Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) - Hungary (Ratification: 1957)

Individual Case (CAS) - Discussion: 2022, Publication: 110th ILC session (2022)

Written information provided by the Government

As Hungary explained in 2021–22, during the examination of Case No. 3399 before the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, the implementation of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and Convention No. 98, were priority considerations in the development of the national legislation under examination.

Hungarian national regulatory frameworks for workers’ collective rights are in line with international labour standards. Article VIII(2) and (5) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary guarantees freedom of association, and its article XVII declares the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike. Act VII of 1989 on strikes contains the detailed guarantee regulations accordingly. However, according to its provisions on unlawful strikes, there is no right to strike in certain public administrative bodies performing public service functions. Act C of 2020 on the Healthcare Service Relationship regulates in line with these provisions, which is also permitted by ILO Conventions. (It should be noted here that under article 298(4) of Act I of 2012 on the Labour Code, Hungary’s general labour law code, a law may – with regard to sectoral and professional specificities – deviate from the provisions of the Labour Code, and this is also the basis for the establishment of rules that differ from the general rules, such as article 15(10) of the Healthcare Service Relationship Act for healthcare providers subject to the Healthcare Service Relationship Act.)

As has been explained earlier, the sectoral legislation is in line with the Compilation of decisions of the Committee on Freedom of Association which, inter alia, provides guidance for a more precise interpretation of Article 6 of ILO Convention No. 98 concerning the application of the principles of the right to organize and to bargain collectively, and which, in the case of the health sector, primarily considers paragraph 576 as a guide.

On this basis, the right to strike may be restricted or prohibited in the public service for public servants exercising authority in the name of the State; or in essential services in the strict sense of the term (that is, services the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population). ILO Convention No. 98, Article 6, states that: “This Convention does not deal with the position of public servants engaged in the administration of the State, nor shall it be construed as prejudicing their rights or status in any way”.

Article 15(1) of the Healthcare Service Relationship Act creates the possibility of reconciling the interests of healthcare providers and persons with a healthcare service relationship, negotiating the settlement of disputes and reaching appropriate agreements – taking into account the principle of safe healthcare provision – with the participation of the Government, the national sectoral interest representation organizations and the national employee interest representation organizations of persons with a healthcare service relationship in a negotiating group of the Health Service Interest Reconciliation Forum (hereinafter referred to as HSIRF). The competence of the HSIRF covers matters relating to the living and working conditions and terms and conditions of employment of persons with a healthcare service relationship working in the health sector.

In Hungary, collective agreements in the health sector used to be very heterogeneous. In drafting the Healthcare Service Relationship Act, the legislator’s aim was, among others, to create a transparent, uniform system for healthcare workers and providers in state and municipal healthcare institutions by establishing a healthcare service relationship. For this reason, the heterogeneous collective agreements were replaced by a regulation at the level of legislation, as the implementing decree of the Healthcare Service Relationship Act incorporated the contents of the sectoral collective agreement for most hospitals. Chapter 6 of Government Decree 528/2020 (XI. 28.) implementing Act C of 2020 on the Health Service Relationship – “Specific rules concerning the working time of a person in a healthcare service relationship” – contains the provisions of the multi-employer collective agreement concluded by the National Healthcare Service Centre with the Democratic Trade Union of Social and Healthcare Workers in Hungary, thus facilitating the guaranteed enforceability of provisions favourable to healthcare workers and healthcare providers in a uniform manner, rather than varying from one institution to another.

The Government of Hungary continues to attach importance to and promote the representation of the interests of healthcare providers and healthcare workers and will continue to provide opportunities for the representation of healthcare workers through interest reconciliation forums with the involvement of trade unions.

The approach set out in the Strategic Partnership Agreement between the Ministry of Human Capacities, the Democratic Trade Union of Social and Healthcare Workers in Hungary and the Independent Trade Union of Ambulance Workers serves as a guideline for negotiations and the further development of an appropriate legislative environment.

The Government of Hungary – upholding the commitments made in January 2022 in response to the recommendations of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association – is currently examining possible directions for the revision of the existing legislation and will continue to ensure that the principle of consultation with the relevant workers’ and employers’ representative bodies is fully respected in any further planned measures.

It is important to note that there have been no changes to the legislation – particularly in view of the parliamentary elections in April this year, due to which the legislative process has been suspended since the recommendations were made. Nevertheless, the Government will keep the ILO informed of progress in accordance with the recommendations.

Discussion by the Committee

Government representative – I am the newly appointed State Secretary for Industry and Employment at the Ministry of Technology and Industry. I would like to start my intervention by informing the Committee that after the Hungarian Parliamentary Elections in April 2022, the new Government is being formed. The transformation of the government structure is not completed and the employment policy portfolio is undergoing changes as well.

At the meeting of the Committee today, I am representing the Government of Hungary, I would like to ask the Deputy State Secretary for Employment Policy, to present the statement of the Hungarian Government.

Another Government representative – First of all, I would like to confirm the strong commitment of the Government of Hungary to effectively cooperate with the ILO Office as well as to completely fulfil its duties as a Member State of the ILO.

Hungary prepares its national reports on the implementation of ratified Conventions every year. However, regrettably, last year we have sent the reports later than the dedicated deadline. Consequently, the Committee of Experts was not in a position to consider our reports and our comments on their previous notes and observation. In order to avoid this situation, we will make every effort to send our national reports in time in the future.

The national report on the implementation of the Convention, which is the issue of our discussion today, was prepared and submitted to the Office in writing on 5 December 2021. In the report, that was also discussed with the social partners in the National ILO Council, we provided detailed information on the latest developments with the relevant national legislation and reacted to the comments of the Committee of Experts.

Today, in the framework of the Committee, I would like to present these views and comments.

The Committee of Experts has requested the comments of the Government on the observations of the Forum of the Cooperation of Trade Unions and the Public Collection and Public Culture Workers Union regarding the legislative process concerning the status of cultural workers. In this regard, we note that the changes in the world of work over the past 30 years, as well as the differentiation of some professions and the specific regulations governing them, have significantly emptied out the Act on the Legal Status of Public Servants, which in many respects has not kept pace with changes in the labour market and labour law.

As a result, in 2020, the Act on the Transformation of the Legal Status of Employees of Cultural Institutions as Public Servants was adopted (the Act), which converts the status of public servants in the cultural sector into an employment relationship regulated by the Labour Code, thereby creating a uniform legal status and working conditions for them. The new legislation also reformed their wages system, with the guarantee that the overall wage conditions of the employees concerned could not be less favourable than provided before.

Therefore, in parallel with the change of status of employees in the cultural sector, the Government granted cultural professionals a 6 per cent wage increase in 2020 with the aim of ensuring the financial recognition of their work.

Before the decision to change the legal status of employees in the cultural sector was made, the cultural sector made serious preparations for about one and a half years to raise the salaries of professionals employed in the sector to a higher level.

The Government pays special attention to the wage conditions of the employees affected by the legal change. The wage increases introduced in 2020, 2021 and 2022 have contributed to the effective performance of cultural tasks, helped to keep those working in the cultural sector on the career track and helped young people to find a profession in the sector.

I would like to highlight that several discussions were initiated with the involvement of the representatives of the cultural sector regarding this reform, during which it was established that the legal relationship of public servants is a burden for the heads of the institutions and needs to be reformed. On 27 May 2020, the National Council of Public Service and Reconciliation also held a discussion on the Act and the Government provided information on the transition of the legal status and the increase in wages.

Turning now to the issue of the representativity threshold and collective bargaining in Hungary, I would like to inform the Committee of the following.

In connection with the observations on trade union representation and the right to negotiate collective agreements, it should be emphasized that, with the entry into force of the Labour Code in 2012, the regulation of the ability to conclude collective agreements is based on a different concept compared to the previous regulations. Its aim is to simplify the rules governing the collective bargaining capacity of trade unions. To this end, the regulation is based on the threshold of 10 per cent, pursuant to said section of the Labour Code, which constitutes a unified requirement in terms of collective bargaining capacity. The objective was to ensure that a trade union with sufficient support could enter into a collective agreement, and to avoid the fragmentation of interest representation when performing collective bargaining and establishing collective agreements.

Relating to the comment on the legal restrictions on the coalition freedoms of trade unions, we note that the provisions regarding collective bargaining shall be taken into account. Pursuant to said section of the Labour Code, trade unions entitled to enter into a collective agreement may conclude a collective agreement jointly. Accordingly, if more trade unions have collective bargaining capacity with the employer, they shall be entitled to conclude the collective agreement jointly. It means that a legal declaration for conclusion of a collective agreement can only be validly concluded by all trade unions.

The threshold of 10 per cent for each trade union concerned is also a condition for joint collective bargaining, which serves to ensure sufficient support. The Labour Code therefore does not allow the collective bargaining of trade unions with a representation of less than 10 per cent since this would increase the fragmentation of interest representation.

In addition, the Labour Code provides for the right of a trade union federation to conclude a collective agreement with an employer (or several employers) pursuant to a special provision. A trade union federation is therefore entitled to conclude a collective agreement if at least one of its member organizations represented by the employer meets the condition for concluding collective agreements and its member organizations authorize it to do so. Consequently, the Labour Code makes it possible for the trade union represented not to negotiate or conclude collective bargaining with the employer directly, but through a trade union federation to which the trade union represented by the employer belongs.

On the question of whether the representation threshold applies to collective agreements at both the company and sectoral levels, it should be emphasized that the Labour Code does not regulate the conclusion of collective agreements at the sectoral level. However, according to the relevant regulations of the Labour Code, it follows that in the case of a collective agreement concluded at the workplace, corporate level or by several employers, such as in a sector or subsector, the threshold of 10 per cent applies as a legal condition.

Regarding the comment on the collective bargaining entitlements of the work council, it may be noted that work councils are not entitled to conclude collective agreements. They may conduct works agreements, which can regulate a right or obligation arising from or related to the employment relationship, except for remuneration. The purpose of this provision is to enable the works agreement to at least partially replace collective agreements, thus encouraging the regulatory role of agreements at the workplace level. However, the condition to conclude a so-called normative works agreement is that the employer does not fall within the scope of any collective agreement and there is no trade union representation.

With respect to the observation of the Committee of Experts on the Equal Treatment Authority, we would like to indicate that the function of the Authority was taken over by the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights as of 1 January 2021. Accordingly, the fight against violations of equal treatment is now carried out by a constitutional body with unchanged staff, without compromising the high level of expertise. The Commissioner acts in administrative procedures in matters specified in the Equal Treatment Act, in accordance with the relevant procedural rules.

It is important to emphasize that the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights has taken over all the responsibilities of the Equal Treatment Authority, including its administrative powers. Thus, the Commissioner can take a binding decision and impose sanctions. The relevant sanctions, that have been set in line with the European Union directives concerned, have not changed.

Between 2017 and 2021, the Authority investigated 17 complaints, where the applicant complained that he/she had been discriminated against by his/her employer because of his/her trade union membership or activity. In most cases, the discrimination meant the termination of the employment relationship, and in several cases the harassment of trade union members and a disadvantage related to a benefit was also claimed. There was a case in which the applicant complained that he/she had not been employed by his/her employer because of his/her earlier trade union activity. Decisions on merits were made in eight out of the 17 cases, and no infringement could be established in any of them.

In connection with the competence of the Equal Treatment Authority, it is worth mentioning that it investigates discrimination based on protective characteristics, including the activities carried out in the trade union related to interest representation. However, the Authority does not have the competence to investigate all violations related to worker representation and the right to organize. In these cases, the Authority informs the applicants of the available remedies.

The Committee of Experts requested information on the sanctions and legal consequences determined by the Equal Treatment Authority. According to the consistent legal interpretation of the Authority, the legal consequence of ordering termination of the infringement does not extend to reinstatement in the position. This is clearly subject to judicial procedures in accordance with a certain paragraph of the Labour Code. The Authority may not provide for the payment of compensation pursuant to a certain paragraph of the Labour Code either. The Authority, however, may impose fines and may order the publication of its final decision.

During the procedures before the Authority, the parties may agree on a settlement, which may, where appropriate, provide for the restoration of the employment relationship or financial compensation. The parties shall request the Authority to approve the settlement by a decision. Settlements involving restoration of the employment relationship or compensation approved by the Authority are rare. It is more frequent for parties to reach a settlement outside the procedure and for the applicant to withdraw his/her application.

The period set by the Equal Treatment Act for the administrative procedure assessing the conformity with the requirement of equal treatment is 75 days. Periods of suspension, adjournment of the procedure and the client’s omission or delay are not included in this period. The Authority compiled statistics for the year 2017, according to which the average duration of administrative procedures in that year was 157 days, which does not include judicial remedy. Based on experience, the judicial review of an Authority’s decision in employment matters usually takes between one to three years.

The Hungarian Government has taken note of the Committee of Experts’ observations that specific legislative provisions are needed for prohibiting acts of interference on the part of the employer. As already stated by the Government, we believe that the current legislation, namely the provisions of the Fundamental Law and the Labour Code, ensure that all forms of unlawful intervention against trade unions are prohibited in Hungary. As to the sanctions applicable in cases of intervention against a trade union, the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights may apply the same sanctions as in the case of harming the principle of equal treatment, or a court may enforce the law based on the Labour Code.

