out that when one and a half years had passed since the promise was made by the' military to hold elections, the Moederbond, under Daal's leadership, had begun an active campaign for a return to a democratic structure in the country.
    21. 21 The employers with whom I spoke considered that the events leading up to 8 December 1982 were political in nature, and that the Moederbond's actions, and in particular the strikes, placed the Government under great pressure. Some saw no change in the Moederbond's attitude to collective bargaining in the July-December' period. Others, however, stated that the attitude of the unions was caused by a vacuum created by the Government itself because the Mediation Board did not operate as a proper link between the unions and the employers. The occupation by the army of the premises after the strike at the Academic Hospital may also, they said, have antagonised the unions. Some others stated that the problems between the unions and the military began as early as 1981 when the Revolutionary Front was established since the unions were unsure as to what their position would actually be in that structure; in any event, they said, it was at that time that the Moederbond started advocating a return to democracy.
    22. 22 The air traffic controllers' strike prompted the C-47, PWO and CLO to submit to the military a phase-by-phase plan, to which the Moederbond later adhered, for a democratic structure for Suriname. Following negotiations between Mr. Daal and Major R. Horb, a member of the Policy Centre, work was resumed on 2 November 1982. Discussion continued with the Policy Centre until 15 November when Lt. Col. Bouterse unexpectedly announced on television that negotiations were closed. According to one group of employers with whom I spoke, during this period Major Horb had appointed 12 bodyguards to protect Daal for four days. The employers also mentioned unrest at the university. In addition, during November an "Association for democracy in Suriname" was formed and representatives of its 13 member associations (the Committee of Christian Churches, the Hindu Religious Community Samatan Dharm, the Hindu Religious Community Aryans, Association of Managers and Editors-in-Chief of the press in Suriname, the Madjlieu Moedirmen of Suriname, the Suriname Islamic Association, the Suriname Muslim Association, the Suriname Business Association, the Association of Suriname Manufacturers, the Suriname Bar Association, the Association of Medical Practitioners in Suriname, the Central organisation of Farmers' Unions and the National Suriname Women's Council), in response to a televised policy statement made by Lt. Col. Bouterse as Chairman of the Policy Council on 15 November, addressed a letter to him on 23 November 1982 in which they pointed out that, in their opinion, the only way for the regime to keep power would be through "repressive power enforcement". The Association proposed the discussion of certain basic principles which in their view were fundamental in any democratic society.
    23. 23 In addition to these events Mr. Daal, according to the Government, was engaged in meetings and activities which, in its view, were subversive in character and which clearly linked him with plans, organised by forces both inside and outside the country, to overthrow the regime by force.
  • (c) The arrests and deaths on 7 and 8 December 1982
    24. 24 The complainants in Case No. 1160 alleged the detention of trade union leaders and the murder of Mr. Daal, President of the Moederbond, on 7 and 8 December 1982. The Government replied that the military authority had issued an official declaration to the effect that, on 8 December 1982, a number of persons, detained for their involvement in activities to overthrow the Government through violent means, were killed in an unfortunate accident as a result of their attempt to escape custody. The Government also stated that it would see to it that such occurrences were prevented in the future.
    25. 25 The Minister of Labour told the mission that many people were arrested for questioning on 7 December because there were serious indications that action might be taken against the regime in late December. He claimed that Daal had been arrested as an individual and that many members of the Moederbond Executive did not know what was going on. The Minister indicated that there was no evidence of a definite link between Daal and the 14 other persons killed on 8 December, but stated that there had been "some meetings" between them prior to that date.
    26. 26 Mr. Derby, President of the C-47 federation and one of the 14 people rounded up that evening to be held in Fort Zeelandia, described the circumstances of his own arrest. He was the only one amongst a final group of 16 (the sixteenth and seventeenth persons, Lt. S. Ramboaus and Sheombar were transferred from the military barracks to the Fort to be held with the others) who were questioned by Lt. Col. Bouterse during that 24-hour period to be allowed to leave the Fort alive. According to Mr. Derby, he and Mr. Daal were not the only trade unionists arrested. The others were: Mr. E.A. Hoost (one of the founders of the C-47, a former legal adviser to the CLO and a former Minister, who was at the time of his arrest a practising lawyer and official adviser to the C-47); Mr. L.P. Rahman (Secretary of the Suriname Brewery Workers' Union, President of the "BOSI" Health Inspection Union, the Pharmaceutical Service Staff Union and the Ministry of Health Staff Union and editor of the C-47's union newspaper); and Mr. Bram Behr. Mr. Derby told me that, up till now, he still did not know why he had been arrested or why he had finally been released. He had been told that Lt. Col. Bouterse let him leave the Fort because he considered Derby to be honest. He stressed that, during his own 18-hour detention - when he shared a cell with several others rounded up on 7 December - he did not suffer any ill-treatment. While detained he had two interviews with Bouterse. He stated that he had asked Lt. Col. Bouterse for the release of Mr. Hoost and two others who had been sharing his cell and was told that they would be released. It was discovered on 9 December that they, too, had in fact been killed along with Daal and the others.
