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Compilation of decisions of the Committee on Freedom of Association

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Collective bargaining15

Restrictions on the principle of free and voluntary bargaining

Intervention by the authorities in collective bargaining

  1. State bodies should refrain from intervening to alter the content of freely concluded collective agreements.
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2502Greece3441018
2785Spain362736
2821Canada364380
2947Spain371463
3039Denmark373263
3072Portugal376923
Digest: 20061001
  1. State bodies should refrain from intervening in free collective bargaining between workers and employers organizations.
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3155Bosnia and Herzegovina378105
  1. In general terms, the Committee wishes to underline the importance it attaches to the principle of the autonomy of the parties to the collective bargaining process, a principle generally recognized in the preparatory discussions that led to the adoption by the Conference in 1981 of the Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 154). It follows from this principle that the public authorities should not as a rule intervene in order to modify the contents of collective agreements freely concluded. Such intervention would be justified only for cogent reasons of social justice and the general interest.
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1052Panama211155
  1. Respect for the rule of law implies avoiding retroactive intervention in collective agreements through legislation.
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2821Canada364380
  1. The intervention by a representative of the public authorities in the drafting of collective agreements, unless it consists exclusively of technical aid, is inconsistent with the spirit of Article 4 of Convention No. 98.
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Digest: 20061002
  1. The Committee recognizes that there comes a time in bargaining where, after protracted and fruitless negotiations, the authorities might be justified in stepping in when it is obvious that the deadlock in bargaining will not be broken without some initiative on their part.
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2785Spain362737
Digest: 20061003
  1. The Committee has expressed the view that the mere existence of a deadlock in a collective bargaining process is not in itself a sufficient ground to justify an intervention from the public authorities to impose arbitration on the parties to the labour dispute. Any intervention by the public authorities in collective disputes must be consistent with the principle of free and voluntary negotiations; this implies that the bodies appointed for the settlement of disputes between the parties to collective bargaining should be independent and recourse to these bodies should be on a voluntary basis, except where there is an acute national crisis.
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2741United States of America362765
Digest: 20061004
  1. Where intervention by the public authorities is essentially for the purpose of ensuring that the negotiating parties subordinate their interests to the national economic policy pursued by the government, irrespective of whether they agree with that policy or not, this is not compatible with the generally accepted principles that workers and employers organizations should enjoy the right freely to organize their activities and to formulate their programmes, that the public authorities should refrain from any interference which would restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof, and that the law of the land should not be such as to impair or be so applied as to impair the enjoyment of such right.
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2447Malta342751
2502Greece3441020
2820Greece365995
Digest: 20061005
  1. Legislation which permits the refusal to approve a collective agreement on grounds of errors of pure form is not in conflict with the principle of voluntary negotiation. If this legislation, however, implies that the filing of a collective agreement may be refused on grounds such as incompatibility with the general policy of the government, it would amount to a requirement that prior approval be obtained before a collective agreement can come into force.
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Digest: 20061006
  1. While the Committee appreciates that the introduction of wage restraint measures must be timed in order to obtain the maximum impact on the economic situation, it nevertheless considers that the interruption of already negotiated contracts is not in conformity with the principles of free collective bargaining because such contracts should be respected.
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Digest: 20061009
  1. While it is not its role to express a view on the soundness of the economic arguments invoked to justify government intervention to restrict collective bargaining, the Committee must recall that measures that might be taken to confront exceptional circumstances ought to be temporary in nature having regard to the severe negative consequences on workers terms and conditions of employment and their particular impact on vulnerable workers.
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2820Greece365995
2947Spain371464
3072Portugal376917
  1. The harmonious development of labour relations would be facilitated if the public authorities, when dealing with the problems concerning the workers loss of purchasing power, adopted solutions which did not involve modifications of agreements without the consent of the parties.
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2887Mauritius364697
Digest: 20061010
  1. Giving by law a special incentive encouraging one of the parties to denounce/cancel collective agreements by which pension funds were set up constitutes interference with the free and voluntary nature of collective bargaining. Moreover, the Committee considers that after the collective agreements by which pension funds were set up were denounced by one of the parties, it pertained to the parties themselves to determine whether and under which terms and conditions the funds would be dissolved and what would become of their assets. Nothing in Convention No. 98 enables the Government to step in and unilaterally determine these issues, much less to unilaterally determine that the assets of a private pension fund, established by collective agreement, would be appropriated and automatically transferred to a public pension scheme. These measures are contrary to Article 3 of Convention No. 87 and Article 4 of Convention No. 98.
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RELATED COUNTRYBerichtPARAGRAPH
2502Greece3441018
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