Having said this, I would like to assure the Committee that we will consider the observations again and examine the practical experiences of the implementation of the relevant legal provisions.

Finally, the Committee of Experts invites the Government to provide information on the number of collective agreements signed, the sectors concerned, and the proportion of the workforce covered by collective agreements. The regulation of 2004 on the detailed rules for the notification and registration of collective agreements obliges the contracting parties to take note of the conclusion, amendment or termination of collective agreements and to comply with the data reporting obligation relating thereto. The Information System of Labour Relations (ISLR) is the IT support system for notifications in connection with collective agreements and registering collective agreements.

Due to the need for clarifications and updates of the relevant data, which is currently in progress, we could present key information on the collective agreements for the years between 2017 and 2019. These data are included in detail in our report on the implementation of the Convention.

Employer members – We would like to begin by thanking the Government for the information provided here in our Committee session, as well as the written submission sent on 16 May 2022. While this is appreciated, we must also note that the Government did not send its regular report on the Convention to the Office, which led the Committee of Experts to repeat its earlier comments. The Government appears to have some problems with its reporting obligations and we note that the submission that the Government did provide on 16 May 2022 does not seem to be related to the issues raised by the Committee of Experts in its observations under the Convention. Therefore, we trust that the Government will in future send its regular report on the Convention in time and also in line with its stated commitment in its submission to the Committee today. Furthermore, we would encourage the Government to share the information in writing with the Committee of Experts that it provided to our Committee just now.

Turning to the observations of the Committee of Experts, the Employers note that it contains, among others, requests to the Government for comments and information, including a request for comments on an observation by Hungarian trade unions alleging that a process concerning the status of cultural workers does not take into consideration the obligations of the Convention. A request was made by the Committee of Experts for comments on the observations made by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) alleging acts of anti-union dismissals, as well as the observations made by the Workers’ group of the National ILO Council denouncing restrictions on collective bargaining, for instance a 10 per cent representation threshold for trade union entitlement to collective bargaining. The Committee of Experts also requested information on the number of collective agreements signed, the sectors concerned, and the share of the workforce covered by collective agreements.

Taking into account the submissions of the Government, the Employers note that there appear to be two main issues in our discussion today. The first issue concerns sections in the Labour Code regarding compensation for unlawful dismissal of trade union members or trade union officials, in particular section 82 of the Labour Code, which provides compensation not exceeding the workers’ 12-month absence pay in the case of unlawful dismissal of trade union officials or trade union members.

Section 83, subsection 1, according to which reinstatement is granted in case of dismissals either violating the principle of equal treatment or violating the requirement for prior consent of the union’s higher body before the termination of a union official, and the possibility for the Equal Treatment Authority in such cases to levy fines in the absence of provisions on penalties for acts of anti-union discrimination against union officials and union affiliates in the Labour Code. In this regard, the Committee of Experts, in its observation, noted with interest the Government’s indication that a new law, Bill No. T17998, envisages to ensure by way of an amendment of the definition of “worker representative” that, in the event of unlawful termination, union officers also have the possibility of requesting reinstatement. Taking into account the Committee of Experts’ observations, the Employers express the expectation that the Government will take the necessary steps to ensure that union officials, union members and elected representatives enjoy effective protection against any act prejudicial to them on the basis of their trade union status or activity, including dismissal, and request the Government to provide information on developments in relation to the adoption of new legislative provisions in this regard.

Further, also taking note of the Committee of Experts’ observations, the Employers call on the Government to indicate whether the Equal Treatment Authority could order a reinstatement in a case of anti-union dismissal of trade union officials and members, to provide information on whether the Authority may order compensation and to provide information on the average duration of the proceedings before the Authority related to anti-union discrimination, as well as on the average duration of judicial proceedings. We welcome some of the information answering some of these questions provided by the Government today and encourage the provision of that information in detail in writing before the Committee of Experts’ next session.

The second issue concerns adequate protection against acts of interference, which is regulated pursuant to Article 2 of the Convention. While, according to the Government, the Constitution and the current national legislation are sufficient to protect and prevent acts of interference, the Committee of Experts expressed doubt, pointing out that the provisions of the Labour Code and the Equal Treatment Act do not specifically cover acts of interference designed to promote the establishment of workers’ organizations under the domination of employers or employers’ organizations, or to place workers’ organizations under the control of employers or employers’ organizations through financial or other means. Noting this issue, the Employers request the Government to take all necessary measures to adopt specific legislative provisions prohibiting such acts of interference on the part of employers or employers’ organizations with express appeal procedures coupled with effective and sufficiently dissuasive sanctions. The Employers consider that the way of implementing the above obligations of Article 2 of the Convention remains within the competence of the Government, as long as the Government ensures effective implementation. The Employers’ view is that this flexibility is reflected in Article 3, which reads “Machinery appropriate to national conditions shall be established, where necessary, for the purpose of ensuring respect for the right to organise as defined in the preceding Articles”. In the Employers’ view, “machinery appropriate to national conditions” could mean specific legislative provisions, but it also could mean other measures. Therefore, this flexibility must be taken into account by the Committee of Experts when considering Hungary’s application of the Convention.

Given that the Government is of the view that the existing laws provide sufficient protection, it may be useful to hear from the Government on what it bases this assessment. Are there, for instance, court decisions that show that the existing legislation is sufficiently effective in protecting against acts of interference? The Employers note that some comments were made on this issue today and look forward to further analysing the Government’s information in this regard. The Employers would appreciate having further information and clarification from the Government on this issue.

Finally, the Employers’ group notes that the discussion of this case in the Committee, in our view, demonstrates a lack of social dialogue at the national level, which includes employers in the competitive sector. We note that long-term industrial peace, effective labour relations and the application in both law and practice of the Government’s obligations pursuant to the Convention require social dialogue at the national level with the most representative employers’ and workers’ organizations. Therefore, we would take this opportunity to remind the Government of its obligations in this regard and to encourage effective national social dialogue with the representative employers’ and workers’ organizations in this respect and in compliance with its international labour obligations.

Worker members – This is the first time this Committee has discussed the application of the Convention in Hungary, which ratified the Convention in 1957. The Committee of Experts’ report points out that the Government is not complying with its obligations under the Convention. More so, the Committee of Experts has not received the Government’s reports and we must reiterate that the whole supervisory system rests on the timely submission of reports by the Government. So, we urge the Government of Hungary to comply with its reporting obligations in this regard.

The Committee’s report raises several repeated and serious violations in law and practice which go to the heart of the protections afforded to trade unions and their members by the Convention. In practice, we find numerous cases of acts of anti-union dismissals, union busting and intimidation in several sectors and several enterprises. Trade union leaders are being dismissed, often during collective negotiations, and anti-union discrimination is rife. Workers lack adequate protection in law against acts of anti-union discrimination, contrary to Article 1 of the Convention. The Labour Code does not contain penalties for acts of anti-union discrimination against union officials and affiliates. While the Government has argued that the Equal Treatment Authority may in such cases levy fines, it has failed to provide the Office with information with respect to the Authority’s competence to order reinstatement and compensation in cases of anti-union dismissals.

Collective bargaining is a right and, together with the right to freedom of association, it enables the exercise of all other rights at work. Without effective and meaningful protection against anti-union discrimination, collective bargaining becomes meaningless. Determining the scope and meaning of the right to collective bargaining under the Convention without its human rights context and the safeguards intended to be afforded to workers when this right is exercised will lead to a race to the bottom regarding terms and conditions at work.

The Committee of Experts has been clear that the Government has to take the necessary steps to ensure that union officials, union members and elected representatives enjoy effective protection against any acts prejudicial to them, including dismissals based on their status or activities. Trade unions, their members and officials must enjoy effective protection against anti-union discrimination.

Moreover, under the current legislation, union officers are not covered by the definition of “worker representative”. This definition covers only elected representatives. Accordingly, union officers cannot be awarded reinstatement in their original job in case of anti-union dismissals. The Government has expressed an intention to revise the definition of “worker representative” contained in section 294-1(e) of the Labour Code in order to ensure its application to union officers. We expect that the Government will take the necessary measures in full consultation with the social partners to ensure the legislative revision of the respective provisions of the law.

Workers also lack effective protection in law against acts of interference. The provisions of the Labour Code and the Equal Treatment Act do not prohibit acts designed to place workers under the domination of employers or employers’ organizations or to place workers’ organizations under the control of employers or employers’ organizations through financial or other means.

We recall that Article 2 of the Convention contains a fundamental principle of workers’ organizations being able to enjoy adequate protection against acts of interference in their establishment, functioning or administration. And we urge the Government to adopt specific legislative provisions prohibiting such acts of interference and providing for sufficiently dissuasive sanctions.

The right to collective bargaining is also severely curtailed by the representativity thresholds provided in the national legislation. Trade unions with less than 10 per cent representation among the workers cannot negotiate collective agreements, even with respect to their own members. In such cases, national laws permit collective bargaining agreements to be entered into by workers’ councils. This undermines the position of trade unions. Besides, the law limits the scope of negotiation to rights arising out of the employment relationship.

In addition, employers have the power to unilaterally modify, annul or extend the scope and content of collective agreements, weakening and undermining every process of collective bargaining. This is clearly inconsistent with the Convention and undermines the effective recognition of collective bargaining as a right.

We must also draw attention to the COVID-19 legislation adopted by the Hungarian Parliament, that is Act C of 2020 regarding healthcare workers and Government Decrees Nos 528/2020 and 530/2020. This regulation is also the subject of the complaint to the Committee on Freedom of Association in Case No. 3426. These regulations were adopted in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, but instead of protecting healthcare workers who were fighting at the frontline of the pandemic, they restrict freedom of association and prohibit collective bargaining. From 1 January 2021, healthcare workers could not conclude collective agreements based on paragraph 15/10 of Act C. Further, all collective agreements in force expired as of 1 January 2021 based on article 6 of Decree No. 530/2020. These provisions seriously violate Article 4 of the Convention, which requires the State to facilitate voluntarily negotiations between the social partners with a view to regulating employment and working conditions by collective agreements.

Generally, the content of collective agreements is freely and mutually agreed between the parties to the agreement, except under special circumstances. Also, Article 4 of the Convention is clear that the machinery for encouraging and promoting the full development and utilization of collective bargaining appropriate to national conditions is the responsibility of the State. The Government must encourage and promote collective bargaining, instead of undermining it, and we call on the Government to repeal the above-mentioned regulations and to restore access for healthcare workers to the fundamental rights to organize and to bargain collectively.

Employer member, Hungary – Hungarian employers, as part of the European and international community of employers, strongly stand for the principles of social dialogue and act to put them into practice. Thus, we think that complying with ILO Conventions is an important foundation of our social dialogue and industrial relations system. Employers regret to realize that Hungary is shortlisted among the serious failures because of failing to comply with its reporting obligations to the ILO and is also on the agenda of the Committee today because of concerns related to the implementation of the Convention. Even though the social partners negotiated the report on the implementation of the Convention with the Government in the framework of the National ILO Council, for some reason the Government failed to submit it to the ILO. As far as we know, the report is ready for submission, and we encourage our Government to approve it and submit it as soon as possible.

After overcoming the changes in the Government based on the elections on 3 April 2022, we believe that national social dialogue is the proper way of treating the cases on the agenda of the Committee today. We would like to draw the attention of the Committee to the fact that employers have not come across the issues covered by the case in the relevant national tripartite forum. When it comes to negotiating the necessary modification of the law, mainly the Labour Code, which is the main legal source of collective rights, the relevant body is the Permanent Consultation Forum of the Competition Sector and the Government. As Members of this entity, we have encountered these issues for the first time here on the agenda of the Committee and in the report of the Committee of Experts. This is a message to our Government and to trade unions as well, if any modification of the law is necessary, employers, as the representatives of the business sector, the Hungarian members of the International Organisation of Employers (IOE), are open to engaging in in-depth negotiations in the relevant form of social dialogue. Even if we have different interests and different opinions regarding the constant cases, we think that speaking today could have been avoided by meaningful national social dialogue, either in the National Tripartite Council or the National ILO Council.

In conclusion, we would like to encourage our Government to intensify national social dialogue on the concerned legal cases and processes, which is a prerequisite for long-term industrial peace. I would like to emphasize again that employers stand for fundamental rights and we are open to negotiate at the national level.

Worker member, Hungary – The case of Hungary on the application of the Convention already has a history which goes back to 2012, when the new Labour Code was adopted. This new Code decreased the collective rights of workers to the possible minimum level that is regulated in international law, mainly by the ILO fundamental Conventions.

Throughout the years, these minimum level rights have been further weakened in practice as well as in legislation. Our collective rights, such as the right to collective bargaining and social dialogue, the right to protection against anti-union discrimination and the right to strike, are not really promoted and protected in Hungary. There are no effective and dissuasive sanctions set out in law against violations of these rights and even the organization of a new trade union is rather difficult because of the many administrative burdens prescribed by the law to be registered as a trade union.