    27. 27 Opinions varied as to the reasons why Daal had continued with the strike when, in their view, the consequences of doing so were obviously dangerous. The Executive of the Moederbond itself was divided on this question. One member stressed that he personally had warned Daal on 29 October about the dangers of continuing the strike action alone without the support of the other federations. Another member, however, maintained that everyone encouraged Daal in his course of action and that the Moederbond as a whole supported him in the strike.
    28. 28 The representatives of the C-47 with whom I spoke thought that Daal had been "victimised" by some groups or interests which they could not precisely identify but that these groups existed both within and outside the country. Mr. Derby mentioned that, on 30 October, he himself had been contacted by persons who were anxious to ascertain whether the C-47 would support Daal's proposed mass meeting planned for the next day. The representatives of the PWO with whom I spoke considered that Daal may also have been encouraged by the mass demonstrations that took place to protest his arrest. The representatives of the CLO executive took the view that Daal, whose strength of personality enabled him to call people out into the streets, easily saw himself as the champion and even a martyr if necessary in the cause of democracy.
    29. 29 The ASFA representatives with whom I spoke stressed that no one, not even Daal, suspected that the military was capable of perpetrating the actions it took on 8 December. One of these representatives had, in fact, met Daal on 7 December and reported him as saying that he was aware that his actions involved a risk but that he "did not care whether he died now or in a year's time". According to the ASFA representatives, Daal had throat cancer. The representatives of the VSB with whom I spoke did not think that Daal realised the impact of his actions. They reported that Daal told them - at a meeting on 2 November between the Moederbond and representatives of employers' and church organisations - that Major Horb had warned him "to consider his future" if he continued to flout the military. They stated that Daal's speeches in favour of free enterprise and his criticism of the Government's socialisation process were naturally described by his opponents as subversive.
    30. 30 From my meetings with government members and officials it was clear that the Government had no plan to carry out an independent inquiry into the deaths. The Attorney-General could not say whether the Minister of Justice was considering the matter. The Minister of Labour, on the other hand, stressed that the events took place against a background of an expected invasion of Suriname and anti-Government pressure from both external and internal forces. The Moederbond Executive stated that it had had three meetings with the Government shortly after the events of 8 December: one, on 11 December, concerned a request from the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources to encourage the bauxite workers, who had been on strike, to recommence work; one, on 13 January, followed an invitation to express their views on the capacities and qualities of the new Government. During that meeting the Moederbond handed over a paper on government policy towards the trade union movement; the third meeting, also on 13 January, took place with Lt. Col. Bouterse himself during which the executive members present deplored the events of 8 December, and expressed the hope that such events would never happen again in Suriname. On none of these occasions was the question of an inquiry into the deaths raised. The other trade union centrals considered that an inquiry would be difficult because of the military leadership and useless because, in their view, the true facts would never be brought to light.
  • (d) The destruction of the Moederbond premises on 8 December 1982
    31. 31 The ICFTU and WCL, complainants in Case No. 1160, alleged that the headquarters of the Moederbond had been destroyed. At the time of the Committee's initial examination of the complaint the Government had made no observations on this point.
    32. 32 During discussions with the Minister of Labour when he confirmed the destruction of the Moederbond headquarters, he assured me that talks had been held between the Moederbond Executive and the Ministry of Public Works and agreement reached on the rebuilding of the premises at government expense. Work was due to begin late 1983 or early 1984 at the latest. The Minister explained that the Government was expected to reimburse the Moederbond for rent paid for its present offices. The Government was undertaking these actions because it did not wish the destruction of the premises to be interpreted as an act against the Moederbond or against the workers. The Moederbond confirmed that the Government had agreed to begin reconstruction in the near future. It is to be noted that the new Moederbond Executive had at first refused government aid to rebuild the premises since it was hoping to receive financial support for this purpose from the international trade union movement. The Caribbean Congress of Labour had, in fact, opened a fund to assist in the reconstruction but the paucity of contributions left reconstruction by such means out of the question.