The aim of the Convention is to support and protect the collective rights of workers, particularly their rights against anti-union discrimination, and to promote collective bargaining.

I would like to highlight some examples of the weakening of collective bargaining possibilities and the current state of anti-union discrimination in Hungary. Concerning the promotion of collective bargaining, according to Article 4 of the Convention, measures have to be taken to encourage and promote the development and utilization of machinery for voluntary collective bargaining. In Hungary, the level of collective bargaining coverage is rather low, as only about 10 per cent of workers are covered by collective agreements. Therefore, the promotion of collective bargaining is sorely needed for us.

Some legal provisions, instead of promoting collective bargaining at the workplace level, which is the traditional collective bargaining level in our country, raise obstacles to the application of this right. Traditionally, in Hungary, several trade unions operate in many enterprises, particularly larger companies.

If these trade unions do not reach separately the representativity threshold to entitle them to collective bargaining, they are not entitled by the law to bargain and conclude collective agreements, even if they form a coalition or a legally formed federation to exceed this threshold together. In this situation, there are no legally recognized trade unions for collective bargaining in the enterprise, even if the trade unions together reach the representativity threshold. The consequence of this, according to the law, is that works councils, instead of trade unions, are entitled to negotiate and agree with the employer on working conditions. This situation weakens the position of and respect for trade unions and undermines their position at the workplace. This regulation does not therefore promote collective bargaining as a traditional right and exclusive prerogative of trade unions.

At the sectoral level, there are currently hardly any collective agreements concluded, which shows that sectoral collective bargaining is also not really promoted.

It was very harmful for trade unions when, in the case of cultural workers and public healthcare workers, there was no social dialogue before the adoption of new laws which basically changed their legal status and affected almost every element of their working conditions. Moreover, public healthcare workers, under the new law, have been deprived of the right to bargain collectively, and have a new legal status as some kind of public servants. However, this new status is a special employment relationship in law, without any rights. Therefore, the total removal of public healthcare workers’ right to collective bargaining seriously violates the Convention, as well as Convention No. 87. The Secretary-General of the trade union of cultural workers, the Public Collection and Public Culture Workers’ Union, asked many times by letter for a conciliation meeting with the Minister about renumeration and the new draft law, but the request was not answered by the competent Ministry, even though negotiation was a legal obligation of the Minister, according to the valid law. Only after the adoption of the new status law by Parliament, during Easter holidays, was the text of the new Act sent to the representative trade unions asking their opinion about it. Under these indecent circumstances, only half hour of working time was left for them to analyse the regulations and elaborate their opinion on it. In view of the limitation on the right to collective bargaining in these sectors, social dialogue has a crucial role in the determination of working conditions, and therefore has to be taken very seriously.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, collective bargaining rights were also weakened by the emergency legislation that was also adopted without social dialogue. Concerning anti-union discrimination, according to Article 1 of the Convention, workers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of anti‐union discrimination in respect of their employment. Hungarian law does not provide adequate protection against anti-union discrimination for trade union officers, so is not in line with this Article.

The new Hungarian Labour Code, adopted in 2012, modified the regulation of the protection of trade union representatives against dismissal or other detrimental measures imposed on them by the employer based on anti-union discrimination. Without the consent of higher trade union officers to the dismissal, trade union officers cannot be dismissed at all. However, according to the law, a court can replace the higher trade union’s consent, if the higher trade union has misused the right. The consequence of this regulation is that the court examines the case, not as an anti-union discrimination case, but what is examined by the court is rather the behaviour of the higher trade union whether it was lawful or whether it engaged in any unlawful action when it refused to agree with the dismissal.

In conclusion, I would like to highlight that there are no real sanctions against the violation of collective rights of workers. We would therefore like to ask the Committee to urge the Government to bring our legislation and practice into line with the Convention and, as it is necessary, we ask for ILO technical assistance too.

Government member, Serbia – The Republic of Serbia has taken note of the report of the Committee of Experts and has listened with interest to the distinguished representative of Hungary on the implementation of the Convention. What we have noticed and what we commend is the constructive approach Hungary is demonstrating in cooperation with the ILO. We would like to underline the argument stated in Hungary’s representation that changes in the world of labour require constant adaptation, including in the regulatory framework.

The Republic of Serbia welcomes the guarantees in the national regulatory framework for workers’ collective rights, which should meet international labour standards. We reiterate that any change in the legal status of workers should not lead to less favourable conditions. In the case presented by Hungary, Serbia, as a neighbouring country, is pleased to hear that the new legislation has come with reformed and increased wages after consultation with the representatives of the relevant sectors.

We believe that Hungary has taken steps to meet the recommendations made by the Committee of Experts and the Republic of Serbia would like to encourage Hungary to continue open and inclusive social dialogue, as well as its constructive cooperation within the framework of the ILO. We look forward to receiving further reports from the Committee of Experts on the continued implementation of the relevant ILO Conventions.

Worker member, Italy – I am taking the floor today on behalf of the three Italian trade union confederations affiliated to the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). We believe that freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining are not only enshrined in the core ILO Conventions, but also part and parcel of the European Social Model, and that the European social partners are given a unique prerogative by European Union Treaties: they can even participate in co-legislation by jointly submitting European social partners’ agreements to be transposed into directives.

We are at a very tragic moment these days when war has come back to the European continent. European Union Member States should do everything they can to promote dialogue and be proud of the high standards for the protection of fundamental rights, including freedom of association, and the enhancement of collective bargaining at all levels.

This is why we are highly concerned about the reiterated lack of action by the Hungarian Government to amend sections 8 and 9 of the 2012 Labour Code and the other provisions highlighted by the Worker spokesperson. This is a long-standing demand by the Committee of Experts, which has so far been ignored. It is unacceptable that free trade union action is undermined by possible allegations of jeopardizing the employers’ reputation or their economic interests when exercising industrial action. This undermines freedom of expression, also connected to the over-regulation imposed in light of the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions and is also misused to limit the right to industrial action in many Member States, including in Hungary, where it has been introduced unilaterally and excessively by the Government.

It is also very worrying to note in the Committee of Experts’ report that the Hungarian Government has failed again to provide the real numbers of unions denied registration, and we fully endorse the demand for transparency. This is also contrary to the spirit of the European Union Directive, which is being finalized these very same hours, which will further strengthen collective bargaining by requiring, among others, the social partners to jointly draft national action plans to cover at least 70 per cent of the workforce with a collective agreement.

In conclusion, I would like to say that the action by the Hungarian Government so far does not seem to go in this direction. This is why we strongly encourage a sincere dialogue with the social partners, as demanded by the unions and employers in the country, to amend the legislation, as suggested by the Committee of Experts.

Interpretation from German: Worker member, Germany – I am speaking on behalf of workers in Germany and in the Nordic countries. We have observed with concern for years now how the right to collective bargaining, guaranteed by the Convention, has been successively and deliberately eroded in Hungary. The labour reforms associated with the radical austerity policy were aimed at deregulation and greater flexibility of the labour market. In this connection, collective labour rights were severely restricted and social dialogue at the national level was largely destroyed.

The number of collective agreements concluded has fallen from 145 in 2006 to ten in 2019. Trade unions are denied effective legal remedies with dissuasive sanctions to defend themselves against interference in their activities.

Inferior working conditions and income have become the Hungarian business model to attract foreign investors. National labour law offers a number of opportunities for employers to adjust working conditions unilaterally to the disadvantage of employees. This deliberate undermining of the procedures for the collective bargaining of working conditions reinforces economic and social dependency and thus the vulnerability of each worker. At a time when workers are particularly weakened by the COVID-19 pandemic, we need strengthened mechanisms, networking and solidarity to carry together what cannot be carried alone. This is what the founding of this Organization aimed at more than 100 years ago, to respect and promote the rights and freedoms of a collectively organized workforce, which in this way develops the necessary power to negotiate humane working conditions.

The Hungarian labour law reforms in recent years have systematically eroded the foundations of this power. The idea of self-responsibility has become the guiding principle of social policy. Thus, Hungary has become another negative example of everything that is wrong with the idea of “a workfare society”.

We therefore call on the Government to immediately amend its legislation, in full consultation with the social partners, and bring it into line with Hungary’s obligations under the Convention to create an enabling environment for collective bargaining.

Observer, International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) – I am speaking on behalf of the ITF, the European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF) and its affiliate the Hungarian Air Traffic Controllers’ Union. I wish to raise with the Committee an example of state intervention in collective bargaining resulting in a severe restriction on the principle of free and voluntary bargaining protected under Article 4 of the Convention.

In 2013, the state-owned enterprise responsible for air traffic control concluded a collective agreement with the union. Among other things, the collective agreement stipulated the minimum service requirements in the event of industrial action. This measure, negotiated voluntarily by the parties, provided for mutually agreed service levels, including a service percentage for commercial aircraft and full air navigation services for search and rescue and medical flights. Over the years, these requirements were strictly adhered to by the union in conformity with the collective agreement.

On 27 July 2021, the Government promulgated Decree No. 446 prohibiting industrial action in air traffic control services in the interests of national defence and security. Following a breakdown in negotiations with its employer in the summer of 2021, the union announced its intention to take collective action in full respect of the agreement. Before taking action, the union sought legal assurances from the Metropolitan Court of Justice. The Court ruled that the action would be lawful and recognized the minimum service provisions negotiated between the parties.

Nevertheless, the union did not pursue the action so as not to fall foul of the Decree. This had an immediate impact on the collective bargaining process. The employer effectively withdrew from the collective agreement by refusing to bargain over wages, in violation of the principle of good faith bargaining. The employer has instead resorted to negotiating directly with employees and even rejected a union request for conciliation and arbitration.

While the Decree in question was repealed on 31 May 2022, the minimum service requirements have now been enshrined in Law No. 136. This Law was introduced without providing any compensatory guarantees to air traffic controllers. This, coupled with the termination of the collective agreement, has deprived these workers of two intrinsically linked fundamental rights.

In line with ILO jurisprudence, workers’ and employers’ organizations must be able to participate in determining minimum services. Where there is disagreement, the matter should be resolved by an independent body. The complete opposite has happened in Hungary. We contend that the Decree and the subsequent Law No. 136 amount to a restriction on free and voluntary collective bargaining, which has completely destabilized labour relations in the sector.

We call on the Government to repeal the relevant sections of Law No. 136 and to ensure that it no longer interferes in free and voluntary collectively bargaining.

Observer, Public Services International (PSI) – I am speaking on behalf of PSI and also the European Public Services Union (EPSU) and our Hungarian affiliates.

In the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Hungarian Parliament adopted legislation that removed collective bargaining and the effective right to strike from health workers in the public sector. Act C on the health service legal relationship and its implementing Decree No. 530, adopted on 6 October 2020 and in force from 18 November 2020, made all collective agreements already concluded with state healthcare workers expire on 1 January 2021, prohibited collective bargaining for health workers in state-owned facilities and made it almost impossible to exercise the right to strike for these workers.

This was not a simple modification of the legislation; the public servant status of healthcare workers was terminated, and all healthcare workers were required to sign a new contract by 1 March 2021, giving them a new legal employment relationship with a so-called “health service status”, which deprived them of the rights and benefits that all other public servants enjoy.

At the same time, workers in other state-owned utility companies were set to receive a 15 per cent pay rise over three years. This would be implemented at different rates in different companies with, for instance, national water company employees receiving 4 per cent in 2021, 7 per cent in 2022 and an extra 4 per cent in 2023.

Although this was the object of a complaint filed with the Committee on Freedom of Association, which had already issued recommendations to the Government, I am also bringing the issue to the attention of the Committee on the Application of Standards because, in the written communication submitted by the Government on 16 May, the Government says it has not taken any measures in regard to the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association, and this is a clear example of the situations mentioned by the Committee of Experts in the General Survey that we have discussed, namely the growing precariousness in health and social care work and the cruel conditions that health and care workers have faced during the COVID-19 pandemic.

We think it is disgraceful that this has been done to the workers, the same people who might have saved the lives of friends, family or colleagues of the lawmakers who adopted this law, when at the same time it has been demonstrated by the ILO and other research that collective bargaining played an important role in mitigating the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on employment and on economic activity.

Observer, Education International (EI) – I am speaking on behalf of EI, the global union federation of teachers’ unions, which represents 383 unions in 178 countries, including the Teachers’ Democratic Union of Hungary (PDSZ) and the Teachers’ Union of Hungary (SEH). I will focus on the many, and unfortunately unsuccessful, attempts by unions in the education sector to engage in negotiations with government representatives.

The Committee of Experts notes in its latest report “the excessive limitation of the scope of collective bargaining”. Indeed, in the education sector, trade union demands relating to wages, the reduction of the workload in education and measures related to COVID-19 requiring workers in public schools to take leave without pay if they have not been vaccinated against the coronavirus have not been considered by the authorities and no real good faith negotiation has been undertaken.