  • (e) The situation since 8 December 1982 up to the time of the mission
    33. 33 From my discussions with the Minister of Labour it appeared that some restrictions on trade union rights were introduced by the authorities immediately after the events of 8 December 1982 but that no such restrictions apply at the present time. For example, between 8 December 1982 and 25 February 1983 public meetings were made illegal by virtue of a Government announcement. According to the Minister of Labour, this was necessitated by the threat of an invasion, but the announcement was revoked once the situation subsided. The Minister confirmed that trade union meetings can now be held freely, without prior notice and without military or police presence. He stressed that there were no restrictions concerning international affiliation nor were any envisaged. After 8 December 1982 the mass media was also brought under government control. According to the Minister this was due to the role of the media in the events leading up to 8 December. A special Government committee had been formed to look into the functioning of the press in accordance with UNESCO guide-lines. The Minister stressed that there was no censorship of the media but admitted that fewer outlets such as radio stations existed. It is to be noted in this connection that two radio stations were also destroyed by the military on 8 December 1982. A curfew was introduced after 8 December but this is now limited to five days of the week (Sunday to Thursday, midnight to 4 a.m.). The minister gave his assurance that no anti-trade union legislation would be introduced.
    34. 34 During the missions meeting with the Attorney-General mention was made of one decree (Decree B-10 dated 29 June 1983), which, according to the authorities, is not directly related to 8 December 1982. According to section 1(1) of the Decree (a copy of which and the regulations pertaining thereto were given to the mission) it is prohibited to import, have in transit, distribute, be in possession of, hold in stock, produce or reproduce any printed material which, in the opinion of the competent authority, could seriously disturb the public order and peace or national security. Section 1(2) designates the Council of Ministers as the competent authority. Section 2 lists the sanctions for breach of section 1 as a maximum of one years' imprisonment or a fine of a maximum of 5,000 guilders. In the regulations under the Decree, one publication entitled "The December assassinations in Suriname - the report of an eyewitness" has been declared to be banned.
    35. 35 According to the Minister of Labour collective bargaining is continuing without change and several strikes, albeit minor ones, have taken place in 1983. He cited the example of a threatened strike in the "Kersten" undertaking over the dismissal of 25 per cent of the employees in violation of the relevant collective agreement; the Minister himself had intervened to settle the dispute before the parties went to the Mediation Board.
    36. 36 Both the Minister of Labour and the Attorney-General confirmed that those persons, whether trade unionists or not, who fled Suriname after 8 December 1982 were totally free to return to the country. No warrants were outstanding for any arrests and there were no cases in the Attorney-General's office pending against trade unionists. Nor were any known trade unionists being held in detention.
    37. 37 The members of the Moederbond Executive with whom I spoke explained that, owing to various absences from the country, it was not until 13 January 1983 that the former Executive members could meet and take measures to continue the Moederbond's work, in particular the reconstitution of the Executive whose president had been killed on 8 December. Acting officers, they said, were appointed at that date in accordance with the Constitutional provisions. On 13 March the, acting executive was able to convene a congress at which the present executive was elected, again in accordance with the constitution of the Moederbond. They expressed concern over the fact that the constitutionality of these elections was being contested. They had fully expressed their views to an ICFTU/CCL mission to Suriname in May 1983. The executive members expressed great disappointment that, in spite of the enormous problems that faced the Moederbond and the attempts that were being made by certain political tendencies in the country to destroy the organisation, it was not receiving the kind of support that would be essential for its survival. Apart from these problems the executive confirmed that trade union affairs and activity could be carried out normally.
    38. 38 The members of the C-47 Executive with whom I spoke confirmed that there were no restrictions on trade union activities. Negotiations between its affiliates and a number of enterprises had been concluded without any problem. In early August 1983 the textile workers' affiliate had held a one-day strike and a two-day strike recently took place in the "Albetil" undertaking. My interlocutors from the PWO stated that they had no complaints either in this regard, and mentioned the recent signing of a collective agreement for cement workers and a strike by the paint/commerce workers this year. They did, however, point out that in view of what happened on 8 December 1982 the Executive would not authorise any action which could be seen as excessive. The members of the CLO Executive with whom I spoke also confirmed that there were no restrictions on trade union activities, but mentioned that the 1984 collective bargaining in the public sector would be most difficult because the unions would not be able to use their full power if negotiations became blocked. According to my interlocutors the military could not afford to let strikes and violence happen and the unions, being aware of this, could only act accordingly.
    39. 39 The employers' representatives of the ASFA with whom I spoke noted that, although collective bargaining was continuing as before December 1982 in the private sector, the unions could no longer force the Government to give in to their demands as they could in the past. According to my interlocutors, both employers and trade unions now had to take into consideration how the Government would react. They stated that whereas a union might strike in the private sector, it would not do so in a government undertaking. They raised the particular problem of the lack of employer representation on the Advisory Board (on which sit the Presidents of the PWO and the CLO and one Government representative) and on the Mediation Board (the employer member resigned four years ago and the Government has not put forward any candidatures to replace him). The employers' representatives of the VSB with whom I spoke referred also to the exclusion of employers from Government bodies concerned with industrial relations. They considered that their rights were restricted more than before and that they were being ignored. Although there had been some meetings between employers and the authorities this year, a promised tripartite group discussion had not taken place. These employers also referred to Decree B-10 which impedes them from keeping copies of the letter sent to Lt. Col. Bouterse on 23 November 1982 by the "Association for democracy in Suriname" of which the ASFA was a signatory. The representatives of the VSB referred to Lt. Col. Bouterse's recent televised statement in which he declared that the events of 8 December could happen again. They stressed that it was against this background that one must evaluate the strength of industrial relations at present in Suriname.
    40. 40 I would mention at this stage that amongst the background documentation handed to us by the National Commission responsible for the handling of the mission was a booklet entitled "Government Statement and Plan of Action for 1983-86." This statement was presented to the public on 1 May 1983 by the Prime Minister. Although some mention is made of "adequate forms of organisation such as co-operatives" for the agricultural sector, no mention is made of trade unions or the role of workers' organisations in the Government's programme. I asked each of my interlocutors the significance of this omission.
    41. 41 The Minister of Labour confessed that his Ministry's contribution to the statement had been prepared hastily and was in fact submitted late; hence the omission. He stressed that, both on paper and in practice, the trade union movement was involved in and consulted about the development plans for the country.
    42. 42 The representatives of three of the four trade union federations with whom I spoke stated that they had not been consulted on the plan of action. The Executive members of the CLO, however, claimed to have been consulted about the plan. The employers also had not been consulted. I was told that the social partners could make comments after publication of the booklet although the employers stated that they had not been asked to do so. According to the C-47, the lack of reference to trade unions was an omission which was understandable. The PWO, on the other hand, guessed that, since at the time of publication, relations between the Government and the labour movement were not good, the unions were purposely not consulted on the plan of action.
  • (f) Future prospects
    43. 43 To my questions relating to any possible change in the trade union structure since 8 December 1982 and regarding the future of the trade union movement, the Minister of Labour replied that there had been no changes and stressed that there were no restrictions on the trade union movement nor were any envisaged. The Government planned, he said, to establish in the future special labour courts to treat individual grievance cases more rapidly and it would appoint labour inspection committees to operate in businesses which employed only a small number of workers.
    44. 44 The representatives of the C-47 with whom I spoke found that there had been no change in the trade union structure but realised that if the workers en masse transferred from another union to the C-47 the trade union movement as a whole would be weakened. The President of the C-47 considered that the Moederbond had been, considerably weakened since the events of 8 December 1982. These representatives were optimistic for the future with or without a' military regime heading the country. They considered that Lt. Col. Bouterse had neither the intention nor the ability to suppress the labour movement.
    45. 45 The representatives of the PWO also saw no change in the trade union structure in Suriname since 8 December but remarked that there had been a history of other unions trying to rob it of its affiliates for some 5 or 6 years. They were not worried about the future under a military regime.
    46. 46 The representatives of the CLO, as is noted above, were apprehensive as to the 1984 negotiations on a collective agreement for civil servants but had no fears that trade union rights would be limited in any way.
    47. 47 The future situation is more critical for the Moederbond. The new executive with whom I spoke appeared to be disunited and there are obvious differences between the more recently elected members and others who remain loyal to the policy followed by Cyrill Daal. The President of the Moederbond described its situation as "vulnerable for three reasons: the workers themselves had lost confidence in the union after the events of 8 December; the doubt which exists at the international and national level as to the integrity of the Executive and the functioning of the federation; some people close to the Government were not convinced that the Moederbond should build itself up again. The executive, he said, was still seeking its way. It continued to deplore openly the events of 8 December 1982 and it would try to prevent such a recurrence, without losing the Moederbond's identity as a free and independent union. Despite the infiltration in its affiliates of certain political groups, he said that the Executive would continue its struggle to strengthen the organisation in the interests of the workers it represented.