In October 2020, the Government prevented negotiations between the higher education union and the authorities of a university. In November 2021, it was not possible to conclude any agreements on wage increases, as the Government maintained the increase of 16,500 Hungarian forints (around €45) determined unilaterally.

In January 2022, the Ministry once again, without negotiation, increased the hours of service of teachers by decree. The Secretary of State also declared a strike by teachers to be unlawful, which was overturned by the Court of First Instance on 28 January. Three days later, on 31 January, one teacher in five was protesting against the absence of social dialogue. Several religious schools, vocational training schools and several nursery schools joined the trade union action which, as we know, is the last resort to push governments to negotiate.

On 11 February 2022, the Government issued a new decree prohibiting collective work stoppages in education. The two teachers’ unions have appealed to the Constitutional Court against the constitutionality of this decree, which imposes a minimum service.

Government representative – On behalf of the Government of Hungary, we have taken note of the comments made by the members of the Committee and we will take them into due consideration. However, we would like to indicate that we focus our response on the remarks of the Committee of Experts with regard to the Convention. I would like to express my deep regret once again for not being able to send to the Committee of Experts our national reports within the deadline, in which we explain our position in much more detail.

In our final reactions, I would like to emphasize that the Government of Hungary considers effective social dialogue at the national, sectoral and company level as an important element of the world of work. On a legislative level, our fundamental law provides the general framework, as well as guarantees of the freedom of the right to organize. Our national regulatory frameworks for workers’ collective rights are in line with international labour standards. Articles 8, 2 and 5 of the Fundamental Law of Hungary guarantee freedom of association and also declare the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike.

Since 2010, we have been working on the development of a more effective framework for social dialogue and a new approach to reconciling interests. The National Economic and Social Council has been operating as the main cross-sectoral institution for social dialogue and a macro-level forum for social consultation for more than ten years. The main aspects of the working methods of the Council are openness, transparency and wide consultation. Additionally, the Permanent Consultation Forum of the Competition Sector and Government was established in 2012 to consult the intentions of employees and employers in the private sector with the Government and to conclude agreements and discuss regulatory proposals.

Reconciliation of the interests of the social partners in the public sector takes place on several platforms at the same time. In matters of sectoral importance affecting the civil service, the competent ministers consult in sectoral consultative forums. A Health Service Reconciliation Forum operates with the participation of the representatives of workers in healthcare service relationships.

Public employees also have their own national-level conciliation forum: the National Labour Council for Public Employees. In addition to this Council, there are other intersectoral and inter-ministerial consultative forums in place to discuss issues related to the living and working conditions of public sector employees. Foremost among these are the Civil Service Reconciliation Forum and the National Civil Service Stakeholder Council. The latter serves as the main national tripartite forum dedicated to discussing common issues and regulations related to the public sector. The effectiveness of the system is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the forums, both at the national and sectoral levels, have been actively involved in tackling the challenges of recent years.

Well-functioning social dialogue is characterized by the fact that tripartite social forums operated effectively at the national level, even during the pandemic. The Permanent Consultation Forum of the Competition Sector and Government met regularly, holding 24 meetings in 2020, 12 meetings in 2021 and one meeting this year. The National Labour Council for Public Employees met three times in 2020, twice last year and once this year. The National Civil Service Stakeholder Council held three plenary sessions in 2020 and also in 2021, of which two were held with the participation of the National Labour Council for Public Employees. The National Economic and Social Council held four online meetings in 2020 and two in 2021.

At these meetings, the most important measures and initiatives of the Government were discussed, including the budgetary implications of the situation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the programmes developed to save jobs and the possibilities for supporting those who became unemployed due to the crisis. At these forums, one of the most important elements of the negotiations is the annual tripartite agreement on the minimum wage with the aim of improving the economic situation of workers. We continuously make efforts to channel the opinions and practical suggestions of the social partners accordingly.

Finally, I would like to emphasize that, in our view, we have succeeded in achieving an inclusive recovery from the COVID-19 crisis with the right combination of well-functioning social dialogue tools and targeted public intervention. The Hungarian Government is committed to continuing and improving the effectiveness of social dialogue so that the social partners can play a meaningful role in economic and social governance in the future too. To this end, the Government is also providing financial and infrastructural support to the social partners, through its own and European Union financial resources. Cooperation and partnership with the social partners are important for us, as the constantly increasing minimum wage and the introduction of significant tax cuts are largely due to the social partners’ active, constructive support, on which we will continue to rely in the future.

Employer members – I would begin our closing comments by noting that some of the submissions made by speakers, in the Employers’ view, go outside the scope of the discussion of the Convention, and will not be addressed in our closing remarks. We also note in particular one speaker’s focus exclusively on the right to strike, which in our view, falls entirely outside the appropriate scope of this discussion regarding the Convention. In addition, we would like to remind all speakers that the mandate of this Committee is to examine government conduct regarding the application in law and practice of international labour standards and we are not present to discuss individual employers’ situations or conduct. We would ask that any references to individual employers made by speakers today be struck from the record.

Taking into account the observations of the Committee of Experts, the Employers reiterate our expectation that the Government will take the necessary steps to ensure that union officials, union members and elected representatives enjoy effective protection against any prejudicial acts based on their status or activities, including dismissal, and we restate our call to the Government to provide information on developments in relation to the adoption of the new legislative provisions discussed today in this regard.

We encourage the transparency of the Government in this process and we also note the call by the Committee of Experts to the Government to provide information on whether the Equal Treatment Authority could provide reinstatement as a remedy in cases of anti-union dismissals of trade union officials and members, to provide information as to whether the Equal Treatment Authority may order compensation, and for the Government to provide information on the average duration of proceedings before the Equal Treatment Authority related to cases of anti-union discrimination.

We call on the Government to provide this information to the Committee of Experts prior to its next session. In addition, as discussed with respect to the issues related to protection against acts of interference, which is regulated by Article 2 of the Convention, the Employers call on the Government to provide further information related to the issue of protection against acts of interference and how this is codified in existing or contemplated new laws.

We appreciate, in closing, the Government’s comments today, as well as its stated commitment to social dialogue. The Employers’ group calls on the Government to commit itself, in both law and practice, to full compliance with the Convention, and we also call on the Government to commit itself to true national social dialogue with the most representative employers’ and workers’ organizations, and to provide information on these measures to the Committee of Experts before its next session.

Worker members – We have taken note of the comments of the Government of Hungary and we must emphasize that the Government of Hungary has an obligation to protect international labour standards, including those contained in the Convention. The Workers’ group is concerned at repeated violations of the right to organize and collective bargaining in Hungary, in both law and in practice. Instead of prohibiting anti-union discrimination and promoting and encouraging collective bargaining, the laws appear to promote anti-union discrimination and demote collective bargaining, and this situation calls for action.

In line with the requests by the Committee of Experts for information, the Government must provide information on the number of collective agreements signed, the sectors concerned, and the share of the workforce covered by collective agreements.

We urge the Government to immediately take comprehensive action to make the laws in Hungary fully compatible with the Convention. Specifically, we call on the Government: to adopt specific legislative provisions in full consultation with the social partners; to prohibit acts of interference on the part of the employer and make express provision for rapid appeal procedures coupled with effective and dissuasive sanctions to allow trade unions with less than 10 per cent representation among the workers to negotiate collective agreements with respect to their own members; to repeal the provisions allowing workers’ councils to conclude collective bargaining agreements where trade unions are present in the workplace; to extend the scope of negotiation beyond the rights arising out of the employment relationship, as it should be left to the parties concerned to decide on the subjects for negotiation; to repeal provisions allowing employers to have the power to unilaterally modify, annul or extend the scope and content of collective agreements; to repeal the provisions of Act C of 2020 and Government Decrees Nos 528/2020 and 530/2020; and to ensure adequate protections in law against acts of anti-union discrimination and make provision for effective and dissuasive sanctions.

We also request the Government to provide information on the average duration of both the judicial proceedings as well as the proceedings before the Equal Treatment Authority related to anti-union discrimination, as requested by the Committee of Experts.

And finally, we would ask the Government to ensure that union officials, union members and elected representatives enjoy effective protection against any acts prejudicial to them, including dismissal based on their status or activities, and to make express provision for rapid appeal procedures coupled with effective and dissuasive sanctions.

To conclude, the Government must make every effort to take the necessary action without further delay and avail itself of the technical assistance of the ILO to ensure that the law and practice in Hungary are fully compatible with the provisions of the Convention.

Conclusions of the Committee

The Committee took note of the oral and written statements made by the Government and the discussion that followed.

The Committee regretted the failure of the Government to report on the application of the Convention to the Committee of Experts.

The Committee noted with concern the significant compliance gaps in law and practice regarding the protection against anti-union discrimination, the scope of collective bargaining permitted under the law and interference in free and voluntary collective bargaining with respect to the Convention.

Taking into account the discussion, the Committee urges the Government, in consultation with the social partners, to:

- review relevant labour legislation to ensure that the representativity threshold for negotiating collective bargaining is not set in a manner that prevents workers from exercising their right to collective bargaining;

- ensure that union officials, union members and elected representatives enjoy effective protection, in law and practice, against any act prejudicial to them, including dismissal, based on their status or activities;

- ensure protection in law and practice against acts of anti union discrimination, coupled with effective and dissuasive sanctions;

- ensure no undue interference in the establishment, functioning and administration of trade unions; and

- provide information on the average duration of both judicial proceedings and proceedings before the Equal Treatment Authority related to anti-union discrimination.

The Committee requests the Government to avail itself, without delay, of ILO technical assistance, to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Convention in law and practice.

The Committee requests the Government to submit a report to the Committee of Experts by 1 September 2022 with information on the application of the Convention in law and practice, in consultation with the social partners.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2022, published 111st ILC session (2023)

Relationship between collective bargaining and the legislation. The Committee notes the Government’s indication that with the adoption of the 2012 Labour Code, collective agreements may derogate from the provisions of the Labour Code not only to the benefit but also to the detriment of the employee, except for the minimum guaranteed standards from which derogations are not allowed. As a general rule, in the absence of any provision to the contrary, the collective agreement may derogate from the provisions of the Second (the Employment relationships) and Third (Industrial relations) Parts of the Labour Code. The Committee notes that according to the Government the objective of the above rules is to strengthen the role of contract-based regulation and to provide an opportunity for the parties to conclude collective agreements in order to create flexible rules adapted to the specific workplace and working conditions. The Committee, however, notes that according to the workers’ group of the National ILO Council, existing data on collective agreements and collective bargaining do not support the Government’s indication that the derogation option adopted under section 277(2) of the Labour Code has contributed to the increase in collective bargaining and collective agreements. In this respect, the Committee recalls that the general objective of the Convention is to promote collective bargaining with a view to agreeing on terms and conditions of employment that are more favourable than those already established by law (see the 2013 General Survey on collective bargaining in the public service, paragraph 298).The Committee requests the Government to: (i) provide a list of issues from which the parties can derogate to the detriment of workers and a list of issues (minimum guarantees) from which the Labour Code does not allow the parties to derogate; and (ii) detailed information on how section 277(2) is being applied and its impact in practice.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2022, published 111st ILC session (2023)

The Committee notes the observations of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) received on 1 September 2022 concerning matters examined by the Committee in the present comment. It further notes the observations of the International Organisation of Employers (IOE) received on 25 August 2022 concerning the discussions that took place at the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards with respect to the application of the Convention.

The Committee also notes: (i) the observations of the workers’ group of the National ILO Council (NILOC) in relation to the Report sent by the Government in view of the discussion before the Committee on the Application of Standards; (ii) the summaries provided by the Government of the position expressed by the workers’ group of the NILOC concerning the report submitted by the Government to the Committee.

Follow-up to the conclusions of the Committee on the Application of Standards (International Labour Conference, 110th Session, May–June 2022)

The Committee notes the discussions held at the Conference Committee in June 2022 on the application of the Convention by Hungary. The Committee notes that the Conference Committee, noting with concern the significant compliance gaps in law and practice regarding the protection against anti-union discrimination, the scope of collective bargaining permitted under the law and interference in free and voluntary collective bargaining with respect to the Convention, requested the Government to: (i) review relevant labour legislation to ensure that the representativity threshold is not set in a manner that prevents workers from exercising their right to collective bargaining; (ii) ensure that union officials, union members and elected representatives enjoy effective protection, in law and practice, against any act prejudicial to them, including dismissal, based on their status or activities; (iii) ensure no undue interference in the establishment, functioning and administration of trade unions; and (iv) provide information on the average duration of both judicial proceedings and proceedings before the Equal Treatment Authority (ETA) related to anti-union discrimination.

The Committee further notes that the Conference Committee requested the Government to: (i) avail itself, without delay, of ILO technical assistance, to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Convention in law and practice; and (ii) submit a report to the Committee by 1 September 2022 on the application of the Convention.

The Committee notes that in July 2022, the Government requested the technical assistance of the Office with respect to the Convention and that a first meeting took place in August 2022 in order to exchange on the modalities of such assistance.

Article 1 of the Convention. Adequate protection against acts of anti-union discrimination. The Committee recalls that it had requested the Government to ensure that trade union officials and members enjoy effective protection against anti-union discrimination and to provide information on the average duration of the related judicial and administrative proceedings. Concerning the specific protection of trade union officials, the Committee notes with satisfaction the Government’s indication that, as a result of Act CLIX of 2017 the definition of employee representatives in the Labour Code now covers trade union officials, enabling them to request their reinstatement in case of unlawful dismissal.

As for trade union members other than officials, the Committee noted in its previous comment the legal provisions of the Labour Code that provide, through judicial procedure, for compensation (not exceeding the worker’s 12-month absentee pay) in case of dismissal and reinstatement in case of violation of the principle of equal treatment (section 82 and 83(1)(a) of the Labour Code). The Committee further notes the Government’s indication that the trade union member may demand compensation under section 166(1) of the Labour Code if the employer caused damage to the employee in connection with the employment relationship. As for the procedure under the Equal Treatment Act in response to the Committee’s previous comment, the Government indicates that the legal consequences set out in the Equal Treatment Act do not extend to reinstatement and the ETA may not provide for compensation. The ETA, however, may impose a fine of HUF50,000 to HUF6 million and order the publication of its anonymised final decision.

Concerning the Committee’s request to provide information on the average duration of both judicial proceedings and proceedings before the ETA, the Committee notes that the Government only provided data for the average processing time before the ETA (66 days excluding the duration of suspension). The Committee also notes that out of the 17 cases submitted before the ETA since June 2017, 10 cases resulted with the rejection of the request and 7 with the termination of the proceedings. The Committee notes that while the reported data allows for a better understanding on the number of submissions, it does not provide sufficient information to determine the grounds on which the cases were rejected by the ETA.

The Committee takes note of the observations of the workers’ group of the NILOC that the legislation lacks dissuasive sanctions and that the data provided on the cases examined by the ETA illustrate both the low number of proceedings and that in the majority of cases the ETA rejects the applications submitted by employees and trade unions. Regarding the above, the Committee wishes to recall that the existence of legal provisions prohibiting acts of anti-union discrimination is not enough if they are not accompanied by effective and rapid procedures to ensure their application in practice and if the sanctions provided for are not effective and sufficiently dissuasive. In view of the above, the Committee requests the Government to: (i) provide comprehensive information on the average duration of both judicial proceedings and proceedings before the ETA, together with details on remedies provided, the number of claims rejected and the grounds for any such rejections; (ii) provide information on the legal provisions under which anti-union discriminatory acts, other than dismissal, can be remedied and the way they are applied; and (iii)carry out, in consultation with the social partners, a comprehensive examination of the effectiveness of the existing protection mechanisms against anti-union discrimination. The Committee requests the Government to provide information in this regard.

Article 2. Adequate protection against acts of interference. In its previous comment the Committee requested the Government to take steps to adopt specific legislative provisions prohibiting such acts of interference on the part of the employer and making express provision for rapid appeal procedures, coupled with effective and sufficiently dissuasive sanctions.

The Committee notes the Government’s indication that in addition to the provisions of the Labour Code, the autonomy of trade unions is regulated by Act CLXXV of 2011 on the right of association and the Civil Code. The Committee notes the detailed description from the Government of the various provisions of the above laws and the indication that since Act LV of 2000 on the promulgation of the Convention forms part of the Hungarian legal system, consequently Article 2 of the Convention should also be deemed applicable. The Committee observes however that neither Act LV of 2000 which contains the official Hungarian translation of the Convention nor the other legislative instruments mentioned by the Government include provisions that specifically prohibit and sanction the acts of interference covered by Article 2 of the Convention. The Committee is therefore bound to reiterate its previous comment and request the Government to take steps to adopt specific legislative provisions prohibiting such acts of interference on the part of the employer and making express provision for rapid appeal procedures, coupled with effective and sufficiently dissuasive sanctions.

Article 4. Promotion of collective bargaining. Representativeness requirements. The Committee notes the Government’s explanation that the uniform 10 per cent threshold for conclusion of collective agreements set by legislation was established with the goal to enhance collective negotiations and to simplify the previous conditions set regarding the ability to conclude collective agreements. The Government adds that deviation from the 10 per cent threshold would: (i) enable trade unions with fragmented support under the 10 per cent threshold to exercise the right to jointly conduct collective bargaining and conclude collective agreement; and (ii) could set aside a trade union or a confederation that alone reaches the 10 per cent threshold. The Committee notes the observations received from the workers’ group of the NILOC that the law restricts the ‘coalition’ of trade unions for collective bargaining in cases when no trade union reaches the 10 per cent threshold. The Committee requests the Government, after consultation with the representative social partners, to examine the possibility of allowing for the coalition of trade unions at the workplace in cases where no trade union reaches the required representativity individually.

Negotiation with work councils. The Committee notes the observations of the workers’ group of the NILOC concerning the possibility for works councils to enter into agreement with the employer in relation to working conditions (except on remuneration). The Committee notes that according to the wording of section 268(1) of the Labour Code: “Such agreements may be concluded on the condition that the employer is not covered by a collective agreement it has concluded, or there is no trade union with entitlement to conclude a collective agreement”. The Committee notes that under this provision, an employer is entitled to conclude a collective agreement with a works council even if there is a trade union organisation in the company, as long as the latter does not reach the representativeness threshold set by the legislation to be able to bargain collectively. The Committee recalls that Article 4 of the Convention refers to collective bargaining between employers or employers' organizations on the one hand and workers' organizations on the other hand, and that it considers that, in order to ensure an effective promotion of the negotiating capacities of workers’ organizations, negotiations with non-union actors should only be possible in the absence of trade unions at the respective level. The Committee therefore requests the Government, after consulting the representative social partners, to review section 268(1) of the Labour Code accordingly.

Material scope of collective bargaining in publicly-owned entities. In its previous comments, under the Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154), the Committee requested the Government to indicate which subject matters were excluded from the scope of collective bargaining in publicly-owned entities. The Committee understands that this question concern mainly public sector workers not engaged in the administration of the State that are therefore fully covered by the Convention.

The Committee notes the Government’s response that sections 204–208 of the Labour Code set out the rules on employment at publicly-owned entities. These rules are mandatory and cannot be derogated neither by an individual nor by a collective agreement (section 213(f) of the Labour Code). These rules encompass: the notice period and severance payment, exceptions to working time (i. e. break from work, except for stand-by work; travel time), full daily working time shorter than general full daily working time may not be prescribed in a publicly-owned entity, except to prevent a hazard or danger to health (section 205(3) of the Labour Code). Finally, derogation from provisions of Chapters XIX-XXI of the Labour Code regulating labour relations is not permitted (section 206 of the Labour Code). Chapters XIX-XXI concern the regulation related to the establishment, functioning and dissolution of works councils and trade unions, including rules related to time allowances provided for trade union officials. The Government indicates that such rules were required by the special “legal status” and economic role of the employer in publicly-owned entities to ensure efficient management and prevention of abuse of State assets, enhanced enforcement of public interest, performance of public functions, publicity related to community objectives and to improve public opinion of companies.

The Committee recalls that workers of state-owned commercial or industrial enterprises are fully covered by the Convention. While the special characteristics of the public service, may allow for some flexibility, legislative measures taken unilaterally by the authorities to restrict the scope of negotiable issues are often incompatible with the Convention, and tripartite discussions are a particularly appropriate method of resolving these difficulties. While taking note of the justification provided for by the Government, the Committee is of the view that the matters excluded from collective bargaining at publicly-owned entities under articles 205-206 go beyond the restrictions that are compatible with the Convention. The Committee therefore requests the Government to initiate discussions with the social partners in order to revise the referred restrictions of the material scope of collective bargaining in publicly-owned entities.

Collective bargaining in practice. The Committee notes the data provided by the Government on the number of collective agreements for the period of 2012–19. While noting the observation of the workers’ group of the NILOC that it is unclear from the data what the number of agreements refers to, the Committee observers that the data shows that in the private sector, in spite of a small increase in the number of collective agreements (from 942 in 2012 to 1011 in 2019), the number of workers covered decreased over the same period of time (from 442,723 to 397,650). In the public sector, both the number of agreements and the number of workers covered decreased at a higher rate (from 1,735 to 820 and from 261,401 to 193,695). In terms of data available for collective agreements covering more than one employer or institution, the data indicates a slightly upward trend in the private sector (from 81 to 84 and 204,585 to 229,477) though the data on collective agreements covering more than one institution in the public sector only refers to the agreement concluded between the State Health Care Centre in 2018, covering 56,612 employees. The Committee also notes that according to the data available at ILOSTAT, the collective bargaining coverage rate in Hungary in 2019 stood at 17.8 per cent. With respect to sectoral level collective bargaining, the Committee notes that there are currently three extended sectoral collective agreements in the construction, tourism and hospitality, and electricity industry. The Committee takes note of the information provided by the workers’ group of the NILOC according to which there was a significant decline in the operation of Sectoral Dialogue Committees, partially due to the decrease in governmental support to their operation. The workers’ group also indicates that recent amendments to provisions on extension of collective agreements further complicated and increased the bureaucracy of the option of extension. The Committee requests the Government to provide its comment on the workers’ observation concerning the extension mechanism and to supply information on the rules relevant to sectoral collective bargaining, including with respect to the extension of collective agreements.

The Committee finally requests the Government to continue providing information on the number of collective agreements signed, the sectors concerned and the share of the workforce covered by collective agreements and to also provide the same statistics, where available, for works agreements.

The Committee hopes that the technical assistance requested from the Office will contribute to the full application of the Convention both in law and in practice.

The Committee is raising other matters in a request addressed directly to the Government.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2021, published 110th ILC session (2022)

The Committee notes the observations of the Forum for the Co-operation of Trade Unions and its affiliate, the Public Collection and Public Culture Worker’s Union, received on 3 May 2021, alleging that a legislative process concerning the status of cultural workers would not take into consideration the provisions of the Convention. The Committee requests the Government to provide its comments in this regard.

The Committee notes that the Government’s report has not been received. It is therefore bound to repeat its previous comments.

The Committee notes the observations received on 1 September 2015 and 1 September 2017 from the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), alleging acts of anti-union dismissals, union busting and intimidation in several enterprises, and criticizing in particular the excessive limitation of the scope of collective bargaining and the employers’ power to unilaterally modify the scope and content of collective agreements. The Committee also notes the observations of the workers’ group of the National ILO Council at its meeting of 11 September 2017, included in the Government’s report, which denounce that: (i) the law does not allow trade unions with less than 10 per cent representation among the workers to negotiate collective agreements, not even with respect to their own members; (ii) the law restricts the ‘coalition’ freedoms of trade unions for entitlement to collective bargaining so that they cannot seek to collectively attain the 10 per cent threshold; and (iii) in those cases where no trade union represents the required percentage, the workers’ council is entitled to enter into a collective bargaining agreement (except on wage issues). The Committee requests the Government to provide its comments with respect to the observations of the ITUC and the workers’ group of the National ILO Council, including to clarify whether the representativity threshold applies to collective agreements at both enterprise and industry levels.

The Committee further notes several judgments of the Supreme Court of Hungary (Curia) supplied by the Government, which have a bearing on the Convention, in particular on the promotion of collective bargaining.

Article 1 of the Convention. Adequate protection against acts of anti-union discrimination. The Committee previously noted the Government’s indications that: (i) section 82 of the Labour Code provides compensation not exceeding the worker’s 12-month absence pay in case of unlawful dismissal of trade union officials or members; (ii) reinstatement is granted in case of dismissals violating the principle of equal treatment (section 83(1)(a)) or dismissals violating the requirement for prior consent of the union’s higher body before the termination of a union official (section 83(1)(c)); and (iii) while the Labour Code does not contain penalties for acts of anti-union discrimination against union officials and affiliates, the Equal Treatment Authority (ETA) may, in such cases, levy fines. The Committee notes with interest the Government’s indication that Bill No. T/17998 on the amendment of legislation related to the entry into force of the Act on the General Administrative Order, which will also bring about the harmonization of the Labour Code and relevant ILO Conventions, contains inter alia a provision amending the definition of worker representatives (section 294(1)(e) of the Labour Code), the purpose of which is to ensure that, in the event of unlawful termination of a worker representative, the possibility of requesting reinstatement into the original job will also be awarded to union officers, not only to elected representatives as is currently the case under section 83(1)(d). The Committee expects that the Government will take the necessary steps to ensure that union officials, union members and elected representatives enjoy effective protection against any act prejudicial to them, including dismissal, based on their status or activities, and requests the Government to provide information on developments in relation to the adoption of new legislative provisions in this regard. In the absence of the information solicited from the Government with respect to the working of the ETA, the Committee requests the Government once again: (i) to indicate whether, given that section 16(1)(a) of the Equal Treatment Act stipulates that the ETA may order the elimination of the situation constituting a violation of law, the ETA may order on that basis reinstatement in case of anti-union dismissals of trade union officials and members; (ii) to provide information as to whether the ETA may order compensation on the basis of section 82 of the Labour Code; and (iii) to provide information on the average duration of the proceedings before the ETA related to anti-union discrimination (including of any subsequent appeal procedures before the courts), as well as on the average duration of purely judicial proceedings.