    48. 48 The ASFA representatives with whom I spoke were less optimistic for the future. Against a background of much talking, they saw little actually being done to improve industrial relations. They stated nevertheless that they adapted to the situation. They were aware of what they described as the ultra-leftist infiltration of the Moederbond and saw the President's position as delicate.
    49. 49 The VSB representatives also considered the Moederbond to be much weaker now that the strong personality of Daal was gone. They pointed out that Daal's impact would not be forgotten easily in the federation.
  • Concluding remarks
    50. 50 My final meeting before leaving the country was with the Ministry of Labour to whom I expressed my gratitude for the thorough manner in which the programme had been arranged and for the courteous manner in which the mission had been received. All my discussions had been frank and these had enabled me to obtain as much information as I could concern all the issues in the case. I stressed, nevertheless, that, without a full and independent inquiry into the events of 8 December 1982 many important facts would never come to light. In view of the Attorney-General's reference of the question of an inquiry to the minister of Justice himself, I expressed the hope that the Minister would exercise his authority in proceeding to such an inquiry. I pointed out that although freedom of association and human rights could be written into the constitutions and laws of countries, true freedom of association - for both workers and employers - could only exist if that freedom was exercised in a climate in which workers and employers could expect to know the consequences of the exercise of that freedom. I stated that as a direct result of the tragic events of 8 December last it was not surprising that there should be a degree of uncertainty about the exercise of that freedom. I suggested that the sooner that uncertainty was removed, the better. In view of the employers' complaints, I recalled to the Minister the importance of the Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention, 1976 (No. 144), which has been ratified by Suriname. I pointed out that the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations had, in fact, this year commented on the composition of the Advisory Board which was not tripartite. I concluded, reassuring the Minister that an objective and impartial report of my mission would be submitted to the Governing Body Committee on Freedom which would reach conclusions in the case. The Minister thanked me for this assurance and expressed the hope that the mission would lead to a better understanding of the issues raised in this case and of the problems that now faced Suriname.
    51. 51 In summary, the mission was received very correctly and the entire programme carried out in a business-like atmosphere. I was satisfied that all my interlocutors spoke openly and frankly and that I was able to obtain corroborated information on all the important aspects of the case. There are, of course, many details concerning the actual manner in which Daal and the others died which were not known to my interlocutors - and which, without a thorough and independent inquiry, may never be known - but the fact that the deaths took place at the hands of the military, and that this is not denied by the Government, tends to minimise the relevance of such details, at least for ILO purposes.
    52. 52 Mr. Daal's tragic death - and that of the 14 others - took place in a political climate in which the military régime saw itself under serious pressure not only from a strong national movement for the restoration of democracy, which included Daal, academics, lawyers, industrialists and churches but also from external forces. Rightly or wrongly, the Government interpreted Daal's activities (strikes which had a destabilising effect, his political statements and demonstrations and his various contacts in Paramaribo) as being part of a subversive plot to overthrow it by force, and accordingly decided to remove him. In spite of the numerous warnings given to him by trade union colleagues and even by some employers, Daal continued with the strike of air traffic controllers and called a mass demonstration which coincided with the arrival of the Prime Minister of Grenada. There is no doubt that this caused great embarrassment and resentment in the upper levels of the military regime and in the final event was probably the decisive factor which led to his death.
    53. 53 As regards the trade union situation in general, there are no apparent restrictions on the exercise of trade union rights. Suriname has model legislation on trade union rights and indeed, as may be seen from the information obtained during the mission, there are no practical limitations on trade union action. However, if the events of 8 December 1982 have not put a stop to the exercise of trade union rights they have undoubtedly created a climate in which the consequences of the exercise of these rights is far from being certain. Strikes and collective bargaining still go on but trade unions, in particular, must obviously think twice before embarking on any action which might be interpreted by the Government as being a political act of opposition.
    54. 54 Following the death of Daal the ICFTU-affiliated Moederbond is greatly weakened. The new leadership - constitutionally elected - is less charismatic, less aggressive and perhaps less politically motivated than Daal. It resents the criticism that it "collaborates" with the military but rather sees the situation as one in which a pragmatic approach must be taken in the present circumstances. Unless this organisation is successful in eliminating the differences that exist amongst its executive, it is likely to break up into smaller, weaker factions which would be undesirable for the trade union movement as a whole.
    55. 55 It only remains for me to express my sincere thanks to the Government of Suriname and, in particular to the members of the National Commission for their courteous assistance in organising the mission's programme. I also wish to thank the representatives of all the workers' and employers' organisations whose helpfulness was greatly appreciated.
  • W.R. Simpson Geneva, September 1983.