Article 2. Adequate protection against acts of interference. In its previous comments, the Committee, while noting the Government’s indication that the Constitution and the current national legislation were sufficient to prevent acts of interference, had requested the Government to take steps to adopt specific legislative provisions prohibiting acts of interference. Noting that the Government provides no information in this respect, the Committee recalls that it considers that the provisions of the Labour Code and the Equal Treatment Act do not specifically cover acts of interference designed to promote the establishment of workers’ organizations under the domination of employers or employers’ organizations, or to place workers’ organizations under the control of employers or employers’ organizations through financial or other means. The Committee requests the Government once again to take all necessary measures to adopt specific legislative provisions prohibiting such acts of interference on the part of the employer and making express provision for rapid appeal procedures, coupled with effective and sufficiently dissuasive sanctions.

Article 4. Collective bargaining in practice. The Committee requests the Government to provide information on the number of collective agreements signed, the sectors concerned and the share of the workforce covered by collective agreements.

The Committee hopes that the Government will make every effort to take the necessary action in the near future.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2017, published 107th ILC session (2018)

The Committee notes the observations received on 1 September 2015 and 1 September 2017 from the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), alleging acts of anti-union dismissals, union busting and intimidation in several enterprises, and criticizing in particular the excessive limitation of the scope of collective bargaining and the employers’ power to unilaterally modify the scope and content of collective agreements. The Committee also notes the observations of the workers’ group of the National ILO Council at its meeting of 11 September 2017, included in the Government’s report, which denounce that: (i) the law does not allow trade unions with less than 10 per cent representation among the workers to negotiate collective agreements, not even with respect to their own members; (ii) the law restricts the ‘coalition’ freedoms of trade unions for entitlement to collective bargaining so that they cannot seek to collectively attain the 10 per cent threshold; and (iii) in those cases where no trade union represents the required percentage, the workers’ council is entitled to enter into a collective bargaining agreement (except on wage issues). The Committee requests the Government to provide its comments with respect to the observations of the ITUC and the workers’ group of the National ILO Council, including to clarify whether the representativity threshold applies to collective agreements at both enterprise and industry levels.

The Committee further notes several judgments of the Supreme Court of Hungary (Curia) supplied by the Government, which have a bearing on the Convention, in particular on the promotion of collective bargaining.

Article 1 of the Convention. Adequate protection against acts of anti-union discrimination. The Committee previously noted the Government’s indications that: (i) section 82 of the Labour Code provides compensation not exceeding the worker’s 12-month absence pay in case of unlawful dismissal of trade union officials or members; (ii) reinstatement is granted in case of dismissals violating the principle of equal treatment (section 83(1)(a)) or dismissals violating the requirement for prior consent of the union’s higher body before the termination of a union official (section 83(1)(c)); and (iii) while the Labour Code does not contain penalties for acts of anti-union discrimination against union officials and affiliates, the Equal Treatment Authority (ETA) may, in such cases, levy fines. The Committee notes with interest the Government’s indication that Bill No. T/17998 on the amendment of legislation related to the entry into force of the Act on the General Administrative Order, which will also bring about the harmonization of the Labour Code and relevant ILO Conventions, contains inter alia a provision amending the definition of worker representatives (section 294(1)(e) of the Labour Code), the purpose of which is to ensure that, in the event of unlawful termination of a worker representative, the possibility of requesting reinstatement into the original job will also be awarded to union officers, not only to elected representatives as is currently the case under section 83(1)(d). The Committee expects that the Government will take the necessary steps to ensure that union officials, union members and elected representatives enjoy effective protection against any act prejudicial to them, including dismissal, based on their status or activities, and requests the Government to provide information on developments in relation to the adoption of new legislative provisions in this regard. In the absence of the information solicited from the Government with respect to the working of the ETA, the Committee requests the Government once again: (i) to indicate whether, given that section 16(1)(a) of the Equal Treatment Act stipulates that the ETA may order the elimination of the situation constituting a violation of law, the ETA may order on that basis reinstatement in case of anti-union dismissals of trade union officials and members; (ii) to provide information as to whether the ETA may order compensation on the basis of section 82 of the Labour Code; and (iii) to provide information on the average duration of the proceedings before the ETA related to anti-union discrimination (including of any subsequent appeal procedures before the courts), as well as on the average duration of purely judicial proceedings.

Article 2. Adequate protection against acts of interference. In its previous comments, the Committee, while noting the Government’s indication that the Constitution and the current national legislation were sufficient to prevent acts of interference, had requested the Government to take steps to adopt specific legislative provisions prohibiting acts of interference. Noting that the Government provides no information in this respect, the Committee recalls that it considers that the provisions of the Labour Code and the Equal Treatment Act do not specifically cover acts of interference designed to promote the establishment of workers’ organizations under the domination of employers or employers’ organizations, or to place workers’ organizations under the control of employers or employers’ organizations through financial or other means. The Committee requests the Government once again to take all necessary measures to adopt specific legislative provisions prohibiting such acts of interference on the part of the employer and making express provision for rapid appeal procedures, coupled with effective and sufficiently dissuasive sanctions.

Article 4. Collective bargaining in practice. The Committee requests the Government to provide information on the number of collective agreements signed, the sectors concerned and the share of the workforce covered by collective agreements.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2014, published 104th ILC session (2015)

The Committee notes the Government’s comments on the 2012 observations from the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC).

The Committee also notes the observations of the workers’ side of the National ILO Council at its meeting of 3 September 2014 included in the Government’s report, as well as the Government’s comments thereon.

The Committee notes the Government’s report, including the information provided concerning: (i) the entry into force of the Fundamental Law of Hungary on 1 January 2012, which provides for the right to organize and the right to collective bargaining in its Articles VIII and XVII; and (ii) the adoption of Act No. XCIII of 2011 on the National Economic and Social Council, which abrogated Act No. LXXIII of 2009 on the National Council for the Reconciliation of Interests.

Article 1 of the Convention. Protection against acts of anti-union discrimination. The Committee previously noted that: (i) section 82 of the Labour Code provides compensation not exceeding the worker’s 12-month absence pay in case of unlawful dismissal of trade union officials or members; (ii) section 83 grants reinstatement in case of dismissals violating the requirement for prior consent of the union’s higher body before terminating a trade union official; and (iii) the Labour Code does not contain penalties for acts of anti-union discrimination against trade union officials and affiliates. Noting that the Labour Inspection Act of 1996 established a mandatory fine for failure by the employer to grant the employment protection envisaged in the Labour Code to employees in an elected trade union position and particularly severe sanctions for repeated offences violating the rights of several employees, the Committee requested the Government to provide information concerning the amount of fines and information on other penalties imposed by labour inspection in cases of acts of anti-union discrimination against trade union officials or affiliates. Moreover, having previously noted numerous allegations of specific acts of anti-union discrimination and alleged delays in the related proceedings, the Committee had invited the Government to initiate a forum of dialogue with the most representative workers’ and employers’ organizations with regard to the functioning and length of the existing proceedings.

The Committee notes the Government’s indications that: (i) section 83 of the Labour Code grants reinstatement, both in case of dismissals violating the principle of equal treatment, and in case of dismissals violating the requirement for prior consent of the union’s higher body before terminating a trade union official; (ii) section 3(1)(l)-(n) of the Labour Inspection Act was repealed on 1 January 2012, which means that monitoring compliance with labour law regarding organization of trade unions and the protection of trade union officials and members is outside the scope of labour inspection and fines are no longer imposed in this context; (iii) the Equal Treatment Authority may, in case of discrimination against trade union officials or members, levy fines ranging from HUF50,000 to 2 million (US$200 to US$8,100) under Act CXXV of 2003 on equal treatment and promotion of equal opportunities (Equal Treatment Act); (iv) under the NGM Decree No. 1 of 2012 on conditions of orderly employment relations and the method of their certification, an employer is not eligible for budgetary aid if subject to a fine for violation of the Equal Treatment Act, unless the commission of the same violation was not established within two years from that decision; and (v) the anti-union discrimination proceedings and their length are determined by the procedural rules of courts and of the Equal Treatment Authority, and a forum of dialogue concerning their proceedings would endanger the impartiality of courts and administrative authorities.

The Committee requests the Government: (i) to indicate whether, given that section 16(1)(a) of the Equal Treatment Act stipulates that the Equal Treatment Authority (ETA) may order the elimination of the situation constituting a violation of law, the ETA may order on that basis reinstatement in case of anti union dismissals of trade union officials and members; (ii) to provide information as to whether the ETA may order compensation on the basis of section 82 of the Labour Code; and (iii) to provide information on the average duration of the proceedings before the ETA related to anti-union discrimination (including of any subsequent appeal procedures before the courts), as well as on the average duration of purely judicial proceedings.

Article 2. Protection against acts of interference. In its previous comments, the Committee requested the Government to indicate the measures taken, or contemplated, so as to adopt specific legislative provisions prohibiting acts of interference. The Committee notes that the Government once again indicates that the Constitution and the current national legislation (sections 6, 7 and 271(4) and Part 3 of the Labour Code) are sufficient to prevent acts of interference; and that, in the case of such acts, courts may enforce the law based on the Labour Code, or the Equal Treatment Authority may apply the same sanctions as those imposed for breaches of the equal treatment principle. The Committee observes that the provisions of the Labour Code and the Equal Treatment Act do not specifically cover acts of interference designed to promote the establishment of workers’ organizations under the domination of employers or employers’ organizations, or to place workers’ organizations under the control of employers or employers’ organizations through financial or other means. The Committee requests the Government to take measures to adopt specific legislative provisions prohibiting such acts of interference on the part of the employer and making express provision for rapid appeal procedures, coupled with effective and sufficiently dissuasive sanctions.

Article 4. Conclusion of collective agreements. In reply to its previous request, the Committee notes the statistical data supplied by the Government on the number and coverage of recently concluded collective agreements, as well as the information on collective bargaining at sectoral level.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2012, published 102nd ILC session (2013)

The Committee notes the Government’s report, including the information provided concerning Act No. LXXIII of 2009 on the National Council for the Reconciliation of Interests and Act No. LXXIV of 2009 on the Sectoral Dialogue Committees and certain issues of medium-level social dialogue, as well as the statistical data concerning the number and coverage of recently concluded collective agreements. It also notes the Government’s observations on the comments of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) dated 4 August 2011.

The Committee notes the comments of the ITUC dated 31 July 2012 on the application of the Convention. It requests the Government to provide its observations thereon.

The Committee also notes the adoption on 13 December 2011 of Act I of 2012 enacting the Labour Code.

Article 1 of the Convention. Anti-union discrimination. The Committee previously noted the Office’s comments on the draft labour law, in particular on the need to provide for rapid appeal procedures and dissuasive sanctions in case of acts of anti-union discrimination. With respect to trade union officials, the Committee notes that: (i) section 273 of the new Labour Code provides for the protection of a limited number of union officials against acts of anti-union discrimination in the form of termination or transfer by requiring the prior consent of the higher trade union body; (ii) section 83 grants reinstatement in case of dismissals violating the requirement for prior consent of the union’s higher body before terminating a trade union official; (iii) section 82 provides compensation not exceeding the worker’s 12-month absence pay in case of unlawful dismissals of trade union officials; (iv) it is unclear whether the new Labour Code stipulates penalties for acts of anti-union discrimination against trade union officials; and (v) the 1996 Labour Inspection Act was amended to cover compliance with rules related to employment protection of employees in an elected trade union position, and levying a fine is mandatory if an employer has failed to grant the protection envisaged in the Labour Code to such employees. As regards trade union affiliates, the Committee notes that: (i) section 271 of the new Labour Code generally prohibits termination or discrimination of employees on the grounds of their trade union affiliation or activity, both at the time of taking up employment and in the course of employment; (ii) in case of unlawful dismissals of trade union members, section 82 provides compensation not exceeding the worker’s 12-month absence pay; (iii) it is unclear whether the new Labour Code stipulates sanctions for acts of anti-union discrimination against trade union affiliates; and (iv) the Labour Inspection Act establishes particularly severe sanctions for repeated offences violating the rights of several employees. The Committee requests the Government to provide information concerning the amount of fines and information or other penalties that can be imposed by labour inspection in cases of acts of anti-union discrimination against trade union officials or trade union affiliates.

Moreover, concerning the effective protection in practice against anti-union dismissals and other acts of anti-union discrimination, the Committee notes that: (i) the Government provides information concerning the proceedings instituted by the Equal Treatment Authority; (ii) the ITUC referred in 2011 to a number of alleged specific acts of anti-union discrimination; and (iii) in the framework of Case No. 2775, the Committee on Freedom of Association has examined numerous allegations of this nature as well as alleged delays in the related proceedings. The Committee invites the Government to initiate a forum of dialogue with the most representative workers’ and employers’ organizations with regard to the functioning and length of the existing proceedings related to anti-union discrimination.

Article 2. Acts of interference. In its previous comments, the Committee requested the Government to indicate the measures taken or contemplated so as to adopt specific legislative provisions prohibiting acts of anti-union interference. The Committee notes that the Government once again indicates in its report that it considers that the Constitution, the Labour Code, the Act on the Right to Association along with section 15 of the Public Finance Act and the severe sanctions envisaged in the Labour Inspection Act for repeated offences violating the rights of several employees are sufficient to prevent acts of interference. The Committee also notes that, according to section 271(4) of the new Labour Code, any entitlement or benefit may not be rendered contingent upon affiliation or lack of affiliation to a trade union. In this respect, the Committee recalls that the specific forms of acts of interference likely to impair the guarantees established by the Convention are very varied in nature. The Committee observes that the provisions in force do not seem to cover all forms of anti-union interference. It highlights the necessity to adopt protective provisions against all acts of interference, in particular those designed to promote the establishment of workers’ organizations under the domination of employers or employers’ organizations, or to place workers’ organizations under the control of employers or employers’ organizations through financial or other means. The Committee is also of the view that legislation should make express provision for rapid appeal procedures, coupled with effective and sufficiently dissuasive sanctions against acts of interference in order to guarantee the application in practice of Article 2 of the Convention (see 1994 General Survey on freedom of association and collective bargaining, paragraphs 231–232). The Committee requests the Government to adopt specific legislative provisions prohibiting all acts of anti-union interference on the part of the employer. It further requests the Government to provide information on the sanctions imposed in law and in practice in case of acts of anti-union interference.

Article 4. Representativeness for the conclusion of collective agreements. The Committee previously requested the Government to indicate in its next report any measures taken or contemplated so as to lower the 65 per cent requirement set out in the Labour Code, as well as to ensure that, where no union represents 65 per cent of the employees in a bargaining unit, collective bargaining rights are granted to all unions in the unit, at least on behalf of their own members. The Committee notes the Government’s indication that trade unions will no longer need to represent 65 per cent of the workforce in order to be able to engage in collective bargaining. The Committee notes with satisfaction that, according to section 276(2) of the newly adopted Labour Code, trade unions shall be entitled to conclude collective agreements if the number of their members reaches 10 per cent: (i) of all workers employed by the employers; or (ii) of the number of workers covered by the collective agreement concluded by the employers’ interest group; and that two or more trade unions may join to reach the required percentage. Noting also the statistical data provided by the Government regarding collective bargaining, the Committee invites the Government to provide further details with respect to the sectors and the total number of workers covered by collective agreements.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2011, published 101st ILC session (2012)

The Committee notes the comments submitted by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) dated 4 August 2011 on the application of the Convention, referring in particular to a number of specific acts of anti-union discrimination. It requests the Government to provide its observations thereon.

The Committee also notes that, at the request of six national trade union confederations, the Office has commented on the draft of the upcoming new Labour Code, in particular concerning the need to prohibit acts of interference and to provide for rapid appeal procedures and dissuasive sanctions in case of acts of anti-union discrimination and acts of interference. The Committee requests the Government to provide information on the measures taken to bring the draft Code into conformity with the Convention and to supply a copy of the new Labour Code once adopted.

The Committee notes that the Government’s report has not been received. It must therefore repeat its previous observation which read as follows:

Article 2 of the Convention. Acts of interference. In previous comments, the Committee had requested the Government to indicate the measures taken or contemplated so as to adopt specific legislative provisions prohibiting acts of anti union discrimination and interference. The Committee notes that the Government once again indicates in its report that it considers that the legislation in force, namely the Labour Code and Act No. CXXV of 2003 on equal treatment and the promotion of equal opportunities, set out sufficiently detailed provisions on the prohibition of all acts of interference. In this respect, the Committee notes that section 32 of the Labour Code affords a protection for certain acts of interference, stipulating that only a trade union or an employers’ organization that is independent from the other is entitled to conclude a collective agreement. The Committee recalls that legislation should make express provision for rapid appeal procedures, coupled with effective and dissuasive sanctions against acts of interference in order to ensure the application in practice of Article 2 of the Convention. Moreover, to ensure that these measures receive the necessary publicity and are effective in practice, the relevant legislation should explicitly lay down these substantive provisions, as well as appeals and sanctions in order to guarantee their application (see the 1994 General Survey on freedom of association and collective bargaining, paragraph 232). In order to give effect to Article 2 of the Convention, the Committee recalls the need to adopt specific legislative provisions prohibiting acts of interference (in particular, those designed to promote the establishment of workers’ organizations under the domination of employers or employers’ organizations, or to place workers’ organizations under the control of employers or employers’ organizations through financial or other means), and establishing rapid appeal procedures, coupled with effective and dissuasive sanctions against such acts.

The Committee further notes the Government’s indication that no particular legislative amendment is planned concerning protection against interference, although an expert examination was initiated in 2009 as to opportunities in finding alternative solutions for the settlement of disputes, which may, depending on the outcome of the tripartite consultations, result in a legislative act that could notably afford a better protection against acts of interference. In these circumstances, the Committee, recalling its abovementioned comments, also requests the Government to keep it informed of any development concerning the abovementioned expert examination and to provide a copy of any legislation adopted in this respect.

Article 4. Representativeness for the conclusion of collective agreements. The Committee had previously requested information on the system of bargaining agent certification at the sectoral and national levels. The Committee notes that the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), in its comments submitted on 24 August 2009, and the Workers side of the National ILO Council (including the National Federation of Autonomous Trade Unions, the Trade Union Group of Intellectuals, the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions, the National Confederation of Hungarian Trade Unions, the National Federation of Workers’ Councils and the Co-operation Forum of Trade Unions) in its comments sent along with the Government’s report on 24 November 2009, both indicate that trade unions need to represent 65 per cent of the workforce (for a single union), a threshold which can hardly be achieved under a plural trade union structure, in order to be able to engage in collective bargaining (section 33(5) of the Labour Code), amend or renegotiate the collective agreement (section 37(1) and (2) of the Labour Code). The Committee further notes the Government’s indication that: (i) the provisions cited above require a relatively high rate of employees for the conclusion of the collective bargaining agreement, as several representative trade unions are unable to enter into one jointly in a given case; (ii) in such a case, the lack of consensus among the trade unions necessitates the observation of the rules according to which the trade union with the highest rate support will be entitled to enter into the collective bargaining agreement, reaching about two-thirds (65 per cent) share mentioned above; and (iii) as amendments have been made recently to the Act on the legal status of public servants (subsection 4 of section 12/A of Act No. XXXIII of 1992 on the legal status of public servants), according to which a trade union having at least a 50 per cent support may conclude the collective bargaining agreement in a similar case, the Government would be ready to discuss an amendment to section 33(5) of the Labour Code. The Committee recalls that high percentage requirements for the recognition of a collective bargaining agent may impair the promotion and development of free and voluntary collective bargaining. In addition, the Committee recalls that where, under a system for nominating an exclusive bargaining agent, there is no union representing the required percentage to be so designated, collective bargaining rights should be granted to all unions in this unit, at least on behalf of their own members (see General Survey, op. cit., paragraph 241). The Committee therefore requests the Government to indicate in its next report any measures taken or contemplated so as to lower the 65 per cent requirement in section 33(5) of the Labour Code, as well as any measure taken or envisaged in order to ensure that where no union represents 65 per cent of the employees in a bargaining unit, collective bargaining rights are granted to all unions in the unit, at least on behalf of their own members.

Finally, the Committee had also requested information on developments concerning a draft Bill pertaining to certain aspects of social dialogue. The Committee notes that, according to the Government’s report, Act No. LXXIII of 2009, on the National Council for the Reconciliation of Interests (“NCRI Act”), and Act No. LXXIV of 2009, on the Sectoral Dialogue Committees and certain issues of the medium-level social dialogue (“SDC Act”), entered into force on 20 August 2009. The Committee will provide its observations on these two Acts in its next report, once translated by the Office.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2010, published 100th ILC session (2011)

Article 2 of the Convention. Acts of interference. In previous comments, the Committee had requested the Government to indicate the measures taken or contemplated so as to adopt specific legislative provisions prohibiting acts of anti‑union discrimination and interference. The Committee notes that the Government once again indicates in its report that it considers that the legislation in force, namely the Labour Code and Act No. CXXV of 2003 on equal treatment and the promotion of equal opportunities, set out sufficiently detailed provisions on the prohibition of all acts of interference. In this respect, the Committee notes that section 32 of the Labour Code affords a protection for certain acts of interference, stipulating that only a trade union or an employers’ organization that is independent from the other is entitled to conclude a collective agreement. The Committee recalls that legislation should make express provision for rapid appeal procedures, coupled with effective and dissuasive sanctions against acts of interference in order to ensure the application in practice of Article 2 of the Convention. Moreover, to ensure that these measures receive the necessary publicity and are effective in practice, the relevant legislation should explicitly lay down these substantive provisions, as well as appeals and sanctions in order to guarantee their application (see the 1994 General Survey on freedom of association and collective bargaining, paragraph 232). In order to give effect to Article 2 of the Convention, the Committee recalls the need to adopt specific legislative provisions prohibiting acts of interference (in particular, those designed to promote the establishment of workers’ organizations under the domination of employers or employers’ organizations, or to place workers’ organizations under the control of employers or employers’ organizations through financial or other means), and establishing rapid appeal procedures, coupled with effective and dissuasive sanctions against such acts.

The Committee further notes the Government’s indication that no particular legislative amendment is planned concerning protection against interference, although an expert examination was initiated in 2009 as to opportunities in finding alternative solutions for the settlement of disputes, which may, depending on the outcome of the tripartite consultations, result in a legislative act that could notably afford a better protection against acts of interference. In these circumstances, the Committee, recalling its abovementioned comments, also requests the Government to keep it informed of any development concerning the abovementioned expert examination and to provide a copy of any legislation adopted in this respect.

Article 4. Representativeness for the conclusion of collective agreements. The Committee had previously requested information on the system of bargaining agent certification at the sectoral and national levels. The Committee notes that the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), in its comments submitted on 24 August 2009, and the Workers side of the National ILO Council (including the National Federation of Autonomous Trade Unions, the Trade Union Group of Intellectuals, the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions, the National Confederation of Hungarian Trade Unions, the National Federation of Workers’ Councils and the Co-operation Forum of Trade Unions) in its comments sent along with the Government’s report on 24 November 2009, both indicate that trade unions need to represent 65 per cent of the workforce (for a single union), a threshold which can hardly be achieved under a plural trade union structure, in order to be able to engage in collective bargaining (section 33(5) of the Labour Code), amend or renegotiate the collective agreement (section 37(1) and (2) of the Labour Code). The Committee further notes the Government’s indication that: (i) the provisions cited above require a relatively high rate of employees for the conclusion of the collective bargaining agreement, as several representative trade unions are unable to enter into one jointly in a given case; (ii) in such a case, the lack of consensus among the trade unions necessitates the observation of the rules according to which the trade union with the highest rate support will be entitled to enter into the collective bargaining agreement, reaching about two-thirds (65 per cent) share mentioned above; and (iii) as amendments have been made recently to the Act on the legal status of public servants (subsection 4 of section 12/A of Act No. XXXIII of 1992 on the legal status of public servants), according to which a trade union having at least a 50 per cent support may conclude the collective bargaining agreement in a similar case, the Government would be ready to discuss an amendment to section 33(5) of the Labour Code. The Committee recalls that high percentage requirements for the recognition of a collective bargaining agent may impair the promotion and development of free and voluntary collective bargaining. In addition, the Committee recalls that where, under a system for nominating an exclusive bargaining agent, there is no union representing the required percentage to be so designated, collective bargaining rights should be granted to all unions in this unit, at least on behalf of their own members (see General Survey, op. cit., paragraph 241). The Committee therefore requests the Government to indicate in its next report any measures taken or contemplated so as to lower the 65 per cent requirement in section 33(5) of the Labour Code, as well as any measure taken or envisaged in order to ensure that where no union represents 65 per cent of the employees in a bargaining unit, collective bargaining rights are granted to all unions in the unit, at least on behalf of their own members.

Finally, the Committee had also requested information on developments concerning a draft Bill pertaining to certain aspects of social dialogue. The Committee notes that, according to the Government’s report, Act No. LXXIII of 2009, on the National Council for the Reconciliation of Interests (“NCRI Act”), and Act No. LXXIV of 2009, on the Sectoral Dialogue Committees and certain issues of the medium-level social dialogue (“SDC Act”), entered into force on 20 August 2009. The Committee will provide its observations on these two Acts in its next report, once translated by the Office.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2007, published 97th ILC session (2008)

The Committee notes the Government’s report. It further notes the comments submitted by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), which refer mainly to matters previously raised by the Committee and to acts of anti-union discrimination, including the dismissal of and disciplinary action taken against trade union officers. The Committee requests the Government to transmit its observations thereon.

Article 1 of the Convention. Anti-union discrimination. The Committee takes note of the Government’s indications respecting the anti-union acts alleged by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in 2006. According to the Government, in several of the cases mentioned by the ICFTU the trade unions concerned successfully sought legal redress for the infringement of their rights. The Committee takes due note of the above information.

Article 2. Acts of interference. In previous comments, the Committee had asked the Government to indicate the measures taken or contemplated so as to adopt specific legislative provisions prohibiting acts of interference. Noting the Government’s statement that Act XXII of 1992 on the Labour Code and Act CXXV of 2003 on equal treatment and the promotion of equal opportunities both contain several provisions protecting workers from acts of anti-union discrimination, the Committee once again requests the Government to indicate in its next report any measures taken or contemplated so as to adopt specific legislative provisions prohibiting acts of interference (in particular, those designed to promote the establishment of workers’ organizations under the domination of employers or employers’ organizations, or to place workers’ organizations under the control of employers or employers’ organizations through financial or other means), and establishing rapid appeal procedures, coupled with effective and dissuasive sanctions against such acts.

Article 4. Representativeness for concluding collective agreements. The Committee had previously requested information on the system of bargaining agent certification at the sectoral and national levels, and had also requested to be kept informed of developments concerning a draft bill pertaining to certain aspects of social dialogue. In this regard, the Committee notes the Government’s indication that in December 2006 Parliament adopted the Act on sectoral dialogue committees, which provides for detailed rules regarding the collective bargaining rights of trade unions at the sectoral level. The Government adds that the said Act is awaiting publication, following its assessment by the Constitutional Court. The Committee notes this information and requests the Government to transmit a copy of the Act on sectoral dialogue committees upon its publication and dissemination.

The Committee had previously noted that the ICFTU, in comments submitted in 2006, referred to new legislation requiring a single trade union or joint delegation of unions in the public sector to comprise at least 25 per cent of the workforce to conclude a collective agreement. The Committee notes the Government’s indication, in its reply to the ICFTU’s 2006 comments, that the new section 12/A of Act XXXIII of 1992 on the legal status of public servants, a trade union or several trade unions jointly are automatically considered capable of concluding a collective agreement when the number of its or their members reaches 25 per cent of the workers in the workplace concerned; otherwise, the collective agreement must be voted on. The Government states that it was the trade union side of the National Labour Council of Public Servants that initiated the inclusion of the number of members as a general requirement, and that the determination of the minimum percentage was established with regard to the average level of representation of public servant organizations. The Government adds that the method for calculating the representativity of trade unions in the public sphere, which is set out in Decree No. 48/2005, was formulated with the full cooperation of the social partners, and that moreover the relevant data are counted by a tripartite institution – the Participation Verification Committee. The Committee takes due note of this information.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2006, published 96th ILC session (2007)

The Committee notes the Government’s report.

The Committee notes the comments made by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in a communication dated 10 August 2006, concerning some issues raised in previous comments, some new information (new legislation is said to have been adopted providing that a single trade union or joint delegation of unions in the public sector has to comprise at least 25 per cent of the workforce to conclude a collective agreement) and raising specific violations of the Convention, including anti-union discrimination (transfers and dismissals), unilateral annulment of collective agreement, and interference in trade union internal affairs. The Committee requests the Government to transmit its observations on the comments made by the ICFTU and on the pending comments of the Committee in its next reports due for the regular reporting cycle in 2007.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2005, published 95th ILC session (2006)

The Committee notes the Government’s report as well as its response to the comments made by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) concerning, more particularly, anti-union dismissals of trade union officers and workers, failure to protect them, interference on the part of employers in the establishment of trade unions or in the activities of already established unions and restrictions in practice to the right to collective bargaining. The Committee notes that the Government has significantly increased the number of labour inspectors, has submitted to Parliament a Bill increasing substantially the legal fines and that a new legal framework has been set up including incentives towards employers to respect trade union rights.

Article 2 of the Convention. With regard to its previous comments concerning the need to adopt specific legislative provisions prohibiting acts of interference, the Committee notes that the Government indicates in its report that there are no such provisions but that Act CXXV of 2003 on equal treatment and the promotion of equal opportunities contributes to preventing acts of interference by providing protection against anti-union discrimination. The Committee requests once again the Government to indicate in its next report any measures taken or contemplated so as to adopt specific legislative provisions prohibiting acts of interference (in particular, those designed to promote the establishment of workers’ organizations under the domination of employers or employers’ organizations, or to place workers’ organizations under the control of employers or employers’ organizations through financial or other means), and establishing rapid appeal procedures, coupled with effective and dissuasive sanctions against such acts.

Article 4. With regard to its previous comments concerning the representativeness requirements set for recognition as a bargaining agent, the Committee notes the clarifications provided by the Government in its report to the effect that these unions need to represent individually or jointly more than 50 per cent of workers in the elections of the works councils in order to be recognized as a collective bargaining agent. However, where this requirement is not met by any union individually or jointly, negotiations may be carried out with the collective agreement being subject to the approval of the employees, as it will be applicable to the whole workplace. The Committee requests the Government to indicate if this system also applies to sectoral or national level collective agreements.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2003, published 92nd ILC session (2004)

The Committee notes the information contained in the Government’s report. The Committee also takes note of the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association in Case No. 2118 [see 330th Report, paragraphs 103-116, and 332nd Report, paragraphs 80-83].

Article 2 of the Convention. The Committee notes from the Government’s report that protection against interference by workers’ or employers’ organizations into each other’s establishment, functioning or administration may be derived from the general provisions governing the establishment and functioning of these organizations, but is not explicitly integrated into labour legislation. On this issue, the Committee recalls that "Governments which have ratified the Convention are however under the obligation to take specific action, in particular through legislative means, to ensure respect for the guarantees laid down in Article 2" (see General Survey of 1994 on freedom of association and collective bargaining, paragraph 230). The Committee therefore requests the Government to take all necessary measures to adopt specific legislative provisions prohibiting acts of interference (in particular, those designed to promote the establishment of workers’ organizations under the domination of employers or employers’ organizations, or to place workers’ organizations under the control of employers or employers’ organizations through financial or other means), and establishing rapid appeal procedures, coupled with effective and dissuasive sanctions against such acts.

Article 4. The Committee notes that the Labour Code provides that collective agreements may be concluded: (a) jointly by all trade unions if their cumulative power represents an absolute majority of the votes cast in the elections for works councils (section 33(3)); or (b) jointly by certain trade unions each one of which represents at least 10 per cent of the votes cast in these elections and have obtained altogether more than 50 per cent of the votes (sections 33(4) and 29(4)); and (c) individually, only where one trade union has received more than 65 per cent of the votes cast in the elections for works councils (section 33(5)). The Committee also notes that the Constitutional Court found these provisions unconstitutional because their application prevents the trade union with the widest support from concluding a collective agreement with the employer.

The Committee considers that problems may arise when the law stipulates that trade unions must attain a percentage of 65 per cent (individually) or 50 per cent (jointly) in order to be recognized as bargaining agents, since unions which fail to secure this excessively high threshold are denied the possibility of bargaining. The Committee requests the Government to take all necessary measures to amend section 33 of the Labour Code so as to lower the minimum threshold requirements set for recognition as a bargaining agent, and ensure that, where no trade union reaches these thresholds, collective bargaining rights are granted to all unions in the unit, at least on behalf of their own members. The Committee requests the Government to keep it informed of any measures taken or contemplated in order to bring the legislation into conformity with Articles 2 and 4 of the Convention.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 1999, published 88th ILC session (2000)

The Committee notes the information supplied by the Government in its report as well as the comments of the workers' representative to the National Council responsible for questions related to the ILO.

Article 2 of the Convention. The Committee asks the Government to indicate, firstly, whether national legislation provides workers' and employers' organizations adequate protection against any acts of interference by each other and, secondly, whether this protection is accompanied by sufficiently dissuasive sanctions.

Article 4. The Committee notes that Decree No. 19/1997 regarding the registration of collective agreements has entered into force.

The Committee notes that the government report states that Act No. LVI of 1999 to amend the Labour Code provides, where there is no trade union representation in an undertaking, that the rights and obligations devolving from an employment relationship should be governed by a company agreement between the employer and the work councils. The Committee notes that the workers' representatives on the National Council responsible for questions related to the ILO criticize this amendment, since it gives the power of negotiation to work councils which are the direct representative bodies of employees but which are not connected to workers' organizations. Given these circumstances, the Committee requests the Government to provide details on the circumstances under which work councils may negotiate and the manner in which the system operates. The Committee recalls that when no grouping of trade unions achieves the required threshold of 50 per cent of the workers to secure recognition as the exclusive bargaining agent, those unions in the unit should be granted bargaining rights, at least on behalf of their own members. The Committee also requests the Government to supply a copy of Act No. LVI of 1999, if possible in one of the ILO working languages.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 1997, published 86th ILC session (1998)

The Committee notes the information provided by the Government in its report.

The Committee observes that several new legislative texts have been adopted, particularly Act LI of 1997, to amend certain provisions of the Labour Code, Act LXXV on Labour Inspection, and Government Decree 38/1997 (III.5) to amend Decree 17/1968 (IV.14) on contraventions. The Committee notes with interest that the penalty system to sanction acts of anti-union discrimination has been strengthened and completed.

Article 4. The Committee, further to its comments, notes that draft regulations concerning the registration of collective agreements are under discussion. It asks the Government to communicate information on any evolution in the matter and to send a copy of the regulations, as well as any available translation thereof, as soon as the text has been adopted.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 1995, published 83rd ILC session (1996)

The Committee takes note of the Government's report. In addition it has noted the comments of the National Federation of Workers' Councils in relation to the protection of workers against acts of anti-union discrimination and the conclusions of the Committee on Freedom of Association in Case No. 1742 (see 294th Report of the Committee approved by the Governing Body at its June 1994 Session).

Article 1 of the Convention. The Committee notes that the Government indicated to the Committee on Freedom of Association that it intended to modernize its legislation on penalties, and requests the Government to indicate in its next report the measures taken or envisaged to strengthen protection of all workers and not only of union leaders against acts of anti-trade union discrimination, particularly through the introduction of effective and sufficiently dissuasive sanctions.

Article 4. In view of the importance of ensuring the independence of the social partners in voluntary collective negotiation on working conditions and ensuring that official registration of collective agreements can be refused only on grounds of form or where the clauses of a collective agreement do not conform to the minimum standards set out in the labour law, the Committee requests the Government once again to indicate whether the Minister of Labour has laid down a procedure for allowing registration of collective agreements under section 38(4) of the Labour Code and, if so, to send it the text.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 1994, published 81st ILC session (1994)

The Committee notes the Government's report and the coming into force of Act No. 22 of 1992 establishing in law the new Labour Code.

Article 4 of the Convention. With reference to its previous direct request concerning the scope of section 9C(3) and D(5) of the Labour Code, as amended by Act No. V of 1989, the Committee notes with interest that Act No. 22 of 1992 enacting the new Labour Code (section 203) repealed Act No. V of 1989.

However, the Committee notes that in accordance with section 38(1) of the Code, in the absence of an agreement providing otherwise, collective agreements come into effect upon approval. Section 38(4) also provides that the Minister of Labour shall determine the procedures for the registration of collective agreements.

The Committee reminds the Government that a system of official approval of collective agreements is acceptable in so far as the approval can only be refused on grounds of form or where the clauses of a collective agreement do not conform to the minimum standards set out in the labour law (see 1994 General Survey on Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, paragraph 251).

The Committee requests the Government to indicate in its next report whether the Minister of Labour has already determined the procedure for the registration of collective agreements in accordance with the provisions of section 38(4) and, if so, to supply a copy of the text in question.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 1991, published 78th ILC session (1991)

With reference to its previous comment, the Committee notes with interest that the amendments to the 1967 Labour Code introduced by Act No. V of 1989 favour collective bargaining as a means of settling conditions of employment and that, since the new Act has come into force, two collective framework agreements have been concluded.

The Committee recalls that amendment of the provisions of a collective agreement should only be possible where they do not conform to the minimum standards set out in the labour law (see paragraph 311 of the Committee's General Survey on Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining).

Accordingly, the Committee requests the Government to indicate the exact scope of:

- section 9 C), subsection 3, of the Code as amended which provides that a collective agreement that violates a collective framework agreement is null and void and of

- section D), subsection 5, which provides that a collective agreement may only be amended because a change is necessary due to an amendment of the law or because unlawful provisions of the agreement itself have been rescinded.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 1989, published 76th ILC session (1989)

With reference to its previous comment concerning the application of Article 4 of the Convention, the Committee takes due note of the detailed information supplied by the Government in its report with regard to the need for the trade unions to give their consent to regulations respecting the living and working conditions of workers. It also notes that, according to the Government, the measures adopted recently to freeze wages were not the result of a legislative intervention but of a high-level decision based on the co-ordination of interests.

The Government also indicates that it is going to revise the wage-fixing machinery, which will be replaced by agreements concluded according to the results of the co-ordination of interests and that a national co-ordinating council of interests, of tripartite composition, was set up on 14 October 1988 and will deal with matters of economic and wages policy.

The Committee requests the Government to continue supplying information in its next report on the implementation of Article 4 of the Convention (the number of collective agreements, their duration, the workers and sectors concerned, etc